

EDITED BY

JULIET KAARBO

CAMERON G. THIES

The Oxford Handbooks of INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

GENERAL EDITORS:
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal

The Oxford Handbook *of* FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Edited by

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and

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FOREWORD

It is an honour to be asked to write a preface for this new *Oxford Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis*. The editors have brought together a distinguished and diverse group of authors to examine the state of the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) since the end of the Cold War. Their charge to these authors in the introduction to the volume is to facilitate the repositioning of FPA within the study of International Relations (IR) from subfield to central focus. Both FPA and IR scholars are facing a set of new challenges from the 'end of theories' debate to increasing interest in problem-driven research; the growing relevance of the domestic, ideational, and agency turns in IR; and a developing focus on methodological pluralism. The time is right for FPA scholars to share and expand on the benefits of their extensive research in opening up the black box of the state and of other relevant actors as well as in building the linkages between internal and external politics. Having been mentored by those who began FPA—for example, Richard Snyder, Harold and Margaret Sprout, James Rosenau, Alexander George, Ole Holsti—and having mentored the editors of this volume as well as a number of the chapter authors, we are intrigued by the challenge this next generation of FPA scholars has accepted.

The Handbook's chapter authors take on the editors' challenge by exploring how FPA builds bridges to IR theories and complements the wide range of theoretical perspectives now comprising IR. Among these are feminism, and critical IR in addition to liberalism, realism, and constructivism. These chapters comprise Part I of the Handbook and set the stage for what happens next. The remaining four parts of the Handbook take Richard Snyder at his word that people matter in international affairs. As he observed, it is policy-makers who perceive and interpret events and whose preferences become aggregated in the decision-making process that shapes what governments, institutions, and organizations do in the foreign policy arena. People affect the way that foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are considered, the choices that are made, and what gets

implemented. And it is people who do not necessarily act rationally, their rationality bounded by how they process information, what they want, the ways in which they represent the problem they are facing, their experiences, and their beliefs.

The other four parts of the Handbook explore the relevance of the people involved in what is happening. Part II is interested in the influences on these policy-makers and why they are relevant and, in certain instances, critical to understand. Consider such influences as culture and identity, public opinion including social media, autocratic institutions, and leader psychology. Part III examines the contexts in which the decision-making is occurring—situations involving soft power, contexts suggestive of sanctions, where reputation and resolve are on the line. Part IV pushes FPA to examine a wider array of types and aggregations of people, for example, policy-makers in non-state actors and those leading substate governments, international organizations, and small states. Finally, Part V tackles the problems that are increasingly important to IR scholars to contribute to understanding such as organized crime, immigration, global health, and climate change, the creeping crises that challenge policy-makers and publics to address.

This Handbook is exciting; it is challenging to both FPA and IR, and we encourage the reader to join in the endeavour to link FPA and IR more directly.

Margaret G. Hermann Syracuse University Stephen G. Walker
Arizona State University

CONTRIBUTORS

Karin Aggestam is a Professor of Political Sciences, Director of the Centre for Advanced Middle Eastern Studies and Scientific Coordinator of the Strategic Research Area 'Middle East in the Contemporary World'. She is also Adjunct Professor at Monash University and Honorary Professor at University of Queensland. Her current interdisciplinary research is focused on digital diplomacy, gender, peacemaking, foreign policy, and Middle East politics.

Susan Hannah Allen, has a PhD in Political Science, Emory University (2005), and is Professor, University of Mississippi (2012–). Her research interests include coercion, international organizations, and the consequences of conflict, with recent articles appearing in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and *Journal of Peace Research* as well as a book co-authored with Amy Yuen: *Bargaining in the United Nations: Setting the Global Agenda* (Oxford University Press).

J. Samuel Barkin is a Professor of Global Governance and Human Security at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He is the author of ten books and some fifty articles and chapters on international relations theory and epistemology, international organization, and environmental politics. His most recent books are *The Sovereignty Cartel* (Cambridge University Press, 2021) and *International Relations' Last Synthesis? Decoupling Constructivisms and Critical Approaches* (Oxford University Press, 2019, co-authored with Laura Sjoberg).

Ryan Beasley is a Senior Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, specializing in Foreign Policy Theory and Political Psychology. His research focuses on decision-making, dissonance, time, motivation, role theory, and coalition cabinets. He has published work in such journals as *International Affairs, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, European Journal of International Relations, Political Psychology, Foreign Policy Analysis, Global Studies*

Quarterly, and *International Relations.* He is the co-editor of *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective* (CQ Press). He has held positions at Baker University as well as The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, Switzerland.

Molly Berkemeier is a Nonresident Fellow with the Center for International Trade & Security at the University of Georgia. Her research focuses on the role of leaders and groups in nuclear politics and alliance relationships; and her work chiefly examines the role of interpersonal relationships and trust between individuals in world politics. Her additional work considers the intersection of nuclear weapons and foreign policy, nuclear latency, and alliance politics.

Jean-Christophe Boucher is an Associate Professor at the School of Public Policy and at the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary. His current work focuses on applied machine learning to understand how the digital world shapes society. He specializes in international relations, with an emphasis on foreign policy, international security, and data analytics.

Mark A. Boyer is Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor at the University of Connecticut. He is the author or co-author of *Global Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2020; 2023 forthcoming), *Defensive Internationalism* (University of Michigan Press, 2005), and *International Cooperation and Public Goods* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), among other published work focusing on environmental issues, globalization and negotiation, and bargaining. Since 2015, he has served as Executive Director of the International Studies Association, whose headquarters is located at University of Connecticut.

Marijke Breuning is a Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. She specializes in foreign policy analysis, with a specific interest in development cooperation and small states, as well as the politics of international children's rights (and especially intercountry adoption), women/gender and politics, and the sociology of the profession. She has published numerous refereed journal articles and book chapters, as well as several books.

Klaus Brummer holds the chair of International Relations at the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany. He served as co-editor-in-chief

of the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2018–2020) and as president of the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association (2015–2016). He has published in peer-reviewed journals such as *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Government and Opposition*, *International Affairs*, *International Politics*, *International Studies Review*, and *Journal of European Public Policy*, is co-author of *Foreign Policy Analysis* (Oxford University Press 2024), and is co-editor of *Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America* (Lynne Rienner, 2015), *Foreign Policy as Public Policy?* (Manchester University Press, 2019), and 'New Directions in Foreign Policy Analysis' (*International Affairs*, 2021).

Susanna P. Campbell is an Associate Professor at the School of International Service and Director of the Research on International Policy Implementation Lab (RIPIL) at American University. She has published a single-authored book and a range of articles on the international aid and development industry in conflict-affected countries; conducted fieldwork in conflict-affected countries, including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Sudan, South Sudan, and East Timor; and has received numerous grants for her research, including from the US National Science Foundation and the US Institute of Peace. Prior to graduate school, she worked for the United Nations, International Crisis Group, and the Council on Foreign Relations; and recently served as a senior advisor for the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, mandated by the US Congress.

Cristian Cantir is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University in Rochester, MI. His research interests focus on substate diplomacy, foreign policy analysis, and Central and Eastern European politics. Cantir's recent publications include an analysis of connections between of kin states and subnational governments, and an article on the emergence of mayor-oligarchs in the Republic of Moldova.

Shannon P. Carcelli is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. She holds a PhD in political science from the University of California San Diego and a BA from Carleton College, in addition to three years' experience working in the field of international development. During the 2018–2019 academic year she served as a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University's Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance.

May Darwich is an Associate Professor in International Relations of the Middle East at the University of Birmingham. Her research attempts to bring Middle East cases to debates within IR theory while surmounting the challenge to the study of state behaviour in the Middle East through theoretical lenses. Her research has appeared in internationally renowned journals *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *Democratization*, *Mediterranean Politics*, *International Studies Perspectives*. She is the author of *Threats and Alliances in the Middle East: Saudi and Syrian Policies in a Turbulent Region* (Cambridge University Press, 2019). She is Principal Investigator (PI) of the project 'Port Infrastructure, International Politics, and Everyday Life: From the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Africa', funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Sandra Destradi holds the Chair of International Relations at the University of Freiburg, Germany. Her research interests include emerging powers and global governance, regional security issues, and the impact of populism on foreign policy. She has published the monograph *Reluctance in World Politics: Why States Fail to Act Decisively* (Bristol University Press, 2023) and articles in journals such as the *European Journal of International Relations*, *Review of International Studies*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Democratization*, *Third World Quarterly*, and *Asian Survey*.

Faye Donnelly is a Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. She is the author of *Securitization and the Iraq War: The Rules of Engagement in World Politics* (Routledge, 2013). Her work been published in the *European Journal of International Relations*, *Finance and Society*, *The International Review of the Red Cross*, *European Journal of International Security*, and *Critical Studies on Security*.

Stephen Benedict Dyson is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut. He is the author of four monographs, including *The Blair Identity* and *Leaders in Conflict* and numerous journal articles on leader psychology in venues such as *International Security*, *Political Psychology*, and *Foreign Policy Analysis*.

Jamie Gaskarth is a Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at The Open University, UK. He is the author/editor of six books and numerous articles on international relations, foreign policy, and intelligence, and served on the Academic Consultative Panel for the 2015

National Security Strategy/SDSR and 2016 Annual Review. He is co-editor-in-chief of the ISA *Journal of Global Security Studies* and was appointed Visiting Professor at Sciences Po, Lyon, in 2018. His latest book is *Secrets and Spies: Intelligence Accountability after Iraq and Snowden* (Chatham House/Brookings Institution Press, 2020).

Giampiero Giacomello is an Associate Professor of Political Science with the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna, Italy, where he teaches cybersecurity and strategic studies, and heads the department's Computational Social Science Center (CSSC). Previously he held visiting research and teaching positions at several American and European universities. His research interests include cybersecurity, social computing, and simulation methods. He has authored and co-edited thirteen volumes and published several articles in *Safety Science*, *Defense Economics*, *International Spectator*, *European Political Science*, *International Studies Review, European Security, International Political Science Review*, and others.

Feliciano de Sá Guimarães is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of São Paulo (IRI-USP) and Academic Director of CEBRI (Brazilian Center for International Relations). He was Visiting Professor at the Political Science Department at Yale University (2019–2020), Program Chair for the 2020 International Studies Association Annual Meeting (Honolulu, Hawaii, USA), and an Associate Editor at Foreign Policy Analysis (2021–2023). His research interests are Brazilian Foreign Policy and Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.

Amelia Hadfield joined the University of Surrey in January 2019 as Head of the Department of Politics, and Chair in European and International Affairs after positions in the UK (Canterbury Christ Church University and the University of Kent) and Brussels (Vrije Universiteit Brussels and the Institute for European Studies). Amelia is a long-standing Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign Affairs, whose research covers a wide range of areas on EU foreign and security policy, and EU-UK relations. Additional areas of interest include foreign policy analysis, international relations theory, international and diplomatic history, international political economy, and public policy analysis.

Alexandra Harden is a PhD candidate in geography at the University of Connecticut. Her research explores the experiences and equity implications of climate change adaptation by analysing the interplay between climate change adaptation discursive framings, climate risk, and adaptation labour. She has an MA from Columbia University in climate and society and a BA from Colgate University in political science.

Colton Heffington is a senior member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories in the department covering global security and cooperation. At Sandia, his research and engagements address nuclear non-proliferation. In addition to his published research on human rights, international conflict, sanctions, and terrorism, he has helped create and maintain the Most Important Problems Database, covering issue salience and public opinion in the US since 1939.

Andrew R. Hom is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh and an Associate Editor of the journal *International Relations*. His research interests include timing and time, IR theory, security and war, and foreign policy. He is the author of *International Relations and the Problem of* Time (OUP), the co-editor of *Moral Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars* (OUP) and *Time, Temporality, and Global Politics* (e-IR). His work also can be found in *International Affairs, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Theory, International Studies Quarterly, Millennium, Security Dialogue, Australian Journal of Politics and History*, *The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics*, the Routledge *Handbook of Ethics and International Relations*, and *Hollow Victories and the Politics of American Wartime* (in progress on a Leverhulme Research Fellowship).

David Patrick Houghton is retired Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and Associate at LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science. He is a specialist in decision-making and US foreign policy. He has published numerous books and articles in these areas, such as *The Decision Point* (Oxford University Press, 2012), and has taught at a number of other universities in Britain and the United States.

Erin K. Jenne is a Professor of International Relations at Central European University in Vienna. She has received numerous grants and fellowships,

including a MacArthur fellowship at Stanford University, a Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs fellowship at Harvard University, a Carnegie Corporation scholarship, and a Senior Fernand Braudel fellowship at European University Institute in Florence. She was co-principal investigator for a Minerva Grant from the US Office of Naval Research on China and soft power. Her first book *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment* (Cornell University Press, 2007) won Mershon Center's Edgar S. Furniss Book Award in 2007. She has published numerous book chapters and articles in *International Studies Quarterly*, *International Affairs, Security Studies, Regional and Federal Studies, Journal of Peace Research, Civil Wars, International Studies Review, Research and Politics*, *Nationalities Papers*, and *Ethnopolitics*. She was an Associate Editor for the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis.*

Tyler Jost is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brown University. His research focuses on national security decision-making, bureaucratic politics, and Chinese foreign policy. He earned his doctoral degree from the Department of Government at Harvard University, and has held postdoctoral fellowships at the Belfer Center International Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government, as well as in the China and the World Program at Columbia University.

Amit Julka is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Ashoka University, India. His research lies on the intersection of Gramscian theory, mixed methods, and South Asian politics. Apart from this, his work also focuses on concepts such as authoritarianism and identity. He is also a Project Coordinator of the Making Identity Project, which studies the evolution of national identity in major powers. Lastly, he is the co-founder of the *Mitti Pao!*, a multilingual podcast based on the culture and politics of India and Pakistan.

Juliet Kaarbo is a Professor of International Relations with a Chair in Foreign Policy at the University of Edinburgh. She is founding co-director of the Scottish Council on Global Affairs. Her research focuses on leader personality and decision-making, group dynamics, foreign policy analysis and theory, parliaments and parties, and national roles, and has recently appeared in journals such as *International Affairs, International Studies Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, International Studies Review, Global Studies Quarterly, Political Psychology*, and

Foreign Policy Analysis. Her books and co-edited volumes include *Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making* (2012), *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations* (2016), and *The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives* (2020). She has served as an Associate Editor for *Foreign Policy Analysis* and *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. She was the 2018 Distinguished Scholar of Foreign Policy Analysis in the International Studies Association (ISA) and served as ISA Vice President in 2022–2023.

Kent J. Kille is a Professor of Political Science at The College of Wooster. He is an expert on international organization leadership, including authoring *From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations*, editing and contributing to *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership*, and serving as editor (with Bob Reinalda and Jaci Eisenberg) of *IO BIO: Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations*. He is also co-author (with Alynna Lyon) of *The United Nations: 75 Years of Promoting Peace, Human Rights, and Development* and has published on the connections between the United Nations and regional organizations.

Paul A. Kowert is Department Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He is the author or editor of four books and numerous articles exploring the way leaders differ in their use of information and advice, the way people form perceptions of other countries, the role of emotion in foreign policy, and the contested dialogue between political psychologists and constructivists in international relations. He is also a specialist in East Asian foreign policy with a particular focus on the role of national identity in US-Japan relations.

Jeffrey S. Lantis is a Professor of Political Science at The College of Wooster. His research specializations include foreign policy analysis, nuclear non-proliferation, international norms, and strategic culture. A former Fulbright Senior Scholar in Australia, Lantis is the author of more than a dozen books, including *Foreign Policy Advocacy and Entrepreneurship: How a New Generation in Congress is Shaping U.S. Engagement with the World* (University of Michigan Press, 2019) and *Arms and Influence: U.S. Technology Innovations and the Evolution of International Security Norms* (Stanford University Press, 2016). He has published numerous journal articles and book chapters on US foreign

policy, Congress, strategic culture, and nuclear technology assistance. He served as Director of the International Studies Association's (ISA) Innovative Pedagogy Conference Initiative and is co-editor of *International Studies Perspectives*. Lantis was named the ISA's 2020 Distinguished Teacher-Scholar by the Active Learning in International Affairs section of ISA, and was co-recipient of the ISA Deborah Gerner Innovative Teaching in International Studies Award.

Martin Egon Maitino is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of São Paulo (USP) and was curator at the Diplomacy for Democracy Institute (2021). His main research interests include foreign policy analysis, climate policy, and Brazilian foreign policy.

Summer Marion is a Lecturer and incoming Assistant Professor in the Department of Global Studies at Bentley University. Her mixed methods research focuses on topics in global governance, international organizations, global health, and philanthropy. Her primary research agenda examines how private foundations influence global policy related to pandemics, notably through public-private partnerships. Her research on international cooperation regarding adoption of trade and travel restrictions during global outbreaks contributes to the Pandemics and Borders Project. Other ongoing projects focus on topics in US foreign policy, environmental governance, and disaster response.

Carla Martínez Machain is a Professor of Political Science at the University at Buffalo. She received her PhD in Political Science from Rice University in May 2012. Martínez Machain's research (funded by the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative and the Army Research Office, among others) focuses on foreign policy analysis, with a focus on military policy and international conflict. Her new book with Oxford University Press is entitled *Beyond the Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Host Country Public Opinion*. Her work has appeared in various journals, including the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Politic*s, and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. She has also written for policy-oriented outlets such as the Washington Post's Monkey Cage blog and The Conversation.

Roseanne W. McManus is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at the Pennsylvania State University. Her research focuses on

signalling and coercion in an international security context. She received her BA from the University of Maryland, and her MA and PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Before pursuing an academic career, she was a Senior Analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. She is the author of eleven articles in peer-reviewed journals and the book *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict*, published by Cambridge University Press. She is a former president of the ISA FPA section.

Alister Miskimmon is a Professor of International Relations at Queen's University Belfast. His most recent book, edited with Jakub Eberle, is entitled, *International Theory and German Foreign Policy* (2022). Alister was Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Adelaide in 2023.

Francesco Niccolò Moro is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (Europe Campus). His research focuses on collective violence, organized crime, and defense and national security policies, and is published, among else, in the *Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Terrorism and Political Violence, European Sociological Review*, and *World Politics*.

Amanda Murdie is the Georgia Athletic Association Professor of International Affairs and Head of the Department of International Affairs in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. She is a past editor-in-chief of *International Studies Review.* She is widely published in the areas of human rights, human security, and non-governmental organizations.

Ben O'loughlin is a Professor of International Relations and Director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. Ben researches the role communication plays in world politics. He was Special Advisor to the UK Parliament Select Committee on Soft Power and UK Influence, and Thinker in Residence at the Royal Academy, Brussels. He has been visiting fellow at Nanyang Technological University Singapore, the University of Sydney, the University of Bologna, University of Canterbury New Zealand, and George Washington University.

Anna R. Oltman is a Lecturer in Human Rights in the Department of Political Science at University College London. Her teaching and research focuses on the politics of refugees and asylum. She completed her doctoral research at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 2020, where she taught courses on human rights, international relations, and American foreign policy. She has worked with several refugee resettlement agencies in the US, including Church World Service and Lutheran Refugee Services, and is a committed advocate for displaced people and migrants regardless of immigration status.

Kai Oppermann is a Professor of International Politics at the Chemnitz University of Technology. He has previously held positions at the University of Sussex, King's College London, and the University of Cologne. His research centres on the domestic sources of foreign policy and international politics, with a focus on British and German foreign policy. His work has been published in journals such as *European Journal of International Relations*, *West European Politics*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, and *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. He is a co-editor at *German Politics* and an associate editor of *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis* (2018).

Diana Panke is a Professor of Political Science with a Chair in Multi-Level Governance at the University of Freiburg. Her research interests include small states in international affairs, international negotiations, international norms, comparative regionalism as well as institutional design of international organizations. Her publications have appeared in outlets including the *Review of International Organizations*, the *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, the *European Journal of International Relations*, *Cooperation and Conflict*, and the *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Her most recent book is *Comparing Regional Organizations: Global Dynamics and Regional Particularities* (Bristol University Press, 2020; co-authored with Sören Stapel and Anna Starkmann).

Timothy M. Peterson is an Associate Professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. His research examines the causes and consequences of US foreign policy, with a focus on the third-party deterrent effect of US sanctions. He also examines the links between commerce and armed conflict, as well as the implications of variation in

democratic institutions for a variety of political and economic outcomes. His work has been published in journals including *International Studies Quarterly*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *Journal of Peace Research.*

Tapio Raunio is a Professor of Political Science at Tampere University. His research interests cover representative democracy and political institutions, both in the context of national politics and at the European level, with a specific focus on legislatures, executives, political parties, and foreign policy decision-making.

Laura Roselle is a Professor Emeritz at Elon University. Laura has served as the president of the Information Technology and Politics section of the American Political Science Association, and as the president of the International Communications section of the International Studies Association. She is an Associate Member of the Centre for Security Research, University of Edinburgh.

Roxanna Sjöstedt is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Lund University. Her research focus concerns international relations and international security; foreign policy analysis; and peace and conflict studies. More specifically, she has conducted research on securitization, identity, norms, epidemics, international intervention, and post-civil war electoral politics. She has published on these topics in, for example, *Security Dialogue*; *Security Studies*; *Foreign Policy Analysis*; *European Journal of International Security*; *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*; and *International Relations.*

Brent Steele is the Francis D. Wormuth Presidential Chair and Professor of Political Science at the University of Utah, and the co-editor in chief of *Global Studies Quarterly*. His research focuses on the Just War traditions, the ethics of international security, historical IR, ontological security, and accountability. His most recent books are *Vicarious Identity in International Relations* (with Chris Browning and Pertti Joenniemi; Oxford University Press, 2021) and *Restraint in International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2019), which co-won the ISA Theory section book award for 2020. He also recently co-edited the *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and International Relations* (with Eric Heinze; 2018), and *Tactical*

Constructivism, Method, and International Relations (with Harry Gould and Oliver Kessler; 2020).

Francesco Strazzari is a Professor of Political Science at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (Europe Campus). He specializes in peace and conflict studies with a specific focus on political violence, armed conflict, and extralegal governance (transnational organized crime) and a focus on Africa and the Mediterranean.

Atsushi Tago is a Professor of School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University and a global fellow of Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). His work has appeared in *The Journal of Politics*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Peace Research*, and other journals. He is a winner of the JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) Prize (2019). His current research project is centred on coalition/alliance politics, territorial disputes, public diplomacy, and political apology among the states.

Cameron G. Thies is MSU Foundation Professor and Dean of James Madison College at Michigan State University. He has published broadly in foreign policy analysis, conflict processes, international political economy, and international relations theory. His work has appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, Comparative Political Studies*, and *Foreign Policy Analysis*, among others. His books include *The United States, Israel, and The Search for International Order: Socializing States* (2013), *Intra-Industry Trade: Cooperation and Conflict in the Global Political Economy* (2015), and *Rising Powers and Foreign Policy Revisionism: Understanding BRICS Identity and Behavior through Time* (2017). Thies also served as editor-in-chief of *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis* (2018), editor of *Political Science Research & Methods* and *Foreign Policy Analysis*, and deputy lead editor of *Journal of Politics*. He was named the Distinguished Scholar of Foreign Policy Analysis (2016), the Quincy Wright Distinguished Scholar (2017), and the Ole R. Holsti Distinguished Scholar (2020) of the International Studies Association. Thies was also President of the International Studies Association (2019–2020).

Baldur Thorhallsson is a Professor of Political Science and founder of the Centre for Small State Studies at the University of Iceland. He has published extensively in academic journals on small European states, European integration, and Icelandic politics. His latest edited books are entitled *Iceland's Shelter-Seeking Behavior: From Settlment to Republic* (Cornell University Press, 2021), *Small States and the New Security Environment* (co-editor) (Springer, 2021), and *Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland's External Affairs* (Routledge, 2019). He holds a PhD (1999) and MA (1994) in Political Science from the University of Essex in the UK.

Jacqui True FASSA, FAIIA is a Professor of International Relations, Director of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the Elimination of Violence against Women (CEVAW) and a Global Fellow, Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo. Her research is focused on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, violence against women, and the gender dimensions of violent extremism and conflict. In 2021, Professor True was named one of the hundred most influential Persons in Gender Policy—for the gender-based violence area.

Bertjan Verbeek is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He has published on the relationship between populism and foreign policy, on the role of intergovernmental organizations in world politics, on the changing role of middle powers in international relations, as well as on crisis decision-making in foreign policy.

Wolfgang Wagner is a Professor of International Security at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His research revolves around the democratic politics of foreign policy and the use of force in particular. Recent publications include *The Democratic Politics of Military Interventions: Political Parties, Contestation and Decisions to Use Force Abroad* (Oxford University Press, 2020).

Leslie E. Wehner is Professor of International Relations at the University of Bath, UK. His research interests include social constructivism and role theory within international relations, international political economy, and foreign policy analysis. He also conducts research on emerging powers (BRICS; Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), leaders and

leadership in foreign policy, populism in IR, and the foreign policy of Latin American states. His most recent articles have been published in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *International Studies Review*, *International Politics*, *International Relations*, and *Journal of International Relations and Development*.

Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark is an Associate Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Whitlark's research explores the role of leaders in nuclear politics and foreign policy decision-making. Her forthcoming book examines preventive military force as a counter-proliferation strategy in both the US and Israeli contexts. Additional work investigates the political implications of the possession of critical technologies used to produce nuclear weapons or nuclear energy (nuclear latency).

Anders Wivel is a Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. He has published widely on foreign policy, realism, and small states in international relations, including articles in e.g., *International Affairs*, *International Studies Review*, *Ethics and International Affairs*, *Global Affairs*, and *European Security*. His most recent book is *Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2021; co-edited with T. V. Paul, Deborah W. Larson, Harold Trinkunas, and Ralf Emmers).

Catherine Z. Worsnop is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland-College Park and a research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Her research focuses on global governance and, specifically, on the role of international organizations in global health. Current projects examine international cooperation during global health emergencies and state compliance with the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations. Worsnop is a Co-PI on the Pandemics and Borders Project, which examines trade and travel restrictions during COVID-19. She is also the current chair of the International Studies Association Global Health Studies Section and has served on expert committees for the World Health Organization. Worsnop holds a PhD in Politics from Brandeis University.

CHAPTER 1

Repositioning Foreign Policy Analysis in International Relations

JULIET KAARBO AND CAMERON G. THIES

This chapter, and *The Oxford Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis* as a whole, seek to reposition the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to a central analytic location within the study of International Relations (IR). There certainly was a time when FPA was more integrated into IR, during the heyday of Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP)—the origins of present-day FPA. This chapter begins by defining FPA and discussing the historical disconnect between FPA scholarship and IR research. We then lay out some advantages for reconnecting FPA and IR, to the benefit of both. We identify trends in recent FPA research and key directions for future work. The structure of the Handbook serves to push forward these new avenues of research.

The Disconnect between FPA and IR

FPA can be characterized as both a subfield and a perspective. As a subfield within IR, FPA, since its beginnings in the 1950s,[1] is a broad tent that includes scholarship that focuses on explaining foreign policy behaviours and foreign policy-making processes. It is multi-layered and conceptually complex, examining the many agents and institutions, cultures and identities, interests and perceptions that influence foreign policies. While FPA does not ignore external factors, attention to domestic politics or decision-making is an essential characteristic of FPA research—FPA scholarship looks into the 'black box' of the state. The focus of FPA has historically been on states' behaviours and their constitutive agents and institutions. The boundaries of the FPA subfield touch many other research areas including security studies, international political economy, and area

studies. FPA has all the trappings of an enduring subfield, with one of the largest sections in the International Studies Association, textbooks, a dedicated journal—*Foreign Policy Analysis*, and a methodology handbook (Mello and Ostermann 2023).

FPA can also be conceptualized as a distinct perspective, or approach, that is narrower than the subfield designation and is psychologically based. Drawing on Hudson's essentialist statement that FPA has 'an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups' (Hudson 2005: 1), FPA stresses the role of central decision-making units and the subjective understandings of leaders. These units and understandings serve as funnels for other international and domestic factors. With this distinct starting point, 'FPA is a *sui generis* … perspective' (Kaarbo 2015: 192) within IR. If human decision-makers are the focus, then we open up the possibility of integrating theories from multiple levels of analysis (Hudson 2005: 3). No single theory need dominate FPA as a perspective, as the multi-factorial and multi-level nature of our explanations lead us to integrate theories from multiple disciplines.

Yet there has long been a disconnect between FPA and the wider discipline of IR. Smith's question, posed in 1986, asking if FPA as a 'distinct (if eclectic) approach to the study of foreign policy has anything to offer other than footnotes to grand theories of international relations …?' (Smith 1986: 13) remains relevant. FPA is often seen as marginal to IR, rarely included in introductory textbooks, in approaches to security studies, international political economy or international organizations, or in university IR theory courses (Houghton 2007; Flanik 2011; Kaarbo 2015). Hellmann and Jørgensen note that FPA and IR 'have over the past decades become separate fields of study … in a state of mutual and more or less benign neglect (2015: 1). Kaarbo (2015) has argued that the primary reasons behind this disconnect between IR and FPA are four-fold. First, the birth of IR lies in the realist tradition in which politics were seen to 'stop at the water's edge' for the sake of state survival. Waltz's level of analysis schema first introduced in the 1950s and later solidified in his distinction between systemic and reductionist theories fostered a 'gradual division … between those studying domestic politics on the one hand and international politics on the other' (Schmidt 2002: 25). With FPA's attention to domestic cultures, institutions, policy-making processes, and the psychological

milieu, the subfield was closer to scholarship in comparative politics and public policy than it was to IR (Smith et al. 2008). This disconnect continued when IR theory was dominated by the neoliberal-neorealist debate at the systemic level in the 1980s.

A second and related reason for the disconnect between FPA and IR is a 'division of labour argument' (Kaarbo 2015: 194), stemming from Waltz's distinction between a theory of foreign policy, focusing on discreet behaviours of units, and a theory of international politics, explaining systemic patterns. This distinction is functional, according to Waltz as 'economists get along quite well with separate theories of firms and markets. Students of international politics will do well to concentrate on, and make use of separate theories of internal and external politics' (Waltz 1996: 57). This division of labour went beyond Waltz's structural realism, with social constructivist Wendt, for example proclaiming: 'like Waltz, I am interested in international politics, not foreign policy' (Wendt 1999: 11).[2] Some of the founding scholars of FPA also accepted this division of labour (e.g., Rosenau 1968, as discussed by Albert and Stetter 2015). There are many rebuttals to the logic and practice of distinguishing between theories of foreign policy and theories of IR, and agents and structures (see, for example, Carlsnaes 1992; Light 1994; Elman 1996; Goldgeier 1997; Moravcisk 1997; Fearon 1998; Barkin 2009; Mearsheimer 2001; Thies and Breuning 2012; Albert and Stetter 2015; Hellmann and Jørgensen 2015; Kaarbo 2015), including Bueno de Mesquita's (2002: 7) argument that 'international politics are not … some predetermined exogenous fact of life … International politics are formed by the aggregated consequences of … individual and collective decisions'. As Houghton (2007) notes, this argument was at the heart of the origins of FPA, both as a subfield and a perspective.

The third reason behind the disconnect between FPA and IR is the perception by many outside FPA that its research is excessively individualistic and ultra-positivist (see, for example, Goldstein and Keohane 1986; Checkel 2008). The accuracy of these perceptions can be debated. Smith (2001: 52), for example, argues that constructivism's 'view of the social world fits well with the foreign policy analysis literature' (see also Flanik 2011) and Kaarbo (2015: 200) notes that FPA's 'focus on subjectivity rejects positivist assumptions of a single, knowable, objective reality' (see also Hill 2003). Despite this debate, it is clear that some in IR see FPA as

epistemologically and ontologically inconsistent with their own research orientations.

Finally, the disconnect between IR and FPA can be explained by some of the weaknesses of FPA itself. FPA's evolution included an early positivist, inductive, quantitative approach which searched for a grand theory of foreign policy (Rosenau 1966, 1968). These efforts were seen as unfruitful and some of the researchers involved themselves declared that the CFP approach was lifeless by the mid-1970s. In response, FPA turned towards single-country, single-case studies and islands of middle-range theories (Kegley 1980; Smith 1986; Carlsnaes 2002; Vertzberger 2002; Hudson 2005). Many of the well-known scholars whose work and intellectual connections spanned IR and CFP/FPA thus returned to IR where disciplinary rewards were greater in the 1980s. By then, FPA was engaged more with psychology than with IR and with its inward-looking orientation, the subfield arguably missed opportunities to connect to developments in IR theory (Kubálková 2001; Vertzberger 2002).

Advantages of Reconnecting IR and FPA

The repositioning of FPA within IR is long overdue and this Handbook aims to repair this disconnect. We see multiple reasons to do so. First, the distinction between IR and foreign policy is intellectually bankrupt. After all, all international politics are rooted in and formed by aggregated foreign policy decisions. While a full discussion of the agent-structure 'debate' is beyond the scope of this chapter and Handbook, we reject the strict demarcation of agents and structures, and the 'division of labour' argument between IR and FPA, as discussed above, that falls from this demarcation. We also reject the related strict distinction between internal and external politics. Indeed, the link between domestic politics and IR was the origin of FPA research and FPA scholarship has consistently demonstrated the importance of domestic politics and decision-making to the central issues in international politics, such as war, economic cooperation, alliances, and nuclear proliferation. We agree with Carslnaes that 'the divide between domestic and international politics … is highly questionable as a feasible foundational baseline for a sub-discipline that needs to problematize this

boundary' (Carlsnaes 2002: 342; see also Caporaso 1997; Hill 2013; Hellman and Jørgensen 2015).

Second, the field of IR is changing in ways to which FPA speaks directly. While IR, with its more recent attention to domestic politics and decision-making, has moved to tear down the ontological wall between domestic and international dynamics, it has largely done so without attention to the potential benefits derived from FPA's long pedigree of research linking internal and external politics. Over the last twenty-five years, IR has seen a cross-theoretical turn towards incorporating domestic politics, decision-making, agency, practices, and subjectivity—the staples of the FPA subfield (Kaarbo 2015). Structural theories of the international system positing uni-dimensional preferences of black-boxed state actors, and even theories of state behaviour rooted in structural characteristics of the state continue to lose salience. IR scholarship incorporating domestic politics and subjectivity, however, is underdeveloped theoretically, empirically, and methodologically. FPA scholarship, on the other hand, has always had the advantage of including a variety of actors, agents, structures, institutions, outcomes, processes, internal and external factors, and subjective, psychological dynamics. FPA can also inform other developments with IR, including the 'end of theories' debate, problem-driven research, the domestic, ideational, and agency turns in IR, and methodological pluralism. FPA has a record of research and theoretical, conceptual, and methodological toolkits not only to inform these developments within IR, but also to bring together disparate areas of IR within a distinct FPA perspective.

Hudson's (2005: 1) aforementioned definition of the ground of IR is also a claim that it is the same for FPA and indeed all of the social sciences. The specific explanandum for FPA 'includes the process and resultants of human decision-making with reference to or having known consequences for foreign entities' (p. 2)—often, but not exclusively confined to states, much like IR. Hudson (2005: 2–5) further identifies the hallmarks of the FPA approach that bring value to IR, including that the explanans are multi-factorial, multi-level, multi-/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent oriented, and actor specific. In one way or another, IR is rediscovering a need for these types of explanations and FPA is up for the task.

The final advantage of reconnecting FPA and IR is that it can benefit FPA and be an opportunity to address enduring criticisms of the FPA subfield,

including that it is isolated within IR, it is state-centric, its policy relevance is not always clear (despite a long-standing commitment in FPA to 'bridge the gap' between policy-makers and academia), and its theoretical foundations and methodological techniques are stale. We now critically assess the state of FPA.

FPA Today

It has been over twenty-five years since the last major statement on the current state and future trajectory of FPA was published in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, edited by Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey, and Patrick Haney (Prentice-Hall, 1995).[3] In that volume, the contributors set out a vision of FPA scholarship that built on, but was decidedly different from, work on CFP in the 1970s and 1980s. The second generation of FPA scholarship, the book argued, was more methodologically diverse, more theoretically conscious, more attuned to context and multi-level explanations, and drew more on insights from comparative politics and area studies research. Hudson's (2005) introductory article that launched the academic journal, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, restated these commitments from the second-generation volume, but also defined more clearly FPA's distinct perspective with human agency as the 'ground' of FPA research. The journal is now in its second decade publishing cutting edge work on a variety of issues, methods, and theories of interest to scholars. The research published in this journal's history provides a rich pool of findings and ideas worth reviewing and pushing forward. Looking back at the journal's volumes, we can see key features of the subfield as they have evolved since 2005 and as they stand today.

Theoretical innovation is a hallmark of FPA scholarship, including work on ontological security (Subotic 2016), securitzation (e.g., Sjöstedt 2007), realism (e.g., Zarnett 2017), neoclassical realism (Götz 2019), constructivism (e.g., Flanik 2011), and work bridging theoretical divides between realism and constructivism (Snyder 2005). The third wave of role theory began in the pages of the journal, including a special issue edited by Cameron Thies and Marijke Breuning (Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2012), and subsequent articles by Breuning (2013), Brummer and Thies (2015), Wehner (2015), and Melo (2019). Other innovations include papers linking FPA to

biology and neurobiology (e.g., McDermott 2014), the study of emotion (Dolan 2016), theories of time (Beasley and Hom 2021), and gender analyses (see the special issue in 2020).

Traditional conflict and security issues continue to be present in the journal, including crisis behaviour (e.g., Peterson and Venteicher 2013), diversionary theory (e.g., Arena and Bak 2015), civil wars (e.g., Machain et al. 2011), peacekeeping (e.g., Schiel et al. 2020), coups (e.g., Thyne and Powell 2016), maritime piracy (e.g., Daxecker and Prins 2015), and terrorism (e.g., Ghatak and Karakaya 2021). Further, we find some attention to new issues in this domain is also present in work on climate change (e.g., Below 2008), drought (Bell and Keys 2018), complex humanitarian emergencies (e.g., Knecht 2009), and health diplomacy (e.g., Chen 2022).

The role of ideational factors is explored in several articles on soft power, religion (e.g., Özdamar and Akbaba 2014), culture (e.g., Malici 2006), strategic culture (e.g., Boyle and Lang 2021), public opinion (e.g., Rathbun 2016), diplomacy (e.g., Mor 2006), human rights, and treaties and international law (e.g., Dalaet and Scott 2006). Issues of economic statecraft also routinely command attention, including economic sanctions (e.g., Early and Spice 2015), foreign aid (e.g., Fariss 2010), trade (e.g., Peterson and Wen 2021), foreign direct investment (e.g., Choi and Samy 2008), economic statecraft more broadly (e.g., Collins 2009), and analyses of support for trade liberalization (e.g., Ehrlich 2009).

The decision-making approach to FPA continues to be well represented in the journal, reflecting the focus on human agency noted in its first issue. This includes work on operational code analysis (e.g., Schafer et al. 2006), poliheuristic theory (e.g., Beckerman-Boys 2014), leadership trait analysis (e.g., Foster and Keller 2014), and emotion (Beauregard 2022). These papers continue to develop the methods associated with content analysis *at a distance* as they seek new applications, often in combination with other theoretical approaches. We also see work on the governmental sources of foreign policy, including work on bureaucratic politics (e.g., Gülen 2022), coalition cabinets (e.g., Kaarbo and Beasley 2008), and political parties (e.g., the special issue in 2018). Populism has also begun appearing in the journal given its recent resurgence around the world (e.g., Plagemann and Destradi 2019).

FPA has always maintained an openness to both qualitative and quantitative methodologies including game theory (e.g., Bapat 2010). New

methodologies being explored in FPA include discreet sequence rule models (Hudson et al. 2008), other new approaches to event data (e.g., Thomas 2015), and sentiment analysis (Fisher et al. 2022), counterfactual analysis (Hansel and Oppermann 2016), experiments (e.g., Clemons et al. 2016) and survey experiments (e.g., de Sá Guimarães et al. 2019).

US foreign policy is a constant focus across time and continues in the pages of the FPA journal, including work on public opinion (e.g., Kleinberg and Fordham 2018), advisory systems (e.g., Mitchell and Massoud 2009), treaty ratification and the role of Congress more generally (e.g., Peake 2017; Tama 2019), and many contributions on US intervention in Afghanistan (e.g., Marsh 2014) and Iraq (e.g., Croco 2016). The Iraq war has been studied from the perspective of other countries as well, including the UK (Hayes 2016), Japan (Miyagi 2009), and Poland (Radziszewski 2013). Indeed, one of the exciting developments in the journal is that there is much more attention on foreign policy outside of the US. This includes work on China (e.g., Raess et al. 2022), Turkey (e.g., Ipek 2015), Paraguay (e.g., Long and Urdinez 2021), Germany (e.g., Brummer 2013), South Korea (Ko 2019), South Africa (Becker 2010), Nigeria (Warner 2017), Indonesia (e.g., Rüland 2014), Japan (Liu 2022), Macedonia, Moldova, and other former Soviet spaces (e.g., Cantir and Kennedy 2015), Israel (e.g., Ziv 2013), Latin America (e.g., Thies 2017), Syria (e.g., Darwich 2016), Brazil (e.g., Wehner 2015), and a themed issue in 2017 on rising regional powers with articles on Brazil, India, China, and Russia.

New(er) Directions

This Handbook builds on the rich foundation of recent research published in the *FPA* journal and elsewhere and on the longer tradition of foreign policy scholarship since the 1950s. In order to reposition FPA to a central analytic location, FPA needs, we argue, to retain its strengths and distinct perspective, but also to develop to address its weaknesses. Key developments needed are: addressing a wider variety of types of actors, expanding into new policy domains, tackling significant policy problems that policy-makers face, linking FPA to other theoretical traditions in IR and other disciplines, updating the core approaches to foreign policy with

relevant empirical, methodological, and theoretical angles, and synthesizing scholarship across these core FPA approaches.

Wider Variety of Actors

Most research in FPA has focused on states, or representatives of states, as the main actors who make foreign policy. Some even include a focus on states as essential to the definition of FPA (e.g., Carlsnaes 2002; Vertzberger 2002; Breuning 2007). While states are undoubtedly important actors in international politics, FPA has attracted criticism for its state-centric quality (e.g., Light 1994; Risse 2013; Hellmann and Jørgensen 2015; Hellmman et al. 2016).

Ironically, FPA's state-centrism has not generated much theoretical reflection on the nature of states. Indeed, White noted the 'silence' of FPA on the nature of statehood (White 1999: 41) and suggested that this may be due to FPA emerging at a time 'when there were no serious challengers to the "Westphalian" state' (White 1999: 41) Over time, with the very nature of statehood contested, White encouraged FPA to draw on work in sociology and historical sociology to theorize the nature of the state. White invokes Halliday's conclusion that 'the argument is not about whether we are or are not "state-centric", but what we mean by the state' (Halliday 1994: 77).

White also argued that 'there appears to be no prima facie reason why the perspective of and the analytical techniques associated with FPA cannot be transferred from the state to other significant international actors' (White 1999: 41). White made the case for the analytical value of using FPA theories and concepts to explain the foreign policy of the EU, a non-state actor. Albert and Stetter (2015) make this point, although in a different way. They argue that FPA's focus on decision-makers makes FPA scholarship less state-centric than most IR research and this allows FPA concepts to travel fairly easily to non-state actors.

There have been attempts to take up White's call to theorize the nature of the state, especially in the context of multi-cultural societies (e.g., Hill 2013) and globalization and global governance (e.g., Hellmann and Jørgensen 2015), and to apply FPA to non-state actors (e.g., Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Walker 2011; Risse 2013; McMillan 2018; for review, see Stengel and Baumann 2014, 2018). Yet we see more room for development in utilizing the FPA perspective and its conceptual and methodological toolkits beyond the

state to examine the foreign policies of a variety of non-state actors, including businesses, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, international corporations, terrorist groups, and substate actors such as provinces. In short, we agree with Stengel and Baumann's declaration that 'non-state actors already are important foreign policy actors, and if foreign policy research wants to avoid becoming marginalized, it needs to start including them in the analysis' (Stengel and Baumann 2018: 266–267).

We also see benefits in maintaining FPA's commitment to include a wide variety of states, not just big powers. Research on small states (see Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2018), middle powers (see Neack 2018), rising powers (see Thies and Nieman 2017; Wehner 2018), authoritarian states (see Weeks and Crunkilton 2018), and novel and aspirant states (see Thies 2013; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018) not only showcases the breadth of FPA and its global reach, but facilitates FPA's response to White's call to better theorize 'stateness'—what are its essential (if any) qualities, what are important patterns of variation in statehood and sovereignty across different actors, and how do these impact foreign policies? Recent efforts to problematize FPA research for 'the Global South' (e.g., Brummer and Hudson 2015; Grove 2018) can also further FPA's reflection on its primary unit of analysis.

More Policy Domains

Another criticism of FPA is that it has narrowly focused on security policy. While many examples of FPA research in other policy areas can be found, especially more recently, the field remains oriented to issues of war, intervention, and other policies involving security threats and military tools. Many have noted the absence of FPA insights into economic foreign policy, for example, although important exceptions to this include FPA work on foreign aid and economic sanctions. Indeed, a key theme of the *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* book published in 1987 (Hermann et al. 1987) was the growing importance of economics, yet attention to security policy remained the dominant focus within the subfield (Light 1994; Vertzberger 2002). FPA scholarship has rarely examined immigration policies, regional integration, global governance, broader areas of security including energy, climate, food, and cyber security, and broader areas of economic policy including financial policy and organized crime. Oltman and Renshon

note that work on immigration has focused on either domestic politics or IR and has typically not incorporated insights from FPA, even though

> in many ways, immigration is exactly the type of issue that is well suited for a foreign policy analysis … approach … as it sensitizes people to "mid-range" theory that links micro- and macro factors, focuses attention on decision makers …, and identifies the interplay between material and ideational factors. We believe this claim applies to many other policy areas.
>
> (2018: 18)

Speaking to Policy-Makers and Policy Challenges

Addressing a wider range of policy areas would not only expand the range of empirical phenomena open to FPA scholarship, it would allow the subfield an opportunity to be more problem focused. Attention to the serious problems facing the world, such as climate change, terrorism, economic development, global health, and financial stability is consistent with recent developments in IR advocating problem-driven research (e.g., S il and Katzenstein 2010). And *policy* after all, is the explanandum for most FPA research.

A desire to be policy relevant is not new for FPA. Indeed, the subfield has a long-standing commitment to speak to policy-makers and policy-making. Alexander George most explicitly advocated for this policy relevance in his 1993 book,[4] *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. George identified the differences in 'culture' between the academic world and the policy-making world, as well as the obstacles for bridging that gulf. Despite these obstacles, George argued that scholars do, and should, have much to say to policy-makers, particularly in the form of 'knowledge to action' scholarship on the 'types of knowledge that are needed by policy-makers in considering how to understand and deal with different types of foreign policy problems' (1994: 154) Specifically, George suggested work on conceptual models of different foreign policy strategies (such as deterrence and crisis management), the conditions that facilitate success for foreign policy strategies, and 'actor-specific models of the values, mind-sets, behavioral styles, internal politics, and culture of actors to whom the strategies may be directed' (1994: 143). These topics (core to the FPA subfield), George argued, are much more helpful to and more openly received by decision-makers than are 'grand theories' such as structural realism.

FPA work on decision-making often has a normative aim to uncover, and assist policy-makers to avoid, dynamics that produce 'fiascos' and 'mistakes' (e.g., Janis 1972; Schafer and Crichlow 2010; Walker and Malici 2011; Oppermann and Spencer 2016). And FPA researchers routinely advise governments on, for example, the personalities of other world leaders (Post 2003; Dyson 2014).

Despite this tradition and its proximity to explaining policy and understanding the policy-makers' world, FPA research could do more to explicitly speak to the world's most challenging, 'wicked' problems. As we saw in the brief review of the FPA journal's contents, coverage of climate change and complex humanitarian emergencies have just started to enter the journal's pages. Climate change, global health, biodiversity loss, persistent poverty, food insecurity, and water insecurity are issues that will increasingly occupy foreign policy-makers time in the future. Moving FPA more squarely into the driver's seat of IR will allow the subfield to address many of the significant policy changes that have occurred in recent decades and the emergence of many of the world's most difficult problems.

Linking FPA to IR Theory and Interdisciplinary Approaches

Despite the disconnect between FPA and IR, as discussed above, FPA has much to contribute to and take from current IR theory. Although the 'grand' theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism have taken a turn towards incorporating domestic and decision-making factors, this development is underdeveloped and can be challenged by FPA research (Ka arbo 2015). Neoclassical realism recognizes that structural imperatives are filtered through individual perceptions, but how that process works is not explained. FPA's understanding of both psychological and social psychological process, in addition to work on governmental politics, could flesh out this process in neoclassical. The liberal or democratic peace also leaves many questions underexplored regarding the role of individual leaders, parliamentary/presidential systems, public opinion, and the elite-mass nexus. Constructivism was predicated on the notion of bringing agency back to a discipline that had previously been preoccupied with structure for decades. Yet, Wendt's (1999) claim that 'states are people too' is unsatisfactory if you take agency seriously, as Hudson (2005) does in her claim that the ground of IR and FPA is human agency.

And while FPA often situates itself vis-à-vis broad questions of IR, such as norm internalization (Vieira 2013), democracy (Hanggi 2004), socialization (Thies 2012, 2013), power balancing (Cantir and Kennedy 2015), and order building (Skidmore 2005; Kaarbo 2018), this is typically done in isolated, individual efforts without a more collective, directed effort of bring an FPA perspective to bear on the big questions in the IR discipline.

FPA has not done much to link to and learn from theoretical developments in IR beyond the 'grand theories' of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. There is little work connecting FPA to, for example, sociological and historical institutionalism, securitization, practice theory, feminism, postcolonialism, ethics, and the visual, multiplicity and temporal turns. And despite FPA's bridging position between IR and work in comparative politics, FPA rarely draws from or speaks to major theoretical debates and empirical puzzles in comparative politics research.

One of FPA's strengths is its interdisciplinary research. FPA scholars have, for example, successfully drawn from and contributed to the field of psychology. Indeed, FPA is one of the longest standing and strongest areas in political psychology scholarship and incorporated insights from behavioural economics (notably Kahenman and Tversky's 1979 work on prospect theory and Simon's 1985 notion of bounded rationality), long before it became popular in the wider economics discipline. Yet FPA could do more on the interdisciplinary front by connecting to, for example, sociology (as IR scholars have more successfully done), public policy, geography, communication studies, and informatics.

There are also clear areas of core work within the FPA subfield that could be refreshed through greater contact with other disciplines. These include work on public opinion, leaders' beliefs and traits, and institutions. Much of this research, however, continues to argue and conclude the same messages. In psychological approaches to foreign policy, for example, scholars continue to rely on older approaches in psychology and generally do not update FPA with newer theoretical developments in, for example, terror management theory, personality approaches, and meaning maintenance theory. New theoretical developments in other disciplines, such as sociology, may also be usefully harnessed to transform FPA and to speak to other cross-disciplinary research in IR. The core FPA approaches can grow, we argue, by engaging recent work in IR theory, comparative politics, and neighbouring disciplines.

In addition, much of the middle-range theorizing in FPA occurs in isolation. Scholars tend to work, for example, within the public opinion area or within the role of parliaments. Rarely do studies seek to connect and synthesize ideas, approaches, and findings across the multiple levels of analysis that constitute FPA.

Structure and Strategy of This Handbook

By advancing FPA along these trajectories, the Handbook will directly address enduring criticisms of FPA, and position FPA to play leader, bridge builder, and innovator roles. This will both redefine FPA and shape the broader study and understanding of international politics. This Handbook also sets the stage for the next generation of research in the field through the identification of key gaps (i.e., new actors, policy areas, theoretical and methodological approaches), prospects for integration within and beyond the field, and potential impact on critical policy problems.

The first major section of the Handbook connects FPA with *other theoretical traditions in IR*. The chapters in this section explicitly examine the linkages between FPA and the dominant and contemporary theories in IR and public policy. Each chapter examines complementarities as well as any distinct perspective an FPA approach provides. While not exhaustive, we have chosen liberalism, constructivism, feminism, realism, ontological security, securitization theory, ethics, critical IR, and public policy as key theoretical traditions with which FPA can connect.

The Handbook's second section covers the *changing sources of foreign policy*. The chapters in this section review the 'traditional' sources of foreign policy and explore how they challenge, complement, and connect to other IR research. The chapters identify what we know/what we do not know, update the theoretical foundations, assess methodological and empirical options, and make appropriate connections to other 'traditional' sources. The updates in these chapters draw from contemporary work in other disciplines (e.g., psychology, behaviour economics, sociology) and from work in comparative politics and situate this research vis-à-vis other theoretical and empirical traditions in IR. The changing sources of foreign policy covered in this section are culture and identity, national roles, parliaments and parties, executives and bureaucracies, populism and

nationalism, public opinion and media, democratic and autocratic institutions and actors, decision-making approaches, and leader psychology.

The third section of the Handbook is on *foreign policy statecraft*. The chapters in this section review the well-researched areas of foreign policy statecraft and foreign policy issue areas and discuss how they challenge, complement, and connect to other IR research. The chapters identify the state of the art of research on statecraft, update the theoretical foundations, assess methodological and empirical options, and make appropriate connections to other FPA and IR research. The updates in these chapters draw from contemporary work in other disciplines (e.g., history, development studies, economics). The broad categories of statecraft covered in this section are public diplomacy, positive incentives (aid, arms transfers, investment, and trade), coercion, socialization and recognition, reputation and resolve, and strategic narratives and soft power.

The Handbook's fourth section *broadens the actors of foreign policy*. This section goes beyond the big powers / Western states that have been the focus of much research in FPA. It also broadens FP research by applying it to non-state actors. The theme of this section is to theorize 'actor-ness' for the study of foreign policy and explore how this relates to larger debates within IR scholarship. Each chapter reviews this area of research, examines any differences between our general knowledge of foreign policy and what we know/expect with the actor covered in the chapter, and assesses the comparative advantage that FPA brings to existing research on these actors. Actors covered in this section are emerging powers, small states, middle powers, international organizations, non-state actors, and substate governments.

The final section *bridges the gap between FPA and policy-makers and policy problems*. The chapters in this section outline what FPA scholarship and an FPA perspective say to some of the big policy problems facing the international community. This section includes chapters on organized crime, climate change, nuclear weapons, immigration, development, human rights, and global health. The chapters in this section address the challenges of academia engaging in the policy-making world. It also makes clear the importance of an FPA approach to issues often considered the purview of IR theorizing.

The argument about the centrality of foreign policy and the distinct contribution of FPA serves as the main theme of the Handbook and is

addressed in each chapter, including agenda-setting suggestions for future research. The chapters in this Handbook take an explicitly comparative perspective (consistent with the foundations of the field). A key goal of this Handbook is to speak to authors all over the world, not just to FPA scholars typically based in the United States. While much of FPA theory has originated in the US, the need to understand foreign policy processes across the world is paramount. The applicability of FPA theory and methods, as well as novel contributions from their application elsewhere in the world, is a theme across several chapters. This will provide comparative empirical findings for many propositions advanced in FPA. It will also help further integrate Comparative Politics with IR—placing FPA at the centre of these disciplines.

Overall, this Handbook adopts a methodologically and theoretically pluralist perspective. Where relevant, the following chapters explicitly consider methodological challenges and innovations. What methodological hurdles prevent progress at the current time? What kinds of data are needed to push an area forward? What new methods are beginning to produce novel insights in the area? Some of the chapters also consider developments in cognate disciplines that may help push FPA forward, theoretically and methodologically. Most importantly, we have asked the contributors to this Handbook to look beyond traditional ways of thinking about FPA to lead the way to the future of this field of study.

Conclusion

The contributors to this Handbook take as their main charge the goal of repositioning the subfield of FPA to a central analytic location within the study of IR. FPA and IR were intellectually closer together early in the discipline's history, but they have clearly drifted apart for a variety of reasons. This undoubtedly includes the discipline's realist origins, which often eschews domestic politics in the conduct of foreign affairs. This normative claim by practitioners of realpolitik was then codified into the discipline through the introduction of levels of analysis, and the obsession with systemic theorizing associated with the Cold War period. FPA's own internal dynamics led to the promise and failure to produce a grand theory of foreign policy with the CFP research programme. The aftermath of CFP

led to a decision-making turn whose focus on individuals and small groups seemed far away from the high politics of neorealist theorizing. Whatever internal disciplinary or external event-driven reasons may be responsible for the drifting apart of FPA and IR, we suggest that the time is right to reunite them for mutual gain.

More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, we suggest that scholars in both IR and FPA have abandoned the theoretical distinction between systemic and unit-level theorizing advocated by Waltz. IR has increasingly turned towards domestic politics, decision-making, agency, practice, and subjectivity in its explanations. Yet it has done so without much reference to the long-standing research programmes within FPA that link domestic and international politics. All throughout the period where IR and FPA diverged, FPA maintained explanations that were multi-factorial, multi-level, multi-/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent oriented, and actor specific (Hudson 2005). IR, whether it knows it or not, needs FPA at this moment of disillusionment with IR theorizing.

FPA also needs IR. IR may force FPA to confront some of its perceived weaknesses, including that it is isolated within the discipline, it is state-centric (despite its central focus on decision-making), that its policy relevance is not always clear (despite its commitment to 'bridge the gap' between policy-makers and academia), and its theoretical foundations and methodological techniques are in need of updating.

This volume represents some of the best thinking on the current state and future possibilities for FPA in relation to IR. Whether our goal to reposition FPA at the centre of IR is achieved is obviously in part a question of disciplinary sociology, but the intellectual material with which to do so is contained within the pages of this Handbook. FPA can be a leader within IR, it can build bridges to other disciplines and even subfields within Political Science, and through these connections can continue to innovate theoretically and methodologically to produce better knowledge about what occurs between and across international agents as a result of the actions of individuals or groups of human decision-makers.

Notes

1. See Hudson (2005, 2018) for review of the field, including its historical roots.
2. Ironically, the conceptual material used to make the central claim 'anarchy is what states make of it' is drawn directly from role theory as developed in FPA. Wendt (1999) argues that during

the social act, if states treat each other as enemies, then we should expect a Hobbesian culture of anarchy to emerge, if friends then a Kantian culture, and if rivals, then a Lockean culture. The debt to role theory that was introduced to FPA by K. J. Holsti (1970) and subsequent scholarship is largely ignored.

3. Other state-of-the-art taking exercises include the *International Studies Review* forum in 2003 edited by Garrison, Vertzberger's 2002 article/chapter, and Hellmann and Jorgensen's 2015 *Theorizing Foreign Policy in a Globalized World*.
4. And in his related 1994 article.

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PART I

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND OTHER THEORETICAL TRADITIONS

CHAPTER 2

Foreign Policy Analysis and Liberalism

AMELIA HADFIELD

INTRODUCTION

How does liberalism contribute to foreign policy analysis (FPA), both in theory and in practice? Liberalism is a group of perspectives, both classical and contemporary, which focuses on how individuals, markets, and states operate at domestic and international levels. What unifies those three levels of analysis (individual, market, and state) is the sanctity accorded to the individual 'self'—be it individual or national, and the inviolability of rights, and liberties, accorded to all selves that make up collectives. For example, human rights are accorded to individuals (and some specific group-based rights to communities), commercial rights are accorded to markets, and democratic representation enshrined within states.

Within the area of FPA, liberalism plays a vital role, providing FPA—as a subfield of International Relations (IR) with its cardinal focus on domestic politics, decision-making processes, and the interdependence of structures and agents (Hudson 2016). Liberalism's legacy within FPA is vital in this respect, and has nurtured key conceptual and empirical outputs on—for example—the role of international organizations operating with sovereign states as members, the process by which national leaders make decisions on behalf of their national constitutions, institutions, and civil society at domestic and international levels. Like realism, liberalism operates within FPA to highlight 'policy relevance', but unlike realism's focus on state-centric dynamics, liberalism's approach is more bottom-up, and self-focused. A liberal starting point for foreign policy practice, and FPA itself, is therefore a social, 'self'-focused ontology, based on progressive change enabling prosperity, peace, and ultimately interdependence between individuals, communities, and states.

Approaching individuals, markets, and states through 'liberal lenses' therefore has 'direct effects' on foreign policy, largely because of the differences between liberal and other approaches (chiefly structural realism) that privilege not just the overarching and determinative role of the international system, but the constraints upon its contents in adopting singular, rather than pluralist, relations with each other. However, simple comparisons are notoriously difficult to sustain, both in theory and practice. As will be seen, liberalism's spectrum is now so wide as to incorporate power-based aspects familiar to realists (empire, intervention, sanctions) as well as ideational-based aspects that complicate liberalism within institutions and nations (absolute vs. relative gains, nationalism, populism). As this chapter explores, there is no single linear liberal philosophy, but rather ever-contested options about the self, rights, and representation, and interdependence between national and international realms. As an analytical starting point for foreign policy, liberalism provides a wealth of perspectives, from basic security communities driven by largely Westphalian imperatives (Mastanduno 2007) to ground-breaking supranational regional entities transcending core principles of sovereignty (Wagner 2017). As the body of FPA reveals, however, the abiding liberal concern is with progressive, individuated opportunities to transcend (realist) preoccupations with state-centric power.

In doing so, liberalism brings with it a system that helpfully individualizes, and humanizes, the international state system by cracking open the 'black box' of a generic state unit, allowing a whole range of identities, ideas, interests, and institutions to flow forth. This provides both FPA and foreign policy decision-makers alike with a far more accurate—but complex—appreciation of what defines states (i.e., their essential *statehood*), as well as what drives and motives them (i.e., their preferred form of *statecraft*). This heightens our ability to identify behavioural patterns, and even to predict outcomes. But liberalism also highlights the grave risks of a system that is—in the early 21st century—something of a victim of its own success, in which liberal statehood can now contain highly illiberal content and liberal statecraft produce illiberal outcomes. As explored below, deploying liberal axioms regarding rights, representative democracy, and peace is found within a range of traditional and contemporary foreign policy approaches in both IR and FPA, including well-known exemplars like democratic peace theory (DPT) (Doyle 1997).

However, alternative, more contemporary approaches, including Kurki's work on IR as a 'study of "multiplicity" ' (2020: 560), and on-going developments in neoclassical realism (NCR) (Ripsman et al. 2016) may represent equally conceptually robust examples of liberalism at work in FPA, helping to further the way in which liberalism continues to analytically inform FPA and vice versa. This chapter explores this fascinating interplay in the following four sections. First, the basic rights and freedoms enshrined in liberalism are explained in terms of their institutionalization with the modern 'liberal state', and the principles that make up liberal 'statehood'. On this foundation, the contribution of liberalism as an analytical starting point to, and avenue through, FPA is then analysed. This is followed by a third section that connects liberal statehood to key examples of liberal statecraft, ranging from its predominance as a global template to recent illiberal incursions at national and international levels. The chapter concludes by reviewing the implications of these shifts on the future use and application of liberalism within FPA.

Liberal Statehood and Foreign Policy Opportunities

Based on the fundamental importance of the freedom of the individual, liberalism as a form of *domestic governance* is grounded in three sets of interrelated entitlements connecting individual, commercial and governmental rights:

> *Individual*: moral freedom, juridical equality, civic rights, consent;
> *Commercial*: private property and ownership of means of production: neoconservative 'laissez-faire' vs. neoliberal social democratic welfare approaches;
> *Governmental*: consent-based representative government, rule of law, republican institutions.

These three characteristics essentially constitute the 'liberal state'. Liberalism's cardinal principle is that of freedom. The liberal state enshrines in its constitution moral freedom (in which individuals are not mere objects but enjoy the right to be treated as individual, ethical subjects), which on the premise of reciprocity generates rights institutionalized at the collective level (for communities, states, and markets) and the international level (institutions and laws). These three characteristics and foundational freedoms bequeath the liberal state with a spectrum of foreign policy options ranging from the wholly normative to the robustly rationalist in

terms of defending or advancing their international motivation and commitment, as well as choosing to operate as constrained or active in terms of their foreign political and economic goals. As Doyle makes clear, the overriding impact of liberalism on foreign policy is a state 'subject to neither the external authority of other states nor the internal authority of special prerogatives … over foreign policy' (2016: 55).

Beyond this, the liberal state is steeped in four core institutions, the first two encompass commercial aspects, the latter two relate to representation and the sovereign nature of the state itself. First, within the group of rights entailed under 'negative freedom', individual rights to private property (including the means of production) is enshrined both as a limit on state ownership (e.g., monopolies) and as a catalyst to expand the various economic rights of individuals. The result is that many liberal states have variants of market (rather than state) socialism or a mixed economy. Second, rather than being controlled explicitly by the state, economic, financial, and trade-based decisions are chiefly (though not exclusively) influenced by market-based forces of supply and demand at national and international levels. While key areas regarding regulation see states cooperating to harmonize various standards and forms of behaviour, the majority of liberal capitalist democracies operate market-driven philosophies, viewing them as key to state cooperation.

Third, as illustrated above, within liberal states individuals enjoy both 'juridical equality' and a range of civic rights that both accompany and underwrite economic rights, ensuring their ability to operate (and be treated) as ethic subjects. The fourth institution is that of the state itself, and the quality of its sovereignty. While liberalism is heavily premised on the role of the individual, and predicated on the rights accorded to individuals, including freedom from arbitrary authority, the state itself is also accorded freedom from supervening external authorities, guaranteeing it the right to non-intervention in its domestic affairs. States gain internal legitimacy to safeguard both the individual rights of their citizens and their own right as a state from their representative institutions; these provide both the consent of the electorate, in terms of a given government, and the freedom as a state to exercise that authority free from external restraint (including the right to preserve the rights of its own citizens). This internal legitimacy is externalized further through the recognition of peer states in the international order. Taken together, internal and external legitimacy obtain

in the sovereignty of the liberal states. This is of supreme importance for liberalism's overall impact on foreign policy because it establishes a system in which 'the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor the internal authority of special prerogatives' (Doyle 1983: 55–56).

From a foreign policy perspective, the challenge is two-fold. First, the challenge is to understand how these various tenets of liberalism and institutional bedrocks can conceivably be drawn together into a workable canon within FPA, operating identifiably as of 'liberal foreign policy'. In doing so, an understanding is needed of how liberal foreign policy contributes to and influences the body of FPA relative to the contrasting axioms of competing theories. Second, the challenge is to understand how liberalism, in terms of statehood (i.e., the self-identified composition of a state) and statecraft (i.e., its chosen outputs), is preferentially identified, practiced, and justified by decision-makers in states (and organizations), specifically seeking to understand how 'liberal foreign policy' obtains in terms of inputs and outputs in contrast to other forms of foreign policy, as well as the impact of the most central part of liberal foreign policy, i.e. liberal internationalism, on previous and current world orders.

Liberal Principles and Liberal Statehood

First, individual rights and freedoms vested in statehood (resting on three freedoms) align with liberal statecraft that supports (if imperfectly) groups of states (or Locke's 'commonwealths') that build and maintain peace with each other (Doyle 1983). Liberal statehood is committed to practices that build mutual trust, that ensure equality before the law, and to working to identify, deepen, and codify links between like-minded liberal states capable of functioning as a zone of peace. However, imperfectly upheld freedoms, or partial forms of peace, periodically erode this structure, leaving unrepresentative principles, enfeebled institutions, unenforceable laws, and a treacherously uneven commitment to international principles, permitting both the overzealous application of liberal principles *and* lacklustre support of liberal states at crucial points in human history.

Second, in combining social and economic rights, liberal statehood unites democracy and capitalism as a method of ensuring individual freedom over property, allowing liberal statecraft to unify around the cross-border benefits of trade and commerce. Denizens of views combine in this category to ensure 'soothing commerce', managed by representative

governments to produce and export a democratic capitalist model capable of keeping the peace by keeping open the market. In doing so, both the international composition of the state and its social structure are transformed, and guided not by a supervening political authority but rather by the invisible hand of market forces. Peace itself is a structured outcome of capitalism, on the one hand, and democracy on the other. Liberal statecraft suffers however from widespread differences in the preferred format of democracy across liberal states, unevenness in their various applications of capitalism, resulting in the inability to constrain political egoism and economic competitiveness, with major transnational forces, including globalization, poorly reflective of achievable, global liberal ends.

Third, and perhaps most robust, is the connection between liberal state units themselves in terms of their preferred form of government, the tools by which to establish and safeguard both individual rights and international peace, and the necessary and sufficient requirements to construct, maintain, and develop multi-level interdependence (Doyle 2008). Representative republican governments are founded on the separation of powers necessary to ensure both representation and democratic governance, and, while likely cooperate innately with like-minded liberal states, they need perpetually to safeguard the quality of their freedom and commitment to peace. Principled, codified respect for rights and freedom for citizens within liberal states help to define liberal statehood. Liberal statecraft based on respect for rights, non-discrimination, and trust in codified principles and agreements can ensure that trust among liberal republics can flourish and pave the way to economic and political cooperation with non-liberal republics, or non-republic states; but these are also vulnerable to the differing interpretation, application, and enforcements of the self-same rights and tools.

The highest form of liberal statecraft—that of genuine interdependence between states permitting the material, permanent reduction of conflict is contingent on the quality of the liberal statehood arising from liberal states, the depth of their own investment in the system (as agents), and the strength of the system itself (as a structure) to absorb and dampen conflictual tendencies while promoting cooperative opportunities. Material benefits remain a perennial problem, with security, economic, and political costs tilting interdependent systems back to nationally motived preferences.

As explained above, each of these overarching principles directly connect *liberal statehood to liberal statecraft*. This is key for FPA, first in order to

point to *identifiably liberal foreign policies* as a preferred and repeatable practice by states, and second to accept the overarching *explanatory power* of liberal foreign policy regarding state preferences and outcomes within the canon of FPA. The connections themselves also provide the surface area (as explored below) to identify historic and contemporary *case studies* of each of the three categories of individual, commercial, and governmental applications of liberal foreign policy. These connections also indicate the increasing range of liberal foreign policies that either defy easy categorization within these categories, or—more troublingly—present extremely *illiberal counter-examples* in either the composition of liberal statehood or its application in liberal statecraft.

LIBERALISM AND FPA

Liberalism provides FPA with a helpful analytical starting point, bequeathing FPA with a focus on domestic levels of analysis, leader-based aspects of decision-making, and the dynamic (rather than pre-given) relationship of actors within an overarching structure, all of which illuminate the composition of statehood as definably liberal in many states, and statecraft as consciously liberal in intent. Derived largely from the development of post-war IR theory, there are a number of key principles defining the role of liberalism within contemporary FPA.

First, within FPA, liberal foreign policy largely discounts the international system as irredeemably anarchic, with foreign policy decision premised solely upon conflict. Instead, change and progress represent the central dynamic enabling peace and stability, either through benign balances of power (including the role of a hegemon) or regional and international organizations. This bequeaths liberal foreign policy-makers with a range of both rational choices in terms of security requirements and normative possibilities over the promulgation of shared values by which to gradually attenuate power struggles between states, and keep the focus on domestic-level needs, and the national ‘self’.

Second, liberal foreign policy essentially replicates the national-level approaches to public goods, regarding them as vital to sustaining prosperity and peace, and demanding either altruistic or collective strategies to provide or regulate such goods. Ideally, liberal foreign policy decision-making

operates simultaneously at national *and* international levels to ensure (or enforce) responsibility within the system for the provision of public goods, reducing self-help tendencies (e.g., bandwagonning or isolation) and establishing instead structural incentive.

Third, liberalism generally aligns constructively within the contours of FPA in its emphasis on state-based progress, the spread of core beliefs to incentivize good behaviour leading to interdependent opportunities. Liberalism's logic of individual rights and collective obligations tips FPA as a canon away from the consequentialist template of realism towards the use of institutionalized principles, helping to embed—*inter alia*—democracy, human rights, and the rule of law within the international system to enhance the quality of current global governance. However, in doing so, we must ask whether liberalism also plays a somewhat uncritical role within FPA? Does it set up decision-makers for naïve options, undoable strategies, and national risk-taking that could have deleterious international consequences? Does liberalism's wholesale faith in the human condition blind decision-makers steeped in an ontology of the social self to the realities of power, acquisition, and insecurity? As a point of departure for foreign policy decision-making, liberalism is as likely as realism to be used to simultaneously critique the methods of those in power and to be extolled as a template for wielding power.

Beyond this trinity of axioms, all liberal foreign policy analyses are founded upon an individual, social ontology, which underwrites the range of moral, republican, commercial, national, and international variants within the school as a whole. This self-based, social ontology entails a clear focus on three subsequent areas, central to defining the composition of liberal statehood and the intent of liberal statecraft.

Of key consideration here is the central role within FPA of liberalism's dedication to analysing the domestic politics (as a level of analysis) and decision-making processes (as the key national dynamic) as vital to foreign policy outcomes. As a framework for FPA, liberalism offers a discretely individuated approach representing individuals and communities within the wider unit of the nation-state itself. In doing so, liberalism attempts to reflect at the international level both the composition and the origins of the 'liberal state' through its subsequent preferences (national interest) and ensuing behaviour (foreign policy). One of liberalism's strongest assets in exporting its domestic credentials to the international level is that of

common values derived from national constitutions and public institutions. As Nussbaum explains, drawing upon hard won philosophies of human progress 'political liberalism starts from the idea of equal respect', founded on political principles safeguarding diversity and liberty (2015: 70); internationalizing constitutionalized ideals requires not only that political principles operating between states 'still have a moral content' but actively requires what Nussbaum calls 'capability', i.e. developing and 'creating enabling conditions' (2015: 70–71) in order to ensure recognizably liberal morals represent both statehood and the practice of statecraft. In this way, liberalism provides FPA scholarship with vital avenues of analysis to explore in terms of the domestic dynamics and the transformational process involved in this respect, and decision-makers with 'an attractive set of goals, which would then be implemented primarily by individual nations, but also through a thin system of international agencies and agreements' (Nussbaum 2015: 77).

Second, within the domestic focus that liberalism affords FPA are two further variables: the role of domestic institutions, and the impact of individual and collective decision-making. Thanks to consistent liberal engagement with its own literature, FPA is far more developed in its treatment of both than realism (Narizny 2017), having produced copious amounts of theory and increasingly formidable analytical results. This is largely because of liberalism's profound legacy within FPA in this particular area, as well as the dominance of US-based theorizing from the 1960s onwards, allowing FPA to focus deeply 'on foreign policy decision making and implementation by individuals and collectives of individuals' (Brummer and Hudson 2017: 157). Consistent with the 'operational code approach', liberalism's individuated ontology puts 'individual decision makers front and centre in the explanation of foreign policy', with a heavy emphasis on both their leadership qualities and their belief systems (Walker 2003: 245). Individual decision-makers employ their beliefs in reaching decisions, ranging from cultural and philosophical standpoints, contextualizing their choices and instrumental views guiding them in both short-term tactics and long-term strategy.

Unsurprisingly, as Brummer and Hudson point out, '[d]ifferences in decision makers' beliefs lead to different policy preferences and ultimately to different policy preferences', providing FPA with unlimited case studies in the 'boundedness and bias' arising from the use of core beliefs like

liberalism to both reflect state principles (statehood) and guide foreign policy-making (statecraft) (2017: 159). Digging down into the cognitive sources of both individual and collective leaders, liberalism illustrates a fascinating opportunity for FPA to retain its focus on decision-making by allying itself with psychology and neuroscience via approaches including the poliheuristic theory (PHT) of decision-making (Mintz 1993; Gross-Stein 2016). Against the context of belief systems, decision-makers variously select and reject options depending on how closely they correspond to pre-defined templates, usually domestic and/or ideological, enabling them to retain or jettison strategies based on both overall utility and domestic cost (Brummer and Hudson 2017: 161). Social psychology has also contributed to FPA for decades to highlight both small- and large-group dynamics that both help and hinder the quality of domestic decision-making, with implications for foreign policy-making (Janis 1982; Mitchell and Massoud 2009).

Finally, liberalism bequeaths to FPA the most complex of challenges, situating its predominantly domestic ontology squarely within the international terrain, amidst systemic forces of power, authority, acquisitiveness, and conflict. There are two modes by which IR theory and FPA have approached this challenge: the agency-structure debate, and the two-level game. The former is steeped in the intellectual traditions of IR entailing whole subsets of agency related to causality vs. constitutive, and structure vs. system dyads, with liberalism injecting degrees of symmetry into realist preferences for top-down, parsimonious explanations of power within IR. Based on the pioneering work of Putnam (1988), the two-level game continues the individuated approaches explored above, but places special emphasis on the unique and uneasy interdependence that individual decision-makers face 'between the international negotiation and the domestic ratification of international agreements' (Brummer and Hudson 2017: 164). Putnam lays out two essential domains within and between which all national decision-makers must negotiate as skilfully as possible: the international (Level I) and the national (Level II), to ensure that any agreement forged between states can be successfully ratified domestically. While achieving a win in either is a challenge, only a 'win-set' in both can produce fruitful foreign policies necessary for stable bilateral agreements and building and maintaining multilateral organizations.

Within FPA, the two-level game provides an ideal microcosm for the most powerful form of liberalism: the exportability of a family of values to help *constitute* bodies of understanding (e.g., international law), and regulate the content and output of bodies of interaction (e.g., international organizations). In doing so, the two-level game demonstrates both the successes and the failures that have met past and present decision-makers in attempting to transpose key liberal norms from individual and national zones to international terrains (Evans et al. 1993), using a spectrum of rational alignment, from normative recognition to profound examples of ideological and systemic interdependence. The way in which these have produced both highs and lows for liberalism as a form of international behaviour, and its impacts on FPA is explored in the final two sections.

Liberal Statecraft

Within the sphere of FPA, these shared commonalities of the liberal states give rise to and enable the persistence of patterns of discernibly liberal behaviour between states. In other words, liberal preferences (on the basis of the above tenets) are found to be permanently at work in determining the choices of states in engaging on issues of power, authority, the distribution of gains, and the modes of conflict and cooperation in the international system. In this way, liberal foreign policy is understood to both reflect and transcend individual states, in outputs that visibly affect individual states (as agents), their capacity to act in the international system (in the form of agency) and structure of the overarching international system (of which they are a constitutive part). Three, points ought to be noted here. First, as above, liberalism has bequeathed to FPA the centrality of domestic content, particularly the process by which nation-states and individual decision-makers export recognizably liberal norms to international structures. This permits FPA to uniquely analyse both the composition of the liberal state in its statehood and the behavioural consequences of liberal foreign policy in its statecraft. Second, despite liberalism's doctrinal pre-eminence in Western philosophy, paradigmatic dominance in IR theory, and analytic importance in FPA, its origins are still distinctly Western, and struggles to translate the sheer number of ideological variants into a single ontology,

cohesive epistemology, or workable methodology. As Grovogui observed presciently:

> Either by benign neglect or sheer intellectual hubris, the vast majority of Western theorists have forsaken the idea of an alternative conceptualization of foreign policy that might differ in both substance and ethos from that which emerged from modern Europe … Thus the prevailing models of foreign policy are derived from extrapolations on selective Western experiences and posited as immutable traditions.
>
> (2003: 31)

Third, as illustrated in examples of liberal statecraft below, and quite possibly related to the 'alternative conceptualizations' suggested by Grovogui, liberalism—as a uniquely domestic theory—has at times undergone a fundamental, and sometimes distorting, transformation in its application to the international realm. In doing so, the initial series of liberal freedoms and opportunities are shifted and even radically misapplied, sometimes with ironically highly illiberal consequences. While these shifts have been analysed in some quarters including IR (Luce 2018; Ikenberry 2020), FPA has yet to fully grasp or articulate the implications of recent 'illiberal turns' in terms of foreign policy-making. Further 'state of the art' reflections on FPA are provided in the conclusion.

Transposed to the international dimension, liberal statecraft has the potential to connect like-minded and incompatible states in terms of their composition, commercial, and international rights. As Doyle has pointed out, the chief principle of liberal statecraft is that liberal states recognize both themselves and others as both democratic and liberal, and therefore shared recipients of a liberal peace that can be internationalized sufficiently to represent a 'zone of liberal peace' (Doyle 2016: 65). Within this zone, liberal states defer from conflict with each other, but are likely to defend their liberal principles against perceived incursions by non-liberal states. As explored below, liberal statecraft runs the gamut of possible outcomes. At best, liberalism's contribution to foreign policy behaviour is reliably positive-sum, premised largely on a liberal grand strategy stretching from late-19th-century liberal internationalism to contemporary DPT. At worst, liberal statecraft spirals into zero-sum outcomes, with liberal states peculiarly vulnerable to imprudent aggressiveness and interventionism, on the one hand, and supine complaisance on the other (Doyle 2016: 59–65). Examples below include contemporary instances of where ideological tensions and practical limitations have undermined liberalism's carrying

capacity as a sustainable international template. Consequentially, this has produced examples of explicit resistance to liberalism or contortions of liberalism, raising queries over its utility as a mode of 21st-century governance, and its analytical vulnerability within FPA more broadly.

Liberal Dominance and Sustainability

Before venturing further into the construction of liberal statecraft and its role in contributing to liberal foreign policy, one key question needs to be addressed: is liberal foreign policy a 'grand strategy'? In other words, where do we find evidence of liberal values affecting both the structure of the international system and the agency of its various state and non-state units? Liberal perceptions argue for the mutual co-constitution of states, and within their structure and the structure of its states, eschewing both the explicitly determinist, power-oriented nature of the system and the functional non-differentiation of its states. In privileging agency over structure, liberalism argues for the role of actors, the society they build, the values to which they adhere, and the exportability of those values to the international level. However, the structure that then replicates and institutionalizes those key principles is vital in ensuring that liberal foreign policy is effectively captured and retained in a space that both represents and transcends states.

Taken together, this may suggest the form of a grand strategy, the question is whether this constitutes an active or passive strategy. The settled liberal order arguably represents the passive aspect of a neoliberal grand strategy, while the agential implementation and spread of liberal values represents its active component. In terms of the former, as Peterson argues, liberalism in the form of an 'international society' 'is buttressed by advanced regional cooperation and international organisations and law that have steadily gained in strength, authority and legitimacy', arguing that in even in terms of recent anomalies, 'the liberal international system of states limits the agency of potential change agents such as Trump because all states, including powerful ones like the US, benefit from its existence' (2018: 30).

The shift from passive to active grand strategy is effectuated in two key ways: the functional force of the structure itself and the willingness of its states to defend it. Post-1945 for example, 'a progressively more forceful liberal structure emerged that increasingly constrained the choices of agents

or statespersons', yielding to a post-Cold War environment in which 'virtually all states sought to become members of the liberal order', espousing what Peterson refers to as 'the three hallmarks of the liberal international order: democracy, liberal economics and international cooperation' (Peterson 2018: 30–31). In terms of willingness to defend this trinity, states have opted for various forms of interventionism. Aligned initially with human security (rather than overt regime change) 'US-led humanitarian intervention to try to limit the bloodshed of internecine conflicts appeared to become something like a norm of the liberal order' (Peterson 2018: 31). With and after Iraq, however—and further complicated by the rise and seeming resilience of illiberal instances including Trump—there are now serious questions regarding the core liberal philosophies being used to justify both modes of intervention, and 'the durability of the liberal order' itself.

The strongest example of structured liberal dominance is the 'cluster of ideas about how to build world order—starting with the liberal democracies—to realize the gains from modernity and guard against its dangers' (Ikenberry 2020: xiii). As Ikenberry argues, what fuses these (and other) liberal variants in producing an overarching liberal tradition 'is the cooperative organization and reform of international order so as to protect and facilitate the security, welfare, and progress of liberal democracy' (2020: xi–xii). Liberalism represents a complex mix of theories and associated practices. Within FPA and IR these represent a long-established conceptual foundation; within foreign policy practice, they operate as belief systems upon which to base actions. The liberal tradition is thus deeply situated in its various historical context (i.e., making further instances of liberal statecraft highly contingent) as well as deeply institutionalized in the macro-governance of the international system so as to appear quasi-permanent.

As a political project, liberalism rests on clear but highly exportable values regarding ethical behaviour and interests regarding the balance of states within the state system. States draw upon progress in terms of modernization, commercial and political interdependence, the codification of behavioural precepts in treaty-based agreements and their socialization, and institutionalization in intergovernmental organizations.

For Ikenberry it is the transposition of liberal statehood as a domestic policy to liberal statecraft as an international template for global

governance in which the risks most clearly lie. Trump, and Trumpism may be an aberration of sorts—but only in terms of the sheer extremism of Trump's preferred approach—rather than in terms of the overall appearance and mainstreaming of illiberal governance within national and international realms. While great power rogues like Russia and China together represent potent external 'illiberal challenges to the Western liberal order', the true dilemma is as follows:

> Equally profound challenges are coming from within the liberal democratic world itself—reactionary nationalism, populist authoritarianism, and attacks on openness and the rule of law. Today's liberal internationalists are once again forced to return to the most basic questions. What are the prospects for liberal democracy? … How can the conflicting values at the heart of liberal order—liberty and equality—openness and social solidarity, sovereignty and interdependence—be brought back into balance? … is there a future for liberal internationalism as a way of organizing global relations and making the world safe for democracy? On what geopolitical and intellectual foundation can liberal internationalism plant its flag?
>
> (2020: xii)

Two possible solutions remain on offer. The first is the long-standing possibility for a durable peace among liberal democracies, as enshrined in DPT, putting agent-structure tensions to work in the service of peace building. The second, promising to outflank DPT conceptually and provide enhanced analytical clout within FPA is NCR. While the latter may appear an odd choice, the appreciably large liberal foundation upon which it rests will keep liberal statehood and statecraft in the conceptual service of FPA scholars for years to come.

DPT and NCR

The core principle of DPT is the absence of war between liberal democracies, which as a distinct foreign policy remains an enduring template for FPA and IR scholars, and policy-makers alike. Resting atop the liberal confluence of peace between nations and democratic state structures, DPT posits that democracies are not only inherently pacific in their treatment of each other, but they reduce the chances of violence in their actions with non-liberal states with 'the pacifying effects of liberal democracy', reliably (if gradually) diffusing norms globally to mitigate violence at the system level (Coetzee and Hudson 2012: 260). Its unit-level focus incorporates a wide variety of socio-political, economic, and military variables, enabling both patterned behaviour and case-specific observations.

DPR also engages with the agent-structure problem, along micro-level constitutional liberalism to reinforce both meso-level democratic structures and macro-level norms to produce for both FPA and IR alike a workable liberal theory of IR. While DPT is likely to remain a liberal staple, equal if not greater usage of liberal principles may be found—somewhat surprisingly—within the emerging variant of NCR (Ripsman et al. 2016). First, as argued by Coetzee and Hudson, NCR offers a more substantial unit-based foundation, which is helpful to liberalism from a unit of analysis perspective, helping to challenge the generic 'liberal assumptions of contemporary 'one-size-fits-all' peace building found in core FPA approaches (2012: 257). More importantly, NCR may—by treating domestic variables as 'intervening' rather than subservient to structural variables—deepen the overall use of uniquely liberal dynamics operating at national and subnational levels, providing a better analysis of foreign policy sources. This in turn may enable an improved understanding of how liberal practices and values contribute to the critical intersection of national and international levels. Much remains for both approaches. DPT still requires a better explanation of the how liberal democracies operate causally to produce peace, on the one hand, and persistent belligerence towards non-liberal states on the other. NCR needs to extract the best of liberal and realist dynamics in its simultaneous inclusion of unit and systemic variables. Absent decent analysis, both programmes run the risk of becoming unfalsifiable, i.e. applying to foreign policy in terms so generic that they ultimately explain very little of substance.

The Conflicting Values of Liberal Statecraft

One of the clearest conflicts arises from the uneasy tension found not between the clash of realism and liberalism, but in the very areas that they have in common: power, authority, sovereignty, and the rational management of the state system. In many senses, the two traditions retain shared perspectives on the use of statehood to craft sovereignty, the use of statehood as a bulwark against anarchy, and the management of 'international space' to mitigate insecurity and promote material and commercial stability. Where realists concede merely to coping with the impact of unpredictable global forces on individual states, liberals generally adhere to the strengths and legitimacy afforded by enshrined rights, the

robustness of democracy, and the pliability of capital structures with a view not merely towards progress but to outright prosperity.

Liberalism differs from realism not only in its complete reliance on the contingency of the liberal democratic template but also the deeply normative philosophy on which it rests, namely that liberal internationalism *ought* to exist as the prime, and ideal, global structure. Realists operate in a world which appears far more pre-determined in terms of power and its distribution, and the type of state behaviour this creates, but the unlikeliness of determining any form of governance as 'ideal' beyond what is merely practical. What both camps share is a pragmatic approach to moderating anarchy and mediating the impulses of power in a world of competing powers and ideologies. Both view sovereignty as necessary and immutable (though, for liberals, possibly capable of applying beyond the nation-state and on occasion being transcended), with forms of interdependence possible (though with varying degrees of reliability).

Indeed, it is upon the two concepts of sovereignty and interdependence that liberal foreign policy demonstrates both its greatest strength and its most excruciating weakness: interpreting the sheer lengths to which rights, freedoms, and obligations can be carried and enshrined. Sovereignty is viewed by realists as a necessary bulwark against both unpredictable and supervening use of force; working together in loose associations to establish clear security alliances is a rational response. For liberals, the sovereign state contains and defends all manner of individual, commercial, social, and governmental rights accruing to a national community. Crucially, liberalism chiefly interprets sovereignty to represent *democratic governance* just as much as it represents the predominant template for states themselves. States in this sense are both 'hands-off', in terms of their independence as sovereign units and 'hands-on' in terms of interdependence with other states when embedded explicitly in multilateral institutions and international law, and implicitly into a wider form of international society.

When sovereignty and interdependence work symbiotically, they serve to reinforce key liberal codes and increase the durability of liberal foreign policy as the preferred method of systemic interaction. However, clashes are frequent and problematic. Taken to extremes however, democracy hardens adherence to sovereignty as a more absolutism template, as well as untrammelled populism conducive to authoritarianism internally. Free and fair elections can succumb to extraterritorial meddling and domestic

obstruction; inbuilt democratic freedoms (association, speech, press, and assembly) can be incorrectly interpreted and unevenly recognized, with the capacity to undermine the legislative, executive, and judiciary organs, and societal tolerance more broadly. Described as the 'democratic triad', popular sovereignty, liberty, and rule of law constitute the inner workings of liberal statehood (Diamond 2021). The chief question here however is durability; echoing a strain found within all liberal political philosophy, liberalism's triad—while embedded it may not necessarily be permanent.

Shapeshifting: The Dangers of Morphing Liberalism to Liberal Internationalism

While less infallible than the realist view, sovereignty encourages liberals to view the state as the prime mode of political organization, and liberal values as sacrosanct—both domestically and internationally—rather than contingent or even alternative. Throughout its emergence, the international system has in fairly routine fashion become inhabited by these self-same liberal states, which in turn have produced a 'widely acceptable way of organizing international relations' (Ikenberry 2020: 6).

The problem is neither the failure of liberalism nor of liberal statecraft as source of liberal foreign policy, but rather that liberal internationalism itself 'has been a victim of its own success. In its Post-Cold War transition from a Western liberal order to a globalized order, it effectively overran its political foundations and undermined in social purposes' (Ikenberry 2020: 6). In other words, liberal's original precepts have now been so extensively reinterpreted, or differentially applied, that they have created fissures in both the structure of contemporary liberal statehood and the system of postmodern liberal statecraft. While liberalism's antecedent ambitions to identify, codify, and defend a domestic liberal order for states successfully established interdependent systems of security, trade, law, and governance, the limits of this same order have possibly been reached. Liberal statehood may allow states to promote liberal values domestically but its 'normative and historically contingent' qualities render it dependent on the universal acceptance of its ethical code, and adherence to the range of rules and institutions that flow from that code at the international level. Liberal statecraft therefore may no longer fully or even partially be able to 'shape the political-institutional and normative environment' that it so successfully fashioned in its own image (Ikenberry 2020: 7).

Liberalism's own conceptual centre is relatively neutral— i.e., based on openness, toleration, and freedom—making it an ideal vehicle onto which to couple other political and economic forces. Some formulae have proved unstoppable, like democracy and capitalism; others, however, including imperialism, nationalism, great-power geopolitics, and even populism and authoritarianism have provided dilutions and oppositions to the original liberal mix. A number of subsequent fragmentations have arisen, each with significant implications for formulations of liberal foreign policy, and conceptual consequences for the role of liberalism within the canon of FPA.

America the Leader vs. America First

One of the greatest recent challenges to liberal statecraft was the 2016 election of US President Donald Trump, which sent shockwaves into the heart of settled domestic and systemic logics underwriting US foreign policy. A number of challenges to liberalism are bound up in the outcome of the election and the subsequent manner in which Trump conducted US foreign policy in the ensuing four years. These range from top-down questions of US hegemony vs. polarization, free trade vs. enhanced protectionism, to mid-order questions on partisanship and state-based dysfunction, to socio-political questions relating to populism and the media, and in doing so severely challenged established understandings of America's role in the international system.

The first of these challenges is perhaps the greatest for the precepts of liberal statecraft: that of America's leading role at the apex of liberal hegemony, a stance largely rejected by Trump. Rather than leadership in the realms of international governance, including shared responsibility for the multilateral, rules-based, free-trade-oriented system, Trump called into question the very principles of the system itself, querying both the role played by America internationally and the cost it incurred in doing so (Peterson 2018). From diplomacy to trade, from climate change to commerce, Trump called first-order issues into question by eschewing many of the long-established free-trade-based structures of the international system, throwing the work of the WTO into chaos, and using tariff wars to indicate both American displeasure with the system and its service to American workers. That the chief challenge to the liberal system and to 'American primacy' would come not from external power shifts or a clear antagonist 'but from the free choice of American voters' called into question the

balance of power afforded by the role of America within the liberal hegemonic order (Musgrave 2019: 3). Musgrave's arguments echo a classic liberal philosophy, namely that liberalism begins at home and is echoed through systems transposed and values agreed upon at the international level. Like Ikenberry, Musgrave argues that America's particular brand of liberal statehood cannot be taken for granted, any more than its preferred form of liberal statecraft can guarantee the future of the international system. For Musgrave however, the chief weakness lies at home: American hegemony cannot perennially propagate an invulnerable 'core', simply because US institutions themselves are fallible, meaning that 'domestic processes in the United States can erode the American political system's ability to commit to hegemonic maintenance. Such maintenance can be costly and requires constant attention' (4). The implications for both liberal statecraft and explicitly liberal foreign policies are detrimental: first because of the risk of a permanent shift within the governing parties of America to ensure an enduring reduction of American leadership within the international system, and second because of the implications to the liberal content of the hegemonic order itself.

Illiberalism and Multi-Polarity

What does the combination of liberalism and recent American examples of illiberalism mean for liberal foreign policy in the global system? Or for our ability to analyse both patterns and anomalies with the body of FPA more broadly? First, while some key axioms remain, many traditional liberal assumptions are being eroded. Atlantic-centred, Western-centric anchor institutions have been rattled by events from Brexit to Trump, from waves of populism to entrenched and combative authoritarianism working within, rather than merely on the fringes of, liberal modes of governance. This has produced an awareness in various quarters of the need for increased institutional pragmatism and national forms of self-help. As argued by Hal Brands, 'the differences between liberal and illiberal forms of government have profound implications for the strategic fitness and competence of the great powers', as well as the range of mid-size and smaller states (2018: 62). More importantly is the tipping or 'inflection point' that occurs when embedded liberal structures are routinely challenged, drawing the battle lines of the 21st century as representing either 'another era of democratic dominance or an age of autocratic ascendancy' (Brands 2021).

The second point is that liberal axioms, including statehood and statecraft, have been surprisingly durable, and may remain so in the future. Under US President Biden, and his G7 and G20 allies, the liberal foundation underwriting the transatlantic alliance stands a good chance of expanding globally in terms of its geopolitical ambitions, and normatively in terms of its value-based remit. This increases the chances of the US and its allies being able to name and shame, chiefly by calling out illiberal practices from outright tyranny to, 'managed democracies' that mimic democratic practices sufficiently well for their citizens to feel they possess the form, if not the content, of the range of liberal rights and freedoms.

Taken together, foreign policy-makers can draw on liberal axioms while also 'losing their ability to anticipate events'; indeed as Luce argues, 'the best foreign policy is conducted by calm minds in possession of the facts—and shielded from the pressure to broadcast instant moral absolutes' (2018: 170). On this basis, FPA needs to draw its conclusions over liberal statehood and statecraft from historic patterns *and* emerging trends. Much of what appears quintessentially liberal is not simply the attractiveness of its value set, but the longevity of its social structures at domestic and international levels. Some of these structures have been badly damaged in recent decades, producing institutional vicissitude, normative trauma, and political polarization. The credibility of 21st-century liberal foreign policy lies therefore both in its *universalizing* ability to overcome polarization and forge a 'bipartisan foreign policy consensus' and in the *localized* ability of its national and regional champions to rework their 'reputation for stability, credibility, and reliability' and in doing so, work liberalism anew (Myrick 2021).

Liberal Challenges and Consequences for FPA

Where might FPA benefit in the future? While liberalism has afforded perhaps the greatest conceptual and empirical well-springs to FPA, there is scope still for cross-fertilization between FPA and realism in enhancing analysis on power and systemic constraints at the national level and its effects on discrete modes of decision-making. As illustrated above, DPT remains useful but imperfect in mapping the likely preferences of liberal states' responses to liberal and illiberal behaviour in the wider system (Rips

man et al. 2016). Despite their differing starting points, scholarly collaboration between FPA's variants of liberalism and NCR may ironically yield more fruitful domestic results in sourcing the origins of national political culture, decision-making, and the use of liberal values within strategic environments (Thies 2010). Indeed, NCR may hold the best promise of permitting greater intellectual reflection between FPA's own realist and liberal content, allowing similarities of approach in the areas of rationalism, strategic decision-making, and two-level dynamics (Putnam 1988).

Liberalism therefore needs to represent more than merely a counter-discourse to both realist foreign policy and realism within FPA, it needs to articulate its own 'grand vision' as persuasively as has realism, enabling scholars to look at 'the still under-explored potential that rests in building bridges between FPA theory and grand IR theory' (Brummer and Hudson 2017: 162). As this chapter has explored, understanding the application of liberalism both to FPA *and* the specific choices employed by states in their foreign policy means connecting forms of *liberal statehood* (understood essentially as 'inputs') to examples of *liberal statecraft* (understood as 'outputs'), which in turn impacts on the composition and overall direction of the international system.

As illustrated above, through the accrued philosophical and political concepts that make up the canon of liberalism, the specific and sustained application of these same principles to state behaviour demonstrates systematic examples of *liberal foreign policy*. From this conceptual foundation, FPA as a discipline can then identify, test, and further analyse their impact at any range of levels: individual, national, regional, institutional, or international. Beyond this, other areas that help FPA eschew the Western-centricism of its liberal components would be a welcome addition, from analysis of the range of strategic cultures underwriting individual decision-making in states around the world, to radical attempts to expand the two-level game to a three-level structure capable of exploring the use of liberal values to affect examples of micro-, meso-, and macro-level governance, or to shed light on new trilateral formats (Brummer and Hudson 2015; Giacalone 2015).

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CHAPTER 3

Foreign Policy Analysis and Public Policy

KLAUS BRUMMER

INTRODUCTION

In the real world, it is often challenging or even outright impossible to ascertain what qualifies as 'genuinely' outward-directed foreign policy as opposed to 'genuinely' inward-directed public policy. Responses to climate change or the Coronavirus pandemic, telecommunications policy which bans foreign companies from domestic markets, or policy-making in highly institutionalized and legalized regional contexts such as the European Union are cases in point. However, in academic scholarship the distinction between foreign/external and domestic/internal seems to be almost as vibrant as ever. Whereas researchers interested in foreign policy use analytical constructs from Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), researchers with an interest in public policies such as health or education draw on Public Policy scholarship which includes theories of the policy process. In this sense, Lentner (2006: 169) argued that the researchers from the respective fields 'seldom employ one another's literature, and they largely draw on different traditions within political science'. True, there has been a recent uptick in efforts towards bringing the two literatures into conversation (e.g., Redd and Mintz 2013), which has shown in particular that Public Policy theories can be successfully applied to explain foreign policy (e.g., Mazarr 2007; Hirschi and Widmer 2010; Mabee 2011; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012; Brummer et al. 2019a). Yet more can be done to explore linkages between the two still by and large separate fields of study (Kaarbo 2019: 218) and, in doing so, to enhance cross-fertilization.

Similar to the introduction to this Handbook which suggests that 'the distinction between international relations (IR) and foreign policy is intellectually bankrupt' (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume), this chapter takes as its point of departure that the separation of policies and

policy-making processes into ‘foreign’ on the one hand and ‘domestic’ on the other is equally no longer tenable—if there ever existed such a clear-cut distinction in the first place (Leira 2019). However, this chapter refrains from engaging yet again in the more abstract discussion on general similarities and differences between foreign and domestic policy and, following from this, whether there can be fruitful interconnections between the literatures of FPA and Public Policy in the first place (Lentner 2006; Charillon 2018; Brummer et al. 2019b; Kaarbo 2019). In my reading of this literature, the discussion has been predominantly affirmative. That is, despite differences between public policy and foreign policy as well as possible drawbacks of applying Public Policy approaches to foreign policy and vice versa (Charillon 2018: 491; Kaarbo 2019: 223–225), there is at the very least a sufficient number of similarities and overlap between foreign and domestic policy and politics to justify continuing and further deepening the dialogue between the respective literatures that according to Charillon (2018: 484) form a ‘natural alliance’.

Therefore, this chapter moves away from this ‘meta-level’ discussion and instead illustrates how the two literatures can benefit from each other by focusing on specific substantive domains. Heeding Lentner’s call, who ‘strongly urge[d] scholars from both subfields to read the literature of the other and to seek insights, knowledge, and methods of attacking the research puzzles of their own respective subfields’ (Lentner 2006: 178), this chapter zooms in on two issue areas that are of interest to both FPA and Public Policy scholars, namely policy change and policy failures, and outlines the benefits that arise from bringing together insights on those issues from the respective fields. The following discussion suggests that FPA can lend nuance to theories of the policy process with respect to grasping the role of political leaders as agents of change or drivers of failure. Conversely, Public Policy can advance FPA by contributing to a better conceptualization and more thorough operationalization of ‘change’ and ‘failure’ as well as by helping to systematize the political processes that lead to those outcomes. Such closer dialogue between FPA and Public Policy not only holds the promise of enhancing our understanding of key political phenomena, thus increasing the policy relevance of scholarship, but also contributes to the repositioning of FPA into the discipline of IR more broadly not least by acting against the perceived isolation of FPA as a field of study (for other suggestions for linking FPA and Public Policy, see

Oppermann in Chapter 15 and Kaarbo and Lantis in Chapter 18 of this volume).

Policy Change

Policy change is ubiquitous in both foreign policy and public policy. Accordingly, a multitude of studies exist in both FPA and Public Policy that explore change, for instance with respect to Germany's pensions policy, China's birth control policy, the bilateral relationship between Greece and Turkey, or US nuclear policy towards Iran (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012; Leifeld 2013; Lantis 2019; Li and Wong 2020). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that researchers from both fields have devoted much attention to conceptualizing as well as empirically tracing the phenomenon of change. However, despite addressing essentially the same questions, there has so far been scant interaction between those literatures. Against this background, the following discussion first introduces core tenets of respectively FPA and Public Policy scholarship on (foreign) policy change and then suggests several avenues for cross-fertilization.

The rather disjointed and eclectic FPA literature on foreign policy change addresses two main questions. The first concerns the conceptualization of change; the other the drivers of change. Regarding the conceptualization of foreign policy change, there is broad agreement in the literature that there is not just one monolithic type of foreign policy change but that differentiation is required. Yet there is considerably less agreement with respect to the operationalization of this insight. Rather, based on different cut-off points or spots on a continuum, the literature points to different types, levels, or degrees of change.

Charles Hermann (1990) offers a widely cited conceptualization and ensuing typology of foreign policy change. Hermann distinguishes 'four graduated levels of change'. 'Adjustment change' refers to alterations in a country's foreign policy with respect to commitment (more or less than before) and/or number of addresses; 'programme changes' entail alterations in the 'methods or means' that a country employs in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals; 'problem/goal changes' encompass changes in the purposes or goals that are associated with and/or pursued by a certain foreign policy; and 'international orientation change' represents the most

fundamental alteration in a country's foreign policy since it comprises 'the redirection of the actor's entire orientation toward world affairs' (Hermann 1990: 5–6).

Other conceptualizations of foreign policy change were developed for example by Jerel Rosati and Kalevi Holsti. Rosati (1994: 236) distinguishes four different types, or rather outcomes, of foreign policy change which he calls 'intensification', 'refinement', 'reform', and 'restructuring' and which differ in the extent to which the scope, goals, and strategy of a country's foreign policy have changed (ranging from little to major). In contrast, Holsti (1982: 4–7) focuses only on the most fundamental type of foreign policy change which he also calls 'restructuring'. He adds to the literature by introducing four types of foreign policy restructuring: 'isolation', 'self-reliance', 'dependence', and 'non-alignment diversification'. Those are differentiated by 'the major directions of actions, transactions and commitments' (Holsti 1982: 4) of a country in its foreign policy pertaining to the level of external involvement, policies regarding types and sources of external involvement, the direction of external involvement, and military/diplomatic commitments.

As far as the drivers of foreign policy change are concerned, the FPA literature is even less coherent. Indeed, it offers a broad array of possible explanatory factors in this regard, which are located on the level of the international system, the domestic level, or the level of individual leaders. More often than not, the independent and/or intervening variables are interwoven in rather complex models that seek to account for foreign policy change (see also for instance Holsti 1982: 12–15; Gustavsson 1999: 83–87; Welch 2005: ch. 2). To give but a few examples: Hermann identifies four 'primary change agents', in the form of individual leaders, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shocks. Mediated by governmental decision-making processes, which serve as the intervening variable, those 'agents' produce one of Hermann's four types of foreign policy change (Hermann 1990: 10–13). Walter Carlsnaes' 'tripartite' model of foreign policy change brings together two agent-focused dimensions, in the form of intentions (choice and preferences) and dispositions (perceptions and values/norms), with structural factors (objective conditions and institutional setting) in order to account for alterations in a country's foreign policy (Carlsnaes 1992: 254–264). Finally, the 'synthetic approach' to account for foreign policy change proposed by Jeffrey Legro (2006)

integrates international factors (relative power of states), domestic political factors (e.g., societal movements), and, most importantly, ideational factors (collectively held ideas).

Unlike FPA, the Public Policy literature features several widely used analytical frameworks to account for policy change. Arguably the two most prominent ones are the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET).[1] The following paragraphs introduce the core tenets of those frameworks based on which possible connections to the FPA literature will be subsequently discussed.

The ACF focuses on long-term change which unfolds over ten or more years (for general introductions, see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible et al. 2009; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2017). More specifically, change (or stability for that matter) in policies is ascertained for so-called policy subsystems which 'are defined by a policy topic, territorial scope, and actors directly or indirectly influencing policy subsystem affairs' (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2017: 139). Policy subsystems are embedded in a broader analytical framework that represents the ACF's conceptualization of the entire policy process. The ACF suggests that the developments which unfold within policy subsystems are conditioned by several parameters that are external to the subsystem (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2017: 143–144). Those include 'relatively stable parameters' (e.g., constitutional structure) as well as more dynamic 'external subsystem events' (e.g., changes in governing coalitions, public opinion, other subsystems). Furthermore, the ACF accounts for 'long-term coalition opportunity structures' (e.g., openness of political system) as intervening factors between the stable parameters and a policy subsystem and for 'short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors' as intervening factors between external events and policy subsystems.

As already indicated, by taking into consideration 'all' persons that seek to influence a policy subsystem, the ACF casts a wide net in terms of actors which extends well beyond those persons who occupy formal positions of power. The individual actors are considered as boundedly rational, with their belief systems being the key cognitive prism through which they perceive their environment. Actors' belief systems are composed of three elements: 'deep core beliefs' relate to fundamental normative axioms and orientations such as political ideologies or identities and are not specific to policy subsystems; 'policy core beliefs' are policy specific and include both

a normative and an empirical component; and ‘secondary beliefs’ concern a specific element within a policy system or relate to instrumental means by which policy goals can be accomplished (Weible et al. 2020: 1080).

The ACF aggregates the individual actors who seek to influence the decisions of governmental authorities in a given policy subsystem into ‘advocacy coalitions’. Advocacy coalitions are characterized by shared beliefs among its members who in addition also coordinate strategies. The latter can comprise both weak and strong forms, ranging from the monitoring of each other’s behaviour to information sharing to the drafting and execution of joint plans of action (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998: 479–480).

Against this background, the ACF suggests four distinct ‘bottom-up’ pathways to policy change within a policy subsystem. Those are: major events or shocks external to the subsystem that trigger changes within the subsystem; events internal to a policy subsystem (e.g., fiascos, scandals); policy learning within advocacy coalitions; and negotiated agreements between formerly competing advocacy coalitions. In addition, there is a ‘top-down’ pathway to policy change where a superior jurisdiction simply imposes change (Pierce et al. 2020: 65–66). In terms of the types of policy change that the ACF pathways may produce, the ACF distinguishes between ‘major policy change’ and ‘minor policy change’. While the former relates to ‘significant shifts in the direction or goals of the subsystem’—thus changes in policy core beliefs—the latter consists of ‘changes in secondary aspects (e.g., change in means for achieving the goals)’—thus changes in secondary beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2017: 145). Either way, ‘policy change reflects winning advocacy coalitions’ policy beliefs’ (Pierce et al. 2020: 65).

PET is interested in occasional, albeit dramatic and large-scale alterations in policies which ‘punctuate’ long periods of stability or stasis in policy subsystems (for general introductions, see Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Jo nes and Baumgartner 2012; Baumgartner et al. 2017). It argues that major policy changes are not the outcome of changes within policy subsystems. Rather, they occur only when an issue moves higher on the political agenda, that is, out of the expert-driven subsystem onto the level of macropolitics where political actors (government, parliament, parties) allocate attention to the issue and possibly enact far-reaching policy changes (Baumgartner et al. 2011: 950). Baumgartner et al. (2017: 63) summarize this dynamic as

follows: '[S]ubsystem politics is the politics of equilibrium—the politics of the policy monopoly, incrementalism, a widely accepted supportive image, and negative feedback … Macropolitics is the politics of punctuation—the politics of large-scale change, competing policy images, political manipulation, and positive feedback'.

Issues move from policy subsystems to the political macro-level when a subsystem's predominant 'policy image' is challenged. Policy images refer to 'the manner in which a policy is characterized and understood' (Baumgartner et al. 2017: 69). Challenges to policy images can result from 'an event that simply cannot be ignored, or by relatively minor events that accumulate over longer periods' (Baumgartner et al. 2017: 61), such as major policy failures in case of the former and the gradual emergence of new norms or ideas in case of the latter. Either way, the status quo is increasingly discredited, and with contestation comes the mobilization of hitherto uninvolved political and governmental actors who infuse new ideas into the debate (Baumgartner 2013: 252–255).

Based on this inflow of new information and how it is being processed, the existing policy image can be fundamentally reformulated or alternative policy images can even be developed which, if adopted and implemented, not only lead to substantive changes in policy but may also have major implications for the institutional structure within a subsystem (Baumgartner et al. 2017: 60). Whether this happens depends on the one hand on the adaptability of the system, that is, the extent to which it can adjust to the different environment. On the other hand, it depends on whether institutional resistance to change or 'institutional friction' (e.g., sunk costs or bureaucratic inertia) can be overcome, the level of which is a function of a country's governing institutions (Baumgartner et al. 2009: 605, 608). If systems cannot adapt and institutional resistance is overcome—which, as discussed, is only rarely the case—far-reaching and disruptive policy punctuations are the outcome.

After having outlined core tenets of the FPA and the Public Policy literatures on policy change, the following discussion offers suggestions on how cross-fertilization between the two literatures could look like. FPA scholarship can contribute to Public Policy theories in several ways. Most importantly, it could help getting a still firmer empirical grasp of individual actors as drivers of policy change. In this sense, key proponents of the ACF have suggested taking another look at actors' belief systems based on

insights from other theories (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2017: 154). FPA's Operational Code Approach (OCA) can be such a theory (George 1969; Walker et al. 2005). Just like the ACF, OCA conceives decision-makers as boundedly rational actors who are steered by their political beliefs (see Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume). More specifically, the two clusters of beliefs contained in OCA, in the form of philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs, are very similar to ACF's policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs respectively. True, this is not the case with respect to the hierarchical subordination of secondary beliefs to policy core beliefs, since philosophical and instrumental beliefs are assigned equal weight and importance. Yet in terms of substance, the overlap is palpable in that philosophical beliefs relate to an actor's policy-domain-specific diagnosis of the political environment (Walker and Schafer 2000), which mirrors closely the empirical dimension of policy core beliefs, and instrumental beliefs to the connection between ends and means in the context of political actions, which is also what secondary beliefs get at.

Hence, in terms of 'belief system coding' (Weible et al. 2020: 1060), OCA offers a tried and tested alternative to existing approaches used in the ACF scholarship (interviews, media reports, surveys, document analysis, etc.) to empirically ascertain and measure the beliefs, and changes therein, of at least the 'principal' members of an advocacy coalition (Weible et al. 2020: 1062).[2] It is those changes in actors' beliefs that can be connected to the avenues to policy change. For instance, OCA can render visible possible changes in actors' beliefs in response to, say, external triggering events or episodes of policy learning, which in turn could reorient the policy preferences within an advocacy coalition and eventually lead to policy change. Similarly, changes in one advocacy coalition's beliefs can open up the possibility for cross-coalition collaboration which in turn can trigger policy change. Overall, as Weible et al. (2020) have called for, OCA potentially contributes to getting a still firmer grasp of advocacy coalitions and diversity therein more broadly.

Insights from FPA can also lead to a firmer specification of the types of policy change under examination. As discussed, ACF distinguishes between major and minor types of change in actors' beliefs and ensuing policies, which seems a somewhat crude measure. Moreover, a recent literature review has found that the majority of ACF studies on foreign policy change fails to qualify the policy change that they are exploring even along this

binary distinction (Pierce et al. 2020: 69–70). So while policy change is a key element of the ACF, the framework is underspecified when it comes to classifying this phenomenon. Therefore, Pierce and colleagues (2020: 79) highlight 'the necessity for further conceptual development about minor and major policy changes'. Similarly, while PET focuses primarily on large-scale change, the theory does acknowledge that incremental adjustments do also occur (in fact even more frequently than drastic changes). However, also PET does not offer much nuance with respect to grouping episodes of change beyond the large/small dichotomy. FPA's more fine-tuned typologies of (foreign) policy change could be of relevance here, such as Hermann's four 'graduated levels of change' whose three qualitative types of change (problem; programme; international orientation) can lend nuance to 'major' policy changes in ACF research or the different intensities of change that PET refers to.[3]

Conversely, the Public Policy literature can contribute to FPA in several ways. Most basically, Public Policy approaches that seek to explain policy change such as ACF and PET offer viable analytical alternatives to existing FPA frameworks, as has already been demonstrated.[4] Indeed, one might even argue that the ACF and PET approaches tie together actors and structures in the generation of policy change in a more coherent fashion than most of the constructs that can be found in the FPA literature.

Moreover, the Public Policy literature points to the necessity of exploring changes in policy that unfold over longer periods of time. Typically, the FPA literature tends to zoom in on specific 'decision points' (Houghton 2013) which trigger changes in foreign policy. However, the ACF suggests that especially more fundamental policy reorientations may be the result of long-term processes that develop over many years and whose outcome cannot be connected to a single decision. Such a long(er) perspective in temporal terms which extends beyond individual decision points seems to align nicely for example with discussions on foreign policy role change, where especially changes in a country's 'master role' (Wehner 2015) tend to be a long time in the making and, as importantly, entail a whole bundle of policy adjustments when being implemented.

Finally, the Public Policy scholarship points to the necessity to systematically incorporate 'non-elite' actors into explanations of policy change. This concerns in particular societal actors (experts, non-governmental organizations (NGO) representatives, etc.) who are present in

policy subsystems where they hold great sway, especially when it comes to the minor policy adjustments which do not tend to receive much attention from political actors. In addition, non-elite actors can also play a key role with respect to the initiation of more far-reaching policy changes, for instance when they successfully act as policy entrepreneurs. Both avenues suggest a need to move beyond FPA's typical orientation on governmental actors who occupy formal positions of power.

Policy Failures

Domestic and international politics are ripe with poor decision-making processes and ensuing low-quality policy outcomes, such as the failure to eliminate bovine tuberculosis, the Berlin airport, Watergate, the Eurofighter, and Brexit (Janis 1982; Grant 2009; Jennings et al. 2018; McConnell and T ormey 2020), to name but a few examples. Therefore, it cannot come as a surprise that both FPA and Public Policy scholarship has devoted considerable attention to those phenomena, which are more or less interchangeably referred to as 'mistakes', 'blunders', 'disasters', 'major failures', or 'fiascos' (e.g., Janis 1982; Gray and 't Hart 1998; Bovens et al. 2001a; Walker and Malici 2011; Bovens and 't Hart 2016; McConnell 2016; Kruck et al. 2018). This section first highlights the main strands of the FPA and Public Policy literature respectively on (foreign) policy failures and then offers suggestions for cross-fertilization between the two literatures.

The FPA literature points to different sources of foreign policy failures (for an overview, see Walker and Malici 2011: 16–24). Several works have attributed the latter to personal characteristics or actions of individual decision-makers. For instance, 'extreme' personality traits (e.g., a considerably higher level of self-confidence) or political beliefs (e.g., a greater inclination to pursue conflictual strategies) have been connected to foreign policy fiascos (Brummer 2016). Similarly, scholarship has shown that leaders are prone to selecting misleading historical analogies when seeking guidance for current policy challenges, which makes them learn the wrong lessons from the past, and based on which they often end up with bad decisions and poor policy outcomes (Houghton 1996). And Walker and Malici (2011) suggest that foreign policy mistakes result from misperceptions of power relationships between leaders, and ensuing

miscalculations with respect to the cost and benefits that are associated with policy options and strategies.

If anything, the literature on group decision-making features an even more extensive discussion on poor foreign policy processes and outcomes. This pertains to both conflictual and conformity patterns of group interaction (Stern and Sundelius 1997). Concerning the former, the literature on 'bureaucratic politics' (e.g., Allison 1971) has highlighted the adverse effects of bureaucratic competition over competencies, resources, etc., on the quality of decisions. Due to interministerial 'pulling and hauling', those processes often conclude with 'resultants' (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 255, 294), that is, unintended and typically suboptimal compromises (for empirical examples, see Brummer 2013; Marsh 2014; Keane 2016).

Works addressing conformity group interaction patterns have established an even more explicit connection between group decision-making and policy failures, for which the Bay of Pigs invasion or the escalation of the Vietnam War serve as examples. The most notable literature in this regard is the one on 'groupthink' (Janis 1982). This model shows how certain structural and contextual antecedent conditions can lead to concurrence seeking in decision groups which in turn triggers certain 'symptoms of groupthink' (e.g., overestimation of the group; conformity pressures) that impede the decision-making process (e.g., selective information search; biased information processing) and more often than not lead to 'unsuccessful outcomes', that is, 'fiascos' (Janis 1982: 243). Another model that links cooperative group interaction patterns and poor decision-making processes and outcomes is called 'newgroup syndrome' (Stern 1997). Placing particular emphasis on the temporal aspect, this model suggests that newly formed groups are particularly prone to engage in poor decision-making processes that in turn lead to equally poor outcomes.

One of the key shortcomings of the FPA literature is that it is anything but specific as to what actually constitutes a poor foreign policy outcome (i.e., a failure, mistake, or fiasco, etc.). In this sense, Schafer and Crichlow argue with respect to Groupthink:

> At times, Janis seems to be suggesting that *outcome* refers to the decision's effect on national interests … but at other times he seems to be implying a more normative position that a poor outcome is an escalation in international conflict. We certainly are not convinced that the two possible outcome definitions are interchangeable.
>
> (Schafer and Crichlow 2002: 47; emphasis in the original)

Therefore, in their own work, which brings together the effects of individual decision-makers and group interaction dynamics, Schafer and Crichlow suggest that the quality of a decision can be ascertained with respect to two dimensions: first, whether it contributes to the achievement of a country's national interest, and second, whether it increases or decreases the level of international conflict. Consequently, decisions that fall short on those dimensions should be considered low quality (Schafer and Crichlow 2010: 56–58). More generically, Walker and Malici (2011: 10–16) suggest that mistakes arise due to failures in diagnosis/intelligence or prescription/policy and can come in the form of either omission or commission.

Similar to the FPA literature, the Public Policy literature also points to a broad array of possible drivers or causes of policy failures. Contrary to the FPA literature, however, individual decision-makers or groups of decision-makers receive only limited attention in this respect. Instead, emphasis is placed on organizational or procedural causes (e.g., McConnell 2010; Jennings et al. 2018). Decision-makers come into those explanations primarily in that they have to navigate and operate within specific structural environments. In this sense, McConnell (2016: 675) argues that: 'If there is a common message here for understanding policy failures and fiascos, it is that we need to think of the institutional frameworks and processes within which policy-makers take decisions'.

Another major difference to the FPA literature results from the much greater attention that the Public Policy literature devotes to the question on how to determine if and to what extent a certain policy has actually failed. As a result, the literature features a much more nuanced conceptualization of what actually constitutes a failure and, relatedly, how failures can be operationalized for empirical analysis. More specifically, the Public Policy literature suggests that policy failures (or successes for that matter) can be assessed along three dimensions: programmatic, political, and process (Bovens et al. 2001b; Marsh and McConnell 2010; McConnell 2016). The programmatic dimension emphasizes the performative, problem-solving dimension of policy-making by examining whether a policy has offered an effective and efficient response to the policy challenge that it was supposed to address. In turn, the political dimension shifts focus to the reputational as well as perceptual and discursive aspects of policy-making by exploring how policies 'are represented and evaluated in the political arena' (Bovens e

t al. 2001b: 20), which by implication highlights the often constructed nature of fiascos (Bovens and ’t Hart 2016). Finally, the process dimension zooms in on whether governments managed to garner sufficient support for their policies among core constituencies and on the legitimacy of decision-making by scrutinizing whether policies are ‘produced through constitutional and quasi-constitutional procedures’ (Marsh and McConnell 2 010: 572).

In addition to those general dimensions along which policy failure can materialize, the public policy literature also offers insights into how to ascertain variation in the extent to which a policy has failed. For instance, H owlett (2012: 543–544) offers six ‘parameters or components’ that can be used to that effect. Those are: the ‘extent’ or ‘size’ to which policies fail; the ‘avoidability’ (or ‘predictability’) of a failure; the ‘visibility’ of a failure to the public; the ‘intentionality’ of a failure; the ‘duration’ of a failure; and the ‘intensity’ which follows from the level of agreement in a certain group on the ‘assessment of failure’. According to Howlett, all failures can be categorized with respect to those six attributes along a range running respectively from small to large (extent), low to high (avoidability, visibility, intentionality, intensity), and short to long (duration) (Howlett 20 12: 544). Moreover, by combining intensity and visibility to the dimension of ‘salience’ and extent and duration to the dimension of ‘magnitude’, Howl ett (2012: 544–545) develops a typology of ‘avoidable policy failures’ which comprise ‘major failures’, ‘diffuse failures’, focused failures’, and ‘minor failures’.

The preceding discussion points to several areas where the FPA and the Public Policy literatures can be fruitfully brought together. The FPA literature can be advanced by making fuller use of the nuanced conceptualization and operationalization contained in the Public Policy literature as to what constitutes a policy failure and how it can be ascertained empirically. As mentioned before, the FPA literature places much more attention on the processes that possibly culminate in a failure than on operationalizing for empirical measurement such outcomes in the first place, as illustrated most vividly by Janis’ work on fiascos that result from groupthink. Therefore, incorporating insights from the Public Policy literature—such as the three dimensions along which policies could fail (e.g., McConnell 2016) or the six parameters based on which the extent of a failure can be ascertained (Howlett 2012)—would put the widely used

classification in the FPA literature of policies as failures (or fiascos) on a much firmer conceptual footing, thereby also rendering insights from different studies more comparable.

In addition to the aforementioned 'positivist' suggestion, which arguably mirrors the predominant approach in FPA regarding the study of failures, the field would also benefit from paying closer attention to the constructed nature of failures. This refers, for instance, to the fact that the same decision or policy outcome can be evaluated very differently at one point in time or over the course of time. Recently, discourse analysis with a particular focus on narratives has been employed in FPA to highlight the social construction of foreign policy fiascos (e.g., Oppermann and Spencer 2016). Additional work in this direction could, for example, explore the conditions that render more likely the social construction of failures as well as the politicization that comes along with it (Brändström and Kuipers 2003).

Conversely, the Public Policy literature could benefit from paying greater attention to the idiosyncratic characteristics of decision-makers who end up with policy fiascos, as proposed in the FPA literature. As I have argued elsewhere, the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual decision-makers are typically glossed over in the Public Policy literature: 'For the most part, references to actors remain unspecific, referring either to generic groups of actors (e.g., "leaders", "policy-makers", "political executives") or, at a still higher level of abstraction, institutions as a whole (e.g., "government", "organizations", "agencies")' (Brummer 2016: 704). Indeed, even those analyses that, next to structural factors, at least also explore the effect of individual decision-makers on policy failures refrain from ascertaining in greater depth the idiosyncratic characteristics of actors along with how the latter might have contributed to the failure under examination. For example, while Dunleavy (1995) highlights that 'hyperactivism' on the ministerial level can be a key reason for policy failures, he does not explore which ministers are for what specific reason (trait, belief, etc.) more or less predisposed to engage in such behaviour. Similarly, in their discussion on whether 'ineffectual leadership' by British Prime Minister Theresa May was crucial for the 'Brexit policy fiasco', McConnell and Tormey (2020: 692–695) point for instance to strategic miscalculations and risky decisions on part of May without, however, tying them to specific idiosyncratic characteristics of hers. Therefore, mirroring the suggestion made above for the study of policy change, the Public Policy literature could benefit from

bringing to bear the leader-oriented approaches featured in FPA (see Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) based on which idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders (e.g., traits, beliefs, or risk propensities) can be systematically ascertained and subsequently connected to substantive decisions or political processes that led to public policy failure. This way, the Public Policy literature would get a better handle on the role of leaders as the main cause of policy failures or at least as contributing to such outcomes in interaction with institutional and societal causes (McConnell 2016: 675).

Finally, for both literatures a promising way forward for studying policy failures could be to refrain from devising analytical frameworks that seek to account for all types and magnitudes of policy failure. In this sense, Bovens and 't Hart (2016: 661–662) call for 'mid-range theory construction based on rigorous comparison of (foreign) policy-making process that we can emulate and adapt for the purposes of explaining particular types of policy failure'. Indeed, rather than developing 'grand' theories of policy failures, more narrow analytical frameworks that seek to explain 'only' specific types of policy failures, such as process failures or programme failures, could be at least as rewarding and arguably also more feasible.

Conclusion

This chapter takes as its point of departure that foreign policy and domestic policy are sufficiently similar to justify using insights from Public Policy to study foreign policy as well as from FPA to study public policy. Against this background, the chapter discusses what cross-fertilization between FPA and Public Policy scholarship can look like based on two empirical phenomena that are of interest to both fields: policy change and policy failures. Generally speaking, the chapter shows how the incorporation of insights from one field to the other can contribute to getting a firmer conceptual and empirical grasp of these phenomena, thereby advancing our understanding of both policy-making processes and outcomes. More specifically, the chapter argues that, on the one hand, insights from FPA can lend nuance to theories of the policy process with respect to grasping the role of political leaders as agents of change or drivers of failure. This finding supports Kaarbo's assessment that 'research on the psychology of decision-making and leader characteristics … is FPA's comparative advantage and has great

promise for application in the study of public policy' (Kaarbo 2019: 227–228). On the other hand, the chapter suggests that insights from Public Policy can contribute to FPA by providing a better conceptualization and more thorough operationalization of 'change' and 'failure' and by helping to systematize the political processes that lead to those outcomes in the first place. Future research could explore whether equally beneficial cross-fertilization is feasible for additional issue areas of joint interest, such as blame games or the implementation and evaluation of policies.

This chapter's suggestions on advancing FPA based on insights from Public Policy scholarship have also implications for repositioning FPA into the discipline of IR more broadly. Three aspects stand out in particular. First, systematically connecting FPA to Public Policy scholarship counters the perceived isolation of FPA as a field of study, arguably even within the discipline of IR (see Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). Indeed, there are multiple points of connection, both conceptual and substantive, between FPA on the one hand and other fields of political science whose exploration would integrate FPA much more firmly into broader academic discourses. Second, incorporating insights from Public Policy scholarship contributes to further expanding the still predominantly state-centred perspective of FPA, in terms of focusing first and foremost on state actors and institutions, to systematically include also non-state actors in its analyses. Indeed, somewhat ironically or even 'paradoxically, FPA—as one of the fiercest critics of state-centrism—itself remains in a sense state-centric' (Baumann and Stengel 2014: 491). Public Policy scholarship underscores the necessity to cast a wider net in terms of non-state actors who at times wield strong informal influence on policy-making processes and outcomes. Last but not least, placing studies of key phenomena such as policy change and policy failure on a firmer conceptual basis by drawing on insights from Public Policy scholarship increases the validity of FPA's empirical insights and findings, and, by implication, also enhances the policy relevance of FPA scholarship. In so doing, it would heed the long-standing plea in the FPA literature for 'bridging the gap' between the academic community and policy-makers, thus theory and practice (George 1993).

Notes

1. This is not to suggest that other analytical frameworks like the Multiple Streams Framework, diffusion models, or different strands of institutionalism cannot be used to explain policy change, or that they cannot be fruitfully connected to the realm of foreign policy (on the latter, see the contributions in Brummer et al. 2019a).
2. On the computer-based coding scheme that is commonly used for OCA studies, see Walker and Schafer (2006).
3. This is not to say that the broader Public Policy literature does not also offer more fine-tuned conceptualizations of 'change', such as Hall's distinction between first-, second-, and third-order change (Hall 1993).
4. See, for instance, Haar (2010), Lantis (2019), Pierce and Hicks (2019) for the ACF; and Goertz (2003), Joly (2016), Joly and Richter (2019) for PET.

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CHAPTER 4

Foreign Policy Analysis and Constructivism

PAUL A. KOWERT AND J. SAMUEL BARKIN

Long ago, when the study of comparative foreign policy was in its infancy and the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) had yet to take shape, Stanley Hoffman (1962, 691) mulled over the challenges that awaited American leaders in an age that already seemed to present more complex choices than the stark preceding wartime years.[1] He lamented that 'policy-making is so frustrating a task in today's America' and sought 'to discuss the most important constraints that restrict the policy-makers' liberty of action, and to see how narrow or how broad a margin remains for choice' (Hoffmann 1962: 668). Hoffmann feared that the United States, beset by many new challenges, wanted to accomplish too much but risked spreading itself too thinly. He recommended that 'the United States get into the painful habit of working with, rather than through or without, others' (Hoffmann 1962: 703).

Hoffmann's conclusions seem as fresh as ever, but our present concern has more to do with the way he conceives of foreign policy as a delicate balance between desire and constraint. A country's various wants and needs define the goals of its foreign policies, but the attainment of these goals is frustrated everywhere by constraints. All of the things countries might want —land, resources, wealth, and ultimately security—are in short supply. And because these things are all coveted just as much by other countries, desire in foreign policy is constrained not only by underlying conditions of scarcity but also by the pursuits of both adversaries and allies. As in the field of economics, so it is in foreign policy that competition is the Scylla to the Charybdis of scarce supply.

Specialists in FPA thus naturally conceive of their subject matter as entailing choice under constraint. In this conception, they join the broad tradition of public policy analysis that treats *policy-making* as synonymous, more or less, with *decision-making*. Most of the action in policy analysis

(*foreign* policy analysis included) involves the study of constraints on choice, setting aside any serious theoretical discussion of purpose. To the task of studying constraints is brought primarily the tool chest of the economist and, secondarily, that of the psychologist. We argue in this chapter that to reclaim the study of purpose in FPA, to understand not only how foreign policy is made but for whom and for what reason, we need access to the toolbox of the sociologist. In the context of international relations (IR) theory this toolbox has been wielded over the past three decades most effectively by an array of scholars working under the banner of constructivism.

The problem facing policy-makers is not only to determine what choice best serves their interests in an environment rife with missing and ambiguous information about policy alternatives, their costs and benefits, associated risks, and tradeoffs among goals. These are challenging enough problems for expected utility theory. Yet the other half of the equation, as previously noted, is competition from others with their own goals. This competition has the effect of making policy choice a strategic problem: policy-makers must consider not only the satisfaction of their own desires in order to choose policies, but also the likely behaviour of other agents in response to these choices. Such problems involve strategic choice and require the tools of game theory in addition to the insights of utility theory (see Elster 1986: 7). Together, game theory and utility theory offer powerful tools for understanding choice. In economics, disciplined by market rationalism, this is essentially the only toolkit that matters.

In FPA, on the other hand, psychological approaches have generally provided an antiphonal correction. FPA has slowly moved from a more simplistic contest between partisans of rational choice and their psychologically informed critics to a deeper appreciation for the way multiple decision systems work (Kahneman 2011). Chronicling this evolution is a task for another day, but it encompasses models of cognitive bias, the application of various logics (heuristic reasoning, analogical reasoning, and so on), the impact of social and emotional dynamics on decision-making, and many other psychological considerations (see Houghton, Chapter 19 in this volume). The application of insights from political psychology to the study of foreign policy is so far-ranging that it is hard to appreciate the full gamut. No matter whether the model is *homo economicus* or *homo psychologicus*, however, what goes unchallenged is a

shared commitment to the decision itself as the fundamental unit of policy analysis. In order to analyse these decisions with scientific rigour, policy *qua* decision theorists give a wide berth to the problems that Weber ruled out of bounds. By refusing to say whether decisions are good or bad, by concentrating instead on whether or not they are efficient as means to exogenously determined ends, they participate in the commitment of modernity to *Zweckrationalität* over *Wertrationalität*.

If the terrain over which decision theorists roam is large, equally vast is the expanse of what might be thought of as constraints on choice. Extending for a moment the metaphor of landscape, these constraints are positioned on different levels (of analysis). From the mountain peaks of the international system and the craggy demands of states themselves, we might gaze out across the savannahs of domestic politics and into the valleys of interest group ambitions. The early pioneers of these territories like Richard Neusta dt (1960) and Graham Allison (1971) conditioned us to think in these terms. The most simplified cartography is provided by Robert Putnam's (1988) notion of two-level games. Other scholars carve out terraces and niches for the study of bureaucratic politics, interest group politics, political institutions, small-group dynamics, and so on. All of these have their influence on foreign policy choices. Tellingly, however, Allison's appeal to kaleidoscopic vision and eclectic analytical taste was nevertheless entitled *Essence of Decision*. In the title and in the book, the nascent field's commitment to choice as the defining feature of policy is evident. Agents at many different levels have their interests, but all of these function as constraining inputs to a single output—the foreign policy decision. Formalizing the problem to account for decisions about war and peace, Bru ce Bueno de Mesquita (1981: 20) wrote,

> One cannot disregard the importance of advisers, cabinet ministers, constitutional provisions regarding declarations of war, legislative actions, or public opinion. All these (and other) sources of information help encourage or discourage the key leader from pursuing one or another course of action. The positions, the arguments and, most important, the potential others have to withhold or contribute resources may dissuade the leader from taking his preferred course of action, but it is still his decision and not theirs.

Bueno de Mesquita's title is equally apt. *The War Trap* is a trap not so much because leaders make choices under many constraints but because—once leaders have considered as many of the interests (their own or others') and constraints as they care to—the decision problem is all but exhausted save for some final considerations of risk propensity. Leaders choose not what

they will, but what they must. As agents, they are effectively interchangeable.

On the face of it, constructivism promises an intellectual break with this tradition. By proposing to see the world as allowing for multiple interpretations, constructivists see none of Bueno de Mesquita's inevitability. Nor do they merely hearken back to Allison's multiplicity of perspectives, for these perspectives still dot a single landscape whereas constructivists see a shifting and malleable terrain, more a 'virtual sandbox environment' than a classical topographic map. In this way, constructivists allow for a far richer problem of choice, as the next section will briefly explain. Yet the more important contribution of constructivism to FPA may lie elsewhere, in breaking away from the intellectual strictures that reduce foreign policy exclusively to the problem of choice under constraint. This chapter develops an argument about what is needed in the constructivist analysis of foreign policy, and about where to find it.

Constructivism, Choice, and Constraint

Confronted by the problem of choice under constraint, constructivists anticipate that the world is more permissive (or less constraining) than other scholars might argue. The agents who have choices to make, their desires, and their interests are all social constructs. So are the constraints under which these agents operate. Moreover, whereas liberal theory posits an autonomous individual and understands politics to represent the voices of those individuals, and whereas Marxist theory begins with the economic determinants of class structure and locates individuals within it, constructivists grant ontological priority neither to agents nor to structures and constraint. Instead, agents depend for their agency on a richly institutionalized array of social structures that confer power and define the plausible limits of beliefs, behaviours, and even identities (see Barkin and S joberg 2019). At the same time, such structures can only be created through the performances of agents. As Brent Steele (2007: 25) concludes, 'most constructivist approaches assume to varying degrees that the world is held together by social ideas and inter-subjective understandings, which constitute, and are constituted by, social identities'. Nicholas Onuf (2013: 127) would prefer, instead, to speak of recognition and status as constitutive

of agency, but his point is largely the same: ‘statuses afford those who hold them opportunities to participate in some range of activities in a society that are open only to them’.

All people may deserve equal respect, as liberal democrats would have it, but clearly all do not share equal status. In IR, Onuf goes on to say, this ‘co-constitutive process validates states as clubs with membership rules of their own and as members of an exclusive society’ (Onuf 2013: 135). The delimitations of such rules also make it possible to think more formally about historical change in ways that have mostly been abandoned since Hegelian materialism and liberal idealism were pushed aside to make room for social science. Big ideas and key thinkers—Onuf lists Newton, Hobbes, and Kant as examples—compel us ‘to rethink what it is possible to think about … What they wrote unleashed a causal torrent and launched what we later observers are sufficiently distanced from to see as an epochal transformation’ (Onuf 2013: 123).

The notion of an epochal transformation highlights the variability of our beliefs over time: the way we see the world changes and evolves. Yet constructivists must also remain attentive to the way beliefs vary across the expanse of the planet. Different societies order institutions and confer status differently, so that epochal change in one place may go largely unnoticed in another. Such variation in the way we recognize agents and their interests is a crucial ontological step for constructivists. It brings the conversation back to the problem of purposive choice. FPA typically handles the question of whose purposes matter only in the most abstract way, generally with a single anodyne assumption. Usually, it is the purpose of the state that is said to matter, and that purpose is power. Or perhaps it is security. Or possibly wealth.

It turns out that even recourse to abstraction does not free us from the inevitable conclusion that purposes actually differ in important ways. And therein lies the rub in the way Weber left the problem. By restricting bureaucratic rationality in the modern world to a preoccupation with efficiency in the pursuit of goals and by refusing to take a stand on whose goals matter—rejecting the pre-modern allegiance to the monarch’s goals, or perhaps some imperfectly understood divine goals—Weber leaves us with an understanding of decision-making that is incomplete by design. We understand that people differ in their preferences or desires, but these are held inscrutable. Since we cannot specify the proper desires, we specify

none at all. Aaron Wildavsky (1987: 5) thus complains, ‘preferences are referred to as “tastes,” for which, as the saying goes, there is no accounting, thus rendering them not merely noneconomic but non-analyzable’. Gary Becker (1976: 133) puts it this way:

> For economists to rest a large part of their theory of choice on differences in tastes is disturbing since they admittedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes, nor can they rely on a well-developed theory of tastes from any other discipline in the social sciences, since none exists. Put differently, the theory which the empirical researcher utilizes is unable to assist him in choosing the appropriate taste proxies on a priori grounds or in formulating predictions about the effects of these variables on behavior. The weakness in the received theory of choice, then, is the extent to which it relies on differences in tastes to ‘explain’ behavior when it can neither explain how tastes are formed nor predict their effects.

IR as a field was always more comfortable with this state of affairs than FPA could be (cf. Katzenstein et al. 1998). Since there were no theories of interests, the approaches that dominated IR theory were of necessity theories of constraint: of the way choice dilemmas, high transaction costs, and tragedies of the commons constrained international cooperation, for example. These problems were overcome only when other constraints permitted it, as when a hegemonic state was powerful enough to impose order. By focusing on whether certain outcomes were more or less likely in equilibrium, IR theory was largely freed from the necessity of getting down to the nitty-gritty of choice, a luxury that FPA did not share.

Constructivists were well positioned to step into this gap, grounding their accounts of preferences in arguments about agent identity (Kowert 2001). Journeying down this path, constructivists returned with reports about the identities and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia (Hopf 2002); Sweden and its quest for greatness during the Thirty Years’ War (Ringmar 1996); contemporary Turkey’s effort to find a place between East and West (Bozdaglioglu 2004), the historical quest of many Western European states to preserve the hierarchy of West over East (Neumann 1999); and the persistent efforts to remake the world in its own image by the United States, the country that flatters itself the ‘most exceptional’ of exceptional states (Nau and Leone 2002). Anthologies of such work organized regionally parse distinctions in identity and foreign policy among countries in the Middle East (Telhami and Barnett 2002), Europe (Hansen and Waever 2002; Guzzini 2012), and Asia (Suh et al. 2004). Organized more conceptually, they consider *inter alia* the identity and foreign policy of rising powers (Thies and Nieman 2017) and declining powers (Onea 2014), of liberal and illiberal states (Risse and Babayan 2015), and of former

colonizers and postcolonial states (Chacko 2013; Gad 2016). This short list barely scratches the surface, but it suffices to illustrate the unremarkable notion than some states want different things from their foreign policies than do others. Or rather, this notion would be unremarkable were it not for the indebtedness of FPA to the field of IR and its ontological commitment to invariant states whose preferences are either identical or unknowable.

A constructivist analysis of place and meaning underscores the point that one should not be too attached to an invariant ontology. Whereas the colonial experience may loom large in the national identity of one state, shaping its preferences and policies, it may not resonate in the same way in a state that traces its real or imagined antecedents back to ancient empires. Or it might be important but mean something completely different. Indeed, the idea of a *state* itself may mean something very different to these two states (Barkin 2021). Attentive to the implications of intersubjectivity, we have said that constructivists 'offer accounts' and 'trace distinctions', but not that they have developed general theories of identity and preferences. Some, like Wendt (1999), content themselves with typologies. Others are forthrightly hostile to any move towards generalization. Hopf (2002: 11–12) says, 'the assumption that identities are reducible to roles and are governed by norms too narrowly conceptualizes the socially possible'. Instead, he goes on,

> a commitment to deep induction and empirical recovery is at cross-purposes with any theoretical conceptualization that short-circuits the process of discovery. If there are identities that are not roles and social practices not governed by norms, it is misguided to construct a theory that narrows a priori the initial vision.

So we are left with a puzzle. Subjective preferences, inscrutable tastes, and highly contingent, situationally bound identities seem like unpromising targets for general explanatory theories, even theories of carefully limited scope. Committed as they are to an intersubjective ontology, moreover, constructivists have good reasons to view nomothetic theories of identity with suspicion, despite their nearly unanimous conviction that norms shape interests and that social identity guides preferences. To abstain from any effort to build such theories out of subjectivist ontological purism wedded to methodological inductivism, however, is to leave the field of play only to intellectual technocracy. We can continue to refine our theories of decision without ever having to come to grips with what those decisions are about.

From Possible to Probable in Constructivist Theory

The apparent risk in theorizing what states want—to say nothing of what they should want—is that such theories will necessarily be contingent and subjective. To this, the constructivist will doubtless reply that theory was never otherwise. To shy away from theory that consorts with subjectivity and restrict ourselves only to explanations with an acceptable veneer of objectivity is merely to impoverish our theory (Barkin 2009). At the same time, theorizing subjectivity does not require us to identify with the moral stance for which we seek to account. This is where the sociologist of normativity parts ways with the moral philosopher.

The sociologist recognizes that theory is not without spatial and cultural extent (cf. Davis 2005). We must therefore consider the geopolitics of theory, and perhaps nowhere more so than in FPA. One domain—arguably, *the* domain—in which subjectivity informs theory is the domain of culture and cultural studies. Cultural studies is not FPA, but the rudiments of a culturally aware FPA have long been present in constructivist scholarship. Searching for a way to characterize the post-Cold War shift towards constructivist thought, Peter Katzenstein (1996: 1) describes the enterprise as 'rummaging in the "graveyard" of sociological studies'. For his anthology of constructivist rummaging, Katzenstein (1996) self-consciously brought sociologists together with political scientists to write about national security and entitled the result, *The Culture of National Security*. R. Ned Lebow has this to say in his *Cultural Theory of International Relations*: 'constructivism recognizes that culture and ideology do more than offer rationalizations for behavior that actors engage in for other reasons. They provide people with identities that offer meaning, order and predictability to their lives'. In his 'reconstruction' of constructivism, Stefano Guzzini (200 0) calls such developments a 'sociological turn' (also see Lapid and Kratoch wil 1996).

Constructivists who reached out to the field of sociology for inspiration found in the work of Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984) a comfortable and convenient analogue to conversations about agency and structure within political science (see Wight 2006). Wendt (1987) and Dessler (1989) led the way, drawing on Bhaskar (1979) as well as Giddens, and were followed by a flurry of interest in the sociology of state security (see Huysmans 1998; M cSweeney 1999; Steele 2008). Other, so-called critical constructivists drew

less on Giddens and more on Berger and Luckmann (1967) or Bourdieu (1977) for inspiration (Hopf 1998, 2010; Zehfuss 2002; Jackson 2008; Adler-Nissen 2013). They were critical not only of 'mainstream' or 'conventional' constructivists, but also of late modern positivist epistemologies in the tradition of critical theory that ran from Adorno and Horkheimer through Habermas, with influence from Wittgenstein and Gadamer. The division between critical and conventional constructivism is important, but not something we wish to address here. It will suffice to say that in Bourdieu no less than in Giddens, constructivists found a sociology of practice and the way it generated meaning. And so, constructivists as a large and varied group have drawn heavily on sociologies of agents and their interests (often styled as *identities* in IR) and of constraints on agent behaviour (often styled as *norms*).

They also found licence, along the way, to pay careful attention to language. For this purpose, the sociological underpinnings of constructivist analysis intersected with its Wittgensteinian roots in linguistic theory. Indeed, the scholar to whom Wendt (1992: 392) gives credit for introducing the term *constructivism* to the field of IR, Nicholas Onuf (1989) was trained in international law and skilled in the hermeneutics of legal thought. Onuf shares this background with Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), and both of them relied as heavily on the work of linguistic philosophers such as Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) as they did on sociologists like Giddens. Their fundamental premise is that the way language works tells us important things about the way the world works, but there are quite a few messy steps along the way from one to the other. It hasn't helped matters that the problem is sometimes cast in terms of a relativist nightmare: does constructivism give scholars (or policy-makers) licence to say whatever they might wish about the world (cf. Risse-Kappen 1994)?

We are better served by asking what they actually do say. The pre-eminent sociologist of this problem—of what people say in their interactions with others—was not Giddens but Erving Goffman (1959, 1969). Goffman presents social life as a performance in which agents (actors) take note of how they are understood and perceived. Their choices and the perceived constraints on these choices must always be interpreted in accordance with the logic of the drama they are acting out. A core insight of Goffman's 'dramaturgical' analysis is that what we say and do depends on the setting in which we say and do it. Agents have choices and perceive

constraints, but the choices are among ways of saying and doing that are suited to a given performance. To put this somewhat differently, Goffman's focus was on language as a script rather than language as a speech act.

Whereas constructivists in fields such as IR largely focus on social construction and the problem of interpreting the world, Goffman would instead have us focus on 'framing' the world and the problem of which elements of the world to include in our frame. This is not framing in the sense in which the term is used in cognitive psychology, denoting biases in the way individuals process information. Goffman's (1974) *frame analysis* uses the metaphor of a picture frame and argues that we choose to include in our 'portrait' of the world aspects of our experience that are suited to a given social and interpretive context. Again, the question is not so much whether we could paint any conceivable picture, but rather what picture makes sense.

As a source of sociological inspiration, Goffman has so far generated less interest among IR scholars and students of foreign policy than have Giddens and Bourdieu, but this has recently begun to change. Frank Schimmelfennig (2002) has offered one of the first detailed assessments of Goffman's relevance to IR. He begins where so much other work in FPA begins: with the problem of strategic choice and the rationalist framework of choice under constraint. He notes that although Goffman himself 'uses the "game" metaphor to describe and analyse social interactions, he is careful to distinguish his perspective from that of rationalist game theory that underpins much of IR rationalism by emphasizing the role of social norms in games'. For Goffman, norms function not merely as constraints on behaviour; rather, they define the game itself and the plausible moves to be considered within it. Nor, for Goffman, is the choice problem primarily how to satisfy interests in the face of environmental constraints, whether material or normative. Rather, it is for the agent to decide how to present behaviour that is meaningful and appropriate to the context. As Schimmelfennig (2002: 425–426) puts it:

> In a cultural environment, actors do behave strategically, but strategic action mainly consists in the self-interested and manipulative use of performances and self-presentations, frames and arguments. Actors do calculate, but these calculations include the social costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, that is, their consequences for the social standing of the actor in the community. Institutions do constrain, but their constraints are based on informal, social sanctioning mechanisms.

Turning from the agent's calculations to agents themselves, Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014, 2016) has argued in several recent works that the state

positions itself socially and is subject to the pressures of symbolic interaction in ways that mirror the experiences of individuals. Adler-Nissen has particularly explored the implications of shame and transgression for state-selves and the way marginalization of 'pariah states' sustains international order.

Goffman is not the only important theoretical touchstone, of course, in the study of symbolic interaction. George Herbert Mead also looms large in the development of this tradition, although his ideas on the subject were mostly published posthumously by his students (Mead 1934). David McCourt (2012, 2014) has relied on Mead to explore the United Kingdom's quest for an appropriate international role after World War II. A great deal of the rapidly growing body of scholarship on role theory in FPA (see Thies 2010; also Breuning, Chapter 12 in this volume) owes a mostly unacknowledged debt to Mead, though the early classics in this tradition make the link clear (see Walker 1987, 1992). For McCourt and most other role theorists, *role* is not an infinitely malleable container, but rather a process of taking cues from the environment that define how an agent is seen and what that agent can permissibly do.

To sum up this overview of ways constructivists might speak to the central concerns of foreign policy, *identity* offers an account of what an agent might want to do, and *normativity* defines the boundaries of what the agent is permitted to do, while cultural *scripts* explain what the agent can plausibly and appropriately do. What a state might desire is too narrow to be a good guide to behaviour, since states do exactly what they might wish to do scarcely more often than people, which is to say rarely. On the other hand, norms are the 'rails' that prevent behaviour from going too far off course, but they are often too broad to account for particular decisions. Scripts, on the other hand, offer the 'Goldilocks' of insights into policy: an account that is just right.

CONSTRUCTIVIST FPA

This chapter began with a discussion of how policy analysis, including FPA, typically organizes itself around the problem of choice under constraint. The preceding section argues in favour of recasting this problem to consider policies as choices made under conditions of *appropriateness* as

well as constraint. This section briefly offers some evidence that doing so would be productive for the field of FPA. We argue, moreover, that an emergent but still underappreciated culturalist approach to FPA is already moving along these lines.

It is not a great leap from the claim that foreign policy choices must be understood in terms of their appropriateness to a specific social setting to the claim that we must pay attention to the socio-cultural context of FPA itself. Yet FPA scholars are mostly reluctant to do so. Accepting this claim is tantamount to acknowledging that there is no single field of FPA, or at least that there cannot be culturally invariant theories of FPA. The neoutilitarian synthesis of realist and liberal approaches to FPA rejects this conclusion on both substantive and scientific grounds. Substantively, realists have generally argued in favour of totalizing models of human nature specifically divorced from cultural content (see, e.g., Brown 2009). And if liberals embrace a more permissive vision of human nature than realists, theirs has nevertheless been a quest for the common (liberal) moral and institutional underpinnings of international order, and not those which might be delimited by their native cultural settings. Indeed, their emphasis on reason and the perfectibility of human institutions aligns liberals closely with the Weberian exclusion of value rationality. The logical endpoint is Terry Nardi n's (1983) conclusion that liberals can never appeal to the purposes of any particular individual or group as justification for a specific international order.

We argue that foreign policies can be understood precisely in terms of the purposes that make sense to individuals and groups, interacting with other individuals and groups, in the international domain. The sense that not only policy, but also our analysis of policy is informed by cultural convictions is not unique to constructivism, though it may be regarded as a consequence of the sociological turn among constructivists. Some feminist IR theorists (see, e.g., Sylvester 1994; Weber 1994) have developed at length the argument that the scientific standards of analysis in IR and FPA are imbued with masculine perspective. Sanjay Seth (2011) argues in a similar vein for the scientifically liberating potential of postcolonial IR theory. Our interest is not to subsume these other approaches, but to argue that constructivists, in particular, must take such concerns seriously.

Perhaps the 'flip side of the coin' for those who embrace scholarship aware of cultural perspectives is the observation that FPA is already

woefully dominated by culturally specific—particularly American—perspectives. Ole Waever (1998: 689) documents the 'unbalanced relationship between American and non-American IR in terms of patterns of publication, citation, and, especially, theory borrowing' and finds that the situation has not changed much since Kal J. Holsti (1985) reached a similar conclusion. Waever (1998: 689) opines that 'all other national IR communities are running huge balance-of-trade deficits against the United States'. The apparent danger of this situation is that it combines intellectual parochialism with political bias, neither of which advances scholarship. If this changes, Waever expects that the shift will not be towards a cosmopolitan scholarly community respectful of many voices, but rather towards the professionalization of other national or regional academic communities.

For those who cleave to the notion of a single scientific standard for FPA, such fragmentation is an ominous development. A sociologically aware constructivist, however, has reason to look at the matter differently. Constructivism can move FPA beyond a tired repetition of choice and constraint as the defining features of policy only if can find ways to admit culture more fully to its analytical corpus. We have argued that Goffman and Mead suggest ways to move forward through the notions of scripts and symbolic interaction. This does not mean that constructivists interested in foreign policy must adopt these frameworks specifically. Rather, we intend to make the more general argument that constructivism in FPA should be sensitive to cultural context and cultural scripts as crucial elements of policy choices.

We find evidence, moreover, that constructivist scholarship is unself-consciously moving in this direction. After reviewing constructivist analyses of foreign policy published in the past twenty years in different regions of the world to the best of our ability, we cannot escape the conclusion that constructivists are embracing a second, somewhat unheralded, cultural turn. They are not only turning with fresh eyes towards culture as *explanans*, but they also comment with increasing frequency on the cultural limits or conditions of scientific inquiry. Among Chinese scholars, for example, there is a sustained and growing interest in the extent to which analytical conventions born in the West are suited to accounts of Chinese foreign policy. Xiangfeng Yang (2017) argues that constructivist interest in state socialization misunderstands the agency of the state itself,

in part because of its reliance on Western models of the state that map awkwardly onto (for example) the Chinese state. Yaqing Qin (2009, 2018) has developed the argument that a Confucian relational sociology is at odds with notions of agent, structure, and rationalism developed in a Western context. Qin (2014) also draws attention to the way explanations of China's so-called 'new assertiveness' create a dialectic in which FPA itself participates in the creation of its objects of analysis. And like Qin, Huiyun Feng (2007) explicitly calls for culturally informed theories of IR and foreign policy in her study of Chinese strategic culture.

Similarly, writing in a prominent Indian IR journal, Shibashis Chatterjee (2006) argues that the use of cultural constructs to understand foreign policy benefits from multiple traditions. Constructivists, he complains, have by and large 'neglected the crucial question regarding the origin of norms—where do norms come from?' (Chatterjee 2006: 57). When they answer this question by invoking notions of *community*, he goes on to argue, they rely on unexamined cultural assumptions that deserve greater attention. Nalin Kumar Mohapatra (2018) likewise argues that interactions among India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan challenge conventional understandings of regional cooperation and compel us to think in terms of the role of a common 'geoculture'. One element of this geoculture undoubtedly stems from colonial and postcolonial experiences. Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi (2009; 5) maintain that 'memories of colonial rule contributed to a political culture which privileged the concept of national autonomy'.

A resurgent scholarship of national autonomy is also evident among Latin American scholars (Saraiva 2010). Amado Luiz Cervo, who Raúl Bernal-Meza (2005) considers a key exponent of the Brasilia school of IR, traces this concern specifically to distinctive national cultural experiences. 'By the force of reading, quotation, learning or even the subconscious', he says, 'the message of that segment of national thought is revived and perpetuated' (Cervo 2008: 15; authors' translation). Crucial ideas (*ideas fuerza*) take root in national contexts and drive foreign policies (Cervo 2003), a view that is reminiscent of Onuf's (2013) attention to 'big ideas'. For his part, Bernal-Meza (2018) extends this point to an analysis of regional geocultures, arguing that borders must be considered as culturally distinctive sites of regionalism in the face of globalization. Particularly for developing countries, he contends, the border shapes culturally distinctive identities that, in turn,

contribute to a different understanding of *region*. Focusing on the Andean region, Germán Camilo Prieto (2016) likewise maintains that the notion of region as an analytical construct depends on regional cultural constructs and these, in turn, on the discursive practice of regional officials. And Carlos M anuel Reyes Silva (2015) argues that the notion of a common geoculture—even a regionally specific one—must also consider cultural constructs that are internal to the state. Reyes Silva specifically invokes Mead (and Wendt's appropriation of Mead) but criticizes their approach for relying on a purely interactionist approach to state identity at the international level. Particularly in multi-cultural societies, he argues, the internal cultural contest is as crucial for an understanding of the link between identity and security as are encounters among states in international society.

African journals in which one might find work on FPA have had somewhat tumultuous publication histories, but there is evidence of attention in their pages as well to cultural limits on FPA. Lere Amusan (201 8) argues that notions of national interest in post-Apartheid South Africa are based on themes ranging from xenophobia to *ubuntu* (a term suggesting that one's personhood depends on other people) that take a form and primacy of place they might not in other countries. A study by Albert Domson-Lindsay (2014: 391) of South Africa-Swaziland relations argues in a similar vein that a state's interest is not 'constant and exogenously given'. 'Constructivism', he says, 'takes a more sociological approach to the discussion of how state identity, behaviour or interests are constituted', and this is necessary in order to appreciate the 'complexity of Swaziland's policy behaviour … and the centrality of the interaction context in the constitution of interest' (397–398, 405). Bianca Naudé (2016: 488) similarly focuses on state interaction to develop the argument that South African foreign policy is misunderstood and seen as irrational or schizophrenic because of 'a scholarly obsession with materialism that attributes agency in international relations to either strategies and interests, or to norms and institutions that are meant to regulate behaviour'. Drawing on Wendt, Naudé argues for a 'transsubjective' state personhood wedded to ontologically social notions of 'collective emotionality'.

These examples of scholarship from different parts of the world each make the claim, from an explicitly constructivist perspective, that FPA requires cultural contextualization. Quite often, these scholars are inclined towards an interactionist sociology, arguing that cultural perspectives are

formed out of encounters across cultural divides. If there is an overarching theme to this research, it is not simply that foreign policy analysts in different regions have somewhat different concerns, but rather that they see foreign policy as dictated by different standards of reasonable behaviour arising out of distinct cultural contexts. This theme is also implicit in the way constructivist FPA scholarship in one part of the world differs from that in others (see Giacalone 2012; Brummer and Hudson 2015). That is to say, scholars in this diverse group are not making the same argument about the importance of culturally specific FPA concepts, but rather they are making a variety of different arguments about the virtues of cultural awareness in constructivist FPA. The discipline of FPA would do better to highlight this pluralism rather than to pursue unifying leitmotifs, whether informed by constructivism or another analytical perspective.

We are, of course, cherry picking our examples from a much larger body of scholarship which does *not* undertake the sort of FPA we have in mind. Yet it is hard to escape the conclusion that constructivist FPA is moving in the direction of greater cultural awareness. And we intentionally did not select examples from the much larger corpus of European and North American FPA scholarship. We think it is clear enough that the efflorescence of distinctive European schools of IR (the English School, the Copenhagen School, etc.) also has implications for FPA consistent with the argument made here. Finally, we chose not to dwell too much on an unenforceable distinction between FPA and the analysis of IR. We return briefly in our concluding section, however, to the conviction that an interest in the choices states actually make gives FPA licence to explore themes that are largely ignored by IR theory. The latter treats choices like water flowing downstream, guided towards an inevitable conclusion by gravity. It is true that the banks of the river guide the water, but the flow of water is itself capable of reshaping the river's course.

Conclusion

Somewhere between the notion that every people and nation is entitled to its own FPA and the notion there can be but a single field of FPA is the space for which we are arguing: the understanding that cultural standards define important questions, privilege certain theories, and inform notions of

what constitutes a suitable empirical test. We began with an account of policy itself, arguing that restricting the problem of policy to the desires of states on one hand, and constraints on the satisfaction of these desires on the other, incapacitates our efforts to understand what states will actually choose to do. The sociological turn among constructivists paves the way not only for more compelling discussions of preference formation, but also for a more ontologically diverse field of FPA. We return now to the words of a prominent scholar of policy, Aaron Wildavsky (1987: 5), who arrived late in his career at a position that resembles our own:

> Rejecting a social science that begins at the end by assuming interests, I wish to make what people want—their desires, preferences, values, ideals—into the central subject of our inquiry. By classifying people, their strategies, and their social contexts into the cultural biases that form their preferences, cultural theory attempts to explain and predict recurrent regularities and transitions in their behavior. Preferences in regard to political objects are not external to political life; on the contrary, they constitute the very internal essence, the quintessence of politics: the construction and reconstruction of our lives together.

Wildavsky was not a constructivist, but no matter. Here, he neatly captures an essentially constructivist conviction about the study of foreign policy.

We are also very much aware that constructivism is a big tent. We have shied away from generalizations about what constructivism as a whole says (or should say) about FPA—in part out of respect for the highly diverse corpus of constructivism and in part because our interest runs more towards the celebration of distinct perspectives than the distillation of a common one. We do not see a variety of constructivisms as a problem; indeed, realists, liberals, feminists, and adherents to other paradigms also speak with many voices. It is clear that not all constructivist scholars embrace dramaturgical logic as a central preoccupation. This is fine, just as it is fine that some realists are game theorists, and some are historians. Neoclassical realists pay a great deal of attention to the role of domestic politics; the same concerns hardly register for Waltzian neorealists. So it is with constructivism.

But a great many constructivists are, in fact, interested in the ways cultural variation invites the application of different scripts to policy problems. This awareness is precisely what constructivists have always promised: attention to the ways that our differences cause us to construct different worlds and to act in them accordingly.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 5

Foreign Policy Analysis and Feminism

KARIN AGGESTAM AND JACQUI TRUE

INTRODUCTION

Gender representation and inclusion feature large in contemporary global policy discourses, for example, as one of the four pillars of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, as well as in feminist political theory and activism (see Phillips 1998). Gender representation is also central in the growing number of studies on diplomacy, which map and analyse gendered practices of diplomats (Aggestam and Towns 2018; Cassidy 2018). Another notion that figures prominently in global policy discourses is gender mainstreaming, which is embedded in international liberalism and has been widely adopted in the last two decades by international institutions (True 2004). This international context has provided a window of opportunity to promote gender equality and women's rights even though it is relevant to assess to what extent gender mainstreaming has influenced the foreign policy of specific countries. This chapter takes Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in a new direction by engaging with feminist International Relations (IR) theory (see Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). We argue here that gender is a major fault line in contemporary global politics as differences in values and attitudes about gender and sexuality within and across countries trigger deep division and polarization (Inglehart and Norris 2003; True 2004: 158; Bjarnegard and Melander 2017). As many countries reckon with, for example, whether or not to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in 2021, due in part to its staunch regime of gender apartheid, this fault line has become even more salient in foreign policy. As such, we consider gender as a useful category to understand and explain change and continuity in foreign policy.

There are presently two major, but contrary, trends in global politics. First, there is a growing number of 'women-friendly' states that have taken the lead in promoting gender equality in global affairs. States, such as Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, Germany, USA, and the UK are pursuing the Women, Peace, Security (WPS) agenda, as one of their core pillars in foreign policy (Aggestam and True 2020). As mentioned, there is a noticeable advocacy on the advancement of gender equality, empowerment, and leadership, often framed as 'smart diplomacy and economics', that is ultimately assumed to promote global security (Clinton 2010; Hudson et al. 2012; Wallström 2016). This chapter defines 'pro-gender equality norms' as the inclusion of one or more of the four following types of commitments in foreign policy: (a) the explicit practice of 'gender mainstreaming' as a foreign policy approach to advance gender equality and women's rights within and across foreign security and defence, economic development, trade, aid, and humanitarian policies; (b) international development assistance that deliberately targets gender inequality and aims to transform gender relations; (c) a focus on women's security and human rights as indicators of state stability and international security; and (d) other foreign policy initiatives on gender equality, institutional or legislative mechanisms, such as establishing global ambassadors for gender equality or women and girls' empowerment, and commitments to promoting women's leadership in the foreign policy domain to achieve greater gender equality.

Second, there is an opposite trend as part of the rise of illiberal democracies and populism, which vociferously contests and resists the diffusion of pro-gender norms at home and in global politics (Kimmel 2015; Kourou 2020; Kaul 2021). The growing remasculinization of foreign policy, marked by an emphasis on short-term security concerns, has led to foreign policy reversals in some countries (Jeffords 1989). For instance, the reinstatement and expansion by the Trump administration of the Mexico City Policy in the United States in 2016, labelled as 'the global gag rule', banned the use of US foreign aid funds to non-governmental healthcare organizations that advocate for abortion rights. Yet, there are nearly no studies in FPA that explain these trends, variations, and gendered dynamics in foreign policy from a feminist perspective (for exceptions, see Henshaw 2017; Aggestam et al. 2019; Aggestam and True 2020, 2021).

Responding to Klaus Brummer's (2021: 6) call to develop a more critical FPA, we argue here that feminist IR theory can advance and fill some of the

‘critical gaps’ that exist in FPA. Feminist IR theory can explain the rise of pro-gender equality norms and feminism in foreign policy as well as the resistance and contestation against this trend by states and other political actors and their implications for international affairs. These challenges and resistance cannot be explained without understanding and recognizing how the structural and hierarchical principles of patriarchy are historically ingrained as part of state identities, diplomatic practices, and global order (Enloe 2017; True 2017a). As such, feminist IR theory moves beyond traditional approaches to conventional foreign policy. Moreover, men’s leadership and attitudes are important to study since both men and women can hold pro-gender equality or feminist attitudes and therefore promote these ideas through their behaviour as foreign policy agents (Tessler and Warriner 1997; Aggestam and True 2021).

While feminist IR theory and FPA rarely have engaged with one another, this chapter identifies a number of key intersections between these two fields of research that can generate new theoretical and empirical knowledge on feminism, gender, and foreign policy of mutual benefit to both feminist IR theory and FPA. For instance, feminist scholarship provides overarching critical theoretical and conceptual perspectives to gender, patriarchy, power configurations, and feminist norms and principles while FPA helps to advance systematic multi-level and comparative approaches to analyse and explain foreign policy decision-making processes and outcomes (Brummer 2021; Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). As such, there is a whole new area open for research and for studies on feminisms and foreign policy specifically.

The chapter is structured in the following way. The first part elaborates both on the strengths and weaknesses of FPA and feminist IR theory in explaining and understanding the gendered dynamics in foreign policy as well as highlighting synergies and intersections. The second part advances a feminist approach to the agency-structure debate in FPA by investigating three interrelated and mutually constituted levels of analysis: (a) gendered leadership between and among individual political agents; (b) gendered institutions between and among states through branding and symbolism; and (c) gendered structures and global interactions of state and non-state actors. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the relevance of feminist FPA in the context of current foreign policy crises and challenges, including the response to the global pandemic and to climate change.

Feminist IR Theory and FPA

Feminist IR theory and FPA offer many rich theoretical and empirical entry points to the study of foreign policy. Yet, few scholars have pursued the task of combining the two strands of research (Hudson and Leidl 2015; Aggestam and True 2020, 2021). In this chapter, we argue that synthesizing them can provide opportunities to advance theory and explore new lines of empirical scholarship. We also believe that this theoretical endeavour could generate new insights to the agency-structure debate in FPA. In the section below, we probe the strengths and weaknesses of these bodies of theory in explaining and understanding the gendered dynamics in foreign policy and identifying where the synergies and intersections are.

Foreign Policy Analysis

While there are major epistemological differences between feminist IR theory and FPA, there are also a number of overlapping areas, for example, on the centrality of linking the domestic to the international; addressing the interplay between agency and structure; an openness to pursue interdisciplinary studies and multi-level theory as well as empirical analysis. FPA has in many ways strived and developed in the shadow of IR (see also Brummer 2021). Whereas IR for a long time dominated the discipline with its reliance primarily on structural theoretical explanations, FPA has since its establishment as a research field centred more on foreign policy decision-making and the complexities of international politics that practitioners and decision-makers are confronted with. As such, FPA has sought to open up the black box of decision-making by pursuing actor-oriented and multi-level theory of foreign policy processes, resulting in complex multi-factorial analyses on a broad range of issues (Rosenau 1974; George 1993; Hill 2015).

Although FPA traditionally puts a strong emphasis on behaviouralism, a broad range of theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches have been advanced, for example, to highlight how psychological, individual, organizational, and bureaucratic processes impact foreign policy outcomes (Gross Stein and Pauly 1992; Hudson 2014). In this regard, Ole Holsti's seminal research in the 1970s on national role conceptions, societal

characteristics, and their influence on policy-making, state agency, and foreign policy outcomes has been instrumental in advancing the field.

Linking domestic politics to IR, Putnam advanced the notions of 'double-edged diplomacy' and 'two-level games' (1988) as a way to capture how diplomats, and political leaders are constrained and enabled by the interaction between these contexts, for instance, in international negotiations. In another study, Jeffrey Checkel (1999) argued that we can only fully understand foreign policy and cross-national variation by linking international norms to domestic policy change. In a similar vein, Michael B arnett (1999) analysed how foreign policy change can be legitimized by studying the interaction between normative international structures and domestic institutional contexts and cultural landscapes, which inform political actors and guide social practices.

In addition, FPA offers a useful entry point as the field contains large and rich numbers of comparative empirical studies of foreign policies. Hence, FPA scholarship has ambitiously sought to conduct major cross-national studies, with large-*N* data collection and data sets. Yet, it has generated more limited advancement of foreign policy theory. Furthermore, FPA tends to be heavily centred and confined to state- and Euro-centrism. It is only recently that FPA has begun to move beyond North America and Europe, and to assess the impact of non-state actors in foreign policy processes and in the broader realm of IR (Hudson 2014; Brummer 2021).

However, as part of the endeavour to open up new directions, critical FPA has developed and grown as a subfield to the larger scholarship on FPA (Williams 2005; Brummer 2021; Beasley et al., Chapter 9 in this volume). This strand of research underlines the importance of both structure and agency, and forwards a much broader view of international politics (Smith e t al. 2016). Similar to feminist theory, critical FPA highlights how states' foreign policies are shaped both by non-governmental organizations on the inside and transnational epistemic communities, social movements, and norms on the outside. Furthermore, critical FPA scholars probe discrepancies between theory, knowledge, and reality as well as the mismatches, which exist between foreign policy rhetoric and action. However, some actors and groups continue to receive scarce if any attention in FPA, particularly the ones who are affected by the foreign policy decisions (Smith et al. 2016: 6; Brummer 2021: 6).

In 1981, Ole Holsti and James Rosenau stated: ‘few predictions about social change seems as safe as the position that women will play an increasingly important role in leadership positions. However, one may judge the pace of change in this respect, there can be little disagreement about the trend’. Still, scholarship on gender in foreign policy is limited and the field continues to be ‘gender blind’ (Hudson 2014: 218). The ground-breaking research by Hudson and Leidl (2015) on the Hillary doctrine opened up the field for gender sensitive and feminist FPA. Yet, there are no studies to our knowledge that use feminist IR studies to explain the overall rise of pro-gender norms and how gender identities and practices impact foreign policy processes and outcomes.

Feminist IR Theory

Feminist IR theory is an expansive and diverse field of scholarship, which is used for analysis in a broad range of issues and areas (see, for example, S joberg 2013; Tickner 2014; Shepherd 2017). As such, it is distinguished by its plural and interdisciplinary theoretical orientation, and multi-level approaches to method and empirical analysis. At the same time, few feminist scholars have studied the adoption of gender norms in foreign policy (for exceptions, see Hudson and Leidl 2015; Bilgic 2016; True 2017 b; Aggestam et al. 2019; Aggestam and True 2020;). One reason for this may be the general scepticism among feminist scholars regarding the capacity of state-centred institutional frameworks to further feminist political agendas. States are often viewed as being ingrained with patriarchal, hierarchical, and oppressive power structures (Peterson 1992; P arashar et al. 2018). Gendered analyses have shown how states both extend masculine protection to ‘women and children’ while also perpetrating the social, political, and economic inequalities that make women insecure in the first place (Parashar et al. 2018). Liberal and postcolonial as well as religious states all variously express hierarchies of male entitlement and female subordination; therefore a state cannot be seen as a neutral agent, from a feminist perspective (Peterson 1992; McBride Stetson and Mazur 19 95). As a consequence, for women to advance and be successful as agents of the state they must conform, to some extent, to its norms and discourses, which reflect a historically, male-centred perspective based on men’s experiences in the world.

Another reason may be a reluctance by diplomats and foreign policy leaders to engage and analyse accounts from within. Token women are often portrayed as operating and adjusting to masculine norms and scripts, and as co-opted by male power structures, which tend to dominate the foreign policy domain. As feminist scholars have long observed, 'adding women and stirring' does not transform policy outcomes (Peterson 1992). Instead, more emphasis has been placed by feminist scholars on 'external' rather than individual-level push factors, such as international norms, transnational networks, and restraining patriarchal power structures.

Given the scepticism towards the state, feminist theory has instead emphasized the state itself as consisting of multiple, often contradictory, agencies and actors highlighting the spaces and opportunities for feminist interventions (Pringle and Watson 1992; Kantola and Dahl 2005). Sandra Grey and Marian Sawer (2009) have developed the concept of insider-outsider support structures that enable women bureaucrats working in the state to connect with women's movement actors working outside the state (see Eisenstein 1996 on the concept of 'femocrat'). Htun and Weldon (2012) have sought to measure the influence of women's civil society movements on key state policy outcomes, such as the rise of new laws to reduce and end violence against women.

Comparative feminist studies have also explored the range of factors affecting the way in which gender norms and gender-sensitive policies are diffused within and across state institutions (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995; McBride Stetson 2001; Outshoorn 2004). For instance, Htun and Weldon (2018) ask when and why do governments promote women's rights? By analysing seventy countries across three decades 1975–2005, they are able to show how different logics of politics operate in different policy domains: on violence against women and work place equality policy norms are influential because of a logic of (international) status hierarchy among states whereas on policies regarding family law, abortion, and contraception a logic of doctrinal politics at the domestic level dominates given the influence of religious institutional actors.

Feminist IR theory that draws on constructivist scholarship has pioneered the study of non-state actors and transnational forces below and above the state in promoting normative changes that have implications for state foreign policies (Klotz 1995; Finnemore 1996; Zwingel 2015). The presence and acceptance of quotas for equitable gender representation,

institutions for mainstreaming gender analysis, and anti-violence against women policy, for example, are structures that increasingly shape contemporary foreign policy, giving rise to specific pro-gender equality norms and strategies. Compared with constructivist and institutional frameworks for norm diffusion, feminist IR theory has been even more focused on how transnational networks within and across states are instigated by locally connected grassroots actors, such as women's groups and organizations rather than international organizations or epistemic 'expert' communities (True 2019; cf. Acharya 2004). In fact, the research agenda on norm diffusion has been vitally shaped by feminist research on feminist networks as agents of diffusion (Krook and True 2012; Htun and Weldon 2012; Hughes et al. 2015). These networks are seen as works in progress that actively shape the international norms that are themselves dynamic processes subject to contestation and change. Moreover, feminist scholars have addressed practical challenges in researching these networks. Thus, they have built new repositories of knowledge collecting international data from the ground-up on women's organizations, pro-gender equality laws, quotas, and institutions in as many states as possible enlisting the assistance of key partners in policy and justice institutions and civil society (True 2018).

While studying international normative change, feminist IR theorists have noticed the dynamic and non-linear evolution of the meaning of norms on gender and gender equality (Lombardo et al. 2009; Zwingel 2015). Focusing on the fluidity and multiple meanings of a norm provides greater analytical leverage for explaining why gender equality norms emerge and appear to be widely accepted across states even though they hardly ever achieve their intended aims (True 2018). This insight is directly applicable to FPA and the analysis of the outcomes of pro-gender equality foreign policies. For instance, in the WPS foreign policy domain, a binary conception of sex can be found at the heart of UNSCR 1325. Yet, over nearly two decades, WPS as an international community of practice has progressively recognized greater diversity and intersectionality in the category of woman (girls/youth, minority status / ethnicity, disability) as well as recognizing the category of men and boys (gender rather than sex), particularly as victims of sexual and gender-based violence, and supporters of women's agency in peacebuilding. As such, greater diversity has changed

the dominant meaning of 'gender' as understood in international peace and security discourse and practice.

Feminist IR theory is both structure- and agent-focused and offers a dynamic, non-linear account of policy change and continuity to FPA as well as the import of gender. In recognizing the on-going constitution of norms, it confers an active role to gendered agents in identifying and interpreting norms and policy problems (Bacchi 1999). At the same time, advocacy networks which continually alter their membership and policy agendas constitute an ontological standpoint that mediates the tension between analysing agency versus structure. As Zwingel argues, transnational networks 'have their own political agendas and are not automatically and supporters of international norms' (2013: 113). They engage in trial and error processes, in theory and practice to see what works in translating principled ideas into concrete outcomes (Krook and True 2012: 117).

A Feminist Agency-Structure Approach to FPA

One of the big debates in the field of FPA relates to agency and structure (Giddens 1979; Carlsnaes 1992), which focuses on the dualism between them. Yet, there has not been any feminist scholarly contribution that have taken as a point of departure to explicitly problematize gendered structures, hierarchies, and political actors in foreign policy, and probe how patriarchy functions as a structuring and ordering principle of global society. To capture the gendered mutual constitution of agent and structure, we therefore suggest that it is useful to think of the interaction between agent and structure as gendered multi-level games (Aggestam and True 2021). Foreign policy actors must negotiate a complex international social world of gender symbolism and gendered practices that affect how states and individuals present themselves and are perceived, and the modes of communication and interaction among them (Harding 2004).

In critically assessing continuity and change in foreign policy, we need to pay particular attention to gendered dynamics in global politics (Aggestam and True 2021). For instance, the rise of illiberal democracies, right-wing populism, and authoritarian leaders and the attack, in particular, on women's reproductive rights and bodily autonomy, suggests the possibility for significant regression in pro-gender foreign policy outcomes. The

concept of ‘gendered multi-level games’ highlights how specific favouring domestic, international, or transnational structures create ‘windows of opportunities’ for the diffusion of or resistance to pro-gender norms in foreign policy. We therefore argue that to analyse these gendered dynamics provides a more precise understanding of how power and authority is exercised in foreign policy. Foreign policy actors are constantly mediating a complex international social world of gender symbolism and normative structures, which affect how states, non-state actors, and individuals present themselves and are perceived.

Furthermore, a feminist approach to the agency-structure problem sensitizes our empirical analysis of situated foreign policy actors to the material lived experience where gender intersects and often reinforces other social categories of inequality and identity, such as race/ethnicity, sexuality, class, nationality status, and so forth. For instance, contemporary global incentive structures may provide an overarching rationale that enables foreign policy actors to positively invoke gender games to advance pro-gender norms in foreign policy. Yet, deeply entrenched patriarchal structures in states and global politics take time to transform. If the present rule-based liberal order, which promotes international norms, such as human rights and gender equality, is further eroded, the opportunities for promoting pro-gender equality outcomes in foreign policy are likely to be reduced. Hence, existing patriarchal structures constrain feminist and pro-gender equality actions as well as enabling resistance against them. To elaborate further on a feminist agency-structure approach in FPA, three interrelated and mutually constituted levels are addressed: gendered leadership (between and among individual political agents); gendered institutions (between and among states through branding and symbolism); and gendered structures (global interactions of state and non-state actor, based on pro- and anti-gender norms and principles).

Gendered Leadership between and among Political Actors

Leadership is central to the study of foreign policy and is increasingly about harnessing the power of global networks and publics as well about addressing common and often intractable challenges in interstate relations (Matthews 1997: 51–66). Yet, few studies analyse women’s and men’s foreign policy leadership as gendered beings. Women and men perform and behave in gendered ways, deploying gender images, language, tropes, and

actions. Gendered structures also pertain to institutions, and how states influence and shape foreign policy processes and decisions. For instance, it is unlikely to see foreign policy change driven by pro-gender norms without significant women's or male feminist leadership. As Sylvia Bashevkin (2018) shows in her analysis of US administrations, not all women secretaries of state have supported pro-gender norms.

On the other hand, agency of political leaders such as Margot Wallstrom in Sweden, Julie Bishop in Australia, Gro-Harlem Brundtland, historically, in Norway, Nkozasana Dlamini-Zuma in South Africa, and Justin Trudeau in Canada has been crucial in seizing the opportunity for pro-gender foreign policies. These leaders have all sought to set themselves apart in the political and international realm through their advocacy of foreign policy that is pro-gender equality and/or feminist. Their leadership styles, however, can be compared both in terms of their projection of masculine and feminine power and their foreign policy approach. Some leaders, like Dlamini-Zuma in South Africa, have prioritized gender inclusion in foreign policy by advocating for diverse actors to be involved in foreign policy, while other leaders, such as Julie Bishop in Australia, have sought to make foreign policies more 'gender-sensitive', mainstreaming gender analysis into foreign aid spending and development programmes. In a more far-reaching way, other leaders, such as Margot Wallstrom in Sweden, have aspired to transform the unequal, gendered structures of international politics through Sweden's feminist foreign policy (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond 2016).

As such, collective leadership styles can be exercised in different ways regarding the adoption of pro-gender equality and/or feminist strategies, such as status quo-oriented (minimalist), gender sensitive (inclusive), and transformative (maximalist) policies. One central conundrum relates to the extent to which individual leaders matter in the adoption of pro-gender equality and feminist foreign policy. Without a doubt, the promotion of pro-gender norms in foreign policy is strongly attached to the roles of key foreign policy actors. In this regard, the concept of norm entrepreneur in foreign policy could be useful (Nadelmann 1990). A norm entrepreneur can be understood as a political actor who actively and consciously seeks to promote foreign policy change by integrating pro-gender equality norms (Davies and True 2017). As such, the rise of women's leadership through pro-gender equality and feminist foreign policies can help us understand the

relationship between agency and structure; and vice versa how agency and structure help us to explain and interpret women's leadership on foreign policy, including its limits and possibilities. Unlike non-state actors who set the agenda by advocating for new norms, foreign policy decision-makers can take advantage of their positionality and their relative power to advance the recognition of certain underimplemented norms by redefining the 'national interest', and what is included in and what is meant by it. Hence, the gender identity and positionality of the entrepreneur or foreign policy actor matters (Davies and True 2017). That identity may also facilitate the diffusion of the norm, particularly when it is juxtaposed to the content of the normative or policy change and when the change being sought challenges conventional foreign policy action (Davies and True 2017).

Gendered Institutions between and among States through Branding and Symbolism

The foreign policy orientation of a state provides an overarching frame to explain the rise, continuity, change, and/or resistance to pro-gender equality norms. States can be compared for their foreign policies in terms of how centrally gender is articulated within a state's foreign policy orientation and practice. For instance, Sweden and Canada have opted to explicitly label and brand their foreign policies 'feminist'. The foreign policy orientation also includes state identity, which is (re)constituted by a broad range of historical, domestic, and international conditions, actors, and practices. Central here is the notion of 'state feminism' that focuses on changing state structures by institutionalizing women's state machinery, feminist social movements, and women's rights and empowerment (Hernes 1987). In the cases of Sweden and Norway the advancement of pro-gender norms in foreign policy practice corresponds with their long-held self-images as 'women-friendly' states. Gender equality has been widely institutionalized and domestically embedded as part of Sweden's and Norway's state feminism. As such, their foreign policy role conception reflects the states' bureaucratic capacity to practically implement pro-gender norms in foreign policy. For instance, Annika Bergman-Rosamond (2020) shows how the launching of a Swedish feminist foreign policy was a culmination of a long-held humanistic idea of 'gender cosmopolitanism'. Likewise, Norway has invested considerable resources over the last decade in order to become a 'superpower' in peacemaking. Increasing professionalization of diplomats

and institutionalization of pro-gender norms has made possible the advancement of gender-inclusive peace processes (Skjelsbaek and Tryggestad 2020). In the case of Canada, the country under Trudeau's leadership has been 'rebranding' itself through its practices of feminist international development assistance, which are part of broader efforts to project an image of Canada as a compassionate and generous member of the global community (Parisi 2020). Hence, states need to be taken seriously, but not by privileging state actors as the main or only unit of the theoretical and empirical analysis. Instead, the domestic-international divide in foreign policy needs to be challenged by recognizing that the state itself consists of multiple actors and is a site of diverse domestic and international structures, processes, and actors. In short, foreign policy increasingly involves harnessing the power of global networks that cut across traditional sovereignties.

As discussed above, Ole Holsti's (1970) work on national role conception depicts how nations view themselves and their roles in the international arena. This is shaped by both political elite perceptions as well as by societal characteristics and domestic political imperatives, which enable and constrain conditions for the advancement of pro-gender norms in foreign policy. The study of gender and democracy stresses the domestic factors, which affect how receptive nation-states are to the promotion of gender equality norms. The more democratic a state is with respect to its governance the more likely women's political perspectives are to be politically articulated. Other variables, such as the degree of women's political representation, and the strength and autonomy of women's movement are also emphasized (Htun and Weldon 2012; Bashevkin 2018; True 2016). Thus, pro-gender equality foreign policies tend to be advanced by democratic states where women's political presence is most manifest and supported by broader women's movements. National role conception or identity as a peacemaker or peaceful democracy are also more likely to adopt pro-gender foreign policy norms to be consistent with this conception. Sometimes the adoption of pro-gender norms in a peace agreement, for example in the case of Columbia or in third-party peace mediation in the case of Norway, can lead to or reinforce the construction of the peacemaker/peaceful democracy identity.

Relevant to analyse and identify here is how pro-gender norms are anchored and formulated into more specific foreign policy strategies.

Practices may be expressed in coalition building with both domestic and international actors and other states. For instance, the coalition ‘friends of WPS’ at the UN Security Council expresses such foreign policy coordination as do the ‘champions’ of the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative. Furthermore, it is important to probe what contexts and under what conditions pro-gender equality practices are identified and launched as an important foreign policy change. Conversely, we must ask what strategies other actors are using to resist and/or contest such foreign policy change.

Gendered Structures and the Global Interactions of State and Non-State Actors

It is striking how the global diffusion of pro-gender norms has been perceived as a ‘window of opportunity’ of foreign policy change for several states in recent years. Without a doubt, the global mobilization around the WPS agenda has provided an incentive structure for states to advance pro-gender norms, which reflects how important it is to identify key representations and discursive structures which might legitimize foreign policies. Moreover, transnational networks and ‘women-friendly’ coalition building among states have been visible in various international fora as a way to advance pro-gender norms. At the same time, norm diffusion requires both contestation and consensus building. In this regard, Sweden and Canada stand out as driving forces in expanding the space for a ‘feminist’ framing of their foreign policies; and the public commitments have been met with praise, contestation, and resistance. In contrast, Australia and Norway have opted for consensus building strategies and gender mainstreaming.

Gendered norms establish biological differences ‘not only as a natural fact but as the ontological basis for political and social differences’ (Kinsella 2005: 271). They not only legitimate differences and inequalities, they produce them. In times of crisis and upheaval, which are frequent in foreign policy and global politics, gendered norms may create the illusion of fixed and stable structures that reassure boundaries—of identity, the home, the public/private, and the nation-state (Aida and True 2016). With such an approach, it challenges the domestic-international divide in foreign policy by recognizing that the state itself consists of multiple actors and bureaucratic processes. Hence, empirical analysis can be used to explore

whether some ideas are targeting some specific spheres and if some domains of foreign policy, such as international aid and humanitarian policy, are more responsive to pro-gender norm diffusion than others, such as national security or international trade policy, and why this is so. Moreover, it can be used to explore how resistance against such norm promotion is articulated and mobilized; and the question posed as to whether there are any links or disconnects between various foreign policy spheres, such as trade, economic policy, security, peace diplomacy, and humanitarian affairs.

Gendered structures also generate power and legitimacy. Conventionally, power is understood in IR scholarship, including FPA, as referring to the material capabilities of states and as a zero-sum quantity in the interstate realm. However, conceptions of power are multiple, and they are increasingly understood as ideational more than positional, shaped by knowledge, and symbolized in military and production structures (Strange 1988). Power is located not merely in material structures, such as the international gender division of labour or controlled by specific actors, it also lies in 'systems of signification and meaning' that are socially produced and affect actors' self-understanding and perceived interests (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 20). In some respects, the popular term in diplomacy, 'soft power', captures this ideational, symbolic, and indeed performative concept of power (Nye 1990).

From a feminist perspective, gender relations are considered intrinsic to the meaning of power itself with masculinity often connoting power and vice versa (Scott 1986). Power is always relational (Tickner 1988; Sylvester 1994) and conceived less as power over another than as the power to act in concert with that other, which is part of the notion of empowerment—both for the individual and the collective. In the realm of foreign policy conceived as gendered multi-level games such an understanding of power is relational and shaped by gender as well as other facets of identity and structure. For instance, hypermasculine performance of foreign policy, which emphasizes the use of strong-arm tactics and displays of hard power may seriously constrain the possibility for pro-gender norms in foreign policy to come to the fore. This approach importantly takes into account the power of identity, the power of ideas, and the power of networks and movements as well as the material capabilities of states. Most importantly, it captures both in theory as well as in practice the critical interplay between

agency and structure, which can explain the rise as well as the resistance of pro-gender norms in foreign policy.

Feminist IR theorists have forged new approaches to conceptualize transnational structures and networks as non-state actors that both directly influence foreign policies through advocacy and indirectly influence these policies through the international normative change they contribute to, which has a bearing on foreign policies (Paxton et al. 2006; Htun and Weldon 2012). Transnational feminist or women's networks work across jurisdictions negotiating and localizing international norms to bring about social as well as policy change even when there may be no favourable foreign policy leader or norm entrepreneur or an international power structure that mitigates against the adoption of such change. Often these networks depend on generations of local and national social movement activism to make such change possible by forging new alliances, and reframing previous ideas and actions (Joachim 2008; Zwingel 2013). Going global is a strategy that is expected to increase public support and remove key obstacles to change, but the politics of connecting issues across jurisdictions has the effect of both changing the agents and the norms themselves being pushed (True 2018). This shows the importance of networks since they play a critical role in the creation of new institutions advancing gender equality, for instance, in foreign policy. At the same time, networks do not work as a unified social movement. As Hughes et al. (2015) underline, women's organizing across states is highly diverse and in the case of electoral gender quotas it frequently comes up against protofeminist agendas that undermine the case for quotas, despite the international support for them.

Networks like norms can also be viewed as works 'in progress'. They are most important in the phase after the introduction of a new norm when the norm in question attains a level of international acceptance. At this stage, networks often become less informal and *ad hoc* and more professionalized and engaged with governments and intergovernmental institutions. They are distinct from individual leader or single groups, and more loosely connected as a set of individuals and groups that actively shapes a norm in progress, that unconsciously reflects the network's own changing formation (Nadelmann 1990; True 2018). For example, networks of women foreign policy leaders pre-date the branding of foreign policy as 'feminist', but they have prepared the ground for them, breaking down 'masculine hegemonies' and

enabling new forms of leadership and governance. Feminist foreign policy relevant governance networks seek to subvert that logic of foreign policy power. They create an alternative logic of empowerment promoted through diplomacy that supports women and men to deliver peace and prosperity through principles of human rights and gender equality.

But what happens when a shifting international environment makes it increasingly difficult to pursue soft power arguments, tools, and practices? To note, patriarchal structures are deeply entrenched in states and global politics. Hence, the feminist 'pragmatist' approach that we see practiced by several 'women-friendly' states of smart economics and politics may be limited and vulnerable when, for instance, confronted with the rise of hypermasculine foreign policies, actors, and anti-gender norms in global politics. Hence, if the present rule-based liberal order is further eroded, there is a greater risk of gender backlash against transformative foreign policy and of regression to traditional foreign policy. Contestation through antagonistic discourses and non-implementation as a way of resisting pro-gender norms may give an indication of the what might be to come in global politics (True and Wiener 2019).

Hence, a feminist approach to FPA may be increasingly relevant in the context of current foreign policy crises and challenges, including the responses to the global pandemic and to climate change. Like all crises, the most recent being the COVID-19 pandemic, the responses have exposed the strengths and the weakness, the challenges and the gaps in existing foreign policy and the analysis of them. Recent events have further solidified the future of feminist or pro-gender norms in foreign policy in the short term. As shown, feminist leadership in foreign, security and public health policy has proven highly effective in reducing the spread and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic globally. However, the pandemic has widened gender inequalities globally (Turquet et al. 2021). As a result, we can observe how contemporary feminist alliances across policy areas and countries have been vociferously building on the feminist foreign policy movement, calling for a feminist COVID-19 Policy and Recovery[1] that addresses climate change as well as recovery from the global pandemic. We have also seen calls for 'feminist peace' in foreign policy especially in light of the 2021 change in the US presidency'.[2] As myriad global crises unfold, actors both inside and outside of governments, in civil society organizations, and in the wider epistemic community will likely continue their mobilization efforts to

promote pro-gender norms in foreign policy. There is thus, an important opportunity to study the change and continuity that they provoke.

Conclusion

The emergence and direction of feminist and pro-gender norms in foreign policy does not take a linear, progressive trajectory. It takes place in a highly contested global political environment where some states adopt feminist framing of their foreign policies while other states reject pro-gender norms and initiate policy reversals, especially in the context of rising right-wing populism in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. In this chapter, we have explored the great potential for future FPA scholarship in drawing on feminist IR theory. There are few FPA scholars that have explored the gendered dynamics of foreign policy alongside other dynamics, such as the personality of leaders, the national role conception underpinning foreign policy decision-making, and the increasing salience of soft power in global politics. Hence, we argue that the time is ripe to explain how gender equality and women's rights norms are among the most contested political phenomena globally and why that matters in the trajectories of foreign policy.

Since both theoretical and empirical knowledge in FPA is sparse, we suggest three directions that should be taken. First, FPA needs more novel theoretical concepts to analyse the gendered political dynamics in foreign policy. In this chapter, we have advanced a feminist agency-structure approach to the study of gender and foreign policy which captures the interplay of gendered leadership, institutions, and structures. There is also a need to revisit some of the central concepts in FPA, e.g. leadership, operational codes, belief systems, and group thinking, to render them more gender sensitive and applicable in an increasingly diversified world of foreign policy actors. Second, there is a need to conduct more systematic empirical studies that take gendered dynamics seriously as a starting point, which can enable cross-national and regional comparison of foreign policy. Third, expanding FPA research in this new direction has the potential to make significant contributions not only to the field of FPA, but also beyond to wider debates in IR on the contestation of the liberal world order, as

gender is increasingly a major fault line in contemporary global politics, albeit underresearched and underappreciated.

Notes

1. The following statement has been endorsed by more than 1600 individuals and women's networks and organizations from more than 100 countries, to demand States adopt a feminist policy to address the extraordinary challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in a manner that is consistent with human rights standards and principles. http://feministallianceforrights.org/blog/2020/03/20/action-call-for-a-feminist-covid-19-policy/
2. In January 2021, a new feminist peace initiative led by Grassroots Global Justice Alliance, MADRE, and Women Cross DMZ released *A Vision for a Feminist Peace: Building a Movement-Driven Foreign Policy*. The framework aims to reimagines US foreign policy built on intersectional feminist principles led by social movements, see https://www.feministpeaceinitiative.org/

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CHAPTER 6

Foreign Policy Analysis and Realism

ANDERS WIVEL

Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) are in a complicated long-term relationship. Both perspectives are largely state-centric and tend to focus on security policy more than other policy areas. They both claim that part of their academic legitimacy stems from policy relevance and a more intimate knowledge of and interest in the challenges and conditions for foreign policy than other theoretical perspectives. However, they identify different, sometimes contrasting, challenges and conditions as pivotal. While foreign policy analysts emphasize the importance of domestic politics and decision-making processes for foreign policy, realists emphasize the importance of structural and systemic factors, and argue that state survival in an anarchic international self-help system leaves only a limited or secondary role for factors inside the state.

This chapter argues that realism and FPA would benefit from cross-fertilization but that the benefits vary across different types of realism. Contemporary realists all start from the same logic of international politics: the anarchic self-help structure of the international system prompts states to focus on security and survival. However, they vary in their expectations on how security is best attained—by defensive or offensive strategies—and the extent to which domestic politics and foreign policy decision-making are assumed to influence foreign policy. For these reasons, a realist starting point may result in very different logics of foreign policy. The different logics reflect that realism is not a falsifiable theory, but a cluster of theories beginning from a shared philosophical position that political life is best understood as a struggle for power between rival groups primarily catering for their own interests (Gilpin 1996: 6).

Realists argue that their focus on power politics makes realist insights applicable over time, but '[b]eneath the apparently smooth surface of realism lies not a single linear theory handed down from ancient times, but

an ever-changing discourse about the nature, application and effect of power in an ever-changing historical environment' (Buzan 1996: 51). Thematics and challenges are recurring, but the content and consequences of power politics are changing, even to realists. They acknowledge that factors such as developments in communications and weapons technology, the growth of international institutions and changing international norms have an impact on how the incentives of the anarchic self-help structure translates into power politics (e.g., Waltz 1981; Buzan 1993; Brooks and Wohlforth 2015; Maass 2017; Wivel and Paul 2019). Realism has been used as an analytical starting point for understanding foreign policy across different regions and regime types, and for both Great Powers and small states, but often modified to fit, e.g., the institutionalization of Europe (Reichwein 2021), or the weak state structures of developing states (Ayoob 2017). The realist concern with power has allowed for dialogue with and inspiration from constructivism (Barkin 2010), Marxism (Carr 1981), feminism (Elshtain 1985), as well as the English School and poststructuralism (Wivel 2021) in seeking to understand world politics and foreign policy.

The argument proceeds in five stages. First, I identify the shared starting point for realist FPA as the anarchic structure of the international system and unpack the consequences for how realists view foreign policy. From this starting point, I zoom in on defensive and offensive structural realism and their contrasting logics on how anarchic incentives translate into foreign policy. Third, I unpack and discuss neoclassical realism: a theoretical perspective, which has since the 1990s developed into the most prominent and widely used starting point for realist FPA. Fourth, I build on this discussion to explore the potential for combining or integrating realism with FPA. Finally, I conclude the chapter arguing that realism's most important contribution to FPA is its ongoing discussion on how, when, and why the external environment influences foreign policy.

International Anarchy and Foreign Policy Incentives

Realists emphasize the importance of international conditions—the anarchic structure of the international system and the strategic environments of individual states—for foreign policy. All politics is essentially a struggle for

power, but power politics plays out differently in international and domestic politics, because there is no legitimate monopoly of power in international relations (IR), i.e. the structure of the international system is anarchic. With no overarching authority or ultimate arbiter, IR take place in a 'self-help system', in which each state needs to take care of its own security and survival (Waltz 1979).

Two challenges follow from this state of affairs. First, in the absence of a legitimate monopoly of power, relative power becomes a key fact factor in IR. This has important consequences for foreign policy. As noted by Kenneth Waltz, the pre-eminent scholar of relative capabilities: (1) 'power provides the means of maintaining one's autonomy in the face of force that others wield'; (2) 'greater power permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcome of action uncertain'; (3) 'the more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how'; and (4) 'great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake' (Waltz 1979: 194–195). In sum, relative power affects the ability of states to conduct an independent foreign policy as well as the content of this policy. Realists expect powerful states to be safer, have a bigger foreign policy action space, and therefore a bigger role for domestic politics, and a bigger geographical scope in their policy than weaker states. They also expect powerful states to be more willing to invest in maintaining and developing international orders than weaker states, because the former have a greater stake in the system than the latter.

However, at the same time the effort of Great Powers to maintain or improve their position in the system may lead them into war with rivalling Great Powers, when emerging Great Powers challenge the position of regional and global hegemons (Gilpin 1981). This is the so-called Thucydides trap named after the ancient Greek general and historian, who in his account of the Peloponnesian War noted that 'the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable' (Thucydides [431 bce] 2009), a logic rearticulated by Graham Allison in his analysis of the future relationship of the rising power China and the declining hegemon, the United States (Allison 2017). For Great Powers, the implication is that even when they enjoy a hegemonic position, they can never stop preparing for the next war (Machiavelli [1532] 2009; Mearsheimer 2014a). For weaker states, it implies that questions of war and peace are

largely determined by the responses of Great Powers to systemic incentives (Maass 2017). They need to navigate Great Power politics rather than seeking to overcome it. Consequently, the anarchic structure of the international system leads realists to discount the likelihood that foreign policy decisions can lead to qualitative change and progress. International affairs will remain a domain characterized by 'recurrence and repetition' (Wight 1960). Great Powers will only produce public goods—such as managing the global natural commons, maintaining and developing an institutional infrastructure across borders, including arenas for negotiation, or keeping the peace—if they perceive it in their interest to do so, and they are likely to use their privileged position to increase global dependency and inequality rather than reducing it. If smaller and weaker states are dependent on Great Powers for the provision of public goods, their foreign policies are likely to be adaptive, reactive, and with an eye on the expectations of the Great Powers.

Two observations on realism and FPA follows from this brief discussion. First, anarchy is an incentive structure, not a determinant of foreign policy. In the words of Kenneth Waltz, '[i]n itself a structure does not lead to one outcome rather than another. Structure affects behavior within a system but does so indirectly' (Waltz 1979: 74). The anarchic structure constitutes a 'framework of world politics', but without the individual decision-makers and domestic society 'there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy' (Waltz 1959: 238). Only in extreme circumstances will a state face a clear and present danger but even when this is the case, misperception, irrational behaviour, and the inability to mobilize domestic resources may lead states to respond differently than expected from structural incentives (Ripsman et al. 2016: 19–25). Consequently, realist FPA can only in rare and extreme circumstances of a clear and present external danger avoid engaging with the psychological, cultural, institutional, and organizational factors highlighted by FPA.

Second, by emphasizing power, inequality, and conflict, a focus on the effects of international anarchy on foreign policy provides us with an alternative language for describing and understanding foreign policy compared to most policy-makers and foreign policy elites. Realism is a critical approach to FPA insofar as its emphasis on relative power and anarchy allows us to question taken for granted beliefs about how and why we do foreign policy, not least in liberal democracies, and to better

understand when we fail to convince other states about our good intentions (Walt 2018). Realists profess a consequentialist ethics of foreign policy based on a 'compromise between morality and power' in making a contextualized choice of the lesser evil (Morgenthau 1946; Carr 1981: 192). As noted by Morgenthau 'prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—[is] the supreme virtue in international politics' (Morgenthau 1967: 10). From this starting point, realists engage in debates on how to reconcile liberal commitments to human rights, and democracy with an anarchic international realm with strong incentives for nationalism (Morgenthau 1946; Mearsheimer 2018). At the same time, realism is frequently used to legitimate and naturalize power politics as a natural reflection or inevitable consequence of international anarchy (Cox [1981] 1986; Yeo 2018). The simultaneous use of realism as a point of departure for critiquing those in power and as tool for exercising power should come as no surprise. It reflects how realism is used as the point of departure for foreign policy decision-making and advice as well as a tool for critical analysis of foreign policy.

Structural Realism: Balancing or Maximizing Power?

All realist foreign policy analyses share an environment-based ontology (Sterling-Folker 1997): they begin from, and award primacy to, the international political environment when explaining the overall behaviour and specific foreign policy choices of states. However, while realist analyses of foreign policy start from a shared understanding of international anarchy as a self-help system (Rathbun 2008), they disagree over which incentives beyond self-help follow from anarchy.

Classical realists emphasize the role and responsibility of the foreign policy decision-maker (the 'statesman') navigating the dangers and temptations of an international realm with few checks, balances, and brakes on the unrestrained use of power. Hans Morgenthau's attention to the intellectual, moral, and practical virtues of leaders is still relevant for understanding international leadership today (Zhang 2017) and may both inform and benefit from contemporary FPA work on the importance of leadership traits. Classical realists explore how interaction between factors at systemic, national, and individual levels produce 'the complexities of

international affairs [that] make simple solutions and trustworthy prophesies impossible' (Morgenthau 1967: 19). In doing so, classical realists acknowledge the 'multi-level', 'multi-disciplinary', and 'resolutely multi-causal' nature of FPA (Morin and Paquin 2018: 8).

In contrast, structural realists seek to isolate the effects of international structure on foreign policy-making. Structural realists offer two competing logics of how anarchic incentives translate into foreign policy. Offensive realists argue that '[a]pprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system' (Mearsheimer 2014a: 33). On some occasions, military expansion may be the most powerful tool to do so but in addition states use diplomatic tools such as blackmailing (threatening a rival to make concessions), bloodletting, and bait-and-bleed policies (keeping a rival in costly protracted conflicts) as well as balancing and buck-passing policies (Toft 2005: 385–386; Mearsheimer 2014a: 147–162). In essence, the most fundamental foreign policy goal is security, and the most effective tool is to create an imbalance of power in one's own favour by military or diplomatic means (Layne 1998). Defensive realists disagree. They regard expansion as counter-productive, because it will provoke other states to counter-balance thereby endangering the survival and security of the state. Consequently, balancing power, not creating imbalances, is the most effective tool for achieving security (Waltz 1979: 121). States seek to preserve their position in the international system but renounce the chance of expansion. They are 'defensive positionalists' (Grieco 1990: 10).

The ability of structural realism to explain foreign policy is an empirical question (Elman 1996; Beach and Pedersen 2020), but the generic nature of the logics of structural defensive and offensive realism leaves them with little predictive or explanatory power if we seek to explain the decisions and strategies of individual states (Schweller 2003). To the extent that these theories tell us about foreign policy, it is the foreign policy of a particular type of states: Great Powers in the Westphalian system.

In addition, the specific claims of both offensive and defensive realism have been questioned. As acknowledged by the most prominent offensive realist, John Mearsheimer, the foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War and after is difficult to understand without including the liberal ideology of the US foreign policy elite (Mearsheimer 2018). Post-Cold War

offensive realist predictions that European cooperation would be replaced by pre-World War II style rivalry (Mearsheimer 1990) have not been supported by the empirical development. However, offensive realism has provided a powerful platform for critique against ideologically driven foreign policies in the West and their detrimental consequences for international security (e.g., Mearsheimer 2014b). Defensive realists' balancing prediction has also been questioned. Some find that there is little historical evidence for systematic balancing (Schroeder 1994; Little 2007; May et al. 2010), while others have argued that balancing is increasingly 'soft' (Paul 2018), institutional (He 2015), or targeted specifically against the threatening elements in an adversary state's military portfolio (Lobell 2018).

Neoclassical Realism: Translating Power Politics Into Foreign Policy

In their introductory Chapter 1 in this volume, Kaarbo and Thies note that FPA does not ignore factors external to the state, although foreign policy analysts tend to emphasize the role of domestic politics and decision-making processes for foreign policy. Mirroring this approach, neoclassical realism does not ignore domestic politics and decision-making, but typically views them as intervening variables and emphasizes the importance of structural and systemic factors as independent variables. Viewed through the neoclassical realist lens, systemic and domestic politics explanations are two logical ends of a continuum of foreign policy explanations, but the vast majority of foreign policy decisions are made on various points of the continuum between these two extremes (Ripsman et al. 2016: 2–4).

Neoclassical realism is most often understood as a foreign policy theory or cluster of theories sharing the belief 'that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities' (Rose 1998: 146). Beginning from the observation that 'in anarchy there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to dominate or destroy them' (Grieco 1990: 38), neoclassical realists argue that 'states respond in large part to the

constraints and opportunities of the international system, when they conduct their foreign and security policies, but that their responses are shaped by unit-level factors' (Ripsman [2011] 2017: 1–2). There is 'no smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt' from structural incentives to foreign policy and 'the translation of capabilities into national behavior is often rough and capricious over the short and medium term' (Rose 1998: 158).

Taking inspiration from Ripsman et al. (2016), we can structure the analysis of this transmission belt as a two-step process. The first step is identifying the nature and clarity of the incentives from international anarchy. Strategic environments of a given state may be more or less permissive or restrictive, i.e. vary in 'the imminence and the magnitude of threats and opportunities that states face', and challenges, opportunities, and optimal policy responses may present themselves more or less clearly to decision-makers (Ripsman et al. 2016: 52). The second step is identifying how decision-makers embedded in domestic institutions and discourses respond to incentives by making foreign policy decisions and formulating national strategies. This is easier said than done. As noted by Juliet Kaarbo, when it comes to domestic politics, neoclassical realism is characterized by 'variations in ontological orientation' (Kaarbo 2015: 203): some focus on the foreign policy executive, others on how this executive is restrained by domestic politics and bureaucracies, and yet others on how ideational factors such as ideology and nationalism structure foreign policy discourse and decision-making.

Based on a review of the neoclassical realist literature, Ripsman et al. identify four clusters of intervening variables—leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions—translating capabilities into national behaviour (Ripsman et al. 2016: 59–79). These four headings are useful for summing up the analytical focus of neoclassical realism, but they also risk hiding complex relations between the large number of heterogenous variables that sometimes cut across the four categories. For instance, the state's ability to extract resources from domestic society highlighted by some neoclassical realists (e.g., Christensen 1996; Taliaferro 2006) may be placed under state-society relations, but it will often depend on strategic culture and domestic institutions. Elite framing of domestic discourses (McLean 2016) may depend on elite cohesion and state capacity highlighted by other neoclassical realists (Gvali

a et al. 2019), and these variables are to varying degrees coupled to leader images, domestic institutions, strategic culture, and state-society relations.

Critics have portrayed this complexity as evidence of a cacophony of realist voices ultimately leading to an incoherent and erroneous perspective on foreign policy (Vasquez 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Narizny 2017). The critique is important insofar as it points to the challenges of theory development and testing, and in particular of adapting broad brush theoretical paradigms such as constructivism, liberalism, and realism into frameworks for FPA. However, as a critique of realist FPA compared to, e.g., liberal FPA, it is less fruitful and at risk of becoming a foreign policy themed re-enactment of the interparadigm debate. Realist FPA—like foreign policy analyses from other IR perspectives—needs to sail between the Scylla of ' "islands of theory" in terms of concrete phenomena', and the Charybdis of generic hypothesis testing leading to the rejection of useful insights on foreign policy 'if they are not general, or universally "true" ' (Most and Starr 1984: 383–384). A potential solution is to 'search for models or theories that operate, hold, or are valid only under certain explicitly prescribed conditions' (Most and Starr 1984: 384). By taking this road, neoclassical realism represents a return to a 'problem-focused' rather than 'pattern-focused' realism allowing us to understand the context and complexity of foreign policy-making (Barkin 2009: 238), but less interested in sticking to telling us a 'small number of big and important things' and making general predictions about foreign policy (Waltz 1986: 329). Still challenges remain. Neoclassical realists 'use theories pragmatically as heuristic tools' (Beach and Pedersen 2020: 105), but what is the systematic of this heuristic and how does it safeguard against messy catchall analyses?

One possible answer to this challenge is to use neoclassical realism as a template for FPA rather than a foreign policy theory. Neoclassical realism as an analytical template is best understood as 'a marriage between IR theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)' (Smith 2019: 10), which shares, 'two of the hallmarks of FPA scholarship', i.e. 'it views the explanation of foreign policy decision making as *multifactorial*, with the desideratum of examining variables from more than one level of analysis (*multilevel*)' (Hudson 2005: 2). It prioritizes a starting point for the analysis (the external environment) but leaves it as an empirical question whether factors external to the state are independent or merely permissive causes of foreign policy.

This understanding has largely flown under the radar in theoretical debates, which have focused on evaluating neoclassical realism as a theory or research programme. However, much of the research published under the heading of neoclassical realism would match this characteristic. It is also consistent with how neoclassical realism is characterized in one of the most cited articles on the perspective: Schweller's argument that neoclassical realists

> emphasize problem-focused research that (1) seeks to clarify and extent the logic of basic (classical and structural) realist propositions, (2) employs the case-study method to test general theories, explain cases and generate hypotheses, (3) incorporates first, second and third image variables, (4) addresses important questions about foreign policy and national behaviour, and (5) has produced a body of cumulative knowledge.
>
> (Schweller 2003: 317)

Like much FPA, neoclassical realism as an analytical template is an uneasy fit with interparadigmatic debates and 'gladiatorial competitions' in which theories compete to defeat their competitors (cf. Donnelly 2000). It does not aim to 'represent or constitute a "thing" that is coherent, distinctive, and hence stabilized' and from which we can draw testable hypotheses to be pitted against those derived from rival theories (Sterling-Folker's contribution to Meibauer et al. 2021: 289). Neoclassical realism, in this understanding, is not an alternative to FPA, but a template for doing FPA based on a realist ontology. It is a top-down approach to understanding foreign policy insofar as it begins from systemic incentives and traces how these incentives travel through the minds of decision-makers, the procedures of bureaucracies, and domestic power struggles over who gets what, when, and how to eventually produce 'foreign policy'.

How might this be done in practice? In an argument compatible with the two-step procedure for doing neoclassical realist FPA above, Mouritzen recommends beginning from the strategic environment and searching for supplementary explanations inside the state in case of 'an explanatory shortcoming'. He emphasizes that 'the applied intrastate model should address the specific explanatory gap left by the environmentally based model; it should not start from scratch and provide a "full narrative" ' (Mouritzen 2017: 635). Domestic politics are filling the explanatory gaps left by the strategic environment, either by explaining why the state does not behave as predicted from the logics of anarchy or by filling out the blanks

left by a focus on these logics (Ripsman et al. 2016: 26–31; Mouritzen 2017: 638).

If we use neoclassical realism as a soft positivist foreign policy theory (e.g., Ripsman et al. 2009, 2016), the structure of the international system remains the independent variable relegating domestic factors to intervening variable status. However, for those using neoclassical realism as an analytical template rather than a theory, the structure of the international system is only privileged as a logical starting point for an analysis on how to respond to the external challenges of the state (cf. Mouritzen 2017: 636). This allows neoclassical realists to meet one of the major criticisms levelled at the perspective: the privileging of the external strategic environment over domestic politics and decision-making (Kaarbo 2015: 204). Thus, independent variables may be located at the domestic politics level with the international environment providing the scope conditions or 'permissive causes' (Juneau 2015: 25). Or we may move to towards 'open, reflexive and even interpretivist variants' of neoclassical realism exploring the meeting between national discourse and international environment (Sterling-Folker 1997: 21; Meibauer 2020: 21). These include self-consciously eclectic analyses of how domestic and elite discourses of dominant powers influence international order through foreign policy (Gelot and Welz 2018; Wivel and Wæver 2018), analyses of the importance of prestige and status concerns for foreign policy (Gegout 2018; Pedersen 2018), and analyses on how nationalism and power politics interact in the production of foreign policy (Lai 2013; Schweller 2018).

In these analyses, material power still matters. Continuity and change in the international environment (the anarchic structure of the international system, the restrictiveness and clarity of strategic environments) remains the starting point for the analysis, but the effect of the environment on actors is embedded in social understandings of state elites and populations constructed and reconstructed in relation to other groups (most often other states). This is a departure from '[n]eoclassical realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism' (Rathbun 2008: 294). It is at step towards a more classical realist understanding of IR and foreign policy. This entails acknowledging core classical realist insights, including that 'we must see the world as it is, rather than as we want it to be', i.e. accepting that the world cannot always be depicted as a coherent and systematic ordering of 'variables' leading to solid predictions about foreign policy (Bar

kin 2009: 233–234). It also means a contextualized understanding of interest and power, i.e. accepting that while interest may be defined in terms of power, the meaning and content of interest and power vary with the political and cultural context of foreign policy-making (Morgenthau 1967).

Two consequences follow from this argument. First, neoclassical realism is more than a 'structural realism + domestic politics' approach. Epistemologically, it spans a continuum from social science quantitative methods positivism (Rosa et al. 2020) over fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (Cuppuleri 2021) and soft positivist qualitative process tracing comparative and single case studies (Ripsman et al. 2009, 2016) to discourse analysis (Gelot and Welz 2018). The classical soft positivist case study (single or comparative) remains the default option, but there is increased interest in applying methods at either ends of the continuum. Ontologically, Sterling-Folker's observation that all realist foreign policy analyses share an environment-based ontology still holds true (Sterling-Folker 1997), but there is an increasing diversity in interpretations of what that means in terms of FPA and practice. Neoclassical realist FPA is placed on a continuum from studies analysing foreign policy as the outcome of a combination of international and domestic power struggles (e.g., Taliaferro 2006) over claims that geopolitical structure is external and binding to the state, but that perceptions of state policy-makers affect the operationalization of this structure (Foulon 2015), and investigations of how the incentives stemming from international anarchy are translated into foreign policy through ideas embedded in grand strategy (Kitchen 2010), to exploring how the interaction between Self and Other in international anarchy and the differentiation of Self (the foreign policy elite and population) from Other (foreign countries) constitutes foreign policy (Sterling-Folker 2009).

The analyses towards the ideational end of the continuum highlight a challenge shared by all neoclassical realists: how to combine 'the continued importance of objective, materialist factors such as power with the observation that these factors are interpreted and perceived—not objectively measured—by human beings making foreign policy'? (Wivel 2005: 357). Assumptions about motives and ideas are impossible to escape and as integral to the realist framework as they are to other approaches (Brooks 1997; Wivel 2005; Kitchen 2010; Meibauer 2020). No matter, where they are placed along the continuum, 'the different realist approaches share

two basic assumptions: that the interaction of objective and subjective factors defines the essence of foreign policy; and that policy processes are pushed and shoved by international power dynamics' (Rynning and Guzzini 2001: 16). Towards the materialist end of the continuum, ideational variables (and domestic politics in general) play a limited role as 'filters' at the intersection between the state and its external environment magnifying or reducing signals from the strategic environment (Rathbun 2008) e.g., through the foreign policy executive or domestic elites. Towards the middle of the continuum, ideational factors are key for the functioning of the 'rough and capricious' translation of capabilities into foreign policy (Rose 1 998: 158).

As we move towards the ideational end of the continuum, it gets increasingly complicated. Ideas and perceptions are no longer merely filters or part of transmission belts located with individual decision-makers and state elites. Discourses and security cultures operate at a collective level. They are constructed and reconstructed in foreign policy decision-making processes, public debates over foreign policy and in dialogue and confrontation with the outside world, other states in particular. To be sure, these analyses remain faithful to core realist assumptions as summed up in an influential textbook account of realism and foreign policy: individuals organize in groups and the most important group actor in foreign policy is the state, self-interest motivates political behaviour, and power is fundamental to politics (Wohlforth 2016). They also remain realist in the sense that they begin their analysis from the strategic environment and argue that '[t]he interplay between units within an anarchic structure provides at the very least a base-line interest in survival' and a likely interest in other goals (wealth, status, etc.) underpinning their security and relative power position (Meibauer 2020: 26). Thus, it is not a discursive understanding of foreign policy despite affinities on groupism, self-interest, and power politics (Hansen 2016). Moreover, even neoclassical realists understanding ideational factors merely as filters sometimes operationalize these filters as collective understandings (e.g., the strategic culture of a country) rather than individual beliefs or perceptions.

How can neoclassical realists placed along the materialist-ideational continuum incorporate ideational factors in their analysis in a non-*ad hoc* manner? They may start from collective discourses or individual beliefs. Looking through the neoclassical realist lens, collective discourses

structuring our understanding of foreign policy today can be understood as the power politics of the past sedimented in the collective memory of the elite and population (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012). They are (right or wrong) lessons of the past, i.e. collective understandings of past foreign policy successes and failures guiding what foreign policy decision-makers can and should do when tackling the challenges of the present. Past wars and other 'near death experiences' are likely to matter the most as they are understood to be telling when it comes to the security and survival of the state. The strength of this approach is that it embeds present discourse in past power politics thereby providing a direct link between material and ideational factors. Present power politics is made in the shadow of past power politics. However, it tells us little about decision-making and the role of individual decision-makers. In order to make this link, neoclassical realists should take advantage of the rich FPA literature on how historical analogies affect the substance of foreign policy as well as the processes of foreign policy-making (e.g. Khong 1992; Breuning 2003; Dyson and Preston 2006; Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017). At the same time, FPA will benefit from neoclassical realist insights on how variations in the strategic environment affect the strength and nature of past lessons (Mouritzen 2009; Saltzman 2015).

Alternatively, we can begin from the assertion that 'the root of ideas lies in individual beliefs' and that '[d]ecision-makers feed their individually held diagnoses of a respective decisional scenario into foreign policy deliberations' (Meibauer 2020: 22). Facing ambiguity, decision-makers seek to persuade opponents to endorse ideas and use them to guide foreign policy. Decision-makers may deliberate to agree on a common position as a basis for foreign policy, or alternatively the foreign policy executive may impose a decision based on ideas without broad backing. Decision-makers may also realize that ideas are incompatible and go for a *faux* compromise or agreement even though this may lead to inconsistent foreign policy, or they may continue to flag their disagreements and postpone decisions (Meibauer 2020: 33–34). This approach may suffer from a blind spot when it comes to how individual beliefs are connected to and embedded in collective discourses, but its big strength is to zoom in on the decision-making process and the individual decision-maker, thereby paving the way for incorporating insights from the FPA literature, including, e.g., leadership trait analysis, political psychology, and decision-making literatures (see chapters by Houghton, Chapter 19, and Dyson, Chapter 20, in this volume).

(Re)Connecting with FPA

Realism has much to give to and much to learn from FPA. The decades after the end of the Cold War have seen a return to a much richer realism than was the case during the late Cold War heyday of structural realism. Realist understandings of the texture and logics of international anarchy and strategic environments as well as the interaction of domestic and environmental factors have developed considerably. Realism today is much more a work-in-progress than it used to be and more open both to dialogue and to internal disagreement (see, e.g., the contributions to Meibauer et al. 2021).

This is good news for realists in particular. Critics are right to point out that realist assumptions on foreign policy leaders, foreign policy elites, decision-making, and domestic politics remain largely underdeveloped and simplistic (Rathbun 2008; Kaarbo 2015; Narizny 2017). The most important reason for this is realists' lack of engagement with the FPA literature, including both theoretical models and analytical results already produced from this perspective. Realists should focus more on building bridges to this literature and fine tune assumptions about what happens in the interaction between environmental and domestic factors. They should spend less time building their own models and propositions on leaders, decision-making, and domestic politics de-coupled from the knowledge already produced by FPA. William Wohlforth may be right that '[r]ealism is the foundational school of thought about international politics around which all others are oriented' (Wohlforth 2016: 35). However, this is not the case in FPA, and realists would benefit from humbly learning the craft and canon of FPA rather than reinventing (a more rudimentary version of) the wheel, when constructing their own assumptions about the actors and processes of domestic politics. As argued by Mouritzen, incorporating theories and propositions derived from the existing literature is an important tool 'to minimize the ad hoc nature' of explanations when adding assumptions to neoclassical realism at the domestic level (Mouritzen 2017: 637). In addition, this deeper engagement with the FPA literature is likely to foster dialogue and a better understanding and appreciation of 'the other side' from both realists and FPA scholars.

At the same time, foreign policy analysts will benefit from exploring the realist literature on how the logics of anarchy restrain and impede the

intentions of national foreign policy elites and create economic and security hegemonies and dependencies. Ripsman et al.'s fine-grained understanding of strategic environments emphasizing the importance of the restrictiveness and clarity of these environments seems particularly promising for combinations with FPA literatures on leader personalities and gender roles. This combination would allow us to answer questions such as: what are the variations in how different leader personalities respond to restrictions in their room for manoeuvre and lack of information? How do gender stereotypes and roles affect the room for manoeuvre and decision-making of male and female leaders and the domestic and international responses to their decisions? When, how, and to what extent are gender norms instrumentalized in the service of power and interest? The work by Aggestam and True on foreign policy leadership in gendered multi-level games is a promising starting point for a dialogue with neoclassical realists on how to answer these questions (Aggestam and True 2021). In addition, the realist attention to power inequalities and dependencies can be used as a platform for getting a better understanding of the complexity of the decision-making environment, in particular in small and weak states. Leaders of small and weak states often face a decision-making environment where politicians, diplomats, and the armed forces of close allies and patron states play a decisive role in their foreign and security policies. Combining FPA and realist insights on how these relationships play out and interact with domestic politics and strategic environments is likely to produce important and potentially policy relevant knowledge. FPA literatures on foreign policy roles and the importance of 'special relationships' are particularly suitable in pursuing this agenda (Thies 2013; Malici and Walker 2016; Haugevik 2018). Finally, realists provide an important counter-discourse to how foreign policy elites (and some analysts) talk about foreign policy. They argue that understanding power is important in order to restrain power and to avoid reckless foreign policies damaging human life and endangering societal values (Rynning 2022).

Will deeper engagement gradually merge realism with FPA? No. Neoclassical realism and FPA have different starting points: neoclassical realists begin their analysis from the international environment of the state, whereas FPA scholars begin their analysis from decision-makers and their domestic context. Each will benefit from taking advantage of the theoretical advancements and analytical results of the other, and there is considerable

potential in studies analysing the same case from both neoclassical realism and FPA perspectives. Analysing the same case top-down and bottom-up will allow us to get a more nuanced understanding not only of that case but also of how our theoretical starting points and assumptions structure our knowledge of foreign policy, including how and why some actors, structures, and institutions are viewed as more important than others.

Conclusion

Realists emphasize the importance of structural and systemic factors for foreign policy but differ in their views of the density of the international system, the typical foreign policy behaviour of states, the impact of domestic politics and individuals on foreign policy, and the relative weight of and interplay between material and ideational factors. At the very least, realism reminds us of the continued importance of power politics. However, it does more than that. Realists unpack the foreign policy challenges and opportunities following from the anarchic structure of the international system. They explain how relative power matters for what states can and cannot do, and debate whether offensive or defensive grand strategies serve states best. Neoclassical realists zoom in on how incentives from international anarchy and the strategic environment of the state affect foreign policy. For some neoclassical realists, the perspective is a theory or cluster of theories in which international anarchy, or the strategic environment, is the independent variable, and decision-maker and domestic politics variables are intervening variables filtering or translating systemic incentives into foreign policy. For other neoclassical realists, the perspective is an analytical template for analysing foreign policy. It begins the analysis from the external environment but does not *a priori* assume if factors external or internal to the state are independent or merely permissive causes of foreign policy. In sum, realist FPA is an ongoing discussion on how, when, and why the external environment influences foreign policy. For this reason, anyone wishing to understand foreign policy needs also to understand realism.

This does not mean that realist FPA is without challenges. Critics have pointed out how the many voices in realist FPA have made it less distinct and coherent, and more difficult to discern from other theories. Adding

complexity and nuances may have increased realism's value as a framework for explaining and understanding foreign policy, but paradoxically at the same time it has decreased its competitiveness vis-à-vis other theories in the interparadigmatic power struggles of the IR discipline. More importantly, realists have yet to engage seriously with the FPA literature. This is an important limitation in realist foreign policy scholarship, but also a good point of departure for strengthening realist FPA in the future.

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CHAPTER 7

Foreign Policy Analysis and Ontological Security Studies

BRENT STEELE

INTRODUCTION

In this contribution to the Handbook, I pursue three purposes. First, I articulate how foreign policy analysis (FPA) overlaps with ontological security studies (OSS), the latter considered here as a research community influenced by constructivism and poststructuralism. Following from the first purpose is a second one, to build upon recent efforts (Mitzen and Larson 2017), to further link FPA to OSS (especially the psychological end of the latter) while also calling for a more robust dialogue between the two research fields. This presents its challenges, as there are some tensions between the two research fields that I also acknowledge and address. Having done so, to further pursue this purpose, I engage two examples of FPA work, bureaucratic politics and the use of 'history' in decision-making, as conceptual areas that have already proven useful for bridging with ontological security.

The third purpose is addressed in the concluding section of the chapter, where I suggest some ways to deepen the dialogue between FPA and OSS. Here I identify academic practices that have already been undertaken to launch this dialogue and provide avenues through which it can be furthered going forward. These three purposes hopefully address the spirit of this Handbook as articulated by the editors in their introductory chapter, namely that to 'play leader, bridge-builder, and innovator roles, FPA research must also develop in new directions' (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). OSS provides, I suggest, some very useful conceptual and theoretical connections that are right in line with the features of FPA that make it an approach that is 'multi-layered and conceptually complex, examining the many agents and institutions, cultures and identities, interests

and perceptions that influence foreign policies' (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume).

OSS in International Relations

Ontological security can be understood as the seeking out of continuity by agents to enjoy a 'stable and whole existence in reality, as opposed to anxiety and loss of meaning that could threaten everyday experiences and self's integrity' (Chernobrov 2016: 583). It is the 'sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly in [one's] perceptual environment' (Giddens 1991: 243). Agents (individuals, groups, and nation-states) utilize a number of practices to attain this continuity and order. These include narratives, routines, and expertise. Narratives provide coherence to the world, by including and excluding events into time-space ordering (Subotić 2016). Routines are regular practices that provide a cadence and set of temporal and spatial expectations. And expertise provides counsel for which routines provide more (or less) order to individuals and groups.

The background to ontological security includes its development as a psychological concept by R. D. Laing in the 1960s (see Laing 1965), as well as its further conceptual articulation, in a sociological direction, found through Giddens's (1984, 1991) work throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In international relations (IR), the stage was initially set in the mid- to late 1990s for its import by works that referred to ontological security in the context of the then ongoing 'identity' turn. Works by Cash (1996), and then Huysmans (1998) and McSweeney (1999) are most notable during this period of time for engaging Giddens's use of the concept directly and applying it to certain pressing issues of IR, such as ethnic conflict and reconciliation. A 'first wave' can be identified with the full importation of ontological security to IR in the mid-2000s through the works of Kinnvall (2004, 2007), Mitzen (2006a, 2006b), and myself (Steele 2005, 2008; see also Delehanty and Steele 2009). These studies appropriated ontological security at the level of states, while also problematizing how that drive at the level of states implicated in sometimes violent ways the ontological and physical securities of individuals within or outside of them.

The critiques of that first wave of studies emerged shortly thereafter in the works of Krolikowski (2008), Zarakol (2010), and Croft (2012), among others. These pointed out the problematic role of the drive for ontological security at the level of states and the Westernized biases of particular cases utilized by ontological security scholars. By the 2010s, a small but significant group of scholars were developing ontological security in IR and applying it to understand a whole host of topics, including security communities (Browning and Joenniemi 2013), peace and conflict resolution (Rumelili 2014), memory politics (Malksoo 2015), migration and securitization (Innes 2010; Croft 2012), and security dilemmas (Lupovici 2 012), to name but a small selection.

If those critiques and further extensions of ontological security represent an 'in-bloom' second wave of its development, then the late 2010s and early 2020s are likely in another, more 'mature' phase of OSS development. This stage has involved an increasing number of journal special issues edited by Kinnvall and Mitzen (*Cooperation and Conflict*, 2017; *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 2018; and *International Theory*, 2020), Cash and Kinnvall (*Postcolonial Studies*, 2017), Kinnvall et al. (*European Security*, 2018), and Steele and Homolar (*Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2019).

Internal Debates in OSS

One of the more important factors in a growing research community is the ability to organize and categorize it as it develops internal distinctions and points of varying emphases.[1] There have been a series of useful internal debates that helped to organize ontological security and set the stage for further extensions of it. I focus on two here because they are important for situating OSS vis-à-vis FPA, as well as within IR theory.

First, intra-OSS debates have mirrored to some degree the Conventional vs. Critical fault lines one sees on occasion in the English School,[2] constructivism, and feminism. In the context of OSS, most of this fault line rests on whether ontological security is an 'anchor' (Mitzen 2006a), something viable and achievable to be used as *the* default assumption we make in our studies, or whether that's a chimera that powerful actors promise but one ultimately never fulfilled, and therefore whether

ontological *insecurity* is the norm. Often, but not always, this ontological assumption overlaps with those who take the state as a given or *as if* it is a given, and those who focus more on unpacking the state and examining broader ontological security drives and forms of insecurity created at different levels of analysis. A similar subcritique within these debates concerns whether ontological security itself reifies a 'Self' that contains a Westernized bias (Zarakol 2010), and thus postcolonial critiques within OSS have emerged as ways to de-centre that Self (Untalan 2020).

Another internal debate in OSS has emphasized ontological security's psychological and sociological ends (launched by the aforementioned intellectual resources developed by Laing and Giddens, respectively), or as Ayse Zarakol succinctly described it in what seems like a prescient assertion back in 2010:

> The budding scholarship on ontological security has run into its own version of the agent-structure problem. Are interactions and the international environment the main source of ontological anxiety for a state, or are the insecure interactions merely a consequence of the state's own uncertainty about its own identity?
>
> (Zarakol 2010: 4)

This has also been characterized by Mitzen and Kinnvall in their various works in terms of 'endogenous' vs. 'exogenous' ontological (in)security generation (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020). Put another way, is ontological security influenced more by the Self's work on the Self, where historical memory, cognitive and/or group moods or psyches play a large role, or by social structures or the social environment/relationships with others?

In hindsight, what emerged here in this second conversation was less a 'debate' than a useful way to organize ontological security early on. Practices of ontological security seeking involve both ends of this agent-structure spectrum. Routines, for instance, are at the intersection of the individual and the social, the psychological and the sociological.[3] Thinking about OSS in this way is therefore not only organizationally helpful, but it may prime the uninitiated for the comprehensive features of the typical ontological security story and how different scholars emphasize different aspects along either psychological or sociological lines.

These two sets of debates are useful for the purposes mentioned earlier, namely how to situate OSS within broader IR 'paradigms' as well as how to position it vis-à-vis FPA. The first set of debates (conventional vs. critical)

provides two particular in-roads—ontological and political—as ways of extrapolating OSS to the divides that characterize constructivism vis-à-vis poststructuralism in IR (Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Barkin and Sjoberg 2019; Michelsen 2021; Kowert and Barkin, Chapter 4 in this volume). The relationship in OSS between more constructivist and poststructural influences focuses on the 'ontology' of ontological security. Do scholars using ontological security see or assume, somewhat following Giddens, the 'Self' as possible to attain, as perhaps a given? Or is the 'wholeness' of the Self instead a fantasy, ever defined by political promises to attend to a 'lack', as seen in Lacanian approaches to OSS (Solomon 2015; Cash 2017; Browning 2019; Vieira 2018)?

These debates disclose a feature of OSS, in that even though it discusses a key referent of both constructivism and poststructuralism—identity—OSS is rarely explicitly linked as an expression of either 'ism'. The inverse also seems to be the case, in that the recent wave of reappraisals of constructivism (Kessler and Steele 2016; Bertucci et al. 2018) barely provide OSS a mention. Why is this the case? Instruction may come from David McCourt's (2016) *International Studies Quarterly* 'theory note'. McCourt argued that some of the development of practice theory and relationalism in IR was a result of late 1990s 'narrowing' of constructivism and thus a rechannelling of erstwhile constructivism into those approaches, approaches that also never explicitly connect to constructivism. Both of them, McCourt argues, nevertheless were therefore able to 'productively reopen' constructivism's once rich 'theoretical lenses'. This all tended to happen in the mid-2000s, again according to McCourt, and the development of both practice theory and relationalism as approaches followed in turn. Unmentioned by McCourt, OSS's development largely tracks with the same timeline of development of these two approaches. Further, those writing on ontological security have done so in ways that, like what McCourt titles 'practice-relationalism' also 'include a commitment to reflexivity, which place the scholar and their potential impact on events and the way events are categorized within purview of the analysis' (2016: 479).

Yet what distinguishes OSS from these other two sets of 'new constructivist' approaches is that as a research community it has tended to regularly welcome *both* constructivist and poststructuralist (and, increasingly, feminist and postcolonial) influences, finding in them sources for enriching core referents (like routines, anxiety, and narratives) and how

to apply those in ways that prove both analytically and politically sensitive. This can be seen by how the more analytically driven, early and more state-centric work of Mitzen (2006b) and myself (2005, 2008), was put into conversation with, and influenced by, the more politically focused, psychoanalytically inspired work of Kinnvall (2004, 2007). When particular provocations have arisen in OSS by more critically focused scholars, such as Rossdale's (2015) concerns regarding ontological security's tendency to 'enclose critique' and not grapple with the ethical implications of ontological security seeking, a number of studies responded by foregrounding precisely those implications (Browning 2016; Browning and Joenniemi 2017; Combes 2017; Steele 2019; Subotic 2019a).

The second set of dialogues regarding the psychological and sociological characterizations of, and resources for, the study of ontological security provide a way forward for understanding the connections between FPA and OSS. As Mitzen and Larson put it, 'Ontological security is a way of thinking about psychological well-being that links our psycho-social needs to structures of power and practice' (2017: 4). The strong influence of psychological approaches in FPA was born from an assumption that 'particularities of the human beings making national foreign policy were vitally important to understanding foreign policy choice' (Hudson 2005: 7). Ontological security finds those individuals important, but further utilizes particular referents in the ontological security 'story' disclosing insights at the levels of groups and political communities.

OSS AND FPA

Important distinctions or points of contention nevertheless could emerge in an increased dialogue and consultation between ontological security and FPA. Mitzen and Larson (2017) in their study advocating for the incorporation of ontological security as a 'lens' to better understand foreign policy, identify two sets of questions that also, in this current chapter, represent potentially meaningful tensions or differences between the two research fields. The first of these they title the 'unit of analysis', resulting in the question of 'whose ontological security' is driving the observed behaviour and, therefore, who the analyst finds to be the key agents (elites, states, groups, etc.) to analyse. FPA tends to centre on the individual and

what impacts, constrains, and enables their decisions. Put another way, FPA is 'agent-oriented theory … States are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency' (Hudson 2005: 2). In OSS, this view is somewhat complicated. OSS ascribes individual-level processes to collectives, including (especially) groups within states and states themselves. This had been a source of tension in OSS, with a series of deliberations over this levels of analysis or 'scaling' issue.[4]

The second distinction Mitzen and Larson address is the direction of causality, specifically 'does who we are cause what we do, or does what we do cause who we are?' They conclude that the answer ontological security scholars settle on is through:

> freezing a moment in an ongoing process. Taking as given the state's sense of self at T1 amounts to treating a process as if it is an essence. For ontological security scholars this is a methodological not an ontological choice—in order to do causal analysis the variables must be separable—and the focus is on how what states do feeds back on, reinforcing or de-stabilizing, their subjectivity or identity.
>
> (Mitzen and Larson 2017: 5)

FPA scholarship has tended to employ more of a positivist causal framework. Comparative Foreign Policy is most reflective of the behaviouralist influence (Hudson 2005: 9), but across most expressions of FPA there exists a common thread of hypothesis testing, independent and dependent variables, and explanatory and predictive purposes.[5] Ontological security's 'ontology' might best be characterized via the classical constructivist lingo, 'co-constitutive'. That is, there exists no effective separation between the ontological (in)security of the subject and the 'external stimuli' of the world. An ontological security-seeking subject engages in practices—again, routines, narratives—that are already constrained and enabled by the world around them in order to make sense,, and therefore be meaningfully part, of that world. Put another way, ontological security scholars tend to avoid the language of 'causality'. Rather, they tend to utilize terms like 'activated', 'shaped', or 'generated'. This is because there are many factors that are at play in the ontological security process—what is a critical situation (identity threat), how it can be narrated in line with the sense of self, how insecurity and the unpredictability of a critical situation is 'felt'. These don't fit the typical temporal ordering and independence conditions we think of when looking for 'causes' in IR.

But upon closer inspection, these two tensions are, if not resolvable, hardly fatal in the attempts to put OSS in closer conversation with at least some parts of the FPA scholarly community. The first of these—the preferred unit of analysis—can be viewed as providing scholars an opportunity to better complement their analyses to incorporate more specific insights from a broader array of actors and environments. Hudson notes that for FPA, 'explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect the decision-making process' (2005: 2). Kaarbo further observes that FPA's 'conceptualization of agency incorporates agent-other interactions and agent-structure relations' (2015: 200). OSS has increasingly been interested in both the constraints on particular leaders that ontological security drives entail and how that leader's perceptions of those drives, i.e. how they define what 'is' the identity of their state, what is affirming for it and what threatens it, shapes their decisions and conditions the execution of foreign policy.

The second, epistemological, tension is also less pronounced in more recent works. As the Mitzen and Larson quote indicates, some ontological security scholars take the pragmatic approach to organize their analyses by reconstructing their interpretations by 'freezing' ontological security-seeking processes so that there can be temporal distinctions akin to cause and effect. On the other hand, and moving away from a hard positivist approach to generating 'causal laws', Kaarbo characterizes FPA as 'generally consistent with positivism without being positivist' (2015: 200).

These tensions are important contexts to keep in mind for what I propose in the following two sections, the two areas where FPA and ontological security dialogues have happened or could happen further (in the third section), and the practices and institutions where these conversations and convergences can continue to proceed (in the concluding fourth section).

Continuing Dialogues in the FPA-Ontological Security Conversation

The opportunity for putting these two fields into more sustained conversation with one another is derived from a very similar set of animating purposes to both—to identify the ways in which humans, groups,

and organizations reduce the complexity of the social world and then how those reductions in complexity impact on their behaviour and the behaviour of others. This reduction in complexity is important to decision-making (see Houghton, Chapter 19 in this volume), the actions those decisions produce (both intended and unintended), *and* for a seeking of a 'consistent sense of Self' so important in the OS process. Ontological security is attained (either fleetingly or more pervasively, depending on the situation) through the reduction of the chaos of late modern life through a number of strategies, including routines and the role of expert systems and narratives. FPA has, in turn, at least two correlating streams of research topics that overlap with these—the functions of bureaucracies and expertise in routinizing action and the role of historical analogies and experiences from the past for the purposes of clarifying present crises.

But before I proceed, a note regarding what I am *not* trying to propose here. FPA and OSS as research fields or communities that have developed robust methods, concepts, approaches, and vernaculars do not 'need' to work more closely together in order to continue providing useful insights regarding global politics. I *am* proposing, however, some obvious overlapping opportunities that have always existed between these two groups, and disclose ways in which the dialogues can deepen for those interested, as I am, in *both* approaches as resources for studying global politics.

Ontological Security, Expertise, and Bureaucratic Politics

A first area of foreign policy where one can already see some cross-dialogue between FPA and OSS is in the evaluation and analysis of bureaucratic politics and organizational processes (see Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume). It is important to note that this line of research in FPA, going back to the foundational studies including Graham Allison's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969, 1971), itself built on work in public administration focused on bureaucracies and organizations (Selznick 1948). Throughout the 1970s, a series of studies followed Allison's, examining both organizational processes and bureaucratic politics (Halperin and Kanter 1973, Halperin et al. 1974; see also Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume). Hudson (2005: 8) notes that the reason for the interest in

bureaucratic organizations was likely conditioned by the Vietnam War, which was ‘seen by the public as defense policy run amok due, in part, to bureaucratic imperatives’.

What animates the work on bureaucratic organizations is an assumption that they are, in the words of Walker and Malici (2011: 24):

> carried by autonomous interests and preferences beyond the common interest that they would serve exclusively in an ideal world. The approach thus emphasizes the politicized nature of bureaucratic life and the impact that bureaucratic parochialism and inter- and intra-agency rivalry and competition can have on information processing, decision making, and outputs.

Work on bureaucratic politics continues to provide insights through today (Drezner 2000; Jones 2010; Carpenter and Krause 2015), although assessments of its progress as a research field have disclosed mixed results.

For instance, one notable inventory of the work on bureaucratic politics, a symposium edited by Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek published in the *International Studies Review* in 1998, appraised the research contributions up until that time, assessed opportunities for further development and cross-fertilization of it, and, finally, considered some of the ‘thorny normative issues’ arising from bureaucratic organizations (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 209–210). It included a number of contributions, including one by a scholar of the topic, David A. Welch, who concluded in somewhat pessimistic terms that ‘at the moment, we know virtually nothing’ about bureaucratic politics because of a lack of achievement of testing insights according to the scientific method. Welch argued, instead, that ‘the only way to reach reliable judgments about the role or importance of bureaucratic politics is to follow the scientific model’ (Welch 1998: 216). Another contribution, by Jutta Weldes, emphasized how Welch’s approach assumed ‘propositions [that] rest on a specific model of politics and on a corresponding set of concepts ‘that a constructivist might want to evaluate critically’ (1998: 218), and that the ‘positivist assessment of the bureaucratic politics paradigm paints a rather bleak picture’ (224). Instead, Weldes counselled a focus on language and discourse found in bureaucracies that shaped the ‘construction of interests’ (218).

Looking back on the symposium almost a quarter century later, one can see how some of the participants were likely pushing for inverse purposes regarding the future study of bureaucratic politics. The editors of the symposium were frank in this admission: ‘It is important to recognize that

this diversity of views derives in large measure from differences among them on the nature and purpose of the social science enterprise, the nature of the social world itself, and the criteria to be applied in adjudicating empirical claims and refining concepts' (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 245). Again, one might think that with its constructivist and poststructuralist influences, OSS would be difficult to put into conversation even today with FPA on this research topic. And yet, there were also opportunities identified in that symposium that could be and in some ways have been taken up, and further developed, by OSS on the study of bureaucratic politics.

For instance, the editors in their introduction noted that 'Relatively little energy has been directed toward the analysis of foreign policy implementation or to more routine policymaking despite the proposition that the bureaucratic impact on policy may be particularly pronounced in these arenas' (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 208). And in one contribution that contrasted with the otherwise dour assessments in the forum, Kaarbo and Gruenfeld argued that insights from social psychology could and had shed light on group conflict dynamics, and that these were useful for the future study of bureaucratic politics:

> Social psychology provides ample evidence that individuals and their behaviors are affected by group membership, power and status relationships, external constituencies, and various other institutional incentives. The founders of the governmental politics perspective understood these influences, and most of the theoretical writing on bureaucratic politics is consistent with early social psychological research on group dynamics.
>
> (Kaarbo and Gruenfeld 1998: 227)

Both of these assertions provide opportunities for OSS. The first, focusing on the importance of 'routine policymaking' has been developed further as a feature of bureaucratic organizations. It provides an opportunity to examine the 'overlap between the role, function and outcomes of routines in ontological security' and the 'standard operating procedures' and even rhythm of bureaucratic organizations (Steele 2017: 78). This calls attention to how organizing, even reassuring and comforting, those routines can be for individuals and thus, following from Kaarbo and Gruenfeld's assertion, how the strength of bureaucratic organizations and the ferocity by which members defend their 'turf' reflects not only (or not even?) their functional contribution to the 'national interest' but rather *the identity needs served by the organization to its individual members*.

A broader scope can also enliven the study of bureaucratic politics. OSS focuses on the superstructural aspects of late modern anxiety that threaten ontological security, and how agents develop tactics and strategies for confronting anxiety. In one study (Steele 2017), I explored the ways in which bureaucratic organizations in the United States represent such expert systems. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)'s role after the 9/11 attacks, and its use of torture and other techniques, and the connections to 'expert' specifications from psychologists, represented an organizational process confronting US anxieties within the War on Terror. In an even more recent and fascinating study, Carolin Schütze (2021) examined the conflict between the ontological security of Swedish bureaucrats working on migration issues with welfare bureaucracies, the latter containing sometimes competing organizational drives. Both studies also demonstrate the ironic outcome of such bureaucratic politics generating new forms of ontological *in*security all the same.

What both Steele and Schütze focus on is a somewhat more specified expression of the 'argumentations' within and across bureaucracies that Weldes called more attention towards in her 1998 symposium study. Here, ontological security's focus on biographical narratives, and their importance as being crucial to an agent's, including a group's, 'well being' means that they 'get attached to and emotionally invested in them and would feel profound anxiety at the thought of their destabilization' (Mitzen and Larson 2017). Further, the dynamism of those 'narratives' have only barely become appreciated or acknowledged. In my 2017 study, I argued that the CIA not only developed a narrative regarding its own 'competence' and efficacy in executing the torture programme of the 2000s, but also became invested in the aesthetic and visual narratives depicting that execution in the film *Zero Dark Thirty*. For both ontological security and FPA scholars, I argued that the case

> focuses our attention on how organizational representatives … combined with popular representations in the media, shows like 24 … and *Zero Dark Thirty*, can influence public opinion and elite narratives by issuing their 'expert' assessments of topics like torture and its ability to foil terrorist plots or lead to terrorist suspects.
>
> (Steele 2017: 84)

The more recent interest in populism and ontological insecurity, including across several special issues on the topic (Kinnvall et al. 2018; Steele and Homolar 2019), has explored another twist on the late modern role

of ‘experts’ and the views of society vis-à-vis expertise. Again, experts and expertization as features of late modernity are assumed to assist and counsel individuals and groups in the construction of ‘healthy’ routines (Giddens 1991). At the level of states and organizations, bureaucracies and their functional specialization contain expertise that can be used to confront particular problems and issues those organizations are designed to mitigate. But in society, when anxiety inevitably re-emerges, individuals react both through a refastening and rigidifying of their previous routines, and with a general resistance to not only new routines, but also experts *as well as* expertise itself. This creates an opening for populist rhetoric (see Jenne and Thies, Chapter 13 in this volume), and thus a defiant scepticism to expert advice as a whole that has become a hallmark of populist identity politics especially in the past decade (Nichols 2017).

History, Historicity, and Historical Analogies

Leaders use analogies from the past to inform decisions in the present (May 1973; Neustadt and May 1986). As Walker and Malici (2011) observe, the broader interest in FPA over leaders’ beliefs involves how those are ‘often the result of past experiences’ (18; see also Jervis 1968: 468, Vertzberger 1986). The study of analogies (Khong 1992; Taylor and Rourke 1995; Houghton 1998), as well as metaphors (Shimko 1994; Flanik 2011, 2018; Marks 2011; Opperman and Spencer 2013), in FPA has developed over a half century (see Houghton, Chapter 19 in this volume). This includes work utilizing experimental designs (Dyson and Preston 2006), and content analyses, with applications exploring analogies used in the Truman (Breuning 2003), Carter and Reagan (Hemmer 2012), Bush (MacDonald 2016), and Obama administrations (Rees 2021). Analogies and metaphor analysis represents a robust stream of research that has helped clarify how leaders have utilized analogies to perceive contemporary crises and execute policies thereafter. The focus here is often in the misapplication of such analogies, and the foreign policy mistakes that these generate (Walker and Malici 2011: 20).

There are a number of overlapping foci of research interest for the intersection of history and ontological (in)security creation. The main thrust of history’s role in OSS followed from the Giddens’s (1984: 199–203) development of what he titled ‘historicity’, the ‘use of history to make

history'. This use of history relates to what OSS scholars title 'critical situations' (Ejdus 2018). Akin, to some degree, to crises in FPA literature, critical situations are 'radical disjunctions of an unpredictable kind affecting substantial numbers of individuals' (Giddens 1984: 61). Critical situations upend routines that order the Self of individuals and collectives. Such critical situations involve events or actions that may generate collective trauma or shame. The former, collective traumas, has always been a central feature of Kinnvall's iconic work in OSS (2004, 2007, 2012). The latter, shame, was another concept imported from Giddensian theory into IR that can be defined as an event, memory, or experience generating anxiety for agents. Shame 'produces a deep feeling of insecurity—it is a temporary but radical severance of a state's sense of Self' (Steele 2008: 3). It has been further developed as a central concept in OSS to index the challenges state leaders face in narrating their past in the present (Subotić and Zarakol 2013; Berenskoetter 2014; Gustafsson 2015; Hagström and Gustafsson 2015; Gustafsson and Krickel-Choi 2020). An additional, and most recent, research interest in OSS focuses on how states confront shame through not only their own past experiences, but the experiences and identities of *other states* through a process of 'vicarious identity', which provides a proxy lesson from other states for how to handle ontological insecurities of the present.[6]

States, and their leaders, utilize narratives to reorder these past, ongoing, and potentially future critical situations. Leaders selectively create (from the materiel of history) biographical stories about groups and collectives. In my 2008 book, I disclosed how different North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, and specifically their leaders, drew on various national sources of shame over past failures to confront human rights abuses, to justify NATO's Operation Allied Force, the intervention against Yugoslavia over the latter's abuses of Kosovo in 1999 (Steele 2008: ch. 6 and esp. table 6.1, p. 128). This included how these different sources were contested, or activated, by various domestic political coalitions.[7] Here, Subotić's (2016) study deserves special mention, in that it not only centralized narrative as a core referent for OSS but also demonstrated in the case of Serbia how the latter's agents went to great lengths to use 'Narratives [to] bridge the rupture created by the external trauma between multiple desired securities of the state' (2016: 658). As Subotić shows, Serbia utilized a 'victimization narrative' around the 'Kosovo myth' regarding Serbian martyrdom at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 to confront the critical situation, in the early

2000s, of ‘losing’ Kosovo to its status thereafter as an independent nation-state (2016: 659–660).

In addition to shame, and following from this line of research by Subotic, OSS has increasingly engaged a related historical concept—political memory—and how it can be a source of ontological (in)security. The result has been the related referent of what Maria Mälksoo first entitled ‘mnemonical security’, or ‘the idea that distinct understandings of the past should be fixed in public remembrance and consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s stable sense of self as the basis of its political agency’ (2015: 222). Here, it is not only political memory but practices of *commemoration* that remain sources of identity, material and discursive understandings of the past that can be politicized and mobilized for reconfiguring identity in the present.

Subotic then picked up this thread with her recent book on Holocaust memory in Serbia, Croatia, and Lithuania. Subotic notes the shift of what is ‘traumatic’ that this presents, from the ‘events themselves’ (of the Holocaust) to ‘their consequent social remembrance’, the latter ‘institutionalized through routinized practices of remembrance such as museum exhibits, memorial sites, days of commemoration, history textbooks, or even inscribed law’ (2019b: 29). I have attempted to contribute to this line of inquiry as well in the context of the ‘Lost Cause’ myth of the US Civil War, and the role of Confederate monuments as an example of reconfiguring the memory of the Confederacy’s ‘loss’ of that war. In doing so, I linked the stakes of such memorialization to the US’s ontological insecurity over ‘losing’ wars.[8]

DEEPENING FPA-OSS DIALOGUES

In this chapter, I have attempted to situate OSS as an approach in conversation with, benefiting from, and contributing to FPA. As I mentioned in the previous section, both research communities have developed vibrant and sophisticated concepts and approaches to the study of foreign policy. Both have developed different streams of research that help focus on the different factors and actors that impact, execute, and are impacted by foreign policy. FPA is the second largest section of the International Studies Association. OSS, while not as well established or

matured in IR as FPA, remains an increasingly growing and expanding research community. The two do not *need* to speak to one another.

And yet, there are some benefits to deepening the already existing dialogue between the two communities.[9] As the chapter has tried to demonstrate, there are plenty of similar, if not identical, concepts and approaches utilized by both research fields. Nor are the two areas I have identified here—bureaucratic politics and the uses of history—exhaustive of the possible intersections between FPA and ontological security. For instance, when one considers the concepts found in OSS foregrounding the emotional and affective resonances of identity drives such as shame and trauma, there remains an opportunity for connecting to the longstanding tradition of generational analysis in FPA. From the 'moods' that Frank Klin gberg (1952) analysed to the intense disagreements between generational 'paradigms' articulated by Michael Roskin (1974), to the new generation of 'mercenaries' and 'revolutionaries' Kevin Marsh and Jeffrey Lantis (2018) have posited in the US Congressional context, opportunities abound for FPA and OSS to enrich common referents to explore a series of research questions on foreign policy.

Promoting further dialogue would, at the very least and short of a 'synthesis', sharpen and clarify concepts utilized by FPA and OSS scholars. Related, such dialogue could also create opportunities for more comprehensive explanations and interpretations of foreign policy. The animating potential benefit here is a factor that FPA scholars know all too well can lead to better foreign policy—creativity. To paraphrase Valerie Hudson in her inaugural article launching the journal *Foreign Policy Analys is* in 2005, the potential here is for both research communities to increase their 'ability to manifest human agency, with its attendant change, creativity, accountability, and meaning' (Hudson 2005: 21).

The prospects for, and practices that can facilitate, such deepening already exist. These opportunities can and have been taken in a number of associations and journals. In addition to the International Studies Association, which includes the aforementioned FPA section (and the journal of the same name) where ontological security work has been presented (and respectively published), a key association for both groups of scholars is the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) and its journal, *Political Psychology*. The annual meeting of the ISPP hosted in a number of locations across the years, and across the world, also proves

convenient for both sets of scholars considering their widespread locations of both groups.

A second set of practices where dialogues could be deepened involve pedagogical practices, such as courses on FPA that include work on ontological security and vice versa.[10] In a similar vein, Master's and PhD dissertations that involve either research area could be enlivened by incorporating committees that include scholars well versed in either, or ideally both, FPA and OSS.

A third area for further deepening dialogue relates to publishing practices, from the decisions editors make to the expectations reviewers have, to the collaborative enterprises that have brought together scholars doing work in either (or, again, both) fields of FPA and OSS. Journal editors might consider, if they haven't already (and some no doubt have!), sending OSS-based manuscripts to FPA-based reviewers, and vice versa. Those reviewers can help in promoting better scholarship through their reviews while also being sensitive to, and perhaps charitable with, the aforementioned tensions noted earlier between FPA and OSS. And scholars from both fields can continue to pursue collaborative projects, as evidenced by a most recent study by two vibrant scholars, one from FPA, one from OSS, that brought forth a more explicit understanding of time to foreign policy decision-making (Beasley and Hom 2021). Of course, one need look no further than the spirit *and* letter of the contributions to this current Handbook, which provide a rich array of scholars enlivening FPA going forward.

Notes

1. McCourt, following from Abbot, titles this 'fractal distinction': 'a social process that sorts individuals into fractals according to given criteria' (2016: 476).
2. Buzan (2001: 482) characterized this tension via the distinctions in 'conservative/pluralist' vs. 'progressive/solidarist'.
3. The work on 'roles' in both FPA and constructivist works filters through these two ends as well, with psychological approaches tending to be foregrounded in the former and sociological in the latter. As with what I'm proposing here for FPA and OSS, there have been some attempts to bring together the two research traditions in how they approach roles, see Hollis and Smith (1986) and the 2012 special issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis* edited by Cameron Thies and Marijke Breuning.
4. See Mitzen (2006b: 352) and Steele (2008: 15–20).
5. I note Welch's (1998) counsel regarding the study in FPA of Bureaucratic Politics below. But his conclusion to that essay is appropriate here regarding his, at least at the time, strident belief

in the importance of the scientific approach to that topic: 'Only by stressing the clarity of concepts, the logical coherence of theories, rigorous deductions about expectations, the validity of measures, and the publicity of research is it possible to have confidence either that bureaucracies have an important influence on state behavior (and, if so, under what circumstances) or that they do not' (Welch 1998: 216).

6. And here, too, one finds work in FPA on vicarity, as seen in Goldsmith's study on 'vicarious learning' (2003).
7. This analysis thus entailed an engagement and consultation of work on coalition politics and foreign policy decision-making, including Kaarbo and Lantis's (2003) work on Germany's Green party, and its influence as a junior coalition partner.
8. 'The inability of political communities to accept those losses connects both the case of the US South and its push towards Lost Cause mythology and Confederate statue iconography and the case of 2010s United States following the trauma of defeats in the War-on-Terror theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq' (Steele 2020).
9. Again, see the dialogues on roles between FPA and constructivist scholars mentioned in endnote 3 of this chapter.
10. The 'vice versa' here may indeed be a stretch. I know of no courses offered specifically on ontological security in IR, although I hope and suspect I may be wrong. That said, ontological security is increasingly taught as a research field within 'critical security studies', the latter being a widespread course topic with attending textbooks. See for instance Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2020: ch. 4).

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CHAPTER 8

Foreign Policy Analysis and Ethics of Responsibility

JAMIE GASKARTH

INTRODUCTION

Ethics concern the question of how we ought to live. To weigh their answers, ethicists explore how societies are constituted, and the positive and negative effects of these structures on social harmony and individual well being. International Relations (IR) theory for the most part looks at the structures that make up the international system (Alden and Aran 2012: 8). How social life is organized at the international level has implications for people across the globe and so there is an ethical component in this description. As we explore the ethics of international life, attention necessarily turns to the actors within that system and their actions—since what people do shapes the society they inhabit. In exploring the ethics of decision-making, we consider why people make choices, how they go about deciding, what they choose to do, and what are the effects. It is here that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) makes a vital contribution to our understanding of international ethics.

FPA, as the introduction to this volume notes, is focused on human agency. It is about how individuals and groups choose to interact with outsiders—those who are 'foreign' to them. Theories of FPA posit different assumptions about how such relations work—and about the possibility of improvement. Some are descriptive (telling us how things are), whilst others are prescriptive (telling us how they could be better). In each case, there are ethical consequences to what is being described and how the analyst approaches the subject.

Where IR theory offers broad brush understandings of how actors relate to one another (and the effect these interactions have on wider structures), FPA grounds these insights in the real-world choices and actions of decision-makers. Thus, FPA is able to test theories, point out strengths and

weaknesses, offer empirical detail about human behaviour at the international level, and provide a more fine-grained awareness of the competing ethical demands faced by participants. FPA is here defined as the broad field of research into foreign policy rather than as the narrow group of cognitive or behaviouralist theories in this area.

Providing a full account of the ethical claims on policy-makers and how they interpret and respond to them is beyond the scope of this chapter. To anchor our discussion, we will consider the concept of responsibility—a focus of many ethical debates in IR (Hansen-Magnusson 2019; Hansen-Magnusson and Vetterlein 2022). Put simply, debates over responsibility are about who should respond to an ethical claim and how. From a theoretical perspective, there is also a third element in terms of the responsibility of the analyst engaging in ethical inquiry. Following Marx, is it enough simply to describe the world, or should scholars also seek to change it?

In this chapter, I set out five dominant theories of IR and their ethical foundations. Realism and Liberalism will be set out in greater depth, as they have had a clearer impact on policy thinking. I then address three from the family of postpositivist or critical social theories: Constructivism, Poststructuralism, and Critical Theory (Smith 1996). In each case, I examine how they grapple with the ethical dilemmas of responsibility and consider how FPA allows us to understand the way these play out in policy practice.

Realism, Ethics, and FPA

Historically, the dominant paradigm of IR as a discipline was Realism. This approach has been wrongly associated with an amoral attitude to policy-making—partly due to its adherents' rejection of moralism (Morgenthau 1948; Molloy 2019). In reality, Realism grounds its ethics in the political community of the state. It is in the relationship between government and its citizens that states derive their ethical legitimacy. The moral purpose of the state is to provide for the safety of its citizens and statecraft is how it does so (Jackson 2000).

For Realists, political leaders are the responsible actors since they can mobilize the resources of the state to act on behalf of their community. When it comes to responsible action, privileging the state-citizen

relationship creates a hierarchy of obligation. Leaders and governments have a responsibility to put the safety of their own people first, and the needs of others are secondary. In this framing, the ordinary practice of ethical inquiry should be to identify what communal interests are at play in any international situation and make a prudential judgement on how they are best served by political action. There is an implied ethical end in mind, in terms of a community secure from external threats; but Realism is informed by a tragic sensibility (Lebow 2003). It sees insecurity as inevitable and so any safety is temporary and fragile.

Importantly, this theoretical approach leans heavily on FPA since most of its adherents wish to say something useful and relevant to foreign policy-makers. The original purpose of Realism was to understand the nature of interactions at the international level, how leaders navigate the tragic dilemmas of foreign policy, and how they might cultivate certain character traits or virtues (notably prudence), to ensure they are best placed to interpret their options accurately and make the least bad choices for their community (Niebuhr 1932; Morgenthau 1948; Wolfers 1962; Wight 2002). It drew deeply from history and political philosophy, and shared with these approaches an awareness of the contingent and temporally specific nature of human agency (Kissinger 1994). Many Realist thinkers were either diplomats or foreign policy-makers themselves (e.g., E. H. Carr, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger) or took an active part in foreign policy debates (e.g., Hans Morgenthau).

Attempts to provide a more systematic general theory of IR, Neorealism, pioneered by Kenneth Waltz, led to the development of a beautifully parsimonious model of state behaviour which removed the human decision-maker from consideration, replacing them with the pervasive influence of anarchy as the governing factor in world politics (Waltz 1959, 1979; Wivel, Chapter 6 in this volume). Unfortunately, this model has little utility in making ethical choices in the real world. If ethics is the study of how we should live, Neorealism has nothing to say about this (e.g., Fearon 1995). Waltz asserted that his structuralist approach was not a theory of foreign policy since, according to him, what statespeople did had, as yet, not fundamentally altered the logic of the international system (Waltz 1995). Rather, he outlined a descriptive theory designed to depict the world as it is. Efforts to suggest Neorealism might have prescriptive power, that if states align with the logic of anarchy rather than seek to overcome it they will be

more successful (Elman 1996), in effect surrender agency (and thereby ethics) to structural forces.

From this tension, Neoclassical Realism emerged. Neoclassical Realists acknowledge the structural constraints of anarchy but explain the behaviour of states in terms of how agents react to their environment (Rose 1998; Kitchen 2010; Lobell et al. 2009). The importance of security and national interests is reaffirmed, yet also problematized by the way these may reflect the interests of sections of a political community rather than an imagined whole (Snyder 1991). Nevertheless, they retain Neorealism's sense that the international system has its own logic based on the effects of anarchy and argue 'when domestic politics and ideas interfere substantially in foreign policy decision making, the system punishes states' (Rathbun 2008: 296). Since domestic values and ideas are an important source of ethical understanding, depicting them as something polluting and aberrant to international behaviour inevitably marginalizes them from policy analysis.

As such, Neoclassical realism has not embraced ethical inquiry in the same way as its Classical forebears. Neoclassical realism does imply the existence of 'ideal state behavior', made up of a 'unitary actor' and 'objectivity premises' for decision-making (Rathbun 2008: 312). This suggests certain ethical assumptions, such as that policy-makers should look after the safety of their citizens first, that they need to aggregate the interests of their community as a whole, and that personal and subjective responses to policy dilemmas should be overridden by an objective assessment of power concerns; but these are assumed rather than foregrounded.

Even if recent Realist IR theory tends to avoid ethical inquiry, this is not the case when it comes to Realist FPA. Indeed, providing an understanding of the ethics of policy-making is arguably a key contribution of Realist FPA work. Two examples in recent literature are the articulation of desirable virtues in foreign policy leaders (what constitutes a responsible actor?) and consideration of what their priorities should be (how can we act responsibly?) With regard to the first, Realist writers continue to explore the virtues or dispositions of leaders making foreign policy choices (Philp 2010; Brown 2012). They frequently exhort policy-makers to exhibit empathy and patience with their rivals to understand their motivations, as in John Mearsheimer's criticism of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy towards Russia (Mearsheimer 2014). The US' failure to look at this

development from the Russian government's perspective, and the absence of awareness of how NATO and US actions are provocative, are argued to fuel antagonism, with negative foreign policy outcomes for the peace of Europe (see also Mandelbaum 1995; Kennan 1997). NATO expansion is framed as 'greedy state' behaviour—suggesting it transgresses desirable ethical norms (Eichler 2021). To make this case, Realists engage in FPA as they investigate how history, strategic culture, and group psychology contributed to NATO's expansion and Russian resentment of this move (Radchenko 2020; Shifrinson 2020). Some Realists perceive antagonism between Russia and the West as being the result of the tragic nature of international politics but still imply that recognition of the needs and desires of one's opponent is desirable (Wohlforth and Zubok 2017; Sushentsov and Wohlforth 2020).

A corollary of this approach is a call to avoid subjective, emotional responses to policy problems. Realists criticize policy-makers in the United States for demonizing opponents rather than understanding their motivations. When it came to responding to the Syrian civil war from 2011 onwards, UK and US vilification of Assad supposedly downplayed the extremist nature of factions in the opposition, the genuine security fears of Alawite and other minorities, and the complexity of the ethnic and religious politics of the region. Interventions undertaken by Western powers were significant enough to dissuade rebels from reaching an accommodation with the Syrian government, but too small to make a difference to the conflict on the ground. Thus, for Realists, US foreign policy contributed to the negative ethical outcomes of more deaths, an intractable conflict, a security vacuum that rivals like Russia were able to exploit, and large financial costs to US citizens (Porter 2020). Instead, Realists advocate the virtues of forbearance, prudence, and humility (when it comes to the acceptance of the limits of power).

A second, linked, ethical injunction by Realists is for policy-makers to order their preferences appropriately. In practice, that means ensuring that effort is directed proportionately according to a given issue's importance. Realist examples of how rhetoric, policy thinking, and actions have become misaligned with interests include US commitments in the Middle East, where historical assumptions are seen as no longer valid (Blagden and Porter 2021), to human rights advocacy, whereby Western policy-makers are held to be creating false expectations about how much vulnerable people abroad

can rely on them to underwrite their security needs (Walt 2019). Rather than risk overextension (and hence weakening the state's capacity to respond to genuine security threats), there is a growing strain of Realism advocating restraint in foreign policy (Posen 2015; Wertheim 2020; Porter 2021; Ashford 2021).

In short, Realist foreign policy analysis not only defines responsible subjects and responsible ends, it also sets out responsible ways by which statespeople should achieve their goals; however, while recommending prudence and restraint may on the surface sound like good advice, Realist FPA can be hazy on how this works in practice. When it came to NATO expansion, was it prudent to take advantage of Russia's weakness to secure domination of the former Soviet sphere? Or should policy-makers have been more magnanimous and resisted this temptation out of consideration for Russian feelings? (For a summary of these different positions, see Shifrinson 2020).

With regard to President Obama's policies on Syria, was his reluctance to enforce his red line on the non-use of chemical weapons poor statecraft (on the Realist basis that threats should not be issued idly or credibility will suffer)? Or prudent recognition that heavier US military involvement in the country was not in its interests? Weighing these choices means engaging in FPA to understand the context to decision-making. One reservation about Realist FPA is the tendency to judge policies by outcomes—with failures attributed to the policy-makers not properly applying Realist precepts. In the messy world of foreign policy decision-making, leaders make choices based on imperfect information and these are implemented in complex ways that may go against the spirit of the decision. Therefore, it is difficult to adjudicate how far a state pursued a 'Realist' foreign policy and the extent to which Realism itself was a success or failure (for a critique of Realist reasoning in this regard, see Jervis 2020).

Realist approaches to FPA are useful for appreciating the tragic dilemmas leaders face, and the burdens of carrying individual responsibility for decisions that affect the lives of millions. The emphasis on restraint and an ethic of prudence puts necessary limits on when and how statespeople can be expected to respond to the needs of others. Without that, responsibility risks becoming too diffuse and so unrealizable. The tragic outlook of Realism allows empathy for leaders, even those who make bad choices and do bad things, opening up the possibility of dialogue and understanding.

Where Realism is weaker is in owning up to the potential contradictions of Realist thought, and identifying when a Realist foreign policy can go wrong.

Liberalism, Ethics, and FPA

The second theoretical perspective to consider is Liberalism. Often framed as a counterpoint or strawman to Realism, Liberalism is a distinct approach with a different animus and governing logic (see Hadfield, Chapter 2 in this volume). Rather than the ethics of statecraft, Liberalism is focused on the ethics of freedom (Booth 1991). Derived from a humanist attempt to reconcile higher authority (God or Government) with individual freedom of conscience, it is acutely aware of the tensions between governmental authority and individual liberty, with some level of government necessary to ensure a just distribution of rights and responsibilities and a voice for the weak; but a need for this power to be curtailed by laws, norms, and institutions.

In the liberal worldview, states are but one form of community, and other actors—such as international organizations, firms, transnational social and religious groups, civil society actors, and elites—may be equally, or more, important in shaping international behaviour. As such, there is a far greater range of actors contributing to policy (and thereby incurring responsibility) in Liberalism than Realism. Furthermore, rather than the Realist focus on safety, Liberals seek the end of human flourishing, otherwise defined as the ability of individuals to reach their positive potential. In that sense, they are distinct from Realists since they have a progressive, teleological view that human society is capable of improvement. As Liberals derive their ethics from individual freedom, and the inherent worth of all human beings, this challenges efforts to construct hierarchies of obligation.

At the heart of liberal ethics is a fundamental dilemma: how far can individual freedom be reconciled with the fact that for a society to function, its members must comply with social norms? The same tension operates at the international level. States are free to organize their communities according to different customs and practices, depending on their history and culture. This pluralist international society is supported by liberal norms of sovereignty and non-intervention (Wheeler and Dunne 1996; Ikenberry 200

9). But, the freedom of societies to choose their own ways of living means some opt for ones that restrict the freedom of individuals and this can lead to illiberal outcomes. Alternatively, where liberals posit universal principles and seek to enforce them on all international society's members, liberal principles of toleration and pluralism are overriden, sometimes violently.

Here again, FPA is central to many of these debates since the mediation and management of difference is a fundamental dilemma for liberal thought. Efforts to liberalize other societies internationally are, in effect, moves to reduce the plurality of ways of living, to minimize domestic/foreign boundaries, and posit universal over particular interpretations of human flourishing. Liberal FPA is better able than Realism to capture the range of actors influencing these debates, from individual dissidents asserting their rights, to civil society actors highlighting atrocities, to diaspora movements providing support to their co-ethnics, to governments contemplating interventions, and up to international regimes and institutions setting out an international legal framework of rights and duties (Hehir 2008). But, in positing liberal values as universal, Liberalism threatens to undermine the categories of domestic/foreign on which FPA relies. This was particularly apparent in the post-Cold War era, when various authors saw globalization and the spread of Liberalism as heralding an end to the state as the primary actor and even the very idea of a 'foreign' policy (Fukuyama 1989; Hain 2001; Russett and Oneal 2001).

Since Liberalism sees foreign policy as more fragmented than the statist view of Realists, this leads to a broader understanding of the ethical responsibilities of policy-makers. Liberal ethics posit humanity rather than the state as the ultimate political community (Linklater 1998). Consequently, statespeople have a responsibility to alleviate the suffering of their fellow human beings, as well as to look after their own citizens. This notion has now been codified in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, achieving the force of international law through its inclusion in the World Summit outcome document of 2005. As critics have noted, R2P discourse has often been accompanied by a universalizing, binary logic that intervention is the only responsible course of action. Thus, with regard to Libya, Jonathan Graubart notes that opponents have been accused of 'fatalism and isolationism'; or of being 'apologists for authoritarian sovereignty', implying 'that only one side takes moral responsibility and

global solidarity seriously' (2013: 71). As the country descended into civil war after 2011 and intervening powers looked elsewhere, such criticisms appeared hollow. What Libya exposed was the extent to which Liberal interventionists were willing to risk disorder in their response to human rights abuses. This perhaps reflects a broader inclination to favour potential freedom and human flourishing, as a goal, over security.

Liberalism offers a number of different prescriptions to Realism about responsible foreign policy. For instance, liberal theory emphasizes the importance of openness (Leira 2019). Greater public knowledge and scrutiny of policy, facilitated by institutions, is believed to reduce the risk of policy capture by special interests. By contrast a 'reason of state' would often be a justification for secret deals and covert action for Realist practitioners, if not theorists. Whereas Realism is associated with calls to separate domestic values from international behaviour, Liberals see these as interdependent and argue that policy-makers have a responsibility to act abroad in ways that reflect the ethical standards of the political community at home. Similarly, Liberals have historically viewed public opinion as a useful constraint on aggressive foreign policy (Chan and Safran 2006) where Realists saw elites as able to moderate its turbulent and irrational aspects (Leira 2019).

For much of the 20th century, Liberalism was seen as a peaceful influence on the state system (Angell 1909; Pagden 2005: 53–54; Miller 20 10b); however, as military interventions justified on Liberal grounds increased, this has been questioned (Desch 2007; Malito 2019). Where Liberal foreign policy-makers faltered was in underestimating the destructive effects of order transformations. The end point of freedom and human flourishing may be desirable; but coercing others to bring them about can create high levels of anxiety and insecurity—conditions in which violence and exploitation may thrive (Mearsheimer 2018; Walt 2019). Early Liberals such as John Stuart Mill recognized the need for circumspection and advocated caution in promoting intervention abroad (Mill 1868). In recent decades, Liberal voices have pursued regime change, based on the assumptions that: (a) individual leaders were personally responsible for atrocities; (b) all human beings would support liberal values given the chance; and (c) the technological superiority of liberal states meant they could impose new forms of governance more easily than past occupiers. Each of these assumptions are contestable.

Another difference between Liberalism and Realism lies in Liberalism's downplaying of communal and cultural ties. A focus on human beings tends to go hand in hand with a more individualistic sense of politics, as well as a belief in the rationality of human beings. Once people see the benefits of an external intervention to impose democracy, or regional integration to promote economic prosperity, they will surely support it, so the argument goes (Angell 1909; Mandelbaum 2003). Yet, atrocities can be the product of social processes in which individual rationality and agency are limited. In line with their emphasis on humanity, Liberals highlight the interconnectedness of humans and identify common global problems that require cooperation to solve; however, ethics are grounded within political communities that exert powerful emotional resonances. Our individual and collective identities are forged through shared historical experience, communal myths, and patterns of behaviour, and these are reinforced by official forms of governance. That creates a strong sense of separation between peoples (Ignatieff 2018). Even if there was agreement at the international level on what values were important, there would still be disputes over how to nurture, support, and enforce them. Teleologies of progress can rub up wrongly against societies which cherish tradition and stasis in social life.

Again, FPA is useful for understanding these tensions as it focuses on how communities 'mediate estrangement'. Since Liberalism embraces a wider range of actors, Liberal FPA scholars can demonstrate how other communities, above and below the state, negotiate interactions with 'foreign' counterparts. Whereas Realist FPA emphasizes conflict and insecurity at the international level, Liberal FPA also considers cooperation and trust, seeing them as a normal feature of world politics (Moravcsik 1997; Wheeler 2019). Furthermore, since Liberal theory sees cooperation as a global public good, it becomes an ethical imperative to understand how it can be facilitated. Responsible statecraft thereby entails building and maintaining institutions to enable cooperation to flourish (Russett and Oneal 2001). The complexity of a globalized world means that broader and deeper institutions are required to deal with policy challenges. This in turn is expected to lead to peaceful outcomes. Andrew Hurrell summarizes this view thusly: 'As large states expand their range of interests and integrate more fully into the global economy and world society, they will be naturally drawn by the functional benefits institutions offer and pressed towards more

cooperative patterns of behaviour' (2006: 6). Indeed, membership of institutions is often conveyed as not just leading to more cooperation but also the spread of liberal values.

Yet, this assumption is contested in the 21st century. Rather than support human flourishing, international law and institutions have operated in tension with liberal values, favouring the status quo and inhibiting moral action in response to atrocities in Syria and other conflict areas. Instead of liberalizing states, laws and institutions are perceived to have been co-opted by authoritarian states to legitimize their rule and avoid accountability, under cover of norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention (Ralph 2014).

Ultimately, liberal theory assumes difference and toleration are good, and cooperative institutions facilitate these; but cooperation requires convergence, which reduces difference. Sometimes convergence is achieved through coercion, which is intolerant. Coercion can also attract resistance, which undermines cooperation. Thus, there are contradictory forces at work between liberal theory and practice (Sørensen 2007). Foreign policy is the mechanism by which these dilemmas are interpreted and played out internationally. An example, one that links IR theory with FPA, lies in democracy promotion (Doyle 1999). IR theory's democratic peace thesis has had an important impact on foreign policy thinking and real-world outcomes. If democratization reduces conflict, so the argument goes, then it would logically be an ethical imperative to encourage and support democratization for the sake of peace. Yet, coercive efforts to democratize autocratic societies have had the opposite effect in some cases, most notably Iraq in 2003 (Miller 2010a). Policy-makers hoped that democratizing Iraq by force would have a positive effect on the governance of the region and install a government that would be pro-Western in its orientation. Instead, it unleashed intercommunal violence and destabilized neighbouring countries.

To summarize, Liberals offer a wider range of responsible actors than Realists and perceive responsibilities to extend beyond one's immediate political community to the broader one of humanity. Liberal interpretations of international cooperation and peace have had a powerful influence on foreign policy practice, from advancing national self-determination, to institutionalizing world politics, and, latterly, to promoting democracy and human rights. Yet, these policies contain inherent tensions. The universalism of liberal values such as democracy and human rights can

conflict with those of freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. Advancing Liberal goals abroad can result in illiberal outcomes at home (Morefield 2020). Analysing foreign policy involves interrogating these contradictions and providing a clearer understanding of how liberal theory translates into praxis at the domestic and international levels. As it incorporates middle range theories, FPA is better equipped to explore these tensions than systemic IR theories, sitting as it does between these two realms and tracing how responsibility flows across community boundaries.

Constructivism, Ethics, and FPA

Constructivism analyses the world in terms of social relations. It explores how actors construct identities for themselves and others and attribute meaning to their interactions (and the material context in which they operate). Constructivism's major ethical contribution has been setting out the normative framework of IR. When it comes to responsibility, Constructivists have provided the most detailed account of the robustness of norms in areas such as arms control (Frederking 2018; Muller and Albert 2021), human protection (Welsh 2013; Acharya 2013; Glanville 2016), the nuclear taboo and non-proliferation (Tannenwald 2005; Lantis 2016), and environmentalism (McDonald 2011; Haas 2016), among others. This work deepens our understanding of the ethical structures of international politics. As Martha Finnemore describes it, Constructivists show us 'the many ways in which normative structures shape our perceptions of problems, structure the range of responses we consider and limit the effectiveness of that response in our own normative terms' (2008: 200). Constructivists also explore how foreign policy actors exercise agency, particularly in terms of their speech acts and social performances. In doing so, Constructivists demonstrate how they conjure the world of IR into existence (Frost 1996; Sikkink 2007: 88–89). Mapping out this normative context is arguably an ethical enterprise in itself, since it exposes negative practices and draws attention to the structures that support ethical behaviour (Price 2008).

Constructivism mirrors Liberalism in the breadth of responsible subjects it analyses. In contrast to the objectivism and teleology of Liberalism, Constructivists highlight the contingency and subjectivism of ethical understanding, particularly when it comes to responsibility. Deconstructing

ethical claims, Constructivists expose their arbitrary and unstable foundations. This endeavour could threaten the very concept of 'foreign' on which foreign policy relies (Waever 1994). Yet, in practice, Constructivist research is more about understanding the basis on which we set out ethical claims on issues such as responsibility, than denying the necessity of choice (Sikkink 2007). To be realizable, claims of responsibility often rely on forms of separation and 'othering' to function. Thus, the mere act of description does not render these categories obsolete. What Constructivism offers is a more expansive understanding of the 'foreign' and foreign policy analysis, encompassing not just a wider range of subjects but also a wider range of behaviour and expressions of governance.

That said, and in contrast to Realism and Liberalism, Constructivism is often criticized for lacking an ethical animus (see Kowert and Barkin, Chapter 4 in this volume). Indeed, it has been posited as a method of analysis rather than as a paradigm. For example, Matthew Hoffmann suggests, 'constructivism has no a priori conception of what is substantively good … in world politics' (2009: 232–233). Seeking to uncover its underlying ethical assumptions, Hoffmann notes a commitment to humility and self-reflexivity but acknowledges these 'may be considered relatively shallow and many may find them less than satisfying as a guide for practice or scholarship in international relations' (242–244).

One can envisage Constructivist ethics emerging from its use of deconstruction. Showing how language, norms, and practices produce meaning and structure social life allows us to better understand its contingency (Sutch 2001). This could lead to a questioning of the prevailing norms and open up space for new understandings; however, Constructivism would struggle to articulate what form they might take, lacking a theory of human nature or society. Indeed, it may lean towards ethical naturalism—the assumption that what is good corresponds with the normal state of affairs. As such, the 'unethical' would be defined as practices which are aberrant to this natural order—a fundamentally conservative position.

Contrary to the circular logic of ethical naturalism, David McCourt has described a 'New Constructivism' which combines pragmatism and a practice-based approach to put forth a pragmatist constructivist ethics (2022: 118–189; see also Cochran 1999, Frost and Lechner 2016). For example, Jason Ralph sets out how Constructivist approaches which deconstruct foreign policy problems can provide a more effective basis for

practical judgement—by revealing how the problem is defined in the first place and the practical effects of these frames. This process can then be combined with the pragmatist 'commitment to ameliorating the shared social problem, which means those skills should be put to use in ways that are other- as well as self-regarding' to arrive at an ethical approach to inquiry (Ralph 2018: 174). In other words, Constructivists can put forward an ethical position even without foundational knowledge, by accepting the contingency of norms and accepting or rejecting them on the basis of their practical effects. Ralph specifically applies this to the R2P and sees indeterminacy as useful in deciding when to put this norm into operation since instances of humanitarian need will vary on a case by case basis (Ralph 2018: 187).

To summarize, Constructivism has been criticized for failing to offer an ethical understanding and conception of the good life—leading it to be labelled a method rather than a theory of human society. Nevertheless, in charting the normative framework of world politics, Constructivists provide a rich account of the scope of ethical understanding and the variety of forms of ethical interaction among international actors. Analysing these interactions often takes the form of a more expansive foreign policy analysis, looking at how forms of difference—foreignness—are constructed and sustained (Rumelili 2007). Moreover, a pragmatist constructive ethics holds out the possibility of analysing the ethics of foreign policy in a practical manner, taking into account the contingency and efficacy of norms.

Poststructuralism, Ethics, and FPA

Sometimes portrayed as a variant of Constructivism, Poststructuralism has similarly been criticized for failing to articulate prescriptions for how life should be lived, and being evasive about standards of research, leading it to be implied as morally relativist (Eagleton 1986; Norris 1992; Østerud 1996). In reality, Poststructuralism does have an ethic of critique which has real-world implications for understanding and responding to ethical dilemmas in politics. Poststructuralist work is generally interested in exploring the relationship between knowledge (and the related expression of meaning) to power. It sees human activity as governed by epistemes,

ways of understanding and expressing social life, that are linked to structures of power (Foucault 1972). However, moving beyond structuralism, Poststructuralists highlight how contingent and fragile these formations are. Rather than having any inherent solidity, they have to be continually conjured into existence through speech acts—sometimes described as articulations (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), or governing statements (Foucault 1972). The organization of these into discourses is highly political and is used to delineate which voices, and ways of expression, are privileged and which are marginalized (most obviously through binary logics such as good/evil, civilized/uncivilized, Western/non-Western).

For many Poststructuralists, the default position should be one of irony (Rorty 1989). Analysing social life, the observer seeks to point out the disconnect between the way patterns of behaviour or understanding are normalized and conveyed as immutable, and the reality of how specific they are to their space and time. This opens up space for challenge and dissent. Indeed, when it comes to responsibility, Poststructuralists see the need to expose and resist the assertion of power as a primary duty of researchers (D reyfus et al. 1982). That is not to say that because social life is constructed, it is easily changed—particularly since it serves the interests of the powerful. Nor, that all assertions of authority and power are negative. Michel Foucault noted towards the end of his life that as a homosexual he was reliant on the police to protect him from bigots, even as he was also oppressed by the prejudice they would often display towards gay people (1982).

Poststructuralist writing in FPA has had profound implications for ethical understanding in world politics. The deconstruction of racial, colonial, and gender assumptions has offered a powerful means of critiquing international practice. For example, Roxanne Doty's article on US counterinsurgency in the Philippines began by noting that much FPA scholarship asks 'why' questions, which 'take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen' (1993: 298). Instead, Doty sought to identify 'how' discursive practices, especially linguistic construction, produce and maintain reality and define the possible (1993: 303). Through their analysis of binary oppositions such as civilized/savage, reason/passion, European/'native' or Filipino, foreign/domestic, good/evil, Doty was able to show how they serve to legitimize intervention and

patterns of domination/submission, as well as to construct wider understandings of world politics like north/south, First World / Third World, core/periphery.

In the same decade, David Campbell provided an insightful analysis of the international community's response to the Bosnia conflict (1998). Despite ostensibly opposing nationalist claims to ethnically homogenous states, Campbell (1998) noted that many of the international responses actually reinforced the legitimacy of their assumptions. Framing the region as subject to the primordial passions of primordial communities, foreign policy-makers inhibited the possibility of alternative, pluralist identities and forms of association. Importantly, and contrary to the supposed moral blindness of Poststructuralism, Campbell persuasively argued that it was Realist authors advocating partition and forced population transfers, such as John Mearsheimer, who were downplaying the ethical consequences of their policy prescriptions (Campbell 1998: 118). Relatedly, David Chandler (2003) criticized the UK emphasis on 'ethical foreign policy' for being irresponsible since it allowed policy-makers to increase their legitimacy through performative action abroad without being held accountable afterwards for negative consequences (for a detailed critique of ethical foreign policy, see Bulley 2009). More recently, the War on Terror and fears over migration have been deconstructed to show the contingent nature of their underlying assumptions (Aradau 2004; Jackson 2007; Nabers 2009). In each case, constructing foreign policy as a separate sphere with different ethical expectations to domestic politics is depicted as leading to negative ethical outcomes.

Early Poststructuralist work has been critiqued for downplaying gender and its 'interlocking modalities of race and sexuality', with FPA 'having comparatively little to say on the topic' (Achilleos-Sarll 2018: 35). This neglect is now being addressed via engagement with the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and analyses of so-called 'feminist foreign policies' of states such as Sweden, Canada, and Mexico (Guerrina and Wright 2016; Thomson 2020; Wright and Guerrina 2020). Authors are combining the methods of Poststructuralism (deconstruction, discourse analysis, reflexivity, positionality) with the insights of postcolonialism and intersectionality to understand how class and gender hierarchies are reproduced in foreign policy (Stern 2011). As Ackerly et al. (2006: 4) put it, feminist scholars 'have had to be particularly creative with the tools of a

discipline not intended for the questions feminists ask, and notably eclectic in drawing out tools from other disciplines and sites' (as cited in Aradau and Huysmans 2019: 45).

Underpinning this work is a sense that scholars have a responsibility to highlight, deconstruct, and challenge patterns of domination and subordination in world politics. What Poststructuralist thinking does not do is to outline a teleology. All social life is given to involve differences in power between participants, and so domination and resistance are seen as continually evolving features of group dynamics. Much to the exasperation of critics, Poststructuralists resist outlining hierarchies of responsibility, or a view of the good life, as to do so is to close down rather than open up space for critique.

For Poststructuralists, positing a responsible subject conjures a relationship of domination and submission which reflects underlying power relations. While a wide range of subjects have the potential to exert responsibility, positioning an actor (usually a member of an elite) as responsible has important legitimizing effects, naturalizing their position at the top of a social hierarchy. Deconstructing this fiction leads to a similarly broad understanding of foreign policy analysis to Constructivism, one that does not just see foreign policy as being about governmental interaction but as a wider system and discourse that separates groups of people from one another (Ashley 1987). As noted, responsible action involves a continual questioning of and resistance to these structures of power (Graubart 2013). While some Poststructuralist writers locate themselves as a product of enlightenment thinking (e.g., Derrida 2004), their approach usually constitutes a rejection of teleologies of progress. Indeed, their perception of power as a constant feature of human interactions and critique of the perfectibility of human society link well with Realist assumptions (e.g., Der rida 1995).

Critical Theory, Ethics, and FPA

Where Poststructuralists often downplay a sense of a desired end state, Critical Theory and Marxist approaches to world politics are far more explicit in their call for different forms of social order (Linklater 1998). Critical Theorists acknowledge the social and material imbalances of power

(see Beasley, Donnelly, and Hom, Chapter 9 in this volume) but do so in order to pursue an ethics of transformation. They are interested in uncovering the way ideas are structured to legitimize material inequalities as a step towards pursuing a more just and equitable society. Thus, a lot of Critical Theory work is focused on border policies, restrictions on migration, racial and class hierarchies, and disparities in global wealth (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2020). The moral imperative, or responsibility, that flows from this is to move society away from a capitalist system dominated by the 'West' and towards a more equal system of distribution and exchange. Much academic scholarship is seen as reflecting the privileged Anglo/Eurocentric position of their sites of knowledge production, even if the authors are engaging in deconstruction. Thus, Poststructuralism is criticized for refusing to 'entertain either the possibility of Eastern subjectivity/agency on the one hand, or the possibility of reconstructing an alternative non-Eurocentric narrative on the other' (Hobson 2007). Since foreign policy is grounded in Eurocentric discourses of statehood and power, FPA too is compromised by association. Perhaps for this reason, FPA has struggled to develop a 'Critical' variant (Brummer 2022).

Is a Critical FPA possible? If it settles for a critiquing of the existing structures of FPA, then it would largely mirror the work of Constructivist and Poststructuralist authors (though perhaps with greater attention to material factors and economics). The problem would be that critiquing is not meant to be an end in itself and may not be radical enough to merit the label 'Critical'. If Critical scholarship engages in FPA to show non-Western perspectives on global interactions, that could de-centre Anglo-European discourses; but it could as easily reinforce and legitimize binary divisions between foreign/domestic, inside/outside, East/West, North/South through which global hierarchies are sustained. Perhaps the only route to a truly Critical FPA would be to detach the category of 'foreign' from statehood and to analyse how social groups or classes use their power to promote their material and ideational interests over others. In that scenario, responsible foreign policy action would be that which promoted equality and social justice; and could come from below as well as above.

Conclusion

From this discussion, we can see that responsibility is understood in different ways, according to the ethical logic of the respective IR theoretical frameworks. For Realists, responsibility is centred round statespeople making choices on behalf of their political community. This ethic of statecraft entails leaders understanding the distribution of power internationally and mobilizing national resources to the greatest advantage for their citizens. Foreign policy is the mechanism by which this negotiation takes place and the purpose of FPA is to identify the kinds of dispositions, heuristics, and calculations of power that will allow states to survive in a hostile competitive environment.

Liberals pursue an ethic of freedom, and as a result have a more expansive understanding of responsibility. In terms of the international environment, trade, interactions, and dialogue between peoples are best facilitated by the spread of institutions and laws. Thus, for Liberals, foreign policy should seek cooperation and mutual gain where possible. Furthermore, Liberalism posits universal values which policy-makers have an obligation to promote, such as the protection of people from human rights abuses. Liberal FPA includes a wider range of actors, including those from civil society, and aims to manage and balance the competing ethical claims of the individual political community with that of humanity.

In the family of critical social theories, we see common methods centred round deconstruction, discourse analysis, reflexivity, and positionality; but these lead in different directions. The Constructivist ethic of deconstruction has descriptive power but lacks an underlying political animus. As a result, it struggles to identify what responsible foreign policy action should follow. Pragmatist Constructivist ethics offers an answer by borrowing the consequentialist ethic of Pragmatism but by that logic one could have a Realist or Liberal Constructivist ethics and so Constructivism itself largely remains a method. Poststructuralist work is motivated by an ethic of resistance, working to challenge and de-naturalize the operation of power, albeit not necessarily to prevent action. Rather, their ethical contribution is in providing immanent critique as ideas about responsibility are put into action in foreign policy. Meanwhile, Critical Theorists' ethic of transformation looks to overcome and transcend the very structures of which 'foreign policy' are a part. In that scenario, the purpose of Critical

FPA is to highlight the destructive effects of physical and imaginative borders between peoples, as well as the hierarchies of responsibility that perpetuate global inequalities.

As such, what we have outlined above are multiple possible FPAs, each providing important insights into the ethical and practical applications of IR theory.

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CHAPTER 9

Foreign Policy Analysis and Critical International Relations

RYAN BEASLEY, FAYE DONNELLY, AND ANDREW R. HOM

INTRODUCTION

To date Critical International Relations (CIR) scholars and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) scholars have not engaged much with each other. This is curious given that there are numerous promising reasons to do so. Among these are a shared challenge to state-centric analyses, a rejection of purely rational approaches, an emphasis on subjectivity, and an openness to multi-disciplinarity. To be sure, FPA's association with positivism, along with CIR's epistemological and methodological pluralism have made collaboration seem insurmountable. We suspect that overlaps may have also been neglected because CIR and FPA have each separately targeted traditionally dominant approaches, pursuing a common cause without sizing up potential allies or adjacent travellers. Consider these illustrative (but not exhaustive) examples of potential commonalities. Both FPA and CIR scholars loosen the hold of rationality assumptions on the discipline's imagination. Both aim to investigate and theorize those non-rational processes, practices, and actors without simply branding them '*ir*rational'. Unmooring these assumptions goes hand in hand with a more pluralistic approach to 'doing international relations'. Diverse examples like the Cuban Missile Crisis (Sylvan and Thorson 1992; Weldes 1999), routinized collective decision-making (Steinbruner 1974), and 'professionals of nothing' (Booth 1997: 114) who enact global politics on their own bodies in seemingly non-strategic ways (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005) all exemplify this.

Yet FPA and CIR do not move away from a rigid, black box-statist view of global politics in the same ways. FPA researchers tend to focus on leaders, elites, and concrete decision-making contexts. Critical scholars have forwarded marginalized subjects at the bottom of political hierarchies. In different ways, FPA and CIR take history more seriously than

mainstream theorizing. However, FPA tends to see history as a contextual factor influencing policy-making, as in historical analogies (Khong 1992), processes of 'sense-making' (van Esch and Swinkels 2015), the experience of leaders and advisors (Saunders 2017), and more generally the influence of the past on the present. CIR has long emphasized that the contemporary setting has a particular and contingent history that makes emancipatory change possible (Cox 1981; Linklater 2007).[1] In addition to points of possible convergence, these examples highlight that while FPA and CIR draw upon quite distinct external literatures for inspiration and operative concepts, both open large tents to multiple approaches and viewpoints on common substantive questions. Yet again, though, vigourous intramural discussions may inhibit conversations between them. For example, foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) draws from behavioural, experimental, and social psychology, while some CIR engages with more radical work in the psychoanalytic tradition.[2]

These examples highlight that FPA and CIR spring forth from broadly similar animating purposes—to open up and complexify mainstream international relations (IR)—but begin from different viewpoints and proceed along vectors quite distinct in method and theory, if less so in substantive concerns. Like two shops set up around the corner from each other, FPA and CIR may not realize that they share a spacious and lively intersection, and maybe even a few load-bearing walls. The purpose of this chapter is to more fully visualize that intersection and to sketch out its potential, challenges, and analytical stakes for both.

In the rest of this chapter, we take a closer look at some of the features that might bring CIR and FPA into productive conversation. We do this by selecting a few areas that are central to FPA and then unpacking them with reference to relevant CIR perspectives. Our goal is to explore how each approach might make contributions to the other. First, we unpack notions of *agents* and *agency* by considering subjectivity as well as the interplay between the human and material world. This captures FPA's and CIR's shared substantive interest in the individual political subject, broadly construed. We then move into a discussion of *perceptions* and *images*, which likewise brings together FPA and CIR interests in non-rational and intersubjective phenomena. Finally, we examine *decisions*, *mistakes*, and *surprises* as areas where FPA and CIR may find some room for productive conversation. In particular, we examine notions of mistakes and the

improvisation of surprise. We conclude with a brief critical examination of this Handbook's purpose, before commenting on a final way in which FPA and CIR have been serving in common cause.

Key FPA Concepts and CIR Views

Agents and Agency

A persistent hallmark of FPA is its focus on agents. Hudson's (2005) inaugural article in the first issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis* cast the subfield as the ground of IR precisely because it takes agents and agency to be of central concern. Beginning with Snyder et al.'s (1962) foundational proposition that we can take the state to be the decision-maker acting on behalf of the state, FPA has long held that individual agency matters. This also springs from FPA's willingness to disaggregate the state. Graham Allison's classic work *Essence of Decision* (1971) was pioneering not just because it challenged the rationality assumption at the heart of nuclear deterrence. It also showed how domestic actors within the state, like foreign policy organizations and bureaucracies, can shape its foreign policy actions.

The commitment to the study of agents is perhaps defining of the field. However, the decision to prioritize individuals over other types of agents is an ontological premise worth scrutinizing. While FPA takes agency seriously, it tends to draw somewhat artificial boundaries around agents to distinguish them from environments. Early work by Sprout and Sprout (1956, 1957) focused on the 'man-milieu' relationship, emphasizing that different dimensions of the environment were important features in explaining foreign policy. However, this did not generate a sustained research programme. CIR not only challenges the FPA claim that states are the primary actors within the international system, which resonates with the substate focus of much FPA work, it also opens possibilities for reconsidering notions of agency itself.

Some critical scholars embrace psychological and phenomenological approaches to agents and their subjective interpretation and action under uncertainty. To be sure, Lacanian psychoanalysis is probably not the first variant of psychology that springs to mind in FPA circles. However, the Lacanian subject is not a self-contained entity in a discrete present. Rather its self-identity is an ongoing process that is prospective in that it concerns

its development, but also retroactive in that it is constituted through discourse that draws on extant symbols and tropes, and may only make sense when viewed as a temporal whole. As Solomon (2014) convincingly shows, political subjects—both individual and collective—produce meaning in the way they construct themselves in time. While this helps the subject constitute itself as an agent, it also renders that subject intrinsically and perpetually de-centred—stretched unevenly across past, present, and future. This 'sparks [a] *desire* for ontological stability', often quenched by aesthetic symbols of origin and constancy (Solomon 2014: 671–674).

While FPA's definition of 'agents' is about humans, and thus could potentially draw from such conceptions of self, it neglects the materialism of their existence as a feature of agency. Several CIR scholars have begun to conceptualize agency in more radical ways. In certain fields, for example, actor network theory (ANT) is in vogue. Perhaps this approach is best understood as, 'a heterogeneous conglomerate of ideas' (Balzacq and D unn Cavelty 2016: 177). Essentially, ANT focuses on the web of interrelationships and interactions that exist between human and 'non-human' actants. Such relational approaches acknowledge that, 'objects can do many things' (Russell and Widger 2018: 391).

What is interesting is the way in which different people assign agency to 'things' (Thrift 2000). For many, ANT helps to bring materiality into view (Stalph 2019). As Aradau notes, 'Rather than relegating materiality to the margins of the social world or including objects as mere passive receptacles of human action, other approaches in the social sciences have for some time now tried to reconceptualize the role and agency of objects in the production of reality' (2010: 493). In this respect, ANT grows out of the 'new materialism' debates in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and processes of 'thingification' (see Latour 1999; Meehan et al. 2013). Both force people to become aware of and, 'think carefully about how they *are* in-the-world' (el-Malik 2013: 363; italics in original). As Lusas and Robb explain, 'The thingworld is the ensemble of objects made and used in a given society—its universe of things' (2021: 4).

At the same time, ANT points towards the transformative power and potential of non-human as well as human actions. This point is important. While non-humans can certainly be viewed as parts of larger networks that gain meaning in complex chains of events, they also give meaning. In sum, they, 'are both changed by their circulation and change the collective

through their circulation. They act and, as a result, demand new modes of action from other actors' (Sayes 2014: 138). In following these paths ANT directs our attention to technological agency ranging from data to phones to cryptocurrencies. At the same time, du Plessis draws attention to, 'how infectious microbes make real borders that are not dependent on human meaning making or identity' (2018: 392). Such approaches stretch FPA's sense of agency, and perhaps the subjects worthy of examination.

The development of a Foreign Policy in the Fourth Dimension (FP4D) timing framework (Beasley and Hom 2021; Hom and Beasley 2021) has further pushed FPA to reconceptualize agents and agency. Timing theory takes an objective and universal notion of *time* and reconceives it as a purposefully constructed set of relationships between different change dynamics. Applied to foreign policy decision-making, this takes the traditional conception of time as a background feature *affecting agents* (typically by distorting their perceptions via 'time pressure') and inverts it into a tool that *agents themselves can use* to influence foreign policy. This also allows us to see how these actors might come to perceive time itself as an active agent 'working against them', further opening the door to examining the subjective construction of time's agency among foreign policy-makers.

Similar to ANT, FP4D demonstrates how timing can become invested in materials, which can then begin to work as agents. For example, the development of the 'crisis hotline' was originally constructed to better time decision-making processes and crisis communications between the superpowers via a tele-type machine (Simon and Simon 2017). This technology would allow rapid communications but would be slow enough to avoid emotional outburst or mistranslation problems. This medium, however, began to exert its own agency, pushing decision-makers to outpace their own diplomatic core and contributing to decision-making with less rather than more information.

FPA's focus on elite agency and agents offers some potential contributions to CIR too. While many CIR scholars might not elect to study elites in the same way as FPA, such research serves as a useful reminder that leaders and privileged decision-makers still matter a great deal. More diverse accounts of global politics that overlook this point may struggle to provide the sort of complex, nuanced, and pluralistic interpretation of ordinary or non-elite aspects of social life that matter in global politics.

Where would any account of the Cuban Missile Crisis be without the backroom machinations of the Kennedys and Khrushchev, or without the group decision-making dynamics of the Presidential Cabinet and the Soviet Politburo? The way the red 'hotline' phone is designed and emplaced may impact crisis behaviour, but the only reason this takes on such international political significance is because it is placed in a room where decisions get made.

Eschewing the study of elites has more to do with CIR's path dependency than any hard distinction. While FPA challenged structural-rationalist IR by asking who is *inside* the black box state, driving its behaviour, CIR's challenge hinged more on diversifying the account of what and who matter *beyond and beneath* the state apparatus—namely marginalized individuals and groups, everyday residents, discourse, and non-human factors. The latter move claims that, in addition to (and not instead of) the state and its decision-makers, other people and things matter, too.

By incorporating the study of elites, CIR might also bring new approaches to bear on agents central to global politics. Think of leader trait analysis (LTA) in FPA (Hermann 1980; Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) with its focus on identifying key personality traits that can shape leaders' foreign policy behaviours, or groupthink analyses and collective decision-making research (Janis 1972; Schafer and Crichlow 2010) foregrounding the silences (Dingli 2015) in such processes, rather than conflict or consensus. Or think of the way that a set of foreign policy decision-makers' key assumptions depend on concepts whose centres do not hold— e.g., that foreign policy occurs between pre-given states with established boundaries, rather than being itself part of a boundary drawing and state (re)constituting practice (e.g., Campbell 1992: 69). Or an ANT assessment of the plethora of flesh, plastic, concrete, and metal actants actually required to make and implement something as huge and complex as a foreign policy decision. We might also take CIR insights on the 'micropolitics' of everyday life (Solomon and Steele 2016) or the quotidian practices of diplomacy (Neumann and Øverland 2004) as an opportunity to move away from the heat of crisis decision-making to the more tepid but ubiquitous pool of procedures, personality quirks, and internal rivalries in which decision-making agents swim on a daily basis. With our diversified understanding of agents, our next aim is to consider how FPA and CIR scholars might also study the perceptions that these agents can both hold and generate. Doing so offers

new insights on how agents and actants make foreign policy perceptions possible.

Perceptions and Images

Beginning with Snyder et al.'s (1962) foundational proposition that we must understand decision-makers' 'definition of the situation', FPA has welcomed a subjective perceptual account of foreign policy-making. Jervis's *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* goes further as a seminal contribution that helped reconstruct the field of FPA from the ashes of comparative foreign policy. Jervis (1976) took seriously the psychology of decision-makers, recognizing that they respond to what they perceive the world to be rather than what it objectively is. He further identified several psychological misperceptions, and positioned them in relation to well-known international relations dynamics such as deterrence, the security dilemma, and leaders learning from history.

Perception, misperception, and more generally *biases* subsequently burgeoned in studies of foreign policy-making. Cottam's (1977) *Foreign Policy Motivation*, Larson's (1985) *Origins of Containment*, and Vertzberger's (1990) *The World in Their Minds* all focused on the ways that psychological factors influence leaders' perceptions of the world and their foreign policies. Research in these traditions has been nearly non-stop in FPA (see Houghton, Chapter 19 in this volume). Here we suggest that this work might benefit substantially from considering the nature of visual perceptions and images themselves. This moves us away from an agent-centred view. It also allows us to focus on *particular* images that may generate widely shared sets of perceptions and help to define the way in which foreign policies are understood.

Oftentimes, it is impossible to think about, understand, or remember foreign policies without images. Consider the footage of Saddam Hussein being dragged out of his hiding place in Iraq. Or the images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Or the photographs of captured children running from a napalm bombing during the Vietnam war. Or the sight of the Berlin Wall being demolished at the end of the Cold War. Each image allows viewers to draw vivid and visceral connections between events, decisions, and policies. This is hardly surprising. Several scholars have already established that images have the

power to shape public opinions (Bennett et al. 1997; Seaver 1998; Keppling er 2007). Others contend that a single frame can transform how we see the world, and how we encounter those who live in it. As Bleiker notes, 'images shape international events and our understandings of them' (2018: 1). Taking a slightly different approach, Hansen has drawn direct connections between iconic images and foreign policy. In her tripartite model, ' "Foreign policy icons" are a particular subset of domestic icons in that they depict foreign policy related events situated outside or within the territory of the state' (Hansen 2015: 272).

Yet, for our purposes, it is important not to become blinded by the glitz of iconic images when it comes to thinking critically about relations between perceptions and images. To paraphrase Enloe, understanding banal actions is crucial to understanding 'the sheer messiness' of FPA (Enloe 2016). In this way CIR provides us with different theoretical and empirical clues for generating and solving pressing foreign policy puzzles. For example, Enloe's call for us to pay attention to 'mundane matters' (2011) chimes perfectly with what Methmann and Rothe label 'little visual security nothings' (2014). Building directly on Huysmans's concept of 'little security nothings' (2011), these scholars pave a way for us to examine the power of throwaway frames. As they write, 'we pay attention to the implicit effects of invisible and mostly unnoticed pictures' (2014: 163).

Moves in these directions are both exciting and daunting. On the one hand, they allow for the quotidian details that often fall out of FPA stories. Embracing the power of trivial objects, spaces, and actors certainly centres our attention on the power of social media (Duncombe 2017; Sadler 2018), political cartoons (Hansen 2011; Wedderburn 2019), pop culture (Grayson e t al. 2009; McCandless and Elias 2021), graffiti (Phua 2020), and even bumper stickers (Bloch 2000) in the construction of FPA agendas. In a trail-blazing piece, Raento and Brunn highlight how states project national identity and foreign policy prowess through stamps (2005, 2008; also see D obson 2002). Casting these tiny pieces of paper, 'messengers of political transition', Brunn further notes that, 'Changes in a state's identity, worldviews, and leaders may be reflected in the designs and themes of the stamps issued' (2011: 21). At the core of each account is an avid belief that perceptions, visualizations, and geopolitics are inextricably intertwined.

Still, the advance of what Förster (2022) terms the 'pollution of visuals' raises several pressing dilemmas for FPA and critical scholars alike. On a

daily, if not hourly basis, political leaders and everyday citizens encounter, view, and interact with a tsunami of images. The omnipresence of visual advertisements and stimuli is exhausting. Taking a more sinister view, evidence exists to show that the relentless rise of (social) media consumption fuels 'fake news' (Monsees 2020). Either way, it is plain that agency and perceptions have altered in the digital age (Gift and Monten 2021). Technically, anyone can become an influencer and even a foreign policy powerhouse. These changes have been heralded as sites of democratization and even sites of resistance. The rise of Twitter revolutions in Tunisia, Iran, and elsewhere could be held up as examples. Without denying the highly positive sides of new and emerging technology platforms, it is important to be candid about potential downsides. Looking at Donald J. Trump's personal Twitter account and Facebook page illustrates that these virtual spaces can also be used to spread hate, violence, and mistruths. This raises a series of puzzles that are extremely difficult to solve. How do foreign policy elites control their public branding and image in these new environments? Are they more vulnerable to highly negative yet hypervisible encounters—like Nigel Farage, a strong supporter of Brexit, being hit by a milkshake? (Magra 2019). What happens when social media becomes a site of state surveillance, retaliation, and brutality? The Hong Kong protests and the subsequent security laws that have been passed by China raise serious concerns about the freedom of speech and the safeguarding of privacy and identity (Tsui 2015; Agur and Frisch 2019). The list could go on. Ultimately, we want to argue that mundane matters are not simply things that are often overlooked in our studies. They are also things that can be misused, abused, and weaponized.

Perceptions and images represent key features in the landscape of foreign policy. While FPA scholars have long proposed that perceptions and misperceptions are central to decision-makers' 'definition of the situation', incorporating a broader understanding of images and visuals may give further insights into how foreign policy decisions are constructed. With this in mind, we turn next to a consideration of 'decisions' themselves, and the associated notions of mistakes and surprises.

Decisions, Mistakes, and Surprises

A central concept for FPA is the notion of 'decision-making'. This even helps to define the way in which FPA scholars see IR. As the Handbook

editors note in their introductory Chapter 1, 'all international politics are rooted in and formed by aggregated foreign policy *decisions*' (p.3, emphasis added). FPA scholars understand that policies and decisions originate from many sources within states, including routine processes and internal conflicts and compromises. They also know that decisions do not always directly translate into behaviours, and often produce unintended consequences. Nevertheless, decision-making undergirds FPA's notion of agency, as, 'all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human *decision-makers* acting singly or in groups' (Hudson 2005, 1 emphasis added).

This focus on decision-making gives FPA scholars license to wander fairly far from the fray of IR and to explore domestic decision-making processes themselves. Indeed, foreign policy decision-making is a distinct focal point for a great deal of FPA research. This work can focus on factors that affect decision-makers across a wide range of levels of analysis, such as societal forces like culture (Wiarda 2016) and public opinion (Foyle 2004), institutional features such as coalitional dynamics (Kaarbo 2012), small group dynamics like groupthink (Schafer and Crichlow 2010), and multiple advocacy (George and Stern 2002), and the beliefs and personality traits of political leaders (Hermann 1980).

In CIR, timing theory (Hom 2020) transcends 'decisions' in some ways (see Beasley and Hom 2021). While timing involves a wilful effort to make things turn out one way rather than another by coordinating various change dynamics, it does not directly focus on 'decisions'. Instead, timing focuses on the consequences that different *timing standards*—overarching frameworks coordinating different change activities—have on a prevailing order that can in turn influence policy-making. Grafting timing theory into foreign policy-making also gives us a new perspective on other FPA concepts associated with 'decision-making' (Beasley and Hom 2021), such as showing how analogies (Khong 1992) and narratives (Subotić 2016) can be used by foreign policy-makers as ways of setting different historical change dynamics in useful relationships. Hom and Beasley (2021) also show how battles over who controls the decision-making process can be viewed less as efforts to prevail politically and more as efforts to keep time with foreign policy events in the world. Going further, they generate novel ideas about how foreign policy-makers attempt to manipulate the timing of *others'* decision-making processes, which is a common practice but had

remained untheorized. Without a critical IR theory that challenged traditional notions of 'time' and 'decision-making', we think such moves would not have been possible.

Studying decisions also carries some notion of accountability that foreign policy-makers have regarding their choices, as they sometimes actively make decisions (or fail to make decisions) that result in a particularly negative outcome. This opens the door for FPA scholars to examine different aspects of foreign policy mistakes and fiascos (c.f. Janis 1972; Op permann and Spencer 2016; Walker and Malici 2020). FPA also looks into antecedent conditions that may affect decisions and mistakes, particularly with a focus on crises and their consequences on the quality of decision-making (Schafer and Crichlow 2010). Crises are times where agents can matter the most, as routine practices and standard operating procedures give way to actively managing highly threatening and unexpected or surprising circumstances. Here FPA scholars often focus on the way in which decision-makers manage information and construct and make sense of a crisis, focusing on factors that can negatively affect their decisions such as stress and short decision time.

Mistakes have a flip side, as they can become part of the story of agency for actors. For example, when one set of policy-makers fails to recognize key aspects of other actors, this 'misrecognition' can shape the political landscape in unforeseen ways. As Epstein et al. correctly note, 'social actors never achieve the type of recognition that they seek' (2018: 794). In many ways, these observations resonate with FPA and critical IR scholars' allowance for ambiguity, surprise, and spontaneity. What Epstein et al. add, however, is the idea that, 'the identity that is being performed is founded in misrecognition' (794). Foregrounding misrecognition as an inescapable part of agency is a wonderful twist to well-told stories we often hear about performativity and power. Ultimately, it draws our attention to failure and mistakes as essential modes of agency and action.

Steps in this direction have already occurred. For example, Åtland and Ven Bruusgaard have studied 'failed securitizations' and speech acts that misfire (2009; also see Salter 2010, Ruzicka 2019). Going further, they acknowledge that, 'it would be interesting to find out why the seeds of securitization fell on stony ground' (2009: 343). This kind of prompt offers an opportunity for CIR and FPA scholars to broaden what is deemed to be worthy of study. The language of failure is often omitted from discussions

seeking to study 'successful' decision-making processes, 'winning' strategies, and 'popular' leaders. However, unpicking what can go wrong and how actors failed to achieve certain goals could extend our understanding of agency, perceptions, and decisions. Concurring Sjoberg notes, 'that failure should be recognized and embraced rather than ignored, covered up, or compensated for' (2019: 77). While a substantial amount of FPA work tries to identify factors that help explain failures, mistakes, and unintended or unexpected outcomes, little work critically reflects on failures as a starting point or views failures as a constructive element in foreign policy (cf. Oppermann and Spencer 2016).

Beyond mistakes, FPA scholars focusing on crises have noted that they often entail something unexpected or surprising (Hermann 1963; Phillips and Rimkunas 1978; Cohen and Rapport 2020), but CIR scholarship comes at surprises from a slightly different angle, emphasizing everyday encounters and the way that actors can extemporize, improvise, and act with spontaneity. A closer look reveals that everyday encounters as well as monumental events can change on a whim. This is not to discount the role of routine, institutionalization, and inertia. Nor do we want to deny that powerful actors and states constantly try to 'guard against the improbable, the unexpected or the unlikely' (Brodin 1978: 98). Nevertheless, even in the most carefully choreographed scenarios, actors must constantly be open to the possibility of adapting the way they move, react, and interpret information. To borrow from Adey and Anderson, 'Preparedness does not obey a single logic of performance' (2012: 101). Elsewhere, Handel has examined the positive and negative impacts that surprises can have on foreign policy (1980). This study also sketches out a multitude of ways that surprises can be enacted, ranging from surprise attacks to what he terms a *fait accompli*, 'which is only a surprise in terms of *timing*' (Handel 1980: 62; italic in original).

Foreign policy mistakes and surprises are interesting concepts for CIR, and FPA has come some way in unpacking these notions. Here we see a possible bridge between FPA work on surprise and mistakes and CIR research into emergent events (McIntosh 2020), ruptures (Lundborg 2011), and the social transformation of disparate or confusing happenings into discrete 'events' or 'crises' eligible for naming (e.g., '9/11', '7/7', or 'the dawn of global Britain'). FPA analyses of mistakes and misperceptions have much to offer, but they also depend on *post hoc* reasoning and hindsight

bias (see Hom and Ciaramitaro 2001 and Cohen and Rapport 2020).[3] CIR pauses to consider the visceral experience—and indeed the social viscera—of surprising happenings *as they unfold*. When combined with theorizations of how such happenings get inscribed into extant frameworks or require more destabilizing efforts to construct new frameworks that accommodate them, CIR might add important middle chapters to the FPA story of mistakes and surprises.

Conclusions and Challenges: Moving from Ideas to Practice

At present, the corner where FPA and CIR have set up shop is not a busy intersection, despite having built their foundations on such common ground. Still, we see real promise in creating new avenues of research that celebrate and extend from their commonalities. In this chapter we have shown that foundational concepts in FPA—such as agents, perceptions, and decisions—can be scrutinized, reconsidered, and broadened. Likewise, the editors are taking pains to set FPA *in relation to* IR, and to 'reposition the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to a central analytic location within the study of international relations' (see Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). For many FPA scholars this is an exercise in open-minded inclusivity, letting 1,000 flowers bloom under a tent big enough to provide the best proximity to the 'ground of IR'.

Drawing boundaries can be helpful, perhaps, and finding a 'centre' conveys a sense of stability and ordering. However, it may not be very critical. Arguably CIR would question, and likely reject, this disciplinary aim. Ultimately, they may remind us that such boundaries are not fixed, they are fluid and ever changing (Parker et al. 2009). Travelling down more critical roads may create new intersections, requiring FPA to abandon boundary drawing and embrace de-centring as its *modus operandi* (Doty 1997). These ideas are already gaining momentum (see Keukeleire and Lecocq 2018). In recent years calls have been made for scholars to relentlessly disrupt and diversify 'totalising and unifying accounts of (global) power relations' (Rosenow 2009: 497). Part of this call requires us to push beyond Western-centric and Euro-centric storylines and theories (see e.g., Shilliam 2011; Ling 2014; Gani 2017). In tandem, de-centring moves may require FPA scholars to ask why they might want to be at the centre at all? What

ontological and epistemological premises and historical order does such a quest reveal?

Throughout this chapter we have pointed to several research topics that FPA and CIR scholars may have in common. We have also hinted at others which could benefit from a cross-fertilization. For just one example, consider LTA research in FPA, which is based on quantitative content analysis of leaders' speeches and draws inferences on key personality traits in order to explain and predict their foreign policy actions and decision-making behaviours (Hermann 1980). A critically inflected approach might consider how LTA traits predict a leader's capacity or tendency to *extemporize*, recognizing the importance of improvisation through surprises or in rebounding from their own foreign policy mistakes. A more critical approach might also push us to consider *other personality features* beyond those included in LTA research, such as 'a sense of humour', which may seem quite different from the existing personality traits that predict decision-making, but which nevertheless can be potent in foreign policy (Bhungalia 2020; Crilley and Chatterje-Doody 2021).

As we close out our discussion, we want to acknowledge that FPA and CIR scholars have both tried to 'keep the world safe', although in different ways. Alexander George (1994) proposed a research programme aimed at 'bridging the gap between theory and practice' in foreign policy-making. He argued that policy-makers needed useful knowledge from academics. George also emphasized the need for 'process theories' which 'focus on how to structure and manage the policy-making process to improve information-processing and judgement so as to increase the likelihood of better decisions' (George 1994: 145). His approach to 'multiple-advocacy' (George 1972) pioneered the way for such process theorizing. Akin to Janis' notion that avoiding *groupthink* could reduce the likelihood of foreign policy fiascos, George gave impetus for foreign policy scholarship to focus on *improving* decision-making. His proposal was to ensure that multiple points of view are explicitly incorporated, while also avoiding the pitfalls of excessive conflict (George and Stern 2002). These efforts align FPA's focus on human agents, avoiding or mitigating misperceptions and mistakes, thereby improving decision-making.

At minimum, Janis' and George's efforts sit adjacent to an area of CIR so far overlooked in FPA. From reinvigorations of classical realism (e.g., Tjalve 2008; see Hom 2018) to more reflexive interpretations of Frankfurt

School critical theory (Levine 2012), CIR scholars also understand their work as having practical stakes.[4] Here the work of Daniel Levine (2012) offers theoretical resources with clear benefits for those thinking about how FPA might proceed more effectively. Levine's (2012: 38) 'sustainable critique' argues for a 'constellar' approach to both theoretical pluralism and practical deliberations such as foreign policy decision-making. Much as a constellation takes its shape from the *Gestalt* afforded by multiple stars, a constellar approach to political dilemmas insists on engaging them from multiple viewpoints. Crucially, this is *not* to increase the chances that one perspective will discover the 'right' way forward. Instead, because policy dilemmas so often involve competing proposals and incommensurable worldviews, the only way to forestall a most harmful proposal is to prioritize that delicate but vital *balance* of claims and views which avoids the extreme outcomes that reification encourages and that characterized the worst excesses of 20th-century politics.[5] His argument resonates strongly with FPA discussions of groupthink avoidance and multiple advocacy but offers a more restrained middle-range outcome between foreign policy 'mistakes' and 'successes'—namely the avoidance of foreign policy disasters and the possibility of embedding a more balanced and pluralist approach to foreign policy decision-making and its working routines.

Looking forwards, and backwards, it is fair to say that 'keeping the world safe' is an incredibly difficult task. It does not take a genius to realize that tackling global problems ranging from climate change to public health to poverty to gender equality must be collective and collaborative. To paraphrase Bleiker, 'One point is immediately clear: the politics of [any of these issues] is far too complex to be assessed through a single method' (2015: 873). These are nice ideas, encouraging steps, and helpful entry points. But they are also only ideas, steps, and entry points. Putting them into practice will be more challenging. Notably, confrontations and misperceptions may arise as scholars attempt to study FPA from critical perspectives and vice versa. Learning how to create and use more pluralistic frameworks will take time and resolve. This raises questions about the willingness of scholars to undertake the extra training required to do consellar and pluralistic projects, and brings forth another critical question —how to create do-able interdisciplinary projects. However, we see plenty of promising bridges, synergies, and common causes to make such efforts worthwhile.

Notes

1. Relatedly, see the groundswell of research in 'historical international relations' (de Carvalho et al. 2021) and historical institutionalism, again with little cross-pollination.
2. The exception here might be ontological security studies (see Steele, Chapter 7 in this volume), a critical approach drawing from mainstream social psychology like Giddens or Laing (e.g., Steele 2005; Mitzen 2006). Only recently has FPA work begun to incorporate such an approach (cf. Subotić 2016; Eberle and Handl 2020) 3. Cohen and Rapport (2020) use hindsight bias as an instrument, but do not reflect on how their own notion of 'strategic surprise' depends on retrospective judgement.
4. CIR scholars tend to be more circumspect about *positive* goals like 'improving decision-making' or 'bridging' that academic-policy gap (Nye 2008), and instead focus on the more *negative* goal of avoiding worst-case scenarios or forestalling catastrophes like nuclear war (Levine 2012; see also Hom 2018). When compared with experiencing an apocalypse, avoiding it should stand as the most obvious, if minimally, 'improved outcome' of all.
5. Levine (2012: 240–251) demonstrates this provocatively in his discussion of a less bad approach to deliberating the Israel-Palestine issue.

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CHAPTER 10

Foreign Policy Analysis and Securitization

ROXANNA SJÖSTEDT

INTRODUCTION

To what extent can securitization theory help us to engage with the puzzles and problems of foreign policy analysis (FPA)? And how can FPA scholarship contribute to the development of the assumptions of securitization? This chapter will probe these questions and attempt to demonstrate that these seemingly disparate research traditions indeed both complement and inform one another. As with the other theoretical traditions discussed in Part I of this volume, securitization theory has habitually been viewed as a theory of international relations (IR) rather than FPA. However, and as noted by Hayes, there is 'a growing literature that links securitization theory to foreign policy analysis' (Hayes 2016: 335), as hot topics such as climate change, immigration, and epidemics increasingly become the core of both research fields. In addition, the plasticity of the securitization framework in terms of what constitutes both the securitizing agent and the audience, as well as its openness regarding the threat and the referent object, makes it suitable for analysing a broad range of issues, contexts, and actors. Thus, just as the problem-driven and agency focus of FPA research goes hand in hand with the central tenets of securitization, securitization theory contributes to the development of FPA by problematizing the decision-making of different foreign policy problems, by using a different set of assumptions.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, a short outline of the intellectual roots as well as the key assumptions and concepts of securitization theory will be given. Thereafter, the current research agenda of FPA employing securitization is discussed and problematized, with particular emphasis on the two mechanisms that lie at the core of the FPA-securitization nexus, namely the role of securitizing agents (e.g.,

political leaders) and the audience (e.g., the broader political elite or the public). The issues of de- and resecuritization are also addressed, as they are critical in moving the research agenda forward and moving away from the conceptualization of securitization and foreign policy decision-making as linear processes. Recent works covering different research puzzles are used as illustrations of these mechanisms and concepts. They also demonstrate how a securitization analytical lens can help to problematize different contemporary issues of foreign policy, as well as how different empirical applications on foreign policy issues have contributed to the refinement of securitization theory. This discussion also forms the basis for reflections on future research avenues. By way of conclusion, the chapter revisits the overall theme of this volume, and deliberates on the advantages of reconnecting IR theory to FPA, and, more specifically, how a clearer linkage between securitization theory and FPA would contribute to a repositioning of FPA.

Antecedents and Assumptions of Securitization Theory

In essence, securitization theory concerns the construction of threats and how this construction fundamentally determines what issues are moved up on the security agenda, resulting in a particular security policy. The central assumptions of securitization theory take Barry Buzan's groundbreaking notion of a deepening and broadening of the security concept as a point of departure (Buzan 1983, 1991). In a clear break with the traditional realist view on the international system and international security, Buzan stresses the necessity of including other levels of analysis than the state level and argues that the security concept encompasses five sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security. Although these sectors overlap and are analytically related, the identification of five different areas in which threats to the individual, the group, or the nation can arise is an important move from a static and objectivist view of threats and security. This assumption indicates that securitization is actually more closely related to the problem-driven research focus of FPA, rather than the analysis of political courses of events, processes, and patterns in the international system itself, as customary in IR proper.

Another field to which the intellectual roots of securitization can be traced is the philosophy of language, and to Austin's (1975) speech act theory in particular. Consistent with the conceptualization of speech acts, language plays an essential role in securitization theory and helps to construct reality in the sense of constructing threat images (Wæver 1995). In essence, it is argued that '[t]he way to study securitization is to study discourse' (Buzan et al. 1998: 25), although more contemporary securitization research often adheres to the so-called 'sociological turn', and also includes 'practices, context, and power relations' in the discursive analysis (Balzacq 2011: 1; see also Stritzel 2014).

Combining the assumptions of these two precursors, securitization theory offers two main propositions: (1) threats and security are malleable constructs that can include a broad range of issues; (2) language and practices are to be viewed as 'performatives as opposed to constatives' (Balzacq 2011: 1), as they help to shape the contextual setting, and construct different threat images in that setting, rather than solely being reflections of an objective state of affairs (Browning and McDonald 2013). Securitization theory thus moves beyond the traditional view that the foreign and security policies of states mainly concern threats posed by antagonistic states, and argues to the contrary that anyone or anything can be constructed as a threat (Sjöstedt 2020). In other words, threats, and the foreign policy responses to handle them, are not contextually given in the anarchic system but rather should be viewed as the by-product of the intersubjective constructions of actors (Sjöstedt 2019).

Securitization theory thus differs from traditional IR theories. Securitization theory also diverges from the common view of FPA as being essentially an 'individualistic and ultra-positivist' field of research (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). Securitization theory is neither a theory in the traditional positivist sense, explaining causal relationships, nor does it assume that policy is the outcome of the cognitive processes of individual actors. Although putting a clear focus on agency, securitization theory emphasizes the intersubjectivity in threat construction, and the threat construction process captured by the securitization framework identifies how various mechanisms interact in the making of a policy outcome (Balzacq and Guzzini 2015). Four mechanisms are viewed as central cornerstones in the securitization framework and form the basis of the securitization

process: *the securitizing actor*, *the securitizing move*, *the referent object*, and *the audience*.

First, the so-called securitizing actor initiates the securitization process by framing an issue as an existential threat. Normally, this actor is someone who has the necessary platform, power, and authority to be able to construct the threat image and convey the importance of this construction. Political leaders are perhaps self-evident securitizing actors, but also religious and military leaders or leaders of prominent societal groups can have this role. In addition, recent research on securitization has stressed the need to look beyond the actual securitizing actors as they 'do not exist in a political vacuum; rather they are influenced by a variety of actors including political advisors, opposition politicians, public intellectuals, newspaper editors, and ordinary people ' (Floyd 2018: 45). It is therefore important also to pay attention to these functional actors and to the so-called 'securitizing requests', that is, the 'rhetorical moves aimed at persuading others (usually more powerful actors) to securitise' (44). For example, we have seen that societal actors, both individuals and organizations, are highly important in the securitization of environmental issues, such as global warming, influencing decision-makers to place it on the security agenda. This highlighting of actors, both securitizing and influencing, links securitization to the assumptions of FPA in the sense that foreign or security policy decision-making is often the result of the interaction as well as contestation of different domestic actors.

Second, there is the securitizing move, or when the securitizing agent constructs an issue as a threat, either as a result of his or her own cognitive process or by a securitizing request. In line with the broadening of security into different sectors, a number of foreign policy issues beyond the traditional military ones constitute possible threats and issues of securitization, for instance, migration (societal sector); global warming (environmental sector); or international trade (economic sector). Regardless of the issue, a securitizing move commands action and obligates as well as enables the securitizing actor towards a particular subsequent behaviour: if you construct a threat image, you more or less have to act upon and handle this threat. In other words, if a leader of a state declares a pandemic to be a national and societal threat, he or she will in the eyes of society and the political elite be obligated to act on this threat. The COVID-19 pandemic is a prime example of this, as political leaders worldwide took foreign policy

measures, such as border closures and trade policies resulting in 'vaccine-wars', as the necessary and logical outcomes of their securitizing moves. In line with what is claimed by FPA, this demonstrates that the line between domestic politics and foreign policy is becoming increasingly blurred in the sense that leaders are accountable to their electorate regarding international affairs too. Thus, the public declarations of leaders are not merely 'talk', and often result in policies affecting the state's relations with other states.

The third feature of securitization is the referent object, or what is being threatened. In essence, according to securitization theory and contrary to traditional security studies, the object of security is not necessarily the nation-state; it can also be society or groups within that society. In other words, the referent object is defined by the threat that is being perceived. For example, military threats by antagonistic states are presumed to threaten national security, making the state the referent object. When migration is securitized, it is the identity (such as culture, language, or religion) of the receiving society that is deemed to be threatened. In sum, in relation to the referent object, it is apparent that securitization differs from traditional IR, which often views the state as both the sender and receiver of threats and security; and thereby moving beyond the black boxing of the state as the unit of analysis. The malleability of the referent object relates on the other hand to FPA, as this research tradition moves beyond the issue of state-based military threats and incorporates economic and social issues, too, in the foreign policy sphere.

The fourth and final mechanism of the securitization framework concerns the so-called audience. Perhaps more than any other aspect of the securitization framework, the concept of audience has been particularly criticized, since the definition of what it is and what it constitutes is found to be especially vague (Léonard and Kaunert 2011). One key claim of securitization theory is that an issue is not seen as securitized unless an audience accepts the threat construction by the securitizing agent. Until that occurs, we can only talk about securitizing moves. The key interaction in a securitization process is thus between the actor that frames an issue as a threat and the collective towards which the securitization move is directed. Who the audience actually is, and how audience acceptance is to be measured is, however, not clearly addressed in securitization theory (McDonald 2008). One suggestion of how to conceptualize the audience is by pairing it to the securitizing actor; if the latter is the head of government,

the audience could be the broader political elite in the parliament; the general public; or both (Roe 2008). What is important is that securitization requires both the framing of an issue as an existential threat and the acceptance of this framing strategy. If these two steps in the securitization process are met, the issue is moved from the arena of ordinary politics to the field of security, or, in other words, the securitizing actor is empowered to move the issue onto the security agenda and, in turn, designate resources and draft policies to handle it. Again, this indicates that securitization incorporates domestic processes in accounting for foreign policy, something which makes it compatible with much of the FPA research.

These four mechanisms of securitization represent different stages in the process of how an issue becomes constructed as a threat and thereby results in different policies to handle the new security situation. There are, however, two other aspects of securitization theory that increasingly have received scholarly attention and that are highly relevant to FPA. The first, which can be viewed as the other side of the same coin as securitization, is de-securitization, or when a securitized issue is moved down from the security sphere and back to so-called normal politics (Wæver 1995). When de-securitization is taking place, the secrecy and elite focus that is often associated with national security is replaced by more regular policy processes, moving the de-securitized issue 'out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere' (Buzan et al. 2008: 4). De-securitization should, however, not be reduced to the process of merely removing an issue from the security agenda, and research has delved into issues such as 'what counts as desecuritization … why should there be desecuritization … and how can desecuritization be achieved' (Bourbeau and Vuori 2015: 254; also Balzacq et al. 2015). As argued by Hansen, a securitized issue can be moved from the security agenda through different processes. The first, 'change through stabilization' (Hansen 2012: 539) is when an issue is gradually changed from being an acute security problem to being more routinely handled. In relation to foreign policy, the periods of *détente* during the Cold War could be viewed as expressions of this form of de-securitization. Second, 'replacement' (541) concerns when one security issue is substituted by another on the security agenda. 'Rearticulation' (542) occurs when the political elite actively reframes the issue, thereby making it a matter of normal politics. This strategy can naturally be chosen for several purposes. It could be that decision-makers for strategic reasons wish to tone

down the security aspect of a problem, for instance when trying to improve foreign relations with another state. Another possibility is that developments over time change the ways an issue is viewed. For example, the developments concerning medication and treatment of HIV have changed the framing of the pandemic from being an international and national security threat to being viewed as a chronic health condition without security connotations—at least in states that have access to the most advanced treatments (cf. Sjöstedt 2011). 'Silencing ' (Hansen 2012: 544), finally, concerns a phenomenon in which an issue can be viewed as de-securitized because it was never recognized or put on the security agenda in the first place.

After de-securitization so-called resecuritization sometimes occurs. Resecuritization refers to the process whereby a previously securitized issue, which has subsequently been de-securitized and moved to the arena of normal politics, is once again framed as an existential threat to a referent object (McDonald 2011; Ranito and Mayer 2021). In the foreign policy sphere, resecuritization quite frequently occurs, for example after the above-mentioned periods of *détente* during the Cold War. Resecuritization can, however, occur after any of the types of de-securitization discussed above.

Connecting FPA and Securitization: A Multi-Faceted Research Agenda

Although much of the academic work on securitization concerns conceptual discussions and criticisms regarding its theoretical assumptions, there is nevertheless a broad array of studies that applies the securitization framework empirically, in turn contributing to theoretical refinement and development (Balzacq et al. 2016). In particular, and in relation to the overall theme of this Handbook, there is a rich scholarly field that employs the theoretical assumptions of securitization, de-securitization, and resecuritization when addressing research puzzles connected to foreign and security policy. When surveying this field it becomes clear that the two most central mechanisms of the securitization framework are clearly linked to FPA both theoretically and empirically, and that using a securitization framework, problematizing the actor and the audience mechanisms, helps

us to increase our understanding of and refine our explanations regarding issues related to foreign policy behaviour.

Setting the Agenda of Threats: The Context of the Securitizing Agent

As discussed above, the role of the actor is central to both securitization and FPA, thereby opening up the black boxing of the state, as is often customary in more traditional IR approaches. Actors, regardless of whether they be individuals or groups, are the entities that construe issues as threats in need of being pushed up the security agenda. The basis of their threat perceptions and decision-making is neither self-evident nor rational, rather, there is a plenitude of empirical examples demonstrating that a large array of issues can become securitizing moves at a given point in time. Thus, in order to understand why an issue is viewed as a foreign policy threat, we must contextualize and problematize the securitizing agent.

The first important aspect that helps us to explore how, why, and when an issue is constructed as a threat in the first place concerns the implicit recognition that this process is inherently complex. Threats are not given; rather, there are a number of aspects that affect the securitizing actor in the threat construction process. For example, and as demonstrated in the case of military conflict or foreign policy disputes between actors, threat constructions are not one-sided or linear but should rather be viewed as a dynamic and interactive processes that entails both securitization and counter-securitization between the warring parties (Stritzel and Chang 2015).

Another aspect of the multi-actor involvement in securitization is the simultaneous securitization of an issue by different sets of actors, who act either in tandem or in paralleled. For example, concerns such as health emergencies and epidemics are sometimes securitized as being threats against global, national, and societal security. These issues have also increasingly become part of states' foreign policies and in state interactions with other national and international actors (Davies 2008; Youde 2018). The HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the foreign policies designated to handle it, is one global health concern that constitutes an evident example of intersubjective securitization by both state and non-state actors. It can be argued that the parallel securitization by states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational advocacy networks resulted in the viewing of AIDS as a

foreign and security issue becoming a settled international norm, which in turn influenced and shaped foreign policy (Vieira 2007). In sum, acknowledging that there might be an interactive process preceding the securitizing move, or that parallel securitization often occurs, provides for a more in-depth understanding of both why issues are included on the foreign policy agenda and why they take the form they do. Thus, the construction of security, and the subsequent foreign policy measure, is neither a linear process nor the process of a single actor.

A further problematization of the role of the securitizing agent is that this actor does not exist in a vacuum but is heavily affected by a number of things in the process of instigating securitizing moves. The nature of the referent object itself, i.e. what is being threatened, is often central in understanding why a threat image is constructed (cf. Kearns 2017). Territory is a classic example of a referent object in foreign policy relations. Territory also often invokes multi-faceted forms of securitization that in turn has extensive effects on foreign policy and can shift interstate relations from amity to enmity (Wilhelmsen 2021), and even leading to militarized disputes (Chand and Garcia 2017; Garcia 2019).

Identity, particularly in relation to the nation-state, is another important referent object that brings actors to instigate securitizing moves, and there is a rich body of research that has continued to investigate different aspects of the securitization-migration dynamic in different empirical settings, such as the Global North (Bourbeau 2011; Banai and Kreide 2017), Asia (Curley and Wong 2008; Rüland 2017), and South Africa (Ilgit and Klotz 2014). Identity is also central when the securitization concerns minorities and minority rights, which in turn can have effects on interstate relations (Van Baar 2011; Weiss 2016; Geri 2017; Kuczyńska-Zonik 2017; Van Baar et al. 2018; De Genova 2019; Kreide 2019). Identity as a referent object can also be the motivation for constructing enemy images regarding out of area operations, as has been done in the context of the British participation in the war in Iraq. Here, identity played an important part in both explaining why a securitizing move was made and subsequent audience acceptance. (Hayes 2016).

In contrast, some referent objects are apparently more complex for leaders to internalize and in turn instigate securitizing moves. For example, environmental issues pose a particularly intricate problem in terms of initiating securitizing moves, as they lack any obvious external threatening

actor and often have a fairly vague referent object—such as modern civilization or global security (Balzacq et al. 2016). An additional and problematic aspect of the identification of environmental threats is that the securing of the referent object essentially entails an argument that civilization cannot continue with its current behaviour. This could explain why some leaders might find it difficult to both make securitizing moves relating to environmental threats and to sell those moves to the relevant audience in order to form the necessary relevant policies towards more sustainable practices. The means of securitizing against environmental threats such as climate change have also proved to be especially fluid over time and space, with the demand for them increasing over time in the Global North while decreasing in some middle-income countries. Studies have also found that the referent objects in relation to environmental threats have been spatially varied between contextual settings, ranging from a focus on national to economic or human security (Schäfer et al. 2016). In sum, these different examples of referent objects indicate that threat constructions are not static or fixed, thereby helping to problematize the construction of and responses to foreign policy issues.

Another factor that influences leaders in their threat construction processes are the aforementioned functional actors. Zooming in on the securitization process to deal with HIV/AIDS during the 1990s and around the turn of the millennium, it is evident that the United States was especially enterprising in changing security norms to help in the securitization of the international HIV/AIDS situation. However, the perception of the threat, and the subsequent decision to place the issue on the security agenda, was not the sole invention of the political leadership, i.e. President Clinton and Vice-President Gore. Rather, several US societal and political agents acted as important policy entrepreneurs, or functional actors, in moving AIDS onto the security agenda, initiating several securitizing requests. These requests eventually resulted in President Clinton's securitizing move in 2000, that constructed the sub-Saharan AIDS pandemic as a both international and national security threat, and which in turn generated particular foreign policy measures (Sjöstedt 2011). In contrast, the absence of influential domestic actors, and a resistance against the internationally settled norm, resulted in the Russian leadership's reluctance to securitize the AIDS epidemic, despite facing rampant rates of infection (Sjöstedt 2008). Also emphasizing the role of functional actors,

but more clearly adhering to the sociological turn of securitization studies, is the research on the foreign policy activities of the EU. Often focusing on the work of FRONTEX, context and practices by practitioners are here emphasized as being essential in the formation of securitizing moves by leaders (Léonard 2010; Léonard and Kaunert 2020). Similarly also routines and everyday structures within the bureaucracy constitute important forms of securitizing requests in relation to notions of borders and border control (cf. Bigo 2014).

In sum, the role of the securitizing agent must be problematized and contextualized in order to fully understand why securitizing moves are initiated and take the form they do. Paying attention to what influences and affects the leader in relation to threat perceptions and their subsequent foreign policy behaviour clearly informs the field of FPA as well, as it further opens up the decision-making process.

Policy as an Intersubjective Process: The Role of the Audience

The contemporary securitization research agenda does not only problematize the context of the actors that construct securitizing moves, it is also inherent in the assumptions of securitization theory. Security, and any related foreign policy measures, is always to be viewed as the result of an intersubjective process between the securitizing agent and the audience. As described above, the latter is a contested, criticized, and theoretically underdeveloped concept in securitization theory. Nevertheless, paying attention to this entity, both theoretically and empirically, helps to refine our understanding of securitization. This also further links securitization to FPA and its tradition of including domestic others in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making.

The idea of audience acceptance is thus not merely a theoretical construct. Instead, and as demonstrated empirically, in foreign policy decision-making the audience—be it the public or the broader political elite—has a lot of say in the introducing or continuation of a particular policy. This is also true in areas such as military security, which often is believed to be part of more secretive decision-making processes confined to the political elite. It is, however, important to recognize that the acceptance of securitizing moves is a more complex process than what the theory posits. For example, research has shown that the initiation as well as continuation of out of area humanitarian interventions are usually subjected to domestic

audience approval, and several securitization attempts might often be needed before any acceptance occurs (Zimmermann 2017). Empirical evidence has also demonstrated that there can be several audiences, for instance both the wider political elite and the public, that each need to accept the securitizing move, as was the case for the British government before the war in Iraq 2003 (Roe 2008). In relation to the securitization of migration there are often multiple audiences as well. The migration threat image is multi-faceted and constitutes several different types of threat frames, such as crime and terrorism, as well as threats to national identity, the labour market, and the welfare system. Which one is emphasized clearly relates to which audience is being addressed (Huysmans 2000).

It should also be noted that the audience is not always a fixed and delimited unit, and audience approval is not necessarily manifested through formal referendums or parliamentary votes. The audience, and audience acceptance, sometimes exists in the form of a broader societal discourse that expresses support for a particular threat construction and securitizing move. The post 9/11 societal discourse that accepted the securitization move on the War on Terror, and the acceptance of which in turn resulted in a new foreign policy doctrine, is an obvious example of one such more loosely constructed audience (Sjöstedt 2007).

Another relevant aspect to pay attention to in relation to the audience is which factors might hamper or enforce audience acceptance of securitizing moves. Several empirical studies have identified that identity is a key explanation as to why securitizing moves are sometimes accepted and other times rejected by an audience (Sjöstedt 2007; Roe 2008; Hayes 2012). If the audience in some way identifies with an actor that is being securitized as an external threat, for example through sharing a common identity (e.g., of being democracies), it is likely to be less willing to accept the securitizing move. If the democratic bond ties in with the referent object (i.e., their democratic values) the audience is more prone to accept any securitizing moves, even if they would entail foregin policy measures being enforced through military means.

Moving away from Linearity: Addressing De- and Resecuritization

The concept of de-securitization is clearly connected to the above-discussed non-linearity of both securitization processes and foreign policy decision-making. In real life politics, issues move up and down an agenda—

sometimes being forgotten, only to return later. This goes hand in hand with assumptions of, for example, political psychology that argue that decision-makers are unable, due to cognitive limitations, to handle too many issues and too crowded an agenda at the same time. Thus, securitization's assumption that threats can sometimes be de-securitized and moved off the security agenda, and back to so-called 'normal politics', plays into the accepted ways of structuring foreign policy. As described above, in securitization theory, de-securitization is essentially treated as a good thing. However, empirical studies have demonstrated that this might not always be the case. Given the 'existence of objective existential or real threats … for example, when climate change induced global sea-level rise endangers the physical existence of small island states—securitization may well be the more appropriate solution' (Floyd 2013: 24). The same can be said about global health issues. Contrary to common belief, the de-securitization of epidemics such as avian influenza or SARS has actually had negative consequences in disease management, resulting in 'diminished attention and resources, cover-ups of new outbreaks, and efforts to repress whistleblowers and NGOs ' (Wishnick 2010: 463). In other words, de-securitization should not be viewed as a predictably universal good in relation to international problem areas.

In line with the more recent theorizing on de-securitization discussed above, de-securitization should also be disaggregated into different types, as this can play an important role in determining the subsequent handling of a similar issue. Silencing as a coping strategy, for example, rarely solves the issue that initiated a consideration of possible securitization measures (cf. MacKenzie 2009; see also Hansen 2012, 2000). Considerations of de-securitization should also receive that same level of attention as those regarding securitization relating to any object of security, as this can have implications on how any possible de-securitization measures are carried out, and the degree of success likely from that process (Snetkov 2017: 260; see also Aras and Karakaya Polat 2008, Åtland 2008).

De-securitization, and the moving of an issue away from the security sphere, is sometimes followed by resecuritization; that is, an issue may re-emerge on the security agenda. Examples have shown that with regard to both immigration and minorities groupings, the migrants and the minority respectively have been securitized, de-securitized, and then resecuritized (McDonald 2011; Yilmaz and Barry 2020). The same process also

frequently occurs with regard to foreign state relations where the interactions between states can switch from enmity to amity and back to enmity again. In some relations this process takes an extreme form, with a series of securitizing moves. For instance, and as highlighted by Lupovici, the continuous resecuritization relating to the Iranian nuclear programme in the Israeli political discourse—without there actually ever being periods of de-securitization—leads to a form of hypersecuritization, or a 'securitization climax', which has severe consequences for the foreign relations between the two states (Lupovici 2016).

In sum, although being fairly untheorized concepts with limited empirical applications, both de- and resecuritization processes contribute to the broader understanding of how processes of security play out in polity settings and contribute, along with the problematization of the key concepts of the securitizing agent and audience, to more refined analyses of foreign policy decision-making.

Looking Forward: New Theoretical and Empirical Avenues of Exploration

The two key questions examined in this chapter have been: to what extent securitization theory can inform the research field of FPA; and how the research puzzles examined by FPA scholarship can contribute to the development of securitization. The theoretical and empirical discussions above have not only demonstrated that the two research areas can inform one another, but that they actually share a number of significant assumptions that help us to problematize the study of foreign policy problems and the strategies to handle them. Thus, the combination of the two approaches forms a relevant research nexus. One common denominator is the focus on actors. Both the securitization framework and FPA help to pinpoint actors, power relations, and processes that more state-centric approaches of IR do not capture. Additionally, FPA, with its problem-driven focus, centred on empirical puzzles and processes in international politics, serves to concretize the more theoretically driven underpinnings of securitization theory. Thus, and as aptly formulated by Balzacq et al., '[i]n marked contrast to the view that empirical works are mere appendices to theory, we believe that empirical enquiries have played a decisive part in

the development of studies of securitization … [and] are not merely limited to applying existing concepts ’ (2016: 507–508). When linking securitization to FPA, we can safely claim that these studies do not only make theoretical contributions but help us to enhance our analyses of contemporary world issues and actor responses to these issues.

However, a number of considerations would help to refine future research attempts seeking to apply a securitization-FPA approach empirically. One important observation drawn from the current research agenda is the inclusion of discourse, context, and practices when examining securitization processes and their relation to foreign policy. A particular foreign policy is not always formulated as a result of a threat made by another leader—it is often the result of the mundane workings of a bureaucracy setting a path towards a particular foreign strategy. Linked to this, and another issue that could be further problematized and explored, is that the threat construction is often neither linear nor the work of a sole actor. Rather, when examining how issues come to be raised to a particular country’s political agenda, we must pay attention to the fact that multiple securitizations can often occur simultaneously, and that the actual placement of issues on the agenda can be the result of securitizing requests. Which the actors initiate any securitizing requests could be further unpacked and examined empirically within a securitization-FPA research nexus, since we have noted, as discussed above, that these actors can play very important roles in the securitization of issues and any subsequent foreign policy formation. The actions of civil society actors are crucial here. For example, in terms of environmental security we can see that the so-called ‘Fridays for Future’ movement, initiated by environment activist Greta Thunberg, not only prompted a societal securitization of climate change, but also affected both domestic and international policies. Political recognition and, ultimately, the securitization of global threats such as climate change are likely not only to have consequences on domestic policies but also on foreign policy. More studies are needed to capture when, how, and why securitization requests lead to foreign policy change.

A second consideration is that research should increasingly pay attention to the research puzzles and cases beyond the customary ‘Northern’ or ‘Western’ focus of securitization and decision-making by political elites. FPA literature has been criticized for its state-based focus and geographic limitations (Aggestam and True 2020). Equally, securitization literature has

been accused of being constrained by a 'Westphalian straitjacket' (Wilkinson 2007: 11). However, and as shown above, various studies within the field of FPA, using a securitization framework, have begun an exploration of foreign policy threat perceptions in different actors and different contexts. Thus, it is apparent that these approaches can successfully travel beyond their customary research foci. Global health concerns constitute, for instance, a research area that is highly relevant to the study of foreign and international affairs, and where FPA and securitization constitute a useful analytical tool (Sjöstedt 2010; Murphy 2020). Here we can see that the global clearly interacts with the local in the securitization of transnational issues such as pandemics, and foreign policy often is the result of multiple and simultaneous securitization processes by both states and international organizations. Given the consequences of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic on foreign policy, there is a necessity to pay scholarly attention to this research area, and to the causes and consequences of global health in relation to the securitization-FPA nexus. During the development of this pandemic, apparent differences between countries regarding securitization strategies were noted, and these differences generated a wide array of foreign policies, such as closing of borders, threats of trade blockades—or even trade wars with regard to vaccine doses—and a reinstated preferencing of the nation-state and nationalism over cosmopolitanism. A focus on the different mechanisms laid out above would thus clearly be helpful in an endeavour to explain the discursive constructions, practices, processes, and policies that helped in these foreign policy formations.

To conclude, this chapter has pointed to the usefulness of securitization theory when examining the puzzles and problems of the field of FPA. It has also shown that despite not generally being considered an FPA theory, contemporary securitization studies regularly engage in the analysis of research topics clearly at the core of the foreign policy field. In turn, the empirical focus of FPA, in combination with the features shared by both research approaches, has helped to generate new theoretical findings and insights.

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PART II

CHANGING SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER 11

Culture, Identity, and Foreign Policy

AMIT JULKA

INTRODUCTION

When one uses the words international relations (IR) and foreign policy (analysis) (FPA), they are usually referring to two interrelated yet different 'ways of seeing'—in the first, international relations/foreign policy are objects of analyses, and in the second, IR and FPA are disciplines. The first way of seeing includes the study of two 'conceptual objects', the international system (or more expansively, world politics), and in the case of FPA specifically, the study of a state's external policy. From this perspective, foreign policy is indeed a subset of IR / world politics as a whole. Hence, it follows that when someone makes 'foreign policy' the object of their study, whether from a Marxist, constructivist, or psychological perspective, one is indeed analysing foreign policy or, in other words, FPA. However, there is also the second perspective, where IR and FPA are distinct (but slightly overlapping) academic discourses, or what we can call disciplines. From this perspective, both IR and FPA emerge as a set of ideas that constitute categories for academic literature—'This is IR': 'that is FPA'.

While my main concern here is not the politics of disciplinary boundary-making, the above tension lies at the heart of our subject matter. This chapter's main aim is to discuss identity and culture in the realm of FPA and IR, future directions for research, and lastly, the possibility of building bridges between the two literatures. The metaphor of a bridge is an interesting one, for it assumes that there are two disconnected spaces which need to be connected. From the second perspective, i.e. that of seeing IR/FPA as distinct discourses, this is indeed correct. However, from the first perspective, I argue that the main task at hand then becomes one of recognizing bridges that have already been built, before building new ones.

Thus, the task at hand is to reveal existing connections and to build new ones.

Hence, the plan of this chapter is as follows. The first section of the chapter discusses the convergences and divergences of identity- and culture-based research in both disciplines. This discussion will also trace the gaps in existing approaches, and how they provide the impetus for future research. In the second section of this chapter, I shall discuss the possible roadmap for future research, and the value of incorporating insights from other disciplines. The second section also spends some time on reconceptualizing causality and methodology for future research. One of the main arguments in both sections (and this chapter as a whole) is the need for greater engagement with critical theory in FPA (see Beasley, Donnelly, and Hom, Chapter 9 in this volume), and a need to contextualize identity and culture across time and space. I argue that instead of seeing identity and culture as conceptually static, we must see both the conceptualization as well as the content of identity/cultural discourses as a product of historical processes such as colonialism and capitalism. Lastly, while I have tried to cast my net as widely as possible, the aim of the chapter is not to provide a comprehensive literature review, but rather, to present a narrative that connects the past and the present of research on identity and culture with its possible futures.

Furthermore, it is imperative that I should provide a working definition of culture and identity. Following Raymond Williams (who will also be discussed in the next section), I define culture as an agglomeration of ideas, practices, and norms that constitutes a social group (such as an organization, informal network, ethnicity, nation, or a political party). Identity refers to a subset of ideas that constitute the self and the other. The 'self' and the 'other' can be collective (such as nations, ethnic groups) or individual, while ideas can be ascriptive ('I am an accountant'), aspirational/normative ('I should be successful'), and aversive ('I should not be moody'). While culture and identity often overlap, not every idea within the ambit of culture pertains directly to identity. For instance, many Americans may believe that 'praying regularly is important', but it is not necessarily a part of American identity ('I am an American hence I pray regularly').

Identity and Culture in FPA and IR: Unearthing Existing Links

A pre-occupation with culture (and related concepts) is often associated with constructivist and critical IR today. However, one forgets the relatively longer history of engagement of FPA with concepts such as organizational and strategic culture, going back to the Cold War. There are several reasons for this—while IR fetishized 'science' and parsimony to build grand theories of international politics, it was unable to provide concrete explanations for specific events that occurred all too frequently during this time (Kubálková 2001). Specifically, the questions that were often on the minds of both policy-makers and academics (mostly based in the West) were—what are the factors that guide our decision-making? How/what do the Soviets think? How are decisions taken in the Kremlin? To address these gaps, early scholars of foreign policy employed various lenses, such as national role conceptions (Holsti 1970), ethnocentrism and 'cultural distortion' (Booth 2014), groupthink (Janis 1972), national 'styles' (Gray 1981), organizational/bureaucratic culture (Allison 1971), and strategic culture (Snyder 1977). While I shall discuss role conceptions later, a common thread across all the other works was that culture was an important and much-ignored factor that should be considered in foreign policy decision-making. Inherent in this claim was also a critique of rational actor models—these authors argued that the assumptions of rationality that guided these theories were often hard to find in the real world, especially when it comes to behaviour of other states, primarily the Soviet Union.

Thus, this literature argued that the deeply rooted cultural beliefs of the leadership and bureaucracies were important in understanding how states behave in the real world. However, a problematic theoretical assumption also undergirded these critiques—culture was essentially seen as something distinct from rationality, and as the metaphor of 'distortion' indicates, possibly undesirable. It was a subjective 'bug' that rendered the assumed universality of rationality, science, and grand theory unstable. This idea of treating culture as a distinct entity whose influence can be isolated also continued past the Cold War (Booth 1990; Johnston 1995; Legro 1996; Katzenstein 1996). For instance, while appreciating the manifold factors that influence culture, Legro drew a distinction between culture and structure. An important work that provides a cultural and domestic coalition-based

explanation for imperialist overexpansion (a hypothesis initially put forward by Lenin) is Snyder's *Myths of Empire* (Lenin 1927; Snyder 2013). Similarly, Charles Kupchan expands the net of cultural influence beyond elites, and also looks at the effects of the masses on foreign policy (Kupchan 1994). Both Kupchan and Snyder highlight how elites' buy their own myths. Again, the conceptualization of 'myth' here betrays the continuation of the 'rational/objective vs. cultural/subjective' binary. Certain ideas are seen as universal facts, while others are seen as myths.

The end of the Cold War (with the concomitant failure of grand theories of IR to explain it) led to a renewed interest in cultural explanations for state behaviour. A slew of research now focused on individual states and why they betrayed expectations of grand theories (the implicit faith in the universality of grand theory is once again apparent here). For instance, the title of Duffield's piece 'Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism' is itself telling in its ironic assumption of neorealism as a 'default' (Duffield 1999). Similarly, Elizabeth Kier's analysis of French military culture and Michael Barnett's culturalist explanation of Israel's decision to sign the Oslo accords provides important insights into ways of accommodating culture in research (Kier 1996; Barnett 1999). Furthermore, scholarship has gradually expanded its focus to include non-Western cases (Johnston 1998; Bozdaglioglu 2004; Feng 2007; Müftüler-Baç 2011; Yaqing 2011; Hagström 2015).

Colin Gray's 'Strategic Culture as Context' provides a postpositivist (and I would argue, necessary) critique of this tendency to perceive culture as just another independent variable in the mix (Gray 1999). Gray borrows Raymond Williams' view of culture as ideals, idea, and behaviour (Williams 1977). Within this framework, culture cannot just be separated as a variable, and, I would argue, even rationality can be seen as part of a hegemonic culture predicated on capitalism and colonialism (Wallerstein 1983). A similar critique was also provided by Hudson and Sampson, who argued that culture should not be seen as a static residual (Hudson and Sampson III 1999). The idea of stasis is also questioned in Meyer's study of European strategic culture, which argues that cultures are less resistant to change than is commonly presumed (Meyer 2005). He lists three factors that affect this change—threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and learning during crisis.

Another key limitation that can also be found in much of the literature on culture in both FPA and IR is the assumption that ideas are discrete, distinct units. Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes offer an alternative imagination—they argue that instead of viewing an idea as a discrete object, it should be viewed as a symbolic technology—nearby concepts include common-sense, discourses, etc.—that give rise to webs of meaning (Laffey and Weldes 1997). Furthermore, Weldes provided a critical take on the 'national interests' that influenced American policy during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Weldes 1999a). Continuing with this critical interpretation of culture, but inverting the gaze, Ido Oren's work lays out how research on culture is itself shaped by American security concerns (Oren 2000).

However, while interpretivist scholarship on culture offered some valuable insights, a key question that Johnston identified remained unaddressed—namely, if culture explains everything, then it essentially answers nothing (Gray 1999). It is at this point that identity as a conceptual lens becomes particularly important for understanding foreign policy. Specifically, identity helps zoom in on a particularly consequential set of ideas within the broader universe of 'culture'—namely conceptions of the self and the other.

Within IR, the constructivist and critical traditions have been at the forefront of conceptualizing identity—albeit in a myriad ways. Conventional constructivist scholarship tended to have a top-down focus, with identities and norms flowing down from the international system to individual states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999; Agathangelou and Ling 2009). These identities were also deductive—readymade categories such as friend/ally or enemy/rival were imposed on states, rather than being inductively recovered. Furthermore, identity was conceptualized in an instrumentalist fashion—it was important to study identity because it influenced state interests (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996). From an ontological and epistemological standpoint, identity was treated as an explanatory variable, whose influence could be isolated and, most importantly, falsified (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; Abdelal et al. 2006). In its eclectic adoption of interpretivism and positivism, this approach was quite at odds with the nascent stage of constructivism, especially the work of Onuf, whose arguments were more consistent with the postpositivist line of social enquiry (Onuf 1989; Adler 1997; Smith 2001; Zehfuss 2001). However, despite its limitations, the positivist turn did

help in offering a theoretical and empirical advancement of identity. For instance, works such as Abdelal et al.'s 'Identity as a Variable' (2006) helped provide a useful and operationalizable definition of identity, splitting it into contestation and content, and as constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models.

Around the same time however, echoing Johnston's critique of culture, a powerful criticism of identity was beginning to emerge, namely, that the concept had become too expansive to be analytically useful (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). While Brubaker and Cooper's critique had its merits, it was also less applicable to IR or specifically FPA at the time, where work on identity was still in its infancy. In fact, the early 2000s saw a prominent and much needed shift in work on identity. Hitherto, literature on both identity and strategic culture was primarily focused on the state, to the relative neglect of society. The influence of society was still seen within the framework of public opinion, which revolved around more instrumentalist modes of enquiry. Furthermore, this meant that the influence of the masses was seen as a function of their possessing a cogent opinion, which may not have always been the case. It was within this context that Ted Hopf's 2002 work *The Social Construction of International Politics* urged scholars to turn their attention towards 'societal constructivism' (Hopf 2002). As opposed to previous scholarship, societal constructivism argued that it was important to understand mass/societal discourses of identity, as both the state as well as policy-makers could not be considered as isolated from the society around them.

The move towards societal constructivism also demanded new epistemological and methodological paradigms (Hopf 2004). Identities could no longer be 'pre-given' or imposed, they had to be inductively recovered by studying elite and mass texts. Due to its interpretivist bent, identities also became 'thicker', akin to the webs of meaning as espoused by—instead of being an instrumental via—media for the determination of interests (Weldes and Saco 1996; Laffey and Weldes 1997). Furthermore, due to its focus on the domestic, one had to cast their methodological net far and wide—instead of selecting sources in which the chances of 'finding identity' was likely, it was important to 'overhear' identity in order to ascertain which discourses were truly internalized (Hopf 2012).

Societal constructivism proved to be a vital tool of FPA, capable of explaining questions as diverse as the Anglo-American hegemonic

transition, the attitude of East European states towards the EU, or the United States' unwillingness to use force against India in 1971 (Vucetic 2011b; Subotic 2011; Hayes 2012). However, societal constructivist research also had its limitations (for a sympathetic critique, see Julka 2021). First, it was largely restricted to qualitative analysis. As every nation-state encapsulated multiple discourses of identity, the lack of quantitative data meant that it was still difficult to compare the importance of discourses. Second, as FPA literature pointed out, a singular focus on reliance on discourse analysis also brought a certain flatness to explanations, which did not take into account individual agency and institutional dynamics within the state (Houghton 2007; Kaarbo 2015).

The neglect of quantitative analysis was partially a result of the dichotomized nature of academic debates within IR—where positivist and quantitative research, and interpretivist and qualitative research were respectively conflated. Any move towards quantification in interpretivist research was thus viewed with suspicion of positivist reduction. An important breakthrough in this regard has been the Making Identity Count (MIC) project, which provides reliable quantitative data on identity discourses of major powers without compromising on the inductive nature and richness of interpretivist research (Hopf and Allan 2016). Furthermore, by providing both qualitative and quantitative data from 1950 onwards, the database gives valuable insights into the evolution of identity across major powers. Already, data from the project has proved to be useful in understanding key questions related to international politics and foreign policy, such as the prospects of Chinese hegemony and England's Anglo-Saxon orientation (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018; Vucetic 2021).

More importantly, initiatives like the MIC project provide rich grounds for cross-fertilization between constructivist research and traditional FPA. FPA scholars can use data provided by the project to augment analysis of substate dynamics, for instance, the role of identity discourses in intra-elite competition. Furthermore, role theory scholarship, which has a rich history of incorporating quantitative data for material factors, can make use of quantitative data on identity to better understand interactions between role conceptions and identity (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012; Thies and Nieman 2017; Yom 2020; Breuning, Chapter 12 in this volume). On the other side, FPA can provide much needed context to the assumed uniformity of MIC data. For instance, the database assumes a consistent meaning of the term 'elites'

and ‘masses’ across all countries (Smith 2008). While this certainly helps with operationalization, scholars assuming the uniformity of these terms across different countries (with varying political systems, ideologies, and institutional setups) may be blind to both the limitations of the dataset and the insights that it provides.

Furthermore, while identity has proved to be a fertile conceptual apparatus for sparking research, it has its limitations. As Lebow argues, neither individuals nor states possess identities, and instead have multiple identifications (Lebow 2016). Critiquing identity, he argues that states and individuals may be guided by multiple motivations such as historical narratives, and a desire to gain status and esteem along with self-identifications. This critique however has been anticipated by constructivists such as Charlotte Epstein, who tried to resolve the problem of the ‘self’ through a discursive psychoanalytic route (Epstein 2010). However, besides the very relevant point that identity is not the only game in town, there is yet another limitation in much of constructivist scholarship —the concept is seen as ahistorical and static. Some recent scholarship from outside the discipline argues that identity should be seen as a historical product arising from consumer capitalism (Moran 2018).

These critiques also force us to take a step back from a singular focus on identity and rehabilitate culture within FPA. In a certain sense, Lebow’s critique of identity in IR/FPA can be seen as a move towards rehabilitating ‘culture’. In his book *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Lebow looks at the role of motivations/drives such as fear, interest, and honour (Lebow 2008). However, Lebow’s theorization, while seemingly flexible enough to account for the evolution of these concepts across time and space, is noticeably Eurocentric in its conception. Borrowing from Greek philosophy, he proceeds to apply these categories to a variety of cases restricted to the Western hemisphere (its claim to universality notwithstanding). Furthermore, the approach remains deductive, imposing categories from the top, rather than recovering them from below. My critique here should not be seen as a rejection of Lebow’s arguments— certainly, culturally rooted motivations are important to understand human behaviour. However, I would argue that while ideas such as honour and fear are prevalent in societies across the world, their meanings may differ across cultural contexts. Thus, one should be careful of the tendency to universalize categories from Western thought.

However, before I discuss postcolonial perspectives on IR, it is also important to examine the contributions of early interpretivist scholarship on culture and identity in IR and FPA (Shapiro 1988; Campbell 1992; Doty 1993; Alker and Shapiro 1996). David Campbell's *Writing Security* provided the first radical shift in the conceptualization of foreign policy (Campbell 1992). As opposed to instrumentalist approaches, Campbell argued that foreign policy itself was an act of boundary-making which helped define, reproduce, and reinvent the 'inside' and the 'outside' of the nation-state. As a result, security and danger was not based on objective criteria, but discursively produced. Similarly, Roxanne Doty's work revealed how foreign policy is discursively constructed, as opposed to being an objective given (Doty 1996).

Furthermore, critical scholarship on foreign policy trained its sights beyond the state and brought popular culture within its ambit. Starting with Weldes' article on *Star Trek* and US state policy, scholars of popular culture have contributed immensely to our understanding of the role of shared ideas and discourse in international politics (Weldes 1999c; Bleiker 2001; Caso and Hamilton 2015; Hamilton 2019; Griffin 2019; Aistrope 2020; Crilley 2021). Furthermore, popular culture studies have revealed the manner in which specific mediums such as comics, television, aural technologies, and magazines have shaped mass culture as well as politics (Sharp 2001; Sachleben 2014; Hansen 2017; Grayson 2017; Guillaume and Grayson 2020). A significant portion of this literature has been theoretically influenced by Gramscian and neo-Gramscian ideas of hegemony and common-sense (Gramsci 1972; Crehan 2016). However, while literature on popular culture explains very well how popular culture helps legitimize hegemonic ideas of the state, it has been less successful in demonstrating the influence of popular culture on foreign policy.

This lopsidedness is on account of some conceptual limitations. First, most studies of popular culture typically focus on a single genre of texts (such as films or video games), and usually a text is selected based on its alignment with the subject matter. In other words, while it is easier to trace American imperialism in *Star Wars* (which is based on a theme of empire), it is more difficult to see it in a romantic comedy. Second, the literature typically presumes a direct link between the presence of an idea in a popular culture text with its mass acceptance. Not enough attention is paid to the production of the text itself—i.e., texts such as films tend to be

produced by capital-intensive production houses situated in the metropole, and thus may not reflect the cultural notions of the hinterland. Hence, even a popular text may only reflect the ideas of a certain subsection of the population, and may not have mass legitimacy, as frequent criticism of 'Hollywood culture' in American conservative discourse often points out (Hozic 2001). In other words, there might exist a gulf between the popular and the common-sensical.

The concept of 'common-sense' has seen some interest among scholars recently. Perhaps the earliest engagement with Gramscian common-sense can be found in James Der Derian's 'On Diplomacy', where he discusses common-sense' status-quo-ist tendency, which favours the dominant class (Der Derian 1987). This was followed by scholarship focused on the intersubjective beliefs among specific groups such as transnational elites, policy-makers, militaries, or bureaucracies (Doty 1996; Weldes 1999b; Nabers 2009; Thorvaldsen 2013; van de Wetering 2017). However, some recent scholarship on common-sense focuses directly on the masses, in societies such as Russia (Morozov and Pavlova 2021). Hopf's piece, for instance, argued that Russian masses' common-sense was opposed to the economic direction preferred by the Russian elites, which resulted in much resistance to free market policies in the country. Implicit in this piece however, was the assumption that common-sense was a force of external resistance exercised by the masses on elites. In contrast, more recent scholarship uses the framework of mass common-sense to demonstrate how shared ideas of honour and morality between the Indian masses and elites influenced the country's policy towards Kashmir (Julka 2021).

As a concept, mass common-sense allows us to weave together several strands between culture and identity. As common-sense is constituted of the most taken-for-granted ideas and practices (whether pertaining to identity or to culture in general), it answers the question of 'which aspect of culture to look at', without having to choose between identity and culture. This overcomes some of the limitations of literature on popular culture—by analysing a variety of texts selected using controlled randomization, it returns to the empirical commitment of 'overhearing' culture/identity, rather than finding what one is looking for. Furthermore, common-sense as a concept aligns well with some of the recent advancements in literature on the 'practice turn'. While this literature is more rooted in Bourdieusian ideas, it helps build the link between taken-for-granted ideas and dominant

practices and habits that constitute the social world (Hopf 2010; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bigo 2011; Bueger and Gadinger 2015). As was discussed previously, culture is constitutes not just of ideas but also of practices. This is especially consequential to foreign policy, a concept that is inherently geared towards action rather than mere contemplation. Furthermore, thinking in terms of practices enables a better conceptualization of changes on both the practical and the ideational level—with the caveat that the distinction between the ideational and the practical is more analytical (Checkel 1993; Barnett 1999; Meyer 2005; Legro 2009; Hopf 2018).

Earlier, I alluded to the historical nature of identity and culture. Simply put, this suggests that the meanings we ascribe to them are not eternal but evolve with the changing socio-political environment. There are both spatial and temporal dimensions to this argument—how one theorizes is often a product of who, where, and 'when' they are (in historical terms). However, while this is relatively straightforward to understand in abstract terms, how does it change the way we look at IR and FPA? More importantly, is this a critique that is only relevant to conventional, positivist research, as is usually assumed?

Apart from their static conception, much of constructivist and FPA literature relies on insights from social theory in order to conceptualize identity and culture (Berger and Luckman 1967; Giddens 1991; Wittgenstein 2010). While this has refined the way these concepts are employed, it has also meant that there is a certain homogeneity assumed in the way the concepts are assumed to operate across socio-political contexts. There is also a certain amount of methodological nationalism at play—the world is divided into nations that have cultures/identities differing in content but not in theoretical definition. This produces an account of functionally uniform structures and formless agents operating in the same fashion—co-constituting each other endlessly. Often, this is at the cost of amnesia regarding historical forces such as capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy. The international system thus becomes an agglomeration of fully formed and functionally homogenous nation-states, and all that one has to do is to recover the identities/cultures within these units.

Thus, identity-/culture-based approaches in FPA can enrich their understanding by incorporating gendered, postcolonial, and neo-Marxist perspectives (Achilleos-Sarll 2018; Sabaratnam 2020; Brummer 2022; Freeman et al. 2022). At the same time, it is important to recognize insights

from existing literature both within and outside FPA. Scholars of foreign policy have made important strides in understanding the impact of gender in foreign policy, moving from instrumental to more critically informed analyses (Togeby 1994; Stienstra 1995; Sjolander 2005; Bergman Rosamond 2020; Bendix and Jeong 2020; Aggestam and True 2020). Similarly, scholars have utilized religion as a lens to understand how religion has informed foreign policy (Haynes 2008; Warner and Walker 2011; Akbaba and Özdamar 2013; Bettiza 2019). While much of this literature looks at religions of the 'majority', Medha takes a postcolonial and poststructuralist perspective to demonstrate how India's Muslim identity (a minority religion) was used to constitute an expansive notion of 'Indianness' in its foreign policy (Medha forthcoming). Postcolonial and caste-/race-based perspectives have been employed in looking at diverse themes such as the foreign policies of India, Japan, and South Africa, and the racial politics of foreign aid (Shimazu 2002; Chacko 2013; Krishna 2014; Davis 2018; Rutazibwa 2019; Thakur and Vale 2020). Similarly, Manjari Chatterjee Miller compares the role of historical narratives of humiliation and cultural trauma in informing foreign policy in both India and China (Miller 2013). Critical perspectives have also tried to bring in a cultural understanding of international political economy (IPE), as can be seen in the work of Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney (2004). Scholars have also combined postcolonial and political-economic critiques to understand the foreign policy of smaller nation-states, such as Jamaica (Persaud 2001).

Bringing the Material Back In—Theoretical and Methodological Contours for Future Research

The mention of political economy may seem out of place in a chapter on identity and culture. However, I would like to use this 'sense of oddity' to problematize a dichotomy that runs through much of the literature in FPA (and IR) as a whole—that of seeing material and ideational factors as distinct, and almost oppositional, forces. Much of the early constructivist literature tried to answer whether it is 'ideas all the way down', or the role culture plays as opposed to structural factors (Legro 1996; Wendt 1999). There is a neat distinction here—identity and culture belonged to the realm of ideas and the material was largely seen as a primitive agglomerate of

military and economic strength. This distinction, I argue, does considerable conceptual disservice to both the ideational/cultural and the material. Culture, as discussed previously, implies not only shared ideas but also practices. Practices, in turn, encapsulate not only the interaction of an individual with others in society, but also with the material world as a whole—their means of livelihood, interaction with the environment, sexuality, and emotion—what Marx termed as 'species being' (Marx 1969). Furthermore, these components of the material world should not be viewed as separate but as interconnected. This theoretical move also opens up the scope for reconceptualization of identity and culture.

Poststructuralists have problematized the distinction between material forces and ideas, but ultimately, they end up collapsing them onto the flat terrain of the discursive. Furthermore, in trying to problematize the determinism associated with positivist literature—the poststructuralist account emphasized the contingent nature of discursive configurations (Edkins 1999). However, while the poststructuralist account explicitly refuses to prioritize material forces or ideas (and perhaps would even consider such a line of enquiry as misplaced), the centrality of discourse within this theoretical framework does lends itself to 'idea-heavy' explanations (Bieler and Morton 2008). Furthermore, in highlighting, or perhaps overemphasizing the contingent nature of discourse (and failing to recognize historical relations of force), they are unable to explain why, at a certain point in time, some ideas become dominant while others are relegated to the margins (Bieler and Morton 2008). To an extent, this overreliance on the discursive/ideational (at the expense of the material) has also seeped into neo-Gramscian literature, which often overemphasizes the ideational nature of common-sense and hegemony at the expense of their link with material forces (Julka 2021).

A similarly 'flat ontology' also ails literature on new materialism, much of it relying on Latour's actor network theory (ANT) (Nexon and Pouliot 2013; Connolly 2013; Coole 2013). This literature problematizes the presumed unity of actors, and thus prevalent notions of agency. This, as some neo-Gramscians argue, results in troubling ethical implications—if there is no individual actor, who then holds the responsibility for action (Choat 2018)? Furthermore, instead of falling into the trap of crude materialism or discursive reductionism, there is a need to take into account the role of

historical forces and a reconceptualization of ideas as ‘material social processes’ (Bieler and Morton 2008).

Thus, a re-engagement with the material is important to take forward culture-/identity-based research in FPA. As economic, environmental, and technological changes play a greater role in international politics, scholarship must recognize how these developments are producing new identities and cultural practices (Harrington 2016; Allan 2017; Dalby 2018; Scott et al. 2018; Proedrou 2020; Meckling and Allan 2020). However, in the account that I have provided thus far, there is a conflation of the material with the external—all of the components that I have mentioned, i.e. the economic system, the environment, and technological objects are external to the individual. Thus, there needs to be yet another dimension—embodiment—in which materiality can to be explored (Aistrope 2020; Epstein 2020).

As a subdiscipline, FPA is particularly capable of taking on this challenge. Much before IR recognized the value of psychology and cognitive processes, FPA delved into political psychology and provided rich accounts of decision-making (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989; Kennedy 2011). Furthermore, theorists such as William Flanik have called for a synthesis of FPA and constructivist approaches using insights from cognitive linguistics, particularly Lakoff’s theory of metaphors (Flanik 2011). This line of enquiry also has scope for some eclectic convergence between political psychology and postcolonial approaches based on the work of theorists such as Ashis Nandy and Frantz Fanon (Nandy 1989; 1998; Fanon 2007). For instance, Hannah Goozee’s work on trauma argues that psychiatry should be decolonized and cognitive states should not be seen in just individualist terms but also through their interaction with larger socio-political structures such as colonialism (Goozee 2021). This also touches on another site for further convergence on identity and culture—research on emotion and the role it plays in identity construction (Zahariadis 2005; Ross 2006; Åhäll 2009; Mattern 2014; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Hor 2019). This also rests on a problematic distinction between the rational and the emotional, and the privileging of the former (Damasio 1999).

The privileging of the rational also explains why identity and culture have been seen in instrumentalist terms. They were seen as epiphenomenal—part of the malleable toolkit used by elites to sell their policies to the masses. However, the rationalist explanation fails to account for the fact

that elites always choose some ideological frame over others, and that they are often unsuccessful in selling their ideas to the masses. As Srdjan Vucetic argues in his recent paper on the dominance of a transatlantic Anglo-Saxon identity in British politics, discourses of identity and culture are a result of long historical processes and cannot be done away with at a whim (Vucetic 2022). Further, the paper argues that the dominance of a particular identity rests on both ideational and emotional resonance, and thus cannot be seen using a parochial model of rationality.

Any expansion of the 'identity and culture' research agenda in FPA will continue to be meaningless if it remains a merely theoretical discussion and does not incorporate new ideas regarding causality and methodology. This implies that the critique of dichotomies such as ideational/material, rational/emotional, and social/psychological also involves the problematization of causation/constitution, quantitative/qualitative, and positivist/interpretivist divides in epistemology and methodology. As a discipline with a history of eclecticism, it follows that FPA should incorporate new understandings of causality. Recent literature on causality in IR problematizes the reductionist understanding that 'interpretivism equals constitution' while 'positivism equals causality'.

This binary is due to the reduction of causality to Humean understandings, while a non-Humean understanding sees causation and constitution as interlinked (Kurki 2008). Lebow, for example, sees both as being on a spectrum, and Jackson has developed the idea of 'adequate causation' which views ideational factors as historically situated configurations (Lebow 2009; Jackson 2017). Similarly, Banta's idea of causation as enabling/constraining certain outcomes allows for a more nuanced understanding (Banta 2013). More recently, Norman strings together causality and constitution through 'causal fields' which, though defined by constitutive explanations, gives rise to causal explanations (Norman 2021). This literature (going beyond IR) also emphasizes the inherently multi-causal nature of social phenomena (Kurki 2008; Carr 2018). These conceptions of causality are also compatible with the reinterpretation of material forces (and their relationship with ideas) discussed previously. For instance, Jackson's (2017) view of ideas as historically situated configurations can easily be moulded with historical materialist understandings in a manner that strikes a balance between a law-like determinism and free-floating contingency. Furthermore, the

recognition of historicity within these causal frameworks allows for their integration not only with neo-Gramscian approaches but also with historical institutionalism and methodological approaches such as genealogy (Cox 1981; Mabee 2011; Fioretos 2011; Vucetic 2011a).

This reframing of the causal-constitutive and the interpretivist-positivist divide also allows us to explore hybridity in terms of the qualitative/quantitative divide. While 'mixed-methods' research has long been in vogue, literature that strives to preserve the descriptive richness and inductive nature of qualitative research as well as the reliability and validity of quantitative approaches is still the exception and not the rule. However, some green shoots are visible. For instance, the MIC project (see above) has been a step forward in terms of preserving the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). Similarly, more recent scholarship has worked to fuse qualitative and quantitative analysis (Wagner et al. 2014; Barkin and Sjoberg 2017; Bayram and Ta 2020; Julka 2021).

Innovation in methods should also lie at the core of any new research programme that tries to meld identity and culture with political-economy, environment, emotions/affect, and embodiment. So far, the constructivist side of FPA has mostly relied on discourse analysis, focusing on qualitative data. This is also true for most of the literature on emotions, as can be gauged from a recent volume on emotions and methods, in which a majority of the contributions focus on discourse/visual analysis (Clément and Sangar 2017). This reliance on the discursive thus fails to capitalize on perspectives from fields such as psychology and neuroscience. Due to FPA's relatively longer tradition of engagement with psychology and neuroscience, there is scope for some productive and much needed cross-fertilization in terms of both theory and method (Shapiro and Bonham 1973; Tetlock and McGuire 1986). Another site of theoretical bridge building would be literature that integrates the study of identity/culture with emotions (Hymans 2006; Hor 2019).

Conclusions

This chapter has traced the past, present, and future trajectories of research on identity and culture in FPA and IR. This has included the recognition of

existing connections on the subject between FPA and IR, while also pointing out possible areas for convergence in the future. Furthermore, I have discussed the possibility of both theoretical and methodological convergences. The central thrust of my argument has been that both IR and FPA should treat identity and culture as dynamic entities rather than aiming for static and unchanging definitions that do not take into account social and historical forces.

I have also argued that any kind of future research and convergences will be based on unravelling implicit dichotomies or chains of equivalences, such as ideational/material, interpretivist/positivist, and qualitative/quantitative. This, however, does not imply that the differences should be forcibly closed, or collapsed into one, for the sake of unity, but rather that they should be problematized. This also brings me to a final point—namely, that, while building bridges should be encouraged, it should not be seen as an end in itself. Sometimes, tensions between the various branches of a discipline are what provide the impetus for knowledge production. As is the case with bridges, the aim should be to connect two different points—not to make them the same.[1]

Notes

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CHAPTER 12

National Roles and Foreign Policy

MARIJKE BREUNING

INTRODUCTION

From its first introduction to the study of foreign policy and international relations (IR), role theory sought to understand international politics from the perspective of the decision-maker (Holsti 1970). The approach was interdisciplinary and connected with developments in sociology and psychology (Thies 2010; Breuning 2011, 2017, 2019). Holsti's pioneering work (1970) differed from the prevailing approaches in both the study of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and, more broadly, IR. IR focused first and foremost on system-level dynamics, treating states as similar entities that differed in their capabilities (Waltz [1954] 2018; Singer 1961). FPA included some initial forays into interdisciplinarity, but this remained confined to specific research programmes, as detailed by Hudson and Vore (1995) and Hudson (2005). Scholarship employing role theory remained confined to the work of a small group of scholars (Holsti 1970; Walker 1979, 1981, 1987; Wish 1980, 1987).

The revitalization of role theory towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century coincided with a renewed interest in the role of individual decision-makers. In the inaugural issue of the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Hudson (2005: 1) defined the 'ground' of the field as 'human decision makers acting singly or in groups'. In the same period, scholars in IR rediscovered the role of individual decision-makers (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Horowitz et al. 2015), leading to a call for the conceptualization and testing of empirically realistic models of individual decision-making processes (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).

Although role theory in FPA has not consistently hewed to Holsti's (1970) focus on the perspective of the decision-maker, the most promising work employing role theory is rooted in the individual level of analysis and seeks

to discover ‘as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond’ in specific situations (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 118; see also Hudson 2005).

The chapter starts with a discussion of role theory’s roots and the moves on to an outline of its relation to FPA and IR. Subsequently, it reviews contemporary work on role theory in FPA, the range of methodologies employed, as well as the use of role theory in the study of independence movements and international organizations (IOs). The conclusion identifies directions for future role theory research.

Interdisciplinary Roots of Role Theory

Holsti (1970) is credited with introducing role theory to FPA, building on its use in other social science disciplines. He observed that theorists in the field had ‘made references to national roles as possible causal variables’, but also that the concept remained largely undefined (Holsti 1970: 234). Holsti sought to more explicitly explore role theory’s potential use in FPA and IR. He was primarily interested in explaining the interactions between states and the international system, and asked whether ‘detailed knowledge of the number, types, and distribution of national role conceptions among … policymakers’ could be helpful in doing so (Holsti 1970: 236).

To facilitate more systematic empirical study, Holsti (1970: 245–246) provided a definition of national role conceptions, which he described as consisting of

> the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.

Holsti’s (1970) definition remains central to role theory in FPA. First, the focus is on how decision-makers perceive or frame the commitments and behaviours that are appropriate to their state. Second, the definition implies multiple roles, as well as roles that are confined to specific (sets of) relationships, such as global or regional foreign policy arenas. The definition is also notable for what is absent: it is grounded in the understanding that national role conceptions are shaped by the international

environment and leave little room for decision-maker agency or domestic influences. This suggests connection to a structural version of role theory, as will be explored further below.

Despite such limitations, Holsti (1970) demonstrated that national role conceptions could be studied empirically and systematically. Coding statements from high-level policy-makers—such as presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers—he identified seventeen different national role conceptions and found that major powers generally enacted a larger number of roles than smaller states. Holsti's meticulous, systematic empirical strategy yielded several important observations: (1) he identified a larger number of roles than had been identified in previous work. Although some of the roles he identified are specific to the Cold War era, the identification of roles through empirical analysis was an important advance on previous work; (2) he provided evidence that the leaders of one state can—and often do—perceive their state to play multiple roles. He also demonstrated that there were systematic differences in the number of role conceptions held by different types of states. The implications of this observation have not yet been fully explored; and (3) even though Holsti (1970) was interested in explaining dynamics at the system level, his empirical work relies on statements by individual decision-makers who serve as representatives of the state. In doing so, Holsti (1970) accepted the individual decision-maker as the ground of the field—as articulated by Hudson (2005) more than three decades later and acknowledged explicitly in IR in recent years (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).

Role theory in FPA draws on two related strands of work in sociology and social psychology. As mentioned, Holsti (1970) drew primarily on structural role theory. Later work sought to incorporate insights from symbolic interactionism (Walker 1992; Breuning 1995; Harnisch 2011, 2012; McCourt 2012, 2014; Wehner and Thies 2014; Wehner 2015, 2016). The difference between structural role theory and symbolic interactionism is what scholars in IR have called the agent-structure problem (Wendt 1987; Carlsnaes 1992). I explore this further through the lens of role theory.

The first forays of FPA into role theory tended towards the more structural view (Holsti 1970; Walker 1979, 1987; Wish 1980), whereas subsequent studies and more recent work have relied more heavily on symbolic interactionism (Walker 1992; Breuning 1995; McCourt 2012, 2014; Wehner and Thies 2014). For instance, Guimarães (2021) shows how

(and when) small states can successfully influence more powerful regional hegemons. His work is an uncomfortable fit for the structural perspective on role theory, but it is perfectly suited to a symbolic interactionist perspective.

Symbolic interactionism not only emphasizes that human beings—and states—actively shape their roles, but also acknowledges that roles develop in interaction. Thies (2013) showed how the United States and Israel, after they emerged as sovereign states, were socialized into their international roles by other actors in the international system. His work also underscores that such role socialization is not a single event, but unfolds over time.

Building on Mead's (1934) work on the development of the (individual) self, Harnisch (2011) describes the interactive nature of role theory with reference to the *ego* (self) and *alter* (other). The state's 'self' consists of decision-makers' *national role conceptions*—the roles that they perceive as appropriate for their state. The 'other' has *role expectations*, or the roles that decision-makers representing other states perceive as appropriate for the first state's self. The self's *role enactment*—its actual foreign policy behaviour—may or may not correspond to the other's expectations. In other words, there is no guarantee that the self's role conceptions and role enactment correspond to the other's role expectations. In fact, the socialization process (Thies 2013) should bring the self's role enactment and the other's role expectations into alignment. When there is such an alignment, the enactment of foreign policy roles becomes routine. The focus of role theory studies in FPA has tended towards those cases where role enactment does not conform to the other's role expectations. This is where the interesting research questions are found: how do states seek to socialize one another? Why do states resist or comply with other states' efforts at socializing them into a specific role? When and why do states seek to enact new roles—and when are such innovations accepted (or rejected) by relevant other states? Such questions take role theory well beyond its structural beginnings.

Role Theory's Place in FPA and IR

Role theory scholarship in FPA has not remained static over time. On the contrary, recent role theory scholarship in FPA asks very different research

questions than the ones pursued in earlier work. Recent role theory's reliance on symbolic interactionism allows it to contribute to a better understanding of the agent-structure problem in IR and connects role theory with constructivism. This has entailed a shift away from the more systematic empirical approach that characterized the first generation of role theory scholarship in FPA.

As described in the previous section, Holsti and other early role theorists in FPA focused primarily on the impact of the international environment on decision-makers' national role conceptions (Holsti 1970; Walker 1979, 1981, 1987; Wish 1980, 1987; Jönsson and Westerlund 1982; Hollis and Smith 1986; Shih 1988). In other words, it focused on decision-makers' efforts to adapt their state's foreign policy to play a structurally appropriate role in the international system.

Not surprisingly, some of the role conceptions enumerated in this early role theory scholarship were a close match with the state's relative status in the international system. Consider some of the roles that Holsti (1970) identified. He defined a 'regional leader' as a state with leaders who perceive 'special responsibilities' in relation to states 'in a particular region with which it identifies' (Holsti 1970: 261). The leaders of a 'protectee', on the other hand, perceive that other states have a responsibility to protect them, but lack 'any particular orientation, tasks, or functions toward the external environment' (Holsti 1970: 270).

Holsti (1970: 272) recognizes that there is 'some overlap' between the roles he identifies and the focus on a state's position in the international system, typical of IR at the time of his writing. This is also true for Wish (1980, 1987), who makes a connection between role and status. However, Holsti (1970) twins his recognition of the structural features of some roles with the argument that not all of the roles he identifies have correlates to structural positions. In particular, he argues that the role conception framework enables the discipline to move beyond its focus on the major powers to facilitate a better understanding of 'regional systems and the importance of cooperative ventures within them' (Holsti 1970: 273).

Both the focus on the impact of the international structure on national role conceptions and the definition of such role conceptions as (in part) stand-ins for relative status are understandable in the context of IR research in the 1970s, when the field was dominated by structural theories—especially in the United States (e.g. Waltz 1954; Singer 1961).

Unfortunately, this emphasis also reduced the ability of role theory to fully demonstrate its explanatory value. Indeed, Walker (1979, 1987) found a weak correlation between national role conceptions and foreign policy behaviour (or role enactment). Walker (1992) later explored a more symbolic interactionist approach to role theory. However, the disappointing empirical results and the lack of clear differentiation from structural theories of IR did cause role theory to fade for a time.

Had Holsti's (1970) observation regarding role theory's usefulness for studying regional systems been better understood—and had it connected role theory to the development of hypotheses regarding the foreign policy behaviour of small states and middle powers—perhaps role theory would have had a different trajectory. As it stands, role theory re-emerged in tandem with a resurgence in interest in the individual level of analysis in IR. This resurgence was prompted by the end of the Cold War, which revitalized the study of foreign policy. As noted by Kaarbo (2003) and Huds on (2005), FPA had maintained an interest in individual-level analysis.

Emerging interdisciplinary connections to social psychology and sociology also helped scholars of foreign policy to revitalize role theory and incorporate newer developments in symbolic interactionism (Walker 1992, 2011; Harnisch et al. 2011; Breuning 2011, 2017, 2019; McCourt 2012, 201 4; Thies and Breuning 2012; Wehner and Thies 2014). In contrast to structural role theory, which focused on the constraints on human behaviour, symbolic interactionism emphasized agency—the ability of human beings to shape their roles as they see fit and to effect change in the social structure within which they operate (Stryker and Statham 1985; Stryker 2001, 2008).

Of course, these developments in role theory were facilitated by the rise of constructivism in the study of IR, starting in the late 1980s (Thies 2013; Matthews and Callaway 2017). Constructivist scholars, such as Wendt (199 2, 1999), Jepperson et al. (1996), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 2001), Hop f (1998), and Ruggie (1998), differ in focus and emphasis, but also share core assumptions. These include (1) interests are defined by actors; (2) to understand how actors define their interests, researchers must first gain insight into actors' ideas, norms, values, and beliefs; and (3) agent and structure are co-constituted, which means that agent (or actor) and structure actively shape one another—and are shaped by one another.

These core assumptions were already embedded in role theory in FPA before the emergence of constructivism in IR (Breuning 2017). For instance, Holsti (1970: 239) recognized that decision-makers' role conceptions are informed by their 'perceptions, values, and attitudes'. Although Holsti's formulation differs from the first core assumption of contemporary constructivists, both role theory and constructivism accept the need to evaluate foreign policy decision-making situations as they appear 'subjectively to the actors' (Simon 1985: 298).

Role theory also shares the second core assumption of constructivism. Breuning (1995: 236–237) posited that 'an understanding of how decision-makers perceive the world stage and their state's part in the play will improve our understanding of their actions'. That core assumption built on Simon's (1985: 294; italics in original) concept of bounded rationality, which he defined as 'behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed *both* by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker'. Current role theory scholarship might amend Simon's definition to include also the domestic incentive structure. That said, at the heart of the bounded rationality perspective is the core assumption that, in order to make sense of foreign policy behaviour (or role enactment), it is necessary to understand not only what the relevant decision-makers knew, but also their goals, their ability to 'draw inferences from the information' they have, and the problem representation (or conceptualization of the situation) they formulated (Simon 1985: 294).

The first two core assumptions were visible in the first generation of role theory scholarship in FPA, which was primarily informed by structural role theory. The third core assumption, that agent and structure shape one another, is a key component of second-generation role theory scholarship, which draws much more explicitly on symbolic interactionism.

The earlier discussion of the interdisciplinary roots of role theory made reference to the interactive nature of role theory. The discussion introduced the concepts of ego (self) and alter (other), as well as ego's role conceptions and the alter's role expectations. I noted that the self's role conceptions and role enactment may be at odds with the other's role expectations. Taken seriously, the interaction between self and other, and the process through which the two navigate the differences between the self's role conception and the other's role expectation to find a mutually acceptable role, requires a symbolic interactionist perspective. This is also where role theory differs

from constructivism: role theory focuses on the interaction between self and other, not between self and structure. The self may encounter many others and these others collectively socialize the self. Alternatively, a highly influential other may perform a socializing function on behalf of the collectivity of others in the social system.

In sum, the combination of the renewed interest in the individual level of analysis and the rise of constructivism in IR have facilitated the development of a new generation of role theory scholarship in FPA. This second generation draws much more extensively on symbolic interactionism. Whereas Holsti (1970), Walker (1979), and Wish (1980) employed content analysis to identify decision-makers' role conceptions, contemporary work is more eclectic and uses a variety of empirical strategies.

Contemporary Role Theory in FPA

The first generation of empirical role theory scholarship in FPA focused on the national role conceptions of one state's decision-makers in isolation, rather than on the interaction between one side's role conceptions and the other's role expectations. Thies's (2012, 2013) work departs from this one-sided focus on role conceptions to chart the interactive socialization game between an emerging state and a socializing state. His empirical cases are the United States and Israel. The first emerges as a new state in the last quarter of the 18th century, whereas the second emerges in the mid-20th century, on the heels of World War II. Thies (2013) develops a socialization game in which the new state and a specific socializer engage in a game of sequential moves. For each state, he builds his argument around a series of acts that starts with the initial assertion of sovereignty and then develops into roles such as regional protector and great power. He designs formal decision trees for each act in the overall game. These decision trees consist of a series of moves—a dance of adjustments between the emerging state (the self) and the socializer (the other)—that result in the emerging state taking on a role that both self and other view to be acceptable. Hence, Thies's (2012, 2013) socialization game represents an interactionist approach that charts the development of the role conceptions of US and

Israeli decision-makers in reciprocal relations with relevant socializers at specific historical junctures.

The explicit focus on an interactive game can also be found in binary role theory, which was pioneered by Walker (2011). Binary role theory draws more extensively on game theory than Thies' work on the socialization game (2012, 2013). It is capable of modelling sequential moves, but does maintain the unitary actor model of first-generation role theory. Recent work has examined the evolution of cooperation (Walker et al. 2021), as well as balancing behaviour (Marfleet and Walker 2021). While interactionist in its objectives, binary role theory is less rich in historical detail and less able to address questions related to the interactions of unequal actors.

Guimarães (2021) employs an interactionist approach to investigate the circumstances under which small states can change the foreign policy behaviour (or role enactment) of larger, regional powers by relying on ideational resources (such as norms and values) rather than simply accepting their limited material capabilities. He calls into question the universal applicability of the widely cited Melian Dialogue from the *History of the Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides, which conveys that small and weak states are at the mercy of big powers. Countering the lesson embedded in this story, he offers the tale of the Lilliputians from Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, which demonstrates that the small are not invariably powerless. Guimarães (2021) then proceeds to use role theory to theorize that, under specified circumstances, small states can effect role change in a larger state. Using five case studies of small state interactions with a larger, regional neighbour, he shows that small states can indeed have an impact on larger ones, but only if all four factors he enumerates are present. Like Thies (2012, 2013), Guimarães (2021) employs an interactionist approach, but his study goes beyond the interaction between a small state self and a regional power other; he also considers the impact of domestic debate in the regional power, as well as the support of additional small states, in affecting the outcome of the small state's effort to effect change in the regional power's role conception and enactment.

Both Thies (2012, 2013) and Guimarães (2021) seriously engage with the comparative method in their work. Guimarães delves somewhat further into comparative politics by considering the opportunity for external influence created by domestic debate about a state's role conception. Such debate is at

the core of another research programme that has emerged in the second generation of role theory scholarship in FPA.

Research on domestic role contestation, pioneered by Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 2016) takes seriously that states are collectivities rather than individuals. The first-generation role theorists recognized this, but they limited their empirical inquiries to statements by leaders and other high-level decision-makers. This implied that their statements were sufficiently representative of the state's role(s) and ignored the possibility of domestic debate about the state's foreign policy role(s) vis-à-vis other states.

Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 2016) problematize this implied assumption. They argue that the collective nature of the state creates the possibility that domestic actors differ in their conceptions of the state's role. Moreover, they usefully differentiate between horizontal and vertical role contestation. The former denotes disagreement among foreign policy decision-makers and foreign policy elites, whereas the latter denotes disagreement between decision-makers and other foreign policy elites versus the domestic public. On the one hand, this move takes role theory beyond its social-psychological roots, which investigated the individual in society. On the other, rather than anthropomorphizing the state, this strategy not only shows that the state is a 'composite self', but also reveals that inquiries into these horizontal and vertical domestic debates improve our explanations of foreign policy behaviour.

Digging further into domestic role contestation, Breuning and Ishiyama (2021) show empirically that in addition to the horizontal and vertical role contestation defined by Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 2016), the public in new(er) states may not share a unified role conception—suggesting that horizontal role contestation may exist not only among both the foreign policy elite but also among the public. The lack of a unified role conception among the public may make it more difficult for decision-makers to gain domestic support for their foreign policy actions, as the public is fragmented in its view regarding the desirability of enacting one or another foreign policy role.

Over two decades ago, Hudson (1999) used an experimental study to show variation across countries in the degree to which their domestic publics converged around a common 'action template' (a close cousin to role conceptions). Breuning and Ishiyama (2021) use survey data to show variation in the degree to which citizens in eight states that were formerly

part of the Soviet Union agree on the role their state should play in relation to Russia (as the successor to the Soviet Union). They tested for four role conceptions that conceptualize the intersection of the citizens' attitudes towards their own state's capacity to act independently and their positive or negative orientation towards Russia. The study suggests that survey data may be utilized profitably to better understand the degree to which domestic publics converge around specific role conceptions.

This contemporary work shows that second-generation role theory in FPA consists of at least two distinct research programmes. One, there is research that draws on symbolic interactionism. This work probes the interaction between a state and one or more relevant others to show how states socialize one another. Such socialization efforts occur not only when a state first emergences, but throughout its history (Thies 2012, 2013). Socialization efforts flow not only from big powers to smaller powers. Under specified circumstances, small states can socialize more powerful neighbours (Guimarães 2021). Two, there is research that probes the unity or fragmentation of role conceptions within the state as a collectivity. This work delves into the dynamics between foreign policy decision-making and domestic politics. These inquiries centre on questions of role contestation—between decision-makers and other foreign policy elites, as well as between the foreign policy elites and the broader domestic public (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016). These dynamics of horizontal role contestation among elites and vertical role contestation between elites and the public may need to be supplemented with horizontal role contestation among the public (Breuning and Ishiyama 2021).

In addition, some authors have pondered the connections between identity theory and role theory (McCourt 2012, 2014; Flamm 2019). Although roles are not synonymous with identities, the concepts are connected (Monroe et al. 2000; Stryker 2001; Thies 2010; Breuning 2011; Harnisch 2012). McCourt (2014: 7) takes the position that 'states, like individuals, are products of social forces'. In his view, individuals 'play numerous roles over the course of their lives', which are knitted together into one identity (McCourt 2014: 11). In essence, McCourt suggests that identity is the sum total of a person's roles. Stryker (2001: 20) sees it somewhat differently, defining identities as 'self-cognitions tied to roles'. In other words, individuals' self-cognitions attach relative importance (or centrality) to various roles as well as attaching meaning to their roles

collectively. Identity therefore includes something more than the sum of individuals' roles. This is also the position taken by Abdelal et al. (2006), who state that roles may express an aspect of identity and provide insight into identity, but caution that identity is more than the sum of an individual's roles. Not all role theorists in FPA address the intersection of roles and identities. Those who do engage this debate most often appear to favour the position that identity is not simply the sum of an actor's roles (Harnisch 2012; Flamm 2019; Breuning and Pechenina 2020). These scholars tend to find role theory attractive because of the connection to observable behaviour in the form of role enactment. This makes role theory more easily amenable to empirical study than identity.

METHODOLOGIES

Role theorists have employed a variety of empirical strategies. The first generation of role theory scholarship in FPA used content analysis of statements by the highest level decision-makers (Holsti 1970). In its second generation, role theory research has become more eclectic in its empirical strategies, in part as a function of the kinds of research questions this scholarship pursues.

First-generation role theory scholarship employed content analysis and presented quantitative data (e.g., Holsti 1970; Walker 1979, 1981, 1987; Wish 1980, 1987). However, the datasets were not widely shared, because this work was produced before the emergence of data archives and before academic journals in the field began to require accessible replication files.

Second-generation role theory scholarship is more eclectic. Work based on systematic content analysis continues to be present. Breuning (1995) is an early example. She derived four role conceptions from the literature on foreign aid motivation and tested whether—and to what extent—these role conceptions were present in the parliamentary debates on foreign aid and development cooperation in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

More recently, Hansel and Möller (2015) used a content analysis of Indian foreign policy statements to identify salient national role conceptions. They did not use theoretically derived role conceptions, but instead used an inductive strategy based on a codebook that set out basic

parameters. Three coders coded all relevant statements from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs homepage. At least two coders had to evaluate a statement in the same way for it to be included in the dataset.

Although these examples show that systematic content analysis continues to be used by role theory scholars, interpretive narrative analysis has become popular as well. Systematic content analysis is well suited to code for national role conceptions, but fits less comfortably with research designs that seek to demonstrate change across time or track interactions. This is where the flexibility of interpretive narrative analysis offers an advantage. McCourt (2012, 2014) employs such a strategy in his analyses of a series of historical British foreign policy episodes that served to redefine that state's role on the world stage.

Wehner (2015) uses interpretive narrative analysis (as well as interviews with policy-makers) to trace the perceptions that Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela have of Brazil's role as a regional power and its ambitions to emerge as a global power. In a subsequent article, Wehner (2016) applies a symbolic interactionist perspective to economic and security cooperation between Chile and Brazil. Here, narrative analysis serves to trace the development of their roles vis-à-vis one another while also enabling him to demonstrate how other states and IOs affected Chile's roles in its interactions with Brazil.

Finally, Flamm (2019) bridges role theory and image theory in his study of South Korea. He employs narrative analysis in an effort to establish what roles and self-images were considered, contested, and agreed upon by South Korea's decision-makers. Flamm's (2019) narrative analysis is well suited to the kind of fine-grained tracing of debate and the eventual emergence of agreement in which he is interested.

These descriptions show that methodologies such as systematic content analysis and interpretive narrative analysis are suited to different research questions. The former fits studies that aim to identify a state's national role conception, either generally or by issue-area specific means. Narrative analysis suits studies that carefully trace role contestation between decision-makers within a single state, as well as socialization efforts between representatives of different states.

Theory-driven case study analysis has yet other advantages. Thies (2012, 2013) uses historical cases to demonstrate the sequential moves of each act in his socialization game, whereas Guimarães (2021) uses case studies to

test his theoretical propositions regarding the circumstances under which small states are able to socialize—i.e., change the roles of—more powerful neighbours. The strength of his comparative case study design is that he is able to show that if one of his theorized four factors is missing, the hypothesized outcome does not occur. His argument is more persuasive because of the inclusion of cases where not all four factors are present.

Another theoretically driven case study design is represented in the work of Akbaba and Özdamar (2019), who develop a theory that includes religious faith as an ideational source of national role conceptions. They test this with case studies of Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Here, too, the comparative design is a strength of the study. Although Islam is the dominant religion in all four states, the specific interpretation of the religion varies across them as does the role religion has played in political life across time.

Less theoretical is the volume by Harnisch et al. (2016). The editors acknowledge this in the volume's preface, stating that they 'do not test any particular theoretical hypothesis' (Harnisch et al. 2016: xi). Instead, the chapters explore important themes in China's regional and global role through historical and narrative analysis. The volume's substantive chapters usefully probe China's historical position as well as its contemporary relationships on both the regional and global stages, and is accessible to general readers.

Less accessible is the highly abstract, formalized binary role theory (Walker 2011; Marfleet and Walker 2021; Walker et al. 2021). The benefit of relying on formal theory is that it generates new ideas about role theory's interactive dynamics. Hence, binary role theory and other game theory derived models, such as Thies' (2012, 2013) socialization game, fulfil an important function in the further development of role theory in FPA.

These different methodologies each advance the understanding of role dynamics in foreign policy. Each is useful in different research designs. What serves each methodology well is clear and transparent presentation to facilitate not only understanding but also to enable replication. If methodological rigour equates to a high standard for research transparency, then role theory scholarship overall will profit.

Beyond National Roles

Scholarship on domestic role contestation moves beyond a focus on national roles to probe differences between decision-makers, differences between decision-makers and the domestic public, and differences within the domestic public (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012; Breuning and Ishiyama 2021). Examining various types of unity or fragmentation within the domestic polity provides useful insights into the development and change of national role conceptions, as well as the domestic context within which decision-makers operate.

Decision-makers' perceptions of the appropriate role for their state may depend not only on the domestic context and the efforts of external socializers, but also on their own personal characteristics. This is the direction taken by some of the newest developments. Schafer and Walker (2021) have sought to bridge operational code analysis and role theory, seeking to connect leaders' individual beliefs with their conceptions of their state's role international politics. Wehner and Thies (2021) take a broader view, discussing not only operational code analysis and leadership trait analysis, but also additional ways of studying leaders. Their ambition is to lay 'the foundation for a dialogue between role theory and leader-based approaches to foreign policy', which they suggest can yield 'a more complete picture of why governments decide to prioritize certain roles over others' (Wehner and Thies 2021: 1).

Most role theory scholarship has trained its attention on the foreign policy roles of states, including a focus on domestic actors to enrich understanding of the state's national role conception(s) and enactment(s). Two separate lines of inquiry move beyond the focus on states—or their decision-makers—as actors. The first addresses the socialization process of aspirant states and connects role theory with questions of sovereignty and statehood. The second focuses on IOs.

First, Beasley and Kaarbo (2018) build on Thies' (2012, 2013) work on state socialization to investigate the 'pre-socialization' of aspirant states. They employ the example of Scotland's independence referendum in 2014. They observe that role socialization starts not at independence but much earlier. Sovereignty may be officially attained on a specific date, the consideration and active pursuit of it unfold over a period of time. Although it might have been better to maintain the term socialization and to include

both the pre- and post-independence periods, Beasley and Kaarbo's (2018) conceptualization of a three-part process makes sense. The process starts with the aspirant state's consideration of the possibility of independent statehood, which involves both the role of sovereign state and the kind of foreign policy role(s) the new state might pursue. Second, the foreign policy role(s) that the aspirant state might play are not fully known but involve 'questions about not only *whether* an aspirant state should be sovereign, but also what *kind* of roles it should take' that are addressed by both the aspiration and relevant socializers (Beasley and Kaarbo 2018: 14). Third, if the aspirant state becomes sovereign, this 'may transform the roles of the home state from which independence would be achieved' and also may require other states to adjust their roles (Beasley and Kaarbo 2018: 14–15). In a subsequent article, Beasley et al. (2021) further pursue the intersection of the social construction of sovereignty and role theory. They argue that treating sovereignty as a role, we are better able to trace the 'social construction of sovereignty through the altercasting and socializing of states' (Beasley et al. 2021: 9). This is a profitable direction of inquiry that enables the IR literature to make sense of the differential meaning of sovereignty (Grovogui 2002).

The second line of inquiry that takes role theory beyond national roles focuses on the role of supranational actors and IOs. Attention has focused most often on the European Union (EU), although there has been some work on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well (Flockhart 2011). Aggestam and Johansson's (2017) show that EU foreign policy is a negotiation between constituent members and external influences. In effect, the process is akin to simultaneous socialization both internally (by EU members) and externally (by non-EU states). Klose (2018: 1148, see also 2020) investigates the EU's 'actorness', defined as its 'ability to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system'. In doing so, he focuses less on the negotiation between the EU and its constituent members, and more on the EU as an entity capable of acting on the world stage. In his study, Klose (2018) investigates the EU's emerging security role in East Asia, showing the interplay between the EU's role conception and the mixed reception by various East Asian states. Klose's (2018) effort is interesting and opens up the possibility of new lines of inquiry regarding the roles played by IOs in relation to individual states as well. Consider, for instance, a role theory approach to the International

Monetary Fund (IMF)'s structural adjustment programmes as negotiated with specific Global South states. Such an inquiry would tie in with Beasley and Kaarbo's (2018) work on the social construction of (the role of) sovereignty as well.

Conclusion: Multiple Actors on the World Stage

Role theory research in FPA has developed into a thriving and eclectic field. The first generation of role theory research in FPA was bold in its claim that the perspective of decision-makers mattered, but timid in its divergence from the system-level perspective that then dominated the study of IR. The second generation of role theory research relies much less on structural role theory and more on symbolic interactionism, which facilitates a more distinctly agent-based perspective. In doing so, second-generation role theory is much better able to contribute to the agent-structure debate in IR by showing empirically how and when agents have agency or are hemmed in by the international structure.

Role theory research now also intersects better with the research questions pursued in FPA. Second-generation role theory looks beyond national role conceptions and role enactment to investigate domestic role contestation—both horizontally among foreign policy elites and vertically between elites and the broader public. The literature on role contestation within the state provides a framework for understanding how the study of elites, bureaucracies, and public opinion fit together to contribute to the state's foreign policy behaviour (or role enactment). In this way, contemporary role theory provides a framework for bringing together FPA studies of decision-makers, elites, bureaucracies, and public opinion, and shows how these subjects fit together in a multi-factorial explanation of foreign policy.

The role theory scholarship that has moved beyond the state facilitates a deeper understanding of two additional problems in IR: (1) it shows that sovereignty is not a universally applied norm, but something that takes shape through an actor's conceptualization and enactment, as well as other actors' expectations and socialization; (2) role theory also shows that IOs have actorness and could be profitably studied using its concepts, which help to understand that role socialization pertains in that domain as well.

The renewed interest in the individual level of analysis in IR creates opportunities for the kind of research pursued by second-generation role theorists. The attention now being paid to smaller, middle, and emerging powers will deepen our understanding of the limitations of a focus on structure and hierarchy. These states' foreign policies have often been overlooked by IR researchers in the past. However, they are more apt to enact roles at variance with the expectations of other, more powerful actors. As IR comes to grips with a world that is less structured and more in flux, role theory offers tools to make sense of the changing actors and interactions on the global stage.

That said, role theory in its second generation has often prized theoretical contributions. Much of the work cited in this chapter uses either single cases or small-*N* comparative studies. Although such studies are often appropriate to the symbolic interactionist frameworks they employ, they each can offer only provisional conclusions. Too little is known about the generalizability and the scope conditions of the conclusions drawn by many studies.

Role theorists might seek to more carefully consider the limitations of their studies, as well as to seek to replicate their work with additional cases. This does not necessarily entail unfeasible large-*N* studies. After all, the careful empirical process tracing pursued by much of the work in role theory's second generation is rather labour intensive. However, it does require more careful justification of the case selection for small-*N* studies, as well as more explicit consideration of the limitations of single case studies, to move the role theory forward.

A better accounting of the scope conditions of theories will allow role theorists to see more clearly how various theories intersect and/or dovetail. This is not a critique of existing second-generation role theory scholarship: the studies cited in this chapter are carefully theorized and present meticulously crafted empirical work. But these studies represent independently planted trees that still need to be fashioned into a coherent forest. Role conceptions are no longer only national; role theory offers a comprehensive toolbox to analyse a constructed world.

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CHAPTER 13

Populism, Nationalism, and Foreign Policy

ERIN K. JENNE AND CAMERON G. THIES

INTRODUCTION

International relations (IR) scholars have lately come to see populism and nationalism as twin threats to the liberal international order (LIO). In a 2019 special issue of *Foreign Affairs* on 'The New Nationalism,' Jack Snyder warned that populist nationalism posed an existential threat to liberal internationalism (Snyder 2019). This is partly due to the rise in the number of far-right heads of states such as Viktor Orbán, Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, Andrej Babiš, Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Narendra Modi, Jair Bolsonaro, and Janez Janša who have committed themselves to elevating the interests of an ethnopolitical in-group, even if that means rejecting the rules of the LIO. The growth of right-wing populism has been noted by scholars who paint a grim picture of a less predictable world with more populist nationalist leaders (Pappas 2019), as well as by advocates who write approvingly that the world is 'moving in a populist direction' to replace the 'globalist order' with a better alternative (Turley 2018). Populism and nationalism present fundamental challenges to the LIO because, both separately and together, they generate mass-based movements to revise the state and the international system to reflect the parochial preferences of a core in-group.

But why should IR scholars focus on nationalism and populism to the exclusion of other right-wing discourses? And what does foreign policy analysis (FPA) tell us about the relationship between nationalism, populism, and international politics? We begin our review by first defining our terms. *Ethnonationalism* (or nationalism, for short) is the principle that territorialized ethnic groups have the right to self-representation through state or state-like status.[1] By contrast, populism is defined as the principle that the will of 'ordinary people' should be directly translated into

government policy. Hence, populism and nationalism both advocate greater sovereignty for an idealized political community. Such claims are usually made by domestic actors like political parties, media figures, political institutions, and civil society organizations. The question before us now is whether these domestic players influence *foreign* policy and, if so, whether this has had a measurable effect on the LIO.

The impact of populism and nationalism on politics is missed by traditional IR scholarship that focuses more on the relations between states than on the role of domestic actors on the international stage. FPA provides researchers with the methodological tools to examine the connection between ideas and movements on the domestic level and state behaviour on the international level; this is reflected in the recent 'domestic turn' in IR (Kaarbo 2015). We contend that FPA provides a useful conceptual toolkit for understanding *how* these domestic-level phenomena play out on the international level as state leaders attempt to manage constituent demands for greater sovereignty.

A few observations may already be made about this body of work. First, because these movements have different effects in different political contexts, most of the work on populism and nationalism has been *qualitative*—based on single country cases, regional studies, or paired comparisons. Second, qualitative scholars dominate ideational and supply-side studies of populism and nationalism, which focus on the role that leaders have on foreign policy, while *quantitative* and *mixed-methods* scholars dominate demand-side studies that use public opinion and voting data to examine the bottom-up effects of nationalist and populist attitudes on foreign policy. To make matters even more complicated, the study of populism and nationalism is siloed into different political science subfields: populism, with its governance focus, has traditionally been a topic in comparative politics (CP), whereas nationalism, with its state security focus, is more commonly studied in IR.

This chapter addresses three salient debates in this nascent research programme. The first is whether nationalism and populism have had *generalizable* effects on foreign policy. Populist and nationalist rhetoric sometimes inform, but other times run counter to, actual foreign policy behaviour. Thus far, the literature lacks an integrative dimension that can help us make sense of why populism and nationalism have differential effects across cases. It does not help that most foreign policy accounts are idiosyncratic, with scholarship drilling down to the personality and

pathology of the individual leaders (Plagemann and Destradi 2019; Wojczewski 2019; Guimarães and Oliveira e Silva 2021). Populism in particular has been thought to be self-limiting, due to substantial international and domestic political constraints (Taggart 2004; Plagemann and Destradi 2019; Sagarzazu and Thies 2019). Others have argued that identitarian rhetoric provides very little actual policy direction and is simply used by opportunistic leaders to aggrandize power, including winning elections (Gagnon 2006; Magyar 2016).

A second debate concerns *how* we should conceptualize populism and nationalism in FPA. A useful starting place is that both serve as 'discursive and stylistic repertoires' that can be employed by political agents (see Brubaker 2020). Another commonality is that they are both exclusionary discourses—with populism calling for the exclusion of 'elites' from the idealized sovereign community, while ethnonationalism calls for the exclusion of 'national others' from the idealized community (De Cleen 2017; Bonikowski et al. 2018). Since both nationalism and populism are ideologies of sovereignty, they may be articulated with—or layered on top of—each other as well as other ideologies. Populism is eminently 'layerable' because it is a 'thin-centred' ideology capable of being combined with other, thicker ideologies (Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008). Although nationalism has also been described as a thin-centred ideology or frame that can be articulated together with thicker ideologies such as socialism and capitalism (Freeden 1998), it is generally recognized as a more stable force in politics and society, with long historical antecedents (Hutchinson 2017; Malešević 2019). Populism, by contrast, is more intermittent and far more likely to appear during periods of crisis (Moffitt 2016). Recent work in FPA suggests that these 'thicker ideologies' provide motivation and direction for populist foreign policy (Wehner and Thies 2021a). For this reason, populism and nationalism have important conjunctive effects on foreign policy action.

There are three main schools of thought on how populism and nationalism influence state foreign policy: (1) ideational theories, (2) supply-side theories, and (3) demand-side theories.[2] The bulk of this chapter summarizes the three approaches and draws attention to the contributions and blind spots of each. The penultimate section offers a novel mobilizational model that connects these three traditions into an integrated 'inside-out' theory of foreign policy. In the final section, we suggest ways in which these approaches can be partially reconciled using the tools of FPA.

Ideational Theories

According to ideational approaches, foreign policy is the outgrowth of the *ideas* of the politicians in power (Chryssogelos 2017). These ideas shape their understanding of 'state preferences' and subsequent behaviour. As an idea, ideology or discursive frame, *nationalism* holds that cultural and political units should perfectly overlap (Gellner 1983: 1). This means that the boundaries of states should align with the boundaries of the national group and be free from external interference. At the foreign policy level, nationalist leaders would therefore be expected to correct any perceived border misalignment—for example, by uniting with transborder ethnic kin in irredentist campaigns and/or restricting access of 'national others' such as refugees and migrants to the state territory.

Some nationalisms are more likely to lead to international conflict than others. Whereas moderately nationalist politicians merely 'lobby' diplomatically for more rights for their co-ethnics in neighbouring countries, nationalist entrepreneurs with 'diaspora-annexing ideologies' (Van Evera 1994) may use military force to unite the homeland with transborder 'ethnic kin' through policies of national irredentism, as in the case of Nazi Germany in Czechoslovakia and Poland, post-World War I Greece in Turkish Anatolia or contemporary Russia in the Crimea and Donbass regions of Ukraine. However, not every nationalist leader with a diaspora-annexing ideology seeks to rescue or even lobby for their ethnic kin. In what he called 'inconsistent irredentism', Saideman (1998) observed that in the 1990s Slobodan Milošević assisted co-ethnics in Croatia and Bosnia, but not co-ethnics in what is now North Macedonia or Slovenia. In fact, Milošević cut off military aid to his co-ethnic Serbs at the height of the Bosnian war in order to end Western sanctions and save his regime (Gagnon 2006). Likewise, Albanian nationalists called for a Greater Albania in the 1990s but refrained from 'rescuing' Albanian co-ethnics over the border in Kosovo, even as Milošević drove ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo through targeted ethnic cleansing. Other states barely factor their co-ethnics into their foreign policy. Beijing, for example, declined to intervene in Malaysia or Indonesia to 'rescue' ethnic Chinese when they were suffering discrimination. These examples demonstrate the limits of ideational theories of nationalism in

foreign policy. Not every state with an ethnic diaspora acts like a 'kin state' (see also Mylonas 2012). In other words, there is no automatic transmission from nationalist ideas to foreign policy.

Ideational theories of *populist* foreign policy suffer from a similar handicap. The populist *idea or ideology* holds that society is divided into a 'corrupt elite' and a 'pure people', that the former preys upon the latter, and that the 'general will' of the people should prevail (Mudde 2004, 2007; Haw kins et al. 2018). On the international stage, populist leaders are therefore expected to implement foreign policies that elevate the will of 'the people' against that of 'elites' by pursuing protectionist trade policies or by pulling out of international commitments. While the populist governments of mid-century Latin America did indeed enact policies of economic protectionism, including import-substitution industrialization (ISI), populist leaders of the 1990s such as Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, and Fernando Collor de Mello rejected protectionism in favour of *neoliberal* market reforms (Robert s 1995). Indeed, Wajner (2019) finds no clear pattern of specific foreign policies across three waves of populism in Latin America: classic, neoliberal, and progressive neopopulists. Wehner and Thies (2021a) likewise argued that Latin American foreign policy has been driven by pairing populism with the thick ideology of neoliberalism and socialism, respectively. In Europe, too, populist governments have confusingly stood both *for* membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU (the Law and Justice Party in Poland, the Fidesz Party in Hungary) and *against* both (the United Kingdom Independence Party) (Balfour et al. 2016). By contrast, Plagemann and Destradi (2019) take a nuanced approach to the effects of populism in India, concluding that Narendra Modi's populism had a greater impact on the *style* than on the *substance* of India's foreign policy, which had not yet retreated from global governance.[3]

It is clear, that ideas themselves take us only so far in understanding the effects of populism and nationalism on foreign policy. Populist leaders sometimes attack global institutions following their revolution-for-the-people agenda, but other times not, just as nationalist leaders sometimes foment conflict over territory, borders, or intervene on behalf of their ethnic kin, and other times not. Hence, ideas alone provide an insufficient explanation for variation in foreign policy. Still more problematically, these accounts tell us little about *when* such ideas overtake a society or even a

government. Hence, they are silent on the *timing* of populist or nationalist foreign policies.

Elite Theories

Supply-side (elite) approaches help to resolve this indeterminism. They do so by proposing an agent-based mechanism to explain the uneven force of nationalist and populist ideas in foreign policy. Elite theories hold that ideas become politically relevant when they become useful to political leaders. When individual leaders face the threat of removal, they are expected to use divisive discourses to gain or maintain political power by, for example, de-mobilizing popular movements for reform. By arguing that 'the people' are preyed upon by a 'corrupt elite' and that they alone are capable of protecting the people, political leaders can justify pooling policy-making power in a single executive (Hawkins 2010; Weyland 2001: 4). Due to its transgressive and revolutionary style, populist rhetoric can also be used to frame political opponents as enemies that require removal (Moffitt 2016; Mounk 2018; Pappas 2019).[4] The foreign policy implications of this dynamic are not always clear, however, beyond the expectation that populist leaders can be expected to use foreign policy to achieve their domestic political goals.

Supply-side theories of *nationalism* focus on the role of political competition in inducing state leaders to 'rescue' co-ethnics over the border, engage in irredentist campaigns to annex territory, or initiate war against 'hostile nations'. The logic follows that 'ethnic entrepreneurs' use the rhetoric and policies of exclusionary nationalism to maintain political power or appropriate national wealth (Brass 1991; Tishkov 1997; Woodward 1995; Kaufman 1996; Snyder 2000). Gagnon (1994: 134) shows, for example, that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and other regime hard-liners consistently used policies of national aggression to fend off challenges from the political opposition, 'creat[ing] a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity'. This marginalizes political reformers, whose policies threaten the old guard.

What unite supply-side theories of both nationalism and populism is that they hone in on elite incentives themselves. Self-dealing elites are presumed to use populist or nationalist 'card' to 'gamble for resurrection' when they face removal, sell a costly policy to the public, or distract the public from self-dealing behaviours (see also De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999).[5] FPA leadership theories are well suited to developing supply-side theories, as

they offer the promise of investigating the cognitive style and worldview of foreign policy elites (Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume). Özdamar and Ceyd ilek (2019), use operational code analysis to examine European populist radical right (PRR) leaders to see whether they are more hostile than other world leaders. They find that these leaders are indeed more conflictual in their worldview, but they are just as instrumental as non-PRR counterparts. Leadership trait analysis could similarly be used to test for whether the need for power, distrust of others or combinations of traits give rise to distinct orientations that map onto nationalism or populism (e.g., Thiers and Wehner 2022). To assess this possibility, analysts could run a full panel of the many 'at-a-distance' measures and offer predictions for both populists and nationalists, as Winter et al. (1991) did for Presidents Bush and Gorbachev during the late stages of the Cold War. Or, as Kaarbo (2021) suggests, we may want to understand how leaders' personalities change over time. Could personality change explain the sudden emergence of populist/nationalist beliefs in some leaders? Greater understanding of the personalities of leaders might reveal proclivities towards populism and nationalism that help us flesh out a more complete supply-side theory of foreign policy. Experimental research shows that political elites also play an important role in political communication, especially around policy *framing*. Researchers have found, for example, that populist messaging makes individuals more likely to support outsiders and less likely to support mainstream parties (Hameleers et al. 2016) and that populist nationalist messaging makes individuals more likely to voice anti-immigrant positions (Wirz et al. 2018).

Even so most top-down accounts cannot answer the question as to *why nationalist and/or populist leaders enjoy variable success across time and space*. Gagnon (2006: 126–130) observed that Milošević's nationalist policies, once deployed with lethal efficiency, no longer appealed to the bulk of the Serbian public by the time of the 2000 elections. Similarly, US President Trump has promulgated an 'America First' message ever since his bid for the Reform Party nomination in 2000, but failed to attract significant popular support with the American electorate until 2015. How can we explain over-time variation in the *success* of nationalist or populist messaging in a single country? *When*, in other words, do(es) populism and/or nationalism serve as an effective tool for opportunistic political actors at the foreign policy level?

Grass Roots Theories

Demand-side theorists offer a potential answer to these questions. In general, they hold that shifts in public opinion provide the impetus for shifts in state foreign policy. They point out that public opinion is not infinitely manipulable by elites—sometimes frames resonate with the public, and sometimes they do not. This means that a full account of populist or nationalist foreign policy requires an investigation of societal preferences and how these preferences are aggregated by policy-makers. Demand-side theories hold that populist nationalist leaders are a by-product of the wider social movements that bring them to power and keep them in office. This is especially true in electoral democracies, where leaders must compete in a 'marketplace of ideas' (Snyder and Ballentine 1996). In such systems, politicians whose ideas or rhetoric reflects the preferences of the median voter are elevated to office. When a high enough proportion of voters holds nationalist or populist preferences they 'select for' nationalist and/or populist leaders who promise to translate their preferences into state policy.

In these bottom-up models, the real driver is constituent preferences. Indeed, many ethnic or populist entrepreneurs achieved success neither for their oratorical skills nor their ideological commitment, but because of the popularity of their message and its timing. Contemporaries noted, for example, that there was nothing special about Slobodan Milošević, a graying *apparatchik* with stilted speech who had toiled for years as a party functionary under the Yugoslav communist regime (Djilas 1993). He was merely the first Yugoslav leader to capitalize on the re-emerging nationalist discourses of the 1980s.

In sum, demand-side arguments locate the sources of foreign policy change in changing public attitudes. To this end, social scientists have used experimental survey research to identify the demographic and attitudinal correlates of populist attitudes across a range of countries (Akkerman et al. 2014; Bakker et al. 2015; Spruyt et al. 2016; Castanho Silva et al. 2017). Although shedding important light on the marginal effects of such messaging on certain segments of society, survey research at the voter level is still silent about *how societies as a whole* get to be more populist or nationalist over time. This research is also silent on how these preferences are aggregated at the foreign policy level.

Greater integration with FPA approaches might help us unpack this relationship between elites and masses in the formation of foreign policy.

One avenue of integration is to draw on the literature on media and public opinion (Baum and Potter 2008; Rothschild and Shafranek 2017; Chapman and Gerber 2019; Boucher, Chapter 14 in this volume). While the early literature suggested that the public neither knew nor cared about foreign policy, instead taking most of its cues from elite opinion leaders, recent studies have established more of a two-way street between the elites and masses with the media (new and old) playing an important role as well. Boucher and Thies (2019) found, for example, that while President Trump drove the Twitter discussion on his steel and aluminum tariffs, social media had important intermediary effects. Namely, the network formed by retweets of Trump's messaging produced 'echo chambers' or 'filter bubbles' where news media and social media mavens communicated laterally to like-minded individuals.

A second avenue of integration can be found in the literature on culture and foreign policy. Scholars might investigate whether there are certain characteristics of states' political cultures that make the public more amenable to populism or nationalism. For example, Germany's oft-studied 'culture of reticence' (Duffield 1999; Malici 2006; Hansel and Oppermann 2016) transmitted via educational and other socialization mechanisms means that the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) faces significant barriers to political power due to the *cordon sanitaire* established by the mainstream parties to keep it out. FPA tools might also be used to identify the cultural changes that make such impossibilities possible, as Barnett (1999) did in showing the cultural changes in Israeli society that made the Oslo peace accords possible.

A third avenue of integration with FPA can be found in political competition theories, which help to breach the gap between grass roots and elite theories. Foreign policy analysts have developed theories to explain how institutions aggregate public preferences into policy through coalition politics (Hagan et al. 2001; Kaarbo 2008, 2012). Using coalition theory, for example, Saideman (1998, 2001) has shown that governments only engage in irredentist interventions in neighbouring states when the government depends for its survival on the support of groups with strong ethnic ties to the transborder kin in question. Likewise, Shelef (2020) shows state leaders are more likely to make 'nationalist homeland claims' on neighbouring territory during periods of increased domestic political competition. Such models help account for the variation in state-led irredentism. However, they cannot account for shifts in coalitions—that is, why highly nationalist or

populist groups might enjoy more political influence at one point in time than another. Nor can it account for broad shifts in populist and/or nationalist sentiment in society.

To counter these blind spots, the following section introduces a *mobilizational model* that describes how exogenous shocks serve as catalysing events that bring together populist and/or nationalist frames (ideas) with mass demands for protection as well as ideologically or instrumentally motivated elites to produce foreign policy change. Our formulation inverts the more conventional systemic and neoclassical realist conceptions that begin with systemic constraints that then filter down through state-, government-, and individual-level factors to produce foreign policy (Wohlforth 1993; Carlsnaes 2012). Rather than top-down, this is an *inside-out* model in which domestically driven identarian movements provide the impetus for revisionist foreign policy. We believe that this model may serve as a general FPA framework for examining the impacts of populism and nationalism on foreign policy.

A Research Agenda for Populist and Nationalist Foreign Policy

How can a mobilizational model account for over-time variation in the *success* of nationalist or populist leaders in a single country? Tilly (1978) argued that movements of contentious politics are due to the 'overlap of three intersecting areas'—groups, ideas, and events. *Events* change grass roots and elite incentives to engage in a particular kind of mobilization. *Elites* perform the role of communicating ideas to the masses through a selection of repertoires, frames, and performances; and *ideas* come into play by providing a compelling argument for mobilization. Beissinger (2002: 24) contends that a close analysis of these interlocking steps can help 'us to understand the ways in which the politics of the possible shapes the politics of identity'.

Figure 13.1 outlines the mobilizational pathways that inform revisionist foreign policy. From a peaceful foreign policy equilibrium, destabilizing *events* or *structural shifts* can induce collective perceptions of sovereign crisis. These include slow changes like modernization or the growth of inequality as well as sudden shocks such as migration flows or economic collapse—anything that induces the collective perception that the state is no

longer capable of protecting its citizens (Petersen 2002: 22–24; Kriesi and P appas 2015; Rodrik 2017). Such events serve to heighten public anxieties and motivate the public to alleviate that anxiety. According to Druckman (19 94: 63), ‘people see groups as providing them with security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for their loyalty and commitment’. Latent collective insecurities might be triggered by ‘traumatic events such as wars or other political disasters that ‘offer political opportunities for elites to engage in … narrative activation’ (Subotić 2016: 616). Political agents emerge to fulfill grass roots demands by aligning themselves with the threatened in-group.



Figure 13.1 A mobilizational theory of populism and nationalism in foreign policy.

Crises represent both ‘an interpretive frame and rhetorical form’ (Brubake r 2017: 31). Framing an event as a crisis requires considerable interpretive work on the part of securitizing agents. Moreover, crisis framing is unlikely to succeed in the *absence* of events that yield emotive, visual representations of salient threats to the sovereign state. According to Snow and Benford (198 8: 208–211), rhetorical frames only enjoy popular resonance when their elements correspond to real world events, resonate with the listeners’

personal experiences, and complement pre-existing narratives. Mainstream political elites respond to shifts in popular sentiment by 'gambling for resurrection', a term used in the IR literature to refer to the actions undertaken by embattled elites—sometimes at an international level—to regain popular support in the face of regime challenges (Downs and Rocke 1994, De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; see also Gagnon 2006, Schulze 2010). By employing populist and/or ethnonationalist frames in their communication, elites seek the support of a threatened in-group by enacting their favoured policies. For instance, Erdoğan's disproportionately rural and religious voters were rewarded with positive job discrimination in the civil service; Chávez's disproportionately poor and indigenous base received greater welfare assistance (Thies 2017). Likewise, many UK voters opting for Brexit and US voters favouring Trump in the 2016 elections did so in reaction to perceptions of cultural and demographic marginalization (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Gest 2016). Heightened in-group identification is reinforced by elites through repetitive issue framing in a kind of feedback loop.

Such a model can also help us tease out the separate and combined effects of nationalism and populism on foreign policy; we believe these differences are mainly due to the subtle ideational differences between the two phenomena as distinct, but often intertwined, *movements for greater sovereignty for the in-group* (Jenne 2018; Jenne et al. 2021; Jenne 2021). Heiskanen (2020: 335) draws a similar distinction, arguing that nationalism identifies the people as a territorial sovereign, while populism calls for elevating the people as a political sovereign—making up the 'ideological matrix within which modern politics unfolds'.

Since the end of the Cold War, populism has re-emerged as an anti-establishment, anti-system discourse that argues for restoring the *demos*. In crises of political representation (the upper pathway), populist leaders emerge to call for overthrowing the political system and replacing it with 'direct action under the resolute leadership of those who "go to the people" instead of waiting for the people to call them' (Ionescu and Gellner 1970: 116; Urbinati 1998; Abts and Rummens 2007). This unmediated representation is justified as part of a broader effort to even the playing field between predatory elites and the people to restore an imperiled *demos*. Representational crises caused by the de-legitimation of the political establishment tend to select for self-styled 'outsiders' who demand the expulsion of elites in order to elevate 'the people' to power (Doyle 2011). In

populist framing, 'the people' are those who are politically aligned with the speaker. This causal pathway is expected to result in transgressive diplomacy and *systemic conflict* at the domestic and international level (Figure 13.1). To illustrate, Hungary's Orbán justified his newly confrontational approach to the EU, NATO, and Western allies by railing against 'Brussels elites', financial speculators, and globalists for impoverishing the Hungarian people. System revisionism appears to unite populists across ideological lines. In the 2016 US presidential elections, Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump (a left-wing and a right-wing populist, respectively) both articulated a 'trade story' in which billionaires and corporations figured as 'elites' who victimized 'the people' (regular workers), using this picture to advocate for trade protectionism (Skonieczny 2018: 7).

By contrast, *ethnonationalist* mobilization (the lower pathway) involves the use of symbols to mobilize against out-groups in defence of the core ethnonational group to restore the authentic *ethnos*. Such movements may be instigated by state crises involving the country's external sovereignty, such as foreign encroachments in contested border regions (examples include struggles between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus; between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nargorno-Karabakh; and between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir). In such settings, foreign policy executives act as movement leaders—using ethnonationalist frames to capitalize on perceptions of border insecurity. Invoking competitor nations in their rhetoric, they escalate bilateral tensions to generate a win for their nationalist-minded constituents. Nationalist conflicts are particularly prone to violence when waged over territory that is viewed as 'indivisible', defying ready settlement (Toft 2003; Hassner 2010). Such border conflicts can simmer for years, if not decades (see also Shelef 2010, 2020). At the foreign policy level, nationalist leaders may engage in *regional or territorial conflict* with neighbouring countries (Figure 13.1). However, self-styled nationalist leaders are not necessarily alliance or system revisionists. Even at the peak of the 1990s violence in the Balkans, the nationalist governments of Vojislav Koštunica of Serbia, Sali Berisha of Albania, and even Franjo Tuđman of Croatia fomented conflict with their neighbours, but took care to respect their allies and international commitments.

In a climate of conjoined threats to the *ethnos* and the *demos*, political elites are likely to focus on the fears and aspirations of a narrow ethnopolitical base (the middle pathway). Elevated perceptions of threats from beyond and above the state incentivize leaders to use ethnonationalist-

populist (or *ethnopopulist*) frames that call for protecting the interests of the ethnopolitical in-group. In contrast to *traditional* nationalists, ethnopopulist leaders are system revisionists. As leaders of internationally marginalized states, they seek out more flexible allies as sources of external support. For example, Dodson and Dorraj (2008) document how the populist Hugo Chávez, an international pariah, reached out to other pariah states such as revolutionary Iran to increase his diplomatic leverage against the US. Likewise, both Orbán and Erdoğan have made diplomatic overtures to other rules transgressors. Populist leaders generally engage in disruptive or contentious international negotiations—sometimes making a great show of getting 'good deals' for 'the people' at minimal cost, as Orbán has done with his *pávatánc* ('peacock dance') (Palonen 2016). Unlike *non*-nationalist populists, however, ethnopopulists are predisposed to combine their alliance revisionism with territorial or lateral revisionism in their grand strategies, increasing the potential for conflict with their neighbours as well as more distant allies in what we call *omni-conflict* (Figure 13.1). Orbán and Erdoğan are both good examples of this, having continually flouted directives from NATO (and the EU for Orbán), while escalating tensions with neighbouring countries. Ethnopopulists tend to stitch together national and political threats, the *people-nation*, leading to hyper- or omni-revisionism in defence of the ethnopolitical in-group.

The final step in our mobilizational model is *constraints*—both internal and external—that can mitigate the policy effects of each sovereigntist mobilization. FPA highlights a variety of internal constraints that could be incorporated into our model. For instance, one might expect populists/nationalists in presidential systems to face fewer constraints in implementing their foreign policies. Yet, even in such systems, we know that bureaucracies, the legislature, and many other domestic actors seek to delay, modify, or even stop foreign policies that are not in their interests (Oppermann, Chapter 15, Raunio and Wagner, Chapter 17, Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18, in this volume). Kaltwasser and Taggart (2016b: 353) argued that both domestic coalition partners and international pressures limited the transgressive policies of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)-led government of 2000–2005, but that international pressure was more impactful in reining in their populist policies. They write, 'the diplomatic response of the EU member governments was unprecedented in the measures it applied and pressure they were able to bring to bear'. In Eastern Europe, the EU has been successful in constraining revisionist foreign policy in the accession

phase. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 10–17). Epstein and Sedelmeier (2008) describe this as the 'external incentives model', which holds that countries are less likely to comply with EU/NATO directives once they obtain membership because there is no longer a carrot to offer in return for compromise and there is no effective sanctioning mechanism for member states. This suggests that state executives are more likely to back down in confrontations with the EU or NATO *before* rather than after they have gained membership, due to the increased bargaining leverage that membership brings.

Our model expects that, provided the constraints are not too high, populists will pursue foreign policy that places them in conflict with their allies, while nationalist foreign policy places them in contention with their neighbours, often over borders. Ethnopopulists are likely to engage in *both* types of revisionist foreign policies. This helps make sense of the fact that populism and nationalism are sometimes limited to leader rhetoric, whereas other times they impact foreign policy. The connection is unpredictable and uneven. The gap between rhetoric and policy occurs because chief executives are simultaneously the heads of domestic sovereigntist movements and also the heads of institutionally and internationally constrained states.

Conclusion

Populism and nationalism have the potential to shape not just foreign policy, but the international system itself. Although much of this work has been focused on domestic politics or the immediate neighbourhood, the rising number of populist and nationalist heads of state has led IR scholars to speculate about the implications for the LIO. To address these questions, we divided the literature on nationalism and populism according to how they are believed to influence foreign policy: (1) through ideologies, (2) through elite behaviour, and (3), through mass sentiment. Finally, we sketched out a mobilizational model to suggest how these approaches might be integrated to enhance our understanding of when sovereigntist rhetoric crosses over into foreign policy.

There are numerous interfaces in this processual model where the tools of FPA can be put to productive use. First, state foreign policy is not just policy output or 'resultants' (Allison 1971), but extends to state actions and

practices in state role performance. Role theory has already been employed to understand populist foreign policy in Latin America (Wehner and Thies 2021b). This might be extended to the whole world (Thies 2010; Breuning, Chapter 12 in this volume). We expect that the misalignment between the leader's populist/nationalist speech and action occurs when the individual's role expectations as state leader and leader of the sovereigntist movement collide, leading to role strain. Alternatively, alignment between leader speech and foreign policy may occur when these role expectations converge. Wehner and Thies (2021b) sketch out a research agenda connecting leaders to role theory in ways that could be adapted to study role performance in nationalist and populist foreign policy-making.

Second, the growing body of work on ontological security (Subotić 2016; Mitzen and Larson 2017; Steele, Chapter 7 in this volume) speaks to the processes by which populist/nationalist leaders generate discourses of existential threat. What is constructed as an existential threat, and whether it is a threat to the *ethnos*, the *demos*, or both can lead to different types of mobilization processes and ultimately foreign policy outcomes.

Third, the mobilization process for both populists and nationalists is often highly gendered (e.g., Peterson 2007; Abi-Hassan 2017). Further integration of what we know about the masculinist language and goals of populist and nationalist projects will benefit our understanding of the foreign policy they produce (Norocel 2018). Smith (2020) notes that there is very little literature on women in foreign policy-making: they are 'missing in analysis'. We might ask: why are there so few populist/nationalist female leaders? How do they differ from other female leaders and their male counterparts (Geva 2019)? Or, as Aggestam and True (2021) ask, how do 'political leaders harness gender dynamics to further their power, status and authority to act in foreign policy'.

Finally, emotions play an important role in the mobilization process. Populists are often noted for their highly charismatic personalities. Nationalists may be stereotyped as angry about the loss of their culture and historic lands. The ability of populist/nationalist leaders to whip up emotions may be key to their ability to draw adherents and manipulate the framing to get the foreign policy support they desire. Greater engagement with the literature stemming from the 'emotional turn' in IR (e.g., Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Clément and Sangar 2018) and foreign policy (Smith 2021) could help further our understanding of populist/nationalist foreign policy.

Our mobilizational approach brings the two concepts into conversation and sketches out a process whereby populists, nationalists, and ethnopopulists mobilize constituencies towards revisionist foreign policy goals. We hope that this provides a framework for the continued study of the two concepts in foreign policy, especially considering the many FPA literatures that may be called upon to enrich our basic model.

Notes

1. According to Connor (2015), 'ethnonationalism (also called 'ethnic nationalism') connotes identity with and loyalty to a nation in the sense of a human grouping predicated upon a myth of common ancestry'. It is the *ethnic* (kinship) aspect of modern nationalism that gives it its political and social force (Connor 2002).
2. Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) and Chryssogelos (2017) put forward similar tripartite divisions in their influential reviews of different theories of populism. We argue that this tripartite framework can be extended not only to theories of foreign policy, but also to theories of *nationalist* foreign policy (see also Mylonas and Kuo 2018). There are other ways of classifying populism; for example, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014: 377) identify four main conceptual approaches, including discourse, pathology, style, and strategy. We prefer to adopt the tripartite classification as it best covers the main approaches to the study of *both* nationalism and populism.
3. Visnovitz and Jenne (2021) likewise demonstrate the value of going up the ladder of abstraction in the case of Hungarian leader Victor Orbán by examining populism as a political argument that justifies revisionist postures through the use of a sovereignty warrant.
4. Mudde (2007) coined the term 'populist radical right' (PRR) to describe the intersection of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in far-right European parties (see also Ionescu and Gellner 1970; Inglehart and Norris 2019; Enyedi 2020). Others have written on the dangers of right-wing party politics in general (Betz 1994; Oesch 2008; Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016a; Akkerman et al. 2016). We focus on populism and ethnonationalism here because they are sovereigntist movements that have direct implications for state foreign policy.
5. Besides individual leaders, *political parties* serve as another 'supplier' of populism and nationalism (Stroschein 2019). Verbeek and Zaslove (2017: 392–395) argue that different parties offer up different versions of populism depending on their brand or ideology. Thus, PRR parties take a nativist approach to 'the people'; neoliberal populists view 'the people' as the hard-working middle class; regionalists focus on 'the people' in small territorial units; while left-wing populist parties see 'the people' as a specific social category undefined by national borders. These combinations generate different foreign policy agendas. For example, populist parties advocating for the hard-working or middle class tend to adopt more protectionist trade policies or stricter capital controls (Balfour et al. 2016; Verbeek and Zaslove 2017; Brubaker 2017). More work on the role of political parties (Hofmann and Martill 2021; Wagner and Raunio, Chapter 17, this volume), including the influence of populist parties as junior coalition partners (e.g., Verbeek and Zaslove 2015) could complement supply-side studies of populist foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 14

Public Opinion, News, Digital Media, and Foreign Policy

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BOUCHER

The central question organizing the research programmes on public opinion, news and digital media focuses on measuring and delineating the interactive relationship between the public, news media—and to some extent social media—and decision-makers. The study of public opinion and foreign policy has always been a foundational research programme in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Indeed, early work in FPA gave considerable thought to the influence of public preference as scholars sought to better understand the nature and role of public opinion in shaping policy-makers' preferences or, at least, constraining their ability to make independent decisions on matters related to foreign policy issues (Snyder et al. 1954; Spr out and Sprout 1956; Rosenau 1961, 1963; Fearon 1998). In some respect, the initial positivist inclinations of foreign policy scholarship, interested in questions of measurements and causal inferences, translated this research programme into a theoretically rich and empirically diverse literature that remains vibrant and cumulative to this day. In this respect, the study of public opinion, news/digital media, and foreign policy is probably one of the most diverse and progressive (in Lakatosian terms) research programmes in FPA.

The study of public opinion and foreign policy permeates meta-theoretical conversations in International Relations (IR) scholarship. In some respect, through conceptualizing the role of the public, many prototypical IR theory scholars are, ultimately, thinking, theorizing, and engaging in FPA. Realist scholars, despite structuralism's attempt to relegate this problem to the state's 'black box' (Waltz 1979), have long argued that public opinion is an essential element shaping state behaviour (Wolfers 1962; Wohlforth 1993; Christensen 1996; Schweller 1998; Zakaria 1998). Hans Morgenthau (1949), for example, associated public support with one of the components of national power, recognizing the difficulty for

decision-makers to align public sentiment with the pursuit of national interests. As Morgenthau (1949) would surmise:

> A contemporary government, especially one subject to democratic control … must secure the approval of its own people for its foreign policies… That task is difficult because the conditions under which popular support can be obtained for a foreign policy are not necessarily identical with the conditions under which a foreign policy can be successfully pursued.
>
> (160)

Public opinion is central to the work of some neoliberal/transnationalists (Keohane and Nye 1989; Rosenau 1990; Moravcsik 2003) and, more importantly, a pivoting concept in the democratic peace theory literature (Oneal and Russett 2001; Hayes 2011). Constructivists and English School authors, for their part, have taken seriously the place of agents in social constructions, thus incorporating public preferences, identity formation, and norm integration (Katzenstein 1996; Kahl 1998; Finnemore 2013).

This chapter will explore the current work linking public opinion, news and digital media, and decision-makers. First, I will examine the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. The scholarship on this topic is vast, ever expanding, and sectorial, but I will focus on the nature, determinants, and influence of public attitude and foreign policy. Second, I will examine the role and nature of traditional news media in shaping foreign policy, examining the various causal mechanisms (priming, agenda setting, and framing) found in the literature on this issue. Finally, as the digital environment is taking ever-growing importance in our daily lives, some authors have started to understand the impact of social media on states' behaviour, from foreign interference, new sources of public engagement, or public diplomacy. Much of that literature remains unstructured and siloed, but I hope to explore further the burgeoning research on social media and foreign policy.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Working definitions of 'public opinion' abound. Some adopt a minimalist expression: 'Public opinion … may simply be taken to mean those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed' (Key 1964: 14). Others prefer more complex characterizations:

> At present, there is, on the one hand, mobilized opinion, formulated opinion, pressure groups mobilized around a system of interests; and on the other, certain inclinations, opinions in an implicit state which, by definition are not really opinions, if by opinion we mean a formulated discourse with a pretention to coherence.

(Bourdieu [1972] 1979: 130)

Notwithstanding these distinctions, there is a consensus on the idea that 'public opinion' represents views, beliefs, attitudes, or preferences found amongst the public. In this context, such preferences can be widespread or specific to certain interest groups, learned or uninformed, mobilized or latent, a settled belief or volatile.

The Nature of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

The first wave of studies suggested that public opinion was irrational, temperamental, and thus seldom influenced decision-makers, especially on foreign policy issues (Almond 1960; Lippmann 1955; Converse 1964). This view echoed those of realist authors for whom public opinion often steered foreign policy-making away from national interests while also recognizing its inescapable grasp on the mind of elected officials. As E. H. Carr (1936) would argue, public opinion defects consisted in being 'fickle, slow, emotional, gullible, and ignorant' (848), but acknowledged 'the immense power of public opinion on an issue of foreign policy about which it feels strongly. It is inconceivable that the House of Commons could ever be unanimously opposed to a course of action desired by seven million people in this country' (857).

Fortunately, the Vietnam war and the standardization of empirical tools to measure preferences led to a revival of research on public opinion. What some have called the 'Page and Shapiro rebuttal' (Holsti 1996) led to a more refined understanding of the role and structure of public opinion on foreign policy issues (Mueller 1973; Shapiro and Page 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992; Holsti 1996). Shapiro and Page (1988) summed up their assessment: 'Contrary to much conventional wisdom, collective opinion has tended to be rather stable. When it has changed, it has done so by responding in rational ways to international and domestic events that have been reported and interpreted by the mass media and by policymakers and other elites' (211). In short, individuals' policy preferences are coherent (they can explain their views), stable (they rarely change their opinion), and rational (if they do change their opinion, it is for a reason). The Page and Shapiro rebuttal was essential for revitalizing the research programme—indeed, what would be the point of studying public opinion and foreign policy if the public was fickle, ignorant, and mostly ignored by policy-makers?—and represents the current consensus in the literature. Most

research on the subject tends to demonstrate that even if the public has limited knowledge or interest in foreign policy, they can still form sound judgements on events that remain consistent through time (Conover and Feldman 1984; Neuman 1986; Page 1996; Powlick and Katz 1998; Aldrich et al. 2006).

The Foundations of Foreign Policy Attitudes

The second line of inquiry seeks to identify factors influencing foreign policy attitudes. If, according to Page and Shapiro (1992), preferences expressed by the public are rational, coherent, and stable, then we can safely hypothesize that something structures those opinions. In this respect, authors have identified four different causal mechanisms explaining how foreign policy opinion develops in the public: socio-demographic factors, partisanship/ideology, information, and beliefs and values.

The first group of arguments suggests that *socio-demographic* factors, such as gender, age, and education, are associated with public perception of foreign policy issues. Authors argue that such variables are proxies for a deep-seated socialization process and gained experience which shapes attitudes on policy issues, and results are relatively consistent across foreign policy issues. Some authors seek to understand how gender might shape individuals' attitudes towards foreign policy. Data consistently support the notion of a gender gap, with women less likely to support more aggressive foreign policy, defence spending, to accept welfare concessions, torture, trade, and more supportive of foreign aid (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Togeby 1994; Paxton and Knack 2011; Eichenberg 2019: Eichenberg and Stoll 2017; Kleinberg and Fordham 2018; Fay, 2020). This gender gap has provided an empirical foundation for feminist theories of IR (Tickner 1992; Pettman 1996; Paxton et al. 2020). More educated respondents tend to be more supportive of trade, internationalism, and foreign aid (Domke et al. 1987; Paxton and Knack 2011; Kleinberg and Fordham 2018). Concerning age, although results are often tentative, studies find that we can identify generational differences across cohorts which affect support for defence spending, military operations, foreign aid, and trade.

The second group of arguments focuses on the influence of *political ideology* in determining foreign policy attitudes. In short, some authors posit that political affiliation influences individual opinions on foreign policy issues. Adopting an ideational viewpoint, authors suggest that

ideological beliefs, distributed on a left-right scale, influence foreign policy preference.[1] Accordingly, ideas, beliefs, and values associated with ideological leanings should shape policy preferences (Levi 1970; Holsti 2004; Hunt 2009; Milner and Tingley 2015). In this respect, existing research indicates that right-leaning individuals are more favourable towards free trade policies (Holsti and Rosenau 1996), and more supportive of the use of force (Kleinberg and Fordham 2018) and defence spending (Bove et al. 2017; Wenzelburger and Boller 2020). Conversely, left-leaning individuals are more prone to support internationalism (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Wittkopf 1990; Kleinberg and Fordham 2018), humanitarian interventions (Hildebrandt et al. 2013), international law (Moravcsik 2005; Kim 2019), foreign aid (Noel and Thérien 2008), and a commitment to climate change policies (Tingley and Tomz 2020).

Third, scholars have argued that public attitudes are shaped by *foreign policy beliefs or conceptual schemes*. In their broadest sense, conceptual schemes are the means with which we, individually or collectively, make the world 'fit'. For example, Holsti argues that public opinion is influenced by 'belief systems', which are defined as 'a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics' (1962: 245). In this respect, conceptual schemes lay the groundwork to support and legitimize public attitudes on various aspects of life, including politics. They define acceptable and unacceptable policies and serve as an adjudication device with which to judge governmental behaviour. Furthermore, as Wittkopf (1990) would argue:

> interest and knowledge are largely irrelevant to whether the American people are able, in the aggregate, to hold politically relevant foreign policy beliefs. These beliefs may not conform to what political scientists and journalists would like to see as they contemplate the theory and practice of contemporary democracy, but foreign policy beliefs may be both coherent and politically relevant even if they are not grounded in political sophistication.
>
> (15)

Traditionally, and following Wittkopf (1990), foreign policy attitudes are associated with three categories: militant internationalism, cooperative internationalism, and isolationism (Chittick et al. 1995; Rathbun 2007).

Finally, a growing and influential research programme in the United States explored the nature and role of *micro-foundations* on foreign policy preferences of agents (Kertzer et al., 2014; Rathbun et al. 2016; Goren et al.

2016; Kertzer 2017; Bayram 2017). These authors suggest that foreign policy preferences are grounded by underlying moral values (Inglehart 2000; Kreps and Maxey 2018). For Kertzer, micro-foundations are 'an analytic strategy where one explains outcomes at the aggregate level via dynamics at a lower level … which justifies the search for micro-foundations by suggesting that social phenomena are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals—their properties, their beliefs, and their actions' (83). Existing research using available measures of moral values, such as the Schwartz Value scale (Schwartz 1992; Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer 2017) or the World Value Survey (Bayram 2017), demonstrate that moral values influence foreign policy preferences of individuals. Rathbun et al. (2016) and Goren et al. (2016), for example, found that Schwartz's 'conservation' values were correlated with support for militant internationalism while 'universalism' and self-transcendence values were correlated with support for cooperative internationalism. Bayram (2017), for his part, shows that trust is a major predictor of individuals' support for foreign aid programmes.

Elites, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy

The third line of inquiry structuring this research programme focuses on identifying and measuring the interaction between the public's foreign policy attitudes and policy elites. This question has always been at the centre of scholarly preoccupations, as James Rosenau himself would acknowledge back in 1961: 'Most analyses of the opinion-policy relationship are organized around efforts to trace the flow of influence. Almost every aspect of the relationship can be translated into a question of the direction in which influence is being exercised' (1961: 9). In this perspective, studies have ultimately been interested in assessing the directionality of causal arrows between public perception of foreign policy issues and policy-makers with the literature ordered around three alternative models.

The first model linking public opinion and foreign policy decision-making proposes a bottom-up model where the public's foreign policy preferences shape policy (Moravcsik 1995; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005). The democratic peace debate acknowledges the role of public opinion and foreign policy decision-making (Owen 1994; Oneal and Russett 2001; Doyle 2005; Tomz and Weeks 2013). The literature seems to identify two

different causal mechanisms explaining how public preferences shape foreign policy-making: responsiveness and selection (Tomz et al. 2020). Proponents of the responsiveness pathway maintain that citizens directly or indirectly restrict the foreign policy choices of leaders. This proposition is a key principle of the democratic peace theory where, as Doyle (2005) argues, 'public opinion … restrain executives from policies that clearly violate the obvious and fundamental interests of the public, as the public perceives those interests' (464). In this respect, numerous studies have found that democratic leaders consider domestic audience costs of foreign policy decisions, pay close attention, and are sensitive to public perceptions (Mueller 1973; Russett 1990; Foyle 1999; Baum 2004; Holsti 2004; Tomz, et al. 2020). The second mechanism, selection, proposes that the public tends to choose, through elections in democracies, leaders whose foreign policy preferences align with theirs (Tomz et al. 2020).

The second approach proposes, instead, a top-down model where elites shape the public's attitudes on foreign policy issues. Although definitions abound, there is a consensus that political elites are 'persons who devote themselves full time to aspect of politics or public affairs … these elites include politicians, higher level of government officials, journalists, some activists, and many kinds of experts and policy specialists' (Zaller 1992: 6). According to this view, elite opinions are especially important in the fields of foreign policy where the public has often no immediate knowledge of, nor necessarily interest in, specific issues. Furthermore, foreign policy issues, far removed from the everyday lives of citizens, are often complex and require a significant investment to gain any comfortable level of knowledge of them. Consequently, the public often resorts to adopting the points of view of elites on foreign policy issues, those cues essentially serving as a heuristic shortcut for them to form an opinion (Wittkopf 1990; Zaller 1992; Western 2005; Druckman 2001a). These cues come from a multiplicity of sources. Indeed, existing scholarship has demonstrated quite convincingly that partisanship (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Baum and Groeling 2009b; Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013; Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018; Fordham and Kleinberg 2020; Myrick 2021), news media (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2009), social peers (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Herzog et al. 2022), or international organizations (Thompson 2009; Grieco et al. 2011; Tingley and Tomz 2020) are all effective informational pathways shaping public opinion on foreign policy issues.

A third position tries to reconcile the previous two by observing that political elites and public opinion have developed an interactive relationship, thus influencing each other (Hartley and Russet 1992; Sobel 2001; Soroka and Wlezien 2004). Hence, identifying a clear one-way causal route between policy decision-making and public preferences appears pointless according to these authors.

News Media and Foreign Policy

As with the scholarship on public opinion, the literature on news media and foreign policy is vast and has convincingly established that mass media is intimately intertwined with foreign policy-making. Broadly speaking, media is understood as a conveyor belt or linchpin between policy-makers and public opinion. Thus, studying the influence of media on foreign policy is essentially trying to articulate the relationship between three actors: political elites, public opinion, and the media.

First, an important number of scholars have suggested that media coverage of foreign policy issues is influenced, or primed, by elites (Zaller 1992; Western 2005). These authors understand the causal mechanism as a 'top-down' process where elites' consensus and dissensus are repeated by the media. In this context, public opinion and media outlets are seen as passive actors that respond to elite rhetoric. John Zaller's model, for example, incorporates this idea by noting 'Opinion statements … are the outcome of a process in which people *receive* new information, decide whether or not to *accept* it, and then *sample* at the moment of answering questions' (1992: 51). In this context, efforts made by decision-makers and other elites to articulate and substantiate governmental policies are an important factor that will affect how media will respond to decisions (Wittkopf 1990; Holsti 1992; Berinsky 2009). As Powlick and Katz argue, the rhetorical positions of elites, 'are important because through them communicators, consciously or unconsciously, can alter the beliefs and decision processes of recipients of information' (1998: 36). Thus, elites will select and emphasize 'some facets of events or issues and make connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution' (Entman 2004: 5).

Second, a growing number of scholars have argued, instead, that it would be wrong to assume that news media are merely megaphones for either elite rhetoric or public opinion. According to these authors, the relationship between elites, public opinion, and media is a complex, dynamic, and interdependent affiliation (Entman 2004; Baum and Groeling 2009a). News media are, in themselves, actors with some 'independence' that influence both elites and public opinion (Entman 2004; Berinsky 2009; Groeling and Baum 2008). News media, and their journalists, tend to 'select' frames, themes, angles, and in many ways are quite independent of political elites. In this respect, news agencies act as gatekeepers, deciding on what constitutes news and which information will (and will not) be broadcast (Graber 1997; Baum 2003; Groeling and Baum 2008; Baum and Groeling 2009a). First and foremost, news media are agents of information; they prime the public on specific issues, which is an essential constitutive element of opinion formation (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991; Page 1996; Baum and Groeling 2008; Groeling and Baum 2009a). Thus, fluctuations in media coverage, as well as episodic and thematic news cycles, influence the nature and quality of information available to the public and thus have some impact on opinion formation. 'News media shorten, sharpen, and simplify stories and present pictures with strong visual impact so that a reasonably alert grade-schooler can get the point' (Page et al. 1987: 81). For Baum and Groeling (2009a), news media are essentially strategic agents where professional incentives and norms lead journalists to select which stories to report and how to frame the news.

Studies focusing on media effects identify two specific causal mechanisms. First, the *framing effect* is associated with a cognitive device according to which individuals' preferences, emotions, or even behaviours are shaped by how issues are presented (Druckman 2001b; Cacciatore et al. 2016). As Tversky and Kahneman (1985) argued: 'The frame that [is adopted] is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem' (25). In this respect, media structure news coverage in such a way as to present the same information in different lights, emphasizing, for example, the positive or negative aspects of a particular decision (employment vs. unemployment). Individuals are, consequently, faced with equivalency frames that are 'logically identical ways of making the same statement' (Druckman 2001a: 230) and which, in turn, will affect how issues are perceived and evaluated.

Second, news media are especially effective as *agenda-setting* mediums such that the perceived salience of certain issues influences the public's attitude towards issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; Soroka 2003; Baum and Groeling 2009a; Berinsky 2009; Boydstun 2013). In short, to rephrase Bernard Cohen (1963), if news media do not always influence what agents think, they do determine what agents think about. Without news coverage, there is a limited chance that an event will come to the attention of the public, especially on foreign and defence issues, which often do not affect their lives directly (Page 1996; Graber 1997; Powlick and Katz 1998). Scholars generally discriminate between two types of agenda-setting effects (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Iyengar and Scheufele 2012; Cacciatore et al. 2016). First-level agenda setting measures the intensity or importance of coverage of a certain issue (McCombs 2018). Second-level agenda setting, or attribute agenda setting, suggests that what is reported, the specific attributes of a story selected by news organizations, shapes public preferences as 'relevant nodes in the minds of the audience members get activated and that this activation spreads to related concepts' (Iyengar and Scheufele 2012: 12). In this context, news media coverage varies according to *how* the information is presented to the readers and what content or considerations are emphasized (Cacciatore et al. 2016; Leeper and Slothuss 2020). These variations in media coverage can, to some extent, alter how the public and political elites evaluate specific foreign policy issues and, ultimately, might shape policy preferences (Zaller 1992; Nelson et al. 1997; Chong and Druckman 2007).

Although studies have systematically demonstrated that both framing and agenda-setting media effects do, in fact, influence policy preferences, we should not overstate the power of the press in moving public opinion and policy-makers alike. In fact, research on the Cable News Network (CNN) effect, for example, has produced mixed results and many authors have acknowledged that the press had a limited influence on 'forcing' states to intervene in crises for humanitarian reasons (Livingston 1997; Robinson 2002; Gilboa 2005). Nevertheless, measuring and identifying such a complex, interrelated causal mechanism remains a challenge but offers a much more complete image of the influence of news media on foreign policy initiatives.

Foreign Policy in a Digital World

In recent years, digital media has had a significant impact on foreign policy. With the propagation of social media and other online platforms, governments and individuals have been able to communicate and circulate information on a worldwide scale almost instantly (Jungherr et al. 2020; Kreps 2020; Bail 2021; Vaccari and Valeriani 2021). As Keohane and Nye (1998: 81) argued almost twenty-five years ago: 'The information revolution alters patterns of complex interdependence by exponentially increasing the number of channels of communication in world politics—between individuals in networks, not just individuals within bureaucracies'. These technological changes have dramatically altered our daily lives and, although the scholarship on the topic is still evolving, have effectively disrupted how scholars need to think about the connection between public opinion, information, and foreign policy. Although this literature is emerging and conclusions are elusive, three large research efforts seem to focus the attention of scholars.

First, the development of digital media has created new opportunities for diplomacy and public engagement while also presenting new challenges. Indeed, digital media is increasingly shaping the conduct of foreign policy through its role in public diplomacy. Studies have shown that online platforms are increasingly used by governments, international organizations, and non-state actors for communicating directly and in an unmediated fashion with citizens, presenting policy perspectives to domestic and global audiences (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Sandre 2015; Cull 2019; Manor 2019). On the one hand, new research has tried to understand how states' public diplomacy moved into the digital space, using online platforms to advance foreign policy goals (Cull 2019; Manor 2019). On the other hand, scholars are still trying to assess whether such online public diplomacy campaigns have an impact on foreign audiences (Cull 2013; Ingenhoff et al. 2021; Mattingly and Sundquist 2022; Wang and Xu 2022).

Second, digital media also has an impact on the way that foreign policy is reported and covered by the media. The evolution of digital media has profoundly disrupted the information environment of our modern societies and might have completely transformed the relationship between news media and foreign policy. In some respect, the literature has not yet caught up to this digital reality and much of our assumptions and conclusions on

the influence of news media and foreign policy are still anchored in past research that did not account for networked, multi-modal, multi-platform political communications (Benkler et al. 2018). With the rise of social media, it has become easier for people to share information and perspectives about international events and issues (Margetts et al. 2016). This has led to a democratization of content creation and the emergence of citizen journalism where individuals can directly report on events and issues. Furthermore, recent data has shown that digital media and social media platforms have become a main source of information for individuals, especially those from younger generation cohorts (Jungherr et al. 2020). In this respect, individuals' ability to engage online on foreign policy issues in real time and unmediated by news agencies or political elites might have weakened our theoretical expectation of the impact of elite cues on the construction of public opinion.

Third, digital media has also introduced new risks and challenges for the determination and implementation of foreign policy objectives. In recent years, one major concern has been the spread of misinformation, propaganda, and the capacity of foreign actors (governments or non-state actors such as terrorist organizations) to influence foreign policy processes (Bennett and Livingston 2020). With the ease of sharing information online, it has become easier for foreign actors to disseminate false or misleading information in an effort to influence public opinion or to advance their own policy goals (Stengel 2019; O'Connor and Weatherall 2019; Jowett and O'Donnell 2019; Shu et al. 2021). The literature on FPA has yet to fully take into consideration the fundamental changes in the modern information environment, and how it might shape foreign policy processes and decision-making.

Conclusion

As I have tried to convey in this review, the study of public opinion, news and digital media, and foreign policy offers much depth and is a very dynamic research programme. There are, however, some significant gaps that might point towards future research agendas. First, much of the literature is grounded in US case studies, which limits the generalizability of theoretical inferences. As a particular case, the United States is an outlier

in the international system with a very specific political system where the public plays an important role in policy-making and a unique news media landscape which, in the end, offers little empirical value to theory building in FPA (Colgan 2019). As other scholars have repeatedly advocated, the future of FPA, especially concerning research on public opinion, news media, and foreign policy, must expand beyond the United States and provide comparative case studies (Brummer and Hudson 2017).

Second, the research programme is still overly focused on security issues. Here again, we should have serious concerns with any attempts to generalize on data or case studies taking security as its focus of interest to give us any insight into the broader impact of public opinion, news media, and digital media on foreign policy. It is not clear, at least in my opinion, that some assumptions we make about elite cues, the influence of beliefs and values, or media effects on national security issues hold grounds for other policy considerations. We lack a unifying vision of what drives foreign policy attitudes from a multi-sectoral approach encompassing foreign aid, trade, and immigration. There is a problem with endogeneity bias in the literature which, more broadly, is engrained in our theoretical constructs formalizing the relationship between public opinion, news/digital media, and foreign policy. War and peace will always capture the attention of the public, but anxiety and fear for personal safety tend to overdetermine theoretical expectations of how the public and news/digital media might shape foreign policy decision-making. Relying too heavily on work focusing on security might overstate not only the marginal effects we assume factors such as public preferences or media effects may have on foreign policy but also, more importantly, the very conjecture of causal directionality. In some respects, the time is ripe for work using meta-analysis to estimate generalizable effects bridging the divide between foreign policy issues.

Third, studies tend to treat public opinion and news/digital media as a closed system, circumscribed by the imagined confines of states' physical and digital frontiers (Hayes and Guardino 2013). As Rothschild and Shafranek (2017) rightly argued: 'The vast majority of research at the intersection of foreign policy and political communication—both in years past and more recently—has focused on the relationship between the state, its citizens, and the news media in that country' (637). This is a major theoretical and empirical concern for studying public opinion, political communication,

and foreign policy, especially in a digital era where online interactions across multiple platforms have become the norm for most citizens. The basic assumption according to which we can isolate causal mechanisms at the national level, without any consideration for how transnational interactions have increased the sources of information available to agents, thus shaping policy preferences and, to some extent, behaviours, is problematic. It will be more and more difficult to build meta-theoretical constructs without somehow accounting for domestic factors 'internationalized' by digital technologies. The customary distinction between IR and domestic politics is less relevant in a networked, connected digital world. Work on digital public diplomacy, transnational digital diasporas, mis/disinformation, and social media or foreign interference in the digital space will probably significantly nuance our understanding of the digital self and foreign policy.

Furthermore, research examining how and in what respect the digital world is transforming political behaviour and political communication in modern societies will force FPA scholars to reconsider fundamental assumptions on the relationship between the public, the media, and policy-makers. Is there such a thing as a 'public' on digital platforms? And, if so, how is it shaping conversations on foreign policy issues and influencing both policy preferences and policy-makers? How are influencers, with their millions of followers, creating new 'elite' cues and diversifying the sources of information? What is the role of digital platforms, algorithmic bias, and online communities in foreign policy? Are social media platforms setting the agenda on major foreign policy issues? If so, how, and to what extent? Is there cross-pollination between news media and digital media or between platforms themselves? These new research questions will require scholars to expand their theoretical horizon and borrow from an expanding field in digital media and society. They will also need to build new methodological tools adapted to big data, focusing on data analytics and artificial intelligence. Built on a transdisciplinary mindset, FPA scholarship will be at the vanguard of knowledge creation, bridging a multi-faceted, digitally internationalized social world.

NOTES

1. We will address the influence of partisanship further below. There is a fundamental difference between hypotheses associated with political ideology and those related to political partisanship as both lines of arguments assume distinct causal mechanisms. Political ideology identifies ideational beliefs as driving foreign policy preferences while partisanship focuses instead on elite cues.

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CHAPTER 15

Democratic Institutions and Foreign Policy

KAI OPPERMANN

INTRODUCTION

While democracy comes in many different guises (Lijphart 2012), at its core, the concept refers to systems of government in which political leaders are elected and held accountable in regular, universal, free, and fair elections, and which citizens are guaranteed a set of fundamental political rights (see Dahl 1998). Judged by such fairly minimal standards, the widely used 'Polity' data series classifies a majority of states as democracies, up from around one-quarter in the mid-1970s (Marshall and Gurr 2020). This includes many of the richest and most powerful states in world politics (Hamilton 2018). For better or worse, therefore, much of what happens in international politics is bound up with democratic foreign policy. It is thus small wonder that the study of democratic regimes in international politics has been a major preoccupation in International Relations (IR), most prominently in the shape of the democratic peace (e.g., Ray 2003), but also, for example, in International Political Economy (e.g., Mansfield et al. 2002).

However, IR research agendas on democratic systems have often developed largely independent from Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) scholarship. This seems a missed opportunity given that IR and FPA share a fundamentally similar interest in the international behaviour of democracies. The chapter argues that bridging this IR-FPA disconnect promises to address important blind spots in IR research on democracies, while giving FPA work on democratic institutions and actors broader purchase. Specifically, the chapter maps the distinct contributions of FPA scholarship to the study of democratic foreign policy, and identifies the challenges in making this scholarship more directly relevant to IR. To this purpose, it takes up the distinction between FPA as a subfield and

perspective (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). As a subfield, FPA can play a leader role in disaggregating democratic systems and in explaining how different constellations of democratic institutions and actors lead to variance in democratic foreign policy. As a perspective, FPA can develop an innovator role in theorizing the agency of individual decision-makers in democratic foreign policy. Realizing its promise as leader and innovator in IR research, in turn, involves the role of FPA as a bridge builder, in particular to scholarship in comparative politics and psychology. Before concluding, the chapter sketches a research agenda on the politicization of democratic foreign policy to which FPA scholarship on democratic institutions and actors is particularly relevant and which speaks to broader IR research into the dynamics of politicization in international politics.

FPA as a Subfield: The Democratic Politics of Foreign Policy

As a subfield within IR, FPA is committed to opening up the 'black box' of democracy. It starts out from the observation that 'not all democracies are alike' (Ripsman 2002: 1) and focuses attention on how different configurations of democratic institutions and actors will have a differential impact on democratic foreign policy and international outcomes. This puts the FPA subfield in a strong position to play a leader role in IR research on the consequences of democratic regime type for international politics in two ways. First, it sheds light on the conditions under which democratic institutions and actors have more or less of an impact on international state behaviour and it explores the causal mechanisms through which any such impact plays out. Second, the FPA subfield enables comparative research on foreign policy similarities and differences across democracies. In order to fully realize this potential, however, the FPA subfield needs to develop its bridge builder role, in particular to scholarship in comparative politics and public policy. A closer dialogue with these fields can provide analytical frameworks that help FPA researchers to theorize the democratic politics of foreign policy and to synthesize its knowledge about different democratic institutions and actors.

The FPA subfield takes a critical view of how democracy has been traditionally conceptualized in much of IR. This criticism has two closely related angles. First, IR research is charged with underspecifying the concept of democracy. It often takes a simplistic view of democracy that sees democratic systems as a largely undifferentiated class of political regimes (Baum and Potter 2015). In contrast, the FPA subfield understands democracies as a heterogeneous group and seeks to account for variance between them (Auerswald 1999). In other words, where IR assumes uniformity in democratic foreign policy, FPA sees diversity. Second, IR scholarship tends to bracket the political processes through which democracy shapes foreign policy. It postulates that democracy matters in foreign policy, but often remains silent about the underlying mechanisms (Schultz 2013). FPA research, in contrast, zooms in on the politics of democratic foreign policy and seeks to show how and when democratic institutions and actors affect foreign policy (Kaarbo 2015). Thus, where IR assumes democratic constraint in foreign policy, FPA is interested in the processes that bring such constraint about.

These intertwined lines of critique bear most prominently on three major IR research areas. First, the FPA subfield has long challenged the democratic peace research programme (see Hayes 2012), and scholarship on the international conflict behaviour of democracies more broadly, to dismiss the notion of a simple democracy vs. non-democracy dichotomy. Rather, attention should be put on the possible impact of institutional variations within the democratic regime type and on the role of democratic decision-making processes. In particular, democracies differ widely in the organization, autonomy, and accountability of their executives, but the findings are mixed on whether democracies with more constrained executives are (e.g., Elman 2000) or are not (e.g., Prins and Sprecher 1999) less likely to initiate or be involved in military conflict than democracies with less constrained executives.

Similar points apply, second, to scholarship on domestic audience costs in international politics (Fearon 1994) and the argument that such costs are easier to generate in democracies than in non-democracies, enabling democratic regimes to better signal credible commitments. However, this fails to problematize the domestic processes through which audience costs are produced and masks differences in this regard between democracies. For example, the capacity of democracies to produce audience costs in

international negotiations varies with public access to an independent media and the number of opposition parties (Potter and Baum 2014).

A third area of IR research to which the critique of the FPA subfield seems pertinent is International Political Economy. While comparative scholarship in this field has long observed that democratic systems do not all pursue similar foreign economic policies (Katzenstein 1977), many of its most notable findings continue to contrast democracies and non-democracies, showing, for example, that the former have more liberal trade policies (Kono 2006), will more likely be party to free trade agreements (Mansfield et al. 2002), and operate more flexible exchange rate policies (Bearce and Hallerberg 2011). What is less clear, however, is how democratic regime type is causally linked to foreign economic policies and if the impact of democracy works mainly through electoral or interest group politics (Bearce and Velasco-Guachalla 2020). Moreover, research which transcends the democracy vs. non-democracy divide tends to rely on a uni-dimensional continuum between more and less democracy (e.g., Milner and Kubota 2005) that arguably fails to capture the heterogeneity of democratic systems (Reiter and Tillman 2002).

Against the background of these critiques, the promise of the FPA subfield precisely is in unpacking the democratic politics of foreign policy (Ripsman 2002). Broadly speaking, FPA scholarship has taken two overlapping and complementary directions to realize this promise (Schultz 2013). The first starts out from the agency of specific democratic actors and explores how and under what conditions they shape democratic foreign policy. The second focuses on democratic institutions and studies how they enable and constrain foreign policy behaviour. While the *institutions-centred* perspective foregrounds variations across different democratic systems, the *agency-centred* perspective brings into view variations both between democracies and within a democratic system, for example across foreign policy issue areas or decision types (Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Taken together, the FPA subfield views democracy as a ‘collage’ (Bermeo 2010: 1120) of diverse democratic institutions and actors in which the agency of actors shapes and reshapes the institutional setting of democratic foreign policy, while the institutions simultaneously channel and direct the foreign policy influence of democratic actors.

On the agency-centred side, FPA research has zoomed in mainly on four groups of democratic actors: cabinets, political parties, interest groups, and

public opinion. Scholarship on democratic cabinets (Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume) argues that the structure of the foreign policy 'decision unit' (Hermann 2001) and the distribution of influence among cabinet members matter for democratic foreign policy (Hagan 1993). In parliamentary democracies, an important dividing line is between single party and multi-party cabinets which differ systematically in their foreign policy outputs (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). At the same time, the impact of cabinet type on democratic foreign policy is conditioned by a range of other democratic factors, including the relationship between cabinet and legislature and the ideological set-up and cohesion of cabinets (Oktay and Beasley 2017). While the study of political parties in FPA (Raunio and Wagner, Chapter 17 in this volume) may have had 'a rough start' (Hofmann and Martill 2021: 307), it is by now well established that the foreign policy views of political parties vary in systematic ways and that they affect democratic foreign policy (Wagner 2020). Most notably, a growing body of research demonstrates that the placement of political parties on the traditional left-right scale structures party competition on foreign policy and has predictable consequences on the positions parties take on a range of foreign policy issues, including military deployments, human rights, international trade, and foreign aid (Raunio and Wagner 2020).

Organized interests, in turn, have long been identified as powerful societal inputs into democratic foreign policy (Skonieczny 2018). This research has focused mainly on economic and ethnic interest groups, exploring how and to what effect they shape foreign policy decision-making. Empirical findings suggest that the influence of such groups depends on the strength of their organization and mobilization, their material and non-material resources, the broader resonance of their demands, and their access to decision-makers (Beach and Pedersen 2020). Finally, scholarship on public opinion and foreign policy has shown that publics hold meaningful views on foreign policy and that democratic foreign policy is responsive to such views, invalidating a previous consensus that public opinion does not matter for foreign policy (Boucher, Chapter 14 in this volume). In particular, the evidence is that democratic publics use their foreign policy opinions to evaluate political elites and that they can make their views count in elections if foreign policy issues are salient in media reporting and if elite positions on these issues diverge (Aldrich et al. 2006).

Thus, what comes into view from an agency-centred perspective is that democratic foreign policy is shaped by a diverse range of democratic actors, but that the foreign policy influence of these actors is not uniform. Along these lines, the state of play in current scholarship on the four groups of actors is to specify and theorize the conditions under which they matter more or less. While this partly refers back to attributes of the actors themselves, it also focuses attention on the democratic institutional settings in which they operate. These settings are front and centre of institutions-centred research on democratic foreign policy which points to important variance in this regard between democratic systems. Specifically, such variance has been explored on a macro- and meso-institutional level (Clark and Nordstrom 2005).

On the macro level, the focus is on possible foreign policy repercussions of different types of democracy, most notably (semi-)presidential and parliamentary systems (Hamilton 2018). Depending on the democratic regime type, executives enjoy different degrees of structural autonomy from democratic constraints which delimits their capacity to formulate foreign policies that go against the wishes of their domestic constituents (Ripsman 2002). This can be seen, above all, in how democratic systems institute different patterns of executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs or can insulate executives from electoral pressures (Auerswald 1999; Elman 2000). On the meso-institutional level, FPA research has identified a range of institutional variations that affect how the democratic process plays out and circumscribes the foreign policy influence of democratic actors. This includes the number of parties in the party system (Baum and Potter 2015), the structure and foreign policy competences of the legislature (Wagner 2018), the system of interest mediation (Alons 2007), the competitiveness and inclusiveness of the electoral process (Reiter and Tilman 2002), as well as the openness and accessibility of the media system (Potter and Baum 2014).

The FPA subfield has thus produced a rich body of scholarship that looks inside the ‘black box’ of democracy and that provides insights into the nuts and bolts of democratic foreign policy, both from an agency-centred and an institutions-centred perspective. Much of this knowledge, however, remains disconnected and eclectic, feeding into long-standing criticisms of FPA research (Carlsnaes 2002). The challenge for the subfield, therefore, is to synthesize its knowledge about democratic institutions and actors. This challenge has an empirical and a theoretical dimension. Empirically, more

research should aim beyond understanding the roles of specific institutions or actors and explore how they combine to shape democratic foreign policy. For example, while scholarship on democratic multi-party coalitions is entwined with research on the party politics of foreign policy, less is known about how coalition foreign policy relates to other features of democratic foreign policy, such as the influence of parliaments or public opinion. Similarly, political party research in FPA has attended to the party-parliament nexus (Wagner et al. 2017), but not, for example, to the interplay between party and interest group politics.

The theoretical challenge, in turn, is to develop integrated analytical frameworks that enable more holistic perspectives on democratic foreign policy. This seems essential to bring together FPA research on different democratic institutions and actors, and to generate systematic knowledge about the drivers, constraints, and processes of democratic foreign policy. It is also key to facilitate a comparative research agenda to explore foreign policy similarities and differences as well as continuity and change across and within democratic systems. What such frameworks need to do, in particular, is to provide common concepts and terminology to theorize the interplay of democratic institutions and actors in shaping democratic foreign policy. To this purpose, the FPA subfield can draw on a range of theoretical literatures at the intersection between IR and FPA, but should also bring in scholarship from neighbouring fields, in particular comparative politics and public policy.

In IR theory, what stands out as the most obvious starting point to theorize the democratic politics of foreign policy is the pluralist conception of the state in liberalism (Kaarbo 2015). The two-level games approach and its view of foreign policy decision-makers as strategic actors in-between international and domestic pressures and incentives should be particularly promising in this regard (Putnam 1988). Specifically, the concepts of win sets and domestic ratification are well suited to capture, respectively, the varying degrees of executive autonomy in foreign policy and processes of domestic constraint that are central to the analysis of democratic foreign policy. However, the two-level games approach currently falls short precisely in developing these two concepts and in theorizing the determinants of win sets and domestic ratification. Along similar lines, selectorate theory offers alternative concepts to map the domestic constraints of foreign policy decision-makers, linking foreign policy

behaviour to the size of the government's domestic winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). While selectorate theory has been applied to different foreign policy issue areas from military conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004) to foreign trade (Milner and Kubota 2005) and aid (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009), it is more often used to compare democratic and non-democratic regime types than to account for variance in the size and composition of winning coalitions in different democratic settings.

Recent advances in neoclassical realism, moreover, provide another promising angle to theorize democratic foreign policy, starting out not from domestic constraints or the strategic political calculus of foreign policy decision-makers, but rather from structural incentives and pressures on the level of the international system (Meibauer et al. 2021). From this perspective, democratic politics comes into play as an intervening variable between the international power position of states and their foreign policy. While neoclassical realism has started to address the long-standing criticism (Wivel 2005) that its conceptualization of domestic-level factors is unsystematic and *ad hoc* (Ripsman et al. 2016), it would need to direct its focus more specifically at theorizing democratic foreign policy. This can build on institutions-centred work on the structural autonomy of democratic executives (Ripsman 2002) or on agency-centred research on selected democratic actors, such as, for example, interest groups (Ripsman 2009), but has yet to lead to an integrated theoretical framework for understanding the democratic politics of foreign policy.

Moving beyond IR scholarship, efforts in the FPA subfield to develop such frameworks stand to benefit from a dialogue with comparative politics and public policy (Brummer, Chapter 3 in this volume). This is mainly because scholarship in these fields has a longer track record in studying democratic politics, not least from a comparative perspective, which has led to a rich array of theoretical concepts that can be used for this purpose. At a time when the boundaries between domestic public policy and foreign policy are increasingly blurred, both in terms of the range of actors involved and with regard to decision-making processes, these concepts hold ever more promise in enriching the FPA 'toolbox'. By the same token, theories in comparative politics should likewise gain from being used beyond their original scope, in particular by exposing them more directly to international dynamics and pressures (Brummer et al. 2019). While the FPA subfield has already brought in a range of approaches from comparative politics and

public policy, three of these approaches seem particularly suitable for the specific task of theorizing democratic foreign policy.

This is the case, first and foremost, for veto player approaches (Tsebelis 2002). These approaches provide an analytical framework to theorize the relationship between democratic institutions and actors that travels across democratic systems and is well attuned to drawing out similarities and differences between different democratic decision-making contexts. In particular, this enables comparative work about dynamics of change and stability in democratic foreign policy, both across democracies or foreign policy issue areas and over time (Oppermann and Brummer 2018). The concepts of veto players and veto points might also be usefully combined with the two-level games approach or with neoclassical realism to address the shortcomings of the latter two approaches in theorizing the domestic constraints on democratic foreign policy.

A second Public Policy approach that has similar potential is the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). This framework has already often been used in FPA and theorizes democratic foreign policy in terms of coalitions of democratic actors who are united by certain policy beliefs and who compete for influence in foreign policy subsystems that are delineated by foreign policy issue areas (Pierce and Hicks 2019). The particular strengths of this approach include that it considers a broad range of democratic actors, that the concept of the policy subsystem integrates democratic institutions and actors and that it has a model of the policy process.

Last but not least, the principal-agent approach, which originates in economics but has been widely adopted in comparative politics, offers a third possible angle to conceptualize democratic foreign policy (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). From this perspective, the democratic politics of foreign policy can be analysed as chains of delegation between democratic constituents and foreign policy decision-makers (Baum and Potter 2015). The approach sheds light both on the ability of democratic principals to oversee their foreign policy agents and on the capacity of foreign policy decision-makers to evade such control, focusing attention on the critical role of information asymmetries between principals and agents. This cuts to the very heart of democratic foreign policy: that is, the balance between democratic constraint and executive autonomy.

FPA as a Perspective: Subjective Representations of Democratic Politics in Foreign Policy

As a perspective on democratic foreign policy, FPA focuses on how individual foreign policy-makers perceive and interpret their democratic decision-making environment. The claim is that democratic politics should not be understood as an objectively given and observable influence on foreign policy, but that democratic constraints and opportunities shape foreign policy as they are subjectively represented in the minds of decision-makers. In other words, the impact of democratic politics on foreign policy is 'funnelled through' (Kaarbo 2015: 208) the subjective understandings of decision-makers. The FPA perspective on democratic foreign policy foregrounds the individual level of analysis and sees human decision-makers as the theoretical 'point of intersection' (Hudson 2005: 3) through which the influence of democratic institutions and actors plays out. Its view of foreign policy decision-makers builds on concepts in cognitive psychology which puts the FPA perspective in a strong position to play a bridge builder role to connect the study of democratic foreign policy to scholarship in psychology. This brings with it the opportunity for the FPA perspective to play an innovator role in IR research on democratic regimes which for the most part brackets cognitive processes on the level of individual decision-makers.

In order to understand how democratic politics impacts on foreign policy, the FPA perspective seeks to recreate how decision-makers view the democratic context they operate in (Snyder et al. 1962). To this purpose it portrays foreign policy decision-makers as *homo psychologicus* (Houghton 2013) whose definitions of the decision context are shaped by cognitive and psychological factors (see Chapter 19 by Houghton and Chapter 20 by Dyson, in this volume). It thus expects different decision-makers to see similar democratic constraints and opportunities differently. In particular, the FPA perspective conceptualizes decision-makers as boundedly rational 'cognitive misers' who rely on cognitive heuristics and shortcuts 'to construct a simplified model of the real situation' (Simon 1957: 199) that enables them to cope with the complexity of the world and to take 'good enough' decisions (Tetlock 1998).

This analytical focus on the decision-makers' subjective representations of reality has obvious points of contact with constructivist scholarship that understands the international behaviour of democracies in terms of

intersubjectively shared ideas and norms (Houghton 2007). For constructivists, for example, the democratic peace results from the mutual perception between democracies of each other as peaceful and trustworthy (Risse-Kappen 1995). The main difference is that constructivist IR research foregrounds the socialization of democratic actors into a common set of democratic norms and values, while the FPA perspective emphasizes the agency of individual decision-makers in giving meaning to such norms and values (Hermann and Kegley 1995). In other words, where constructivism expects similar representations of democratic politics across decision-makers, the FPA perspective sees scope for individual-level differences.

Along these lines, the FPA perspective can draw on a range of established cognitive and psychological approaches to explore such differences between foreign policy decision-makers. While they all share the aspiration to map the decision-makers' subjective views of the decision context, they zoom in on different cognitive concepts and heuristics (for an overview, see Rapport 2018). The following discussion flags up three such approaches that seem particularly relevant to developing, specifically, the FPA perspective on democratic foreign policy.

The first area of research concerns the belief systems of foreign policy decision-makers. Such belief systems operate as cognitive schemata that guide how foreign policy decision-makers process information about their domestic and international decision context. In particular, cognitive consistency theory (Gawronsky and Strack 2012) suggests that decision-makers, for cognitive and affective reasons, discount information that is inconsistent with pre-existing beliefs and rather seek to interpret novel foreign policy problems in ways that support and stabilize their belief systems (Tetlock 2017). In the context of democratic foreign policy, it has been shown that decision-makers hold different beliefs about the desirability and necessity of public support for foreign policy and that these beliefs shape how decision-makers respond to public opinion (Foyle 1997). More broadly, the Operational Code approach (George 1969) has been widely used to map the political beliefs of democratic (as well as non-democratic) decision-makers. Many of the constituent Operational Code beliefs, moreover, including the master beliefs about conflict and harmony in political life and the best approach to selecting policy goals, speak to how democratic foreign policy-makers understand the workings of democratic politics and how they will likely engage with democratic

institutions and actors. The approach is thus well suited to compare and contrast how different foreign policy decision-makers represent, and act towards, their democratic decision contexts.

This is also true, second, for the analysis of leadership traits (Hermann 2005). This approach suggests that foreign policy decision-makers are marked out by seven such traits that are stable over time and across foreign policy issues, and that can be aggregated into distinct leadership styles. These leadership traits and styles, in turn, are expected to shape how decision-makers approach foreign policy problems. While scholarship has produced diverse findings on the relationship between leadership characteristics and foreign policy behaviour, two (combinations of) leadership traits seem most immediately relevant to the study of democratic foreign policy. For one thing, foreign policy-makers should respond differently to democratic constraints, depending on the interplay between their belief in the ability to control events and their need for power. This predisposes them either to respect or to challenge democratic constraints (Keller 2005a), for example opposition from domestic constituents (Dyson 2007), and it has been shown that democracy works as a stronger restraint on the use of military force if decision-makers are 'constraint respecters' rather than 'constraint challengers' (Keller 2005b). Moreover, the conceptual complexity of decision-makers has been linked to their ability to develop a differentiated understanding of the democratic decision-making environment and to their willingness to consider a broad range of views before committing to a decision (Dyson 2006). For example, this contributes to US foreign policy decision-makers with low conceptual complexity being more prone to the diversionary use of military force than their higher complexity peers (Foster and Keller 2014).

A third starting point to theorize how democratic politics affects the foreign policy choices of individual decision-makers is poliheuristic theory (Mintz 2004). This approach argues that decision-makers use different cognitive heuristics to simplify their decision problems before they move to a rationalist screening of the remaining alternatives. The most theoretically interesting of these heuristics is the non-compensatory principle, according to which decision-makers discard all alternatives out of hand which they find unacceptable on what they see as the most important dimension of the decision. Crucially, the theory expects this dimension to be domestic politics which it considers to be the 'essence of decision' (Mintz 2004: 7).

More specifically, decision-makers will not consider foreign policy options that they believe carry significant risks for their domestic political standing and survival. In democratic contexts, therefore, poliheuristic theory sees the expected implications of foreign policy choices for democratic competition as the decision-makers' top priority. However, in order to more fully realize its potential for the FPA perspective on democratic foreign policy, poliheuristic theory needs to engage more with FPA work on the institutional heterogeneity of democracies and what this means for non-compensatory decision-making. Closely related, the theory would benefit from a clearer operationalization of what counts as prohibitive domestic political costs in the democratic arena and how this can vary between decision units (Brummer and Oppermann 2021) or individual decision-makers (Keller and Yang 2008).

Overall, a common thread running through these three theoretical perspectives on individual decision-makers in democratic foreign policy is that their efforts to account for the decision-makers' subjective representations of democratic constraints and opportunities remains somewhat disconnected from the broader ambition of the FPA subfield to unpack the democratic politics of foreign policy. While the FPA perspective offers rich conceptualizations of decision-makers in democratic foreign policy which are informed by scholarship in psychology, often it does not sufficiently engage with insights of the FPA subfield into the diversity of democratic institutions, actors, and processes. This mirrors more general critiques that the FPA perspective is more engaged with psychology than with politics or IR (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume). In particular, the FPA perspective needs to pay closer attention to the interplay between cognitive and psychological factors on the level of decision-makers and the institutional setting of democratic politics on the state level of analysis. This is because psychological and institutional dynamics intertwine in shaping democratic foreign policy, as has been shown, for example, for democratic coalition cabinets (Kaarbo 2008). It is not only that the decision-makers' subjective representations of the decision context mediate how democratic institutions and actors matter in democratic foreign policy, it is also that democratic contexts affect how decision-makers represent foreign policy situations, for example by shaping individual belief systems or assessments of domestic political acceptability. Most fundamentally, the distribution of decision-making authority in democratic

systems delineates how significant the subjective representations of individual decision-makers, or small groups of decision-makers, are for democratic foreign policy and how useful the analytical focus on such representations is in the first place (Hudson 2014). In any case, for the FPA perspective to develop an innovator role in IR research on the international behaviour of democracies, it needs to be more firmly embedded in FPA scholarship on the democratic politics of foreign policy.

The Politicization of Democratic Foreign Policy

Democratic foreign policy is ever more often being made in domestic political environments in which international affairs are—or can easily become—politicized. Most broadly, politicization refers to the process by which issues enter the realm of political choice and contestation. This involves the increasing salience of these issues in political debate, the broadening of the range of actors that participate in the debate, and the growing polarization between these actors (Grande and Hutter 2016a). In fact, a growing IR research agenda has explored patterns of increasing, but uneven, politicization of international politics and foreign policy (Zürn 2019), for example in areas such as European integration (De Wilde 2011), global governance (Zürn 2018), trade policy (Taylor 2020), and security policy (Hagmann et al. 2018). Drivers of politicization include, among other things, globalization and transnationalization, authority transfers to international institutions, domestic opportunity structures, and the mobilization strategies of political actors (Grande and Hutter 2016b). The consequences that have been linked to the politicization of foreign affairs range from a rise of identity politics and the disruption of international cooperation to legitimacy gains in international politics (Zürn 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2020).

Processes of politicization can be expected to have an important impact on how democratic institutions and actors shape foreign policy as well as on how individual foreign policy-makers interact with their democratic decision-making environment. For example, the range of interests that are being voiced in foreign policy-making, the scope for domestic political gains or losses from foreign policy decisions, and the demands on political leadership will all be different in high-politicization compared to low-

politicization contexts. However, FPA scholarship has yet to integrate a systematic concern with dynamics of politicization into the study of democratic foreign policy. In view of ongoing trends towards a 'punctuated politicisation' (Grande and Kriesi 2016: 280) of international affairs that varies over time and across countries and issue areas, giving more sustained attention to the implications of such variation for democratic foreign policy is an important and promising research agenda, for FPA both as a subfield and as a perspective. Such a research agenda plays to the strengths of FPA scholarship on democratic foreign policy and seems well placed to make central contributions to broader IR research in this field.

From the standpoint of FPA as a *subfield*, politicization leads to a tighter coupling between democratic politics and foreign policy, and brings more democratic actors into foreign policy debates. The analysis of politicized democratic foreign policy thus puts a premium on the subfield's efforts at looking inside democracies to trace the impact of diverse actors, institutions, and processes. On a general level, the hypothesis is that politicization fosters democratic foreign policies that are domestic politics driven, as has been argued, for example, in the context of German foreign policy (see Oppermann 2012). A principal-agent perspective on democratic foreign policy, moreover, would foreground how politicization activates mechanisms of 'fire-alarm oversight' (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984: 165), reducing the foreign policy discretion of decision-makers, which can be seen, for example, in British European policy (see Oppermann 2008). Other things being equal, decision contexts in which foreign policy is highly politicized should also enhance the role of domestic audience costs in democratic foreign policy (see Freudlsperger and Jachtenfuchs 2021). On a more specific level, politicization redistributes foreign policy influence between different democratic institutions and actors. As cases in point, high levels of politicization tend to de-value the technocratic expertise of non-majoritarian institutions, such as government bureaucracies (see Christense n and Redd 2004), and put special interest groups at a disadvantage relative to broader electoral pressures (see Bearce and Velasco-Guachalla 2020). Conversely, politicization may itself be shaped by the democratic context of foreign policy-making, opening up possibilities for the FPA subfield to contribute to explanations of politicization dynamics in international affairs. For example, democratic actors and institutions, such as political parties (R aunio and Wagner 2020) or parliaments (Mello and Peters 2018), stand out

as possible drivers of politicization, and populist contestation of democratic foreign policy (see Verbeek and Zaslove 2017) enhances politicization as much as it benefits from it.

Viewed from the FPA *perspective*, the politicization of foreign policy affects the role of individual decision-makers in democratic foreign policy. To begin with, politicization incentivizes high-level decision-makers to develop an interest in foreign policy and puts possible repercussions of foreign policy decisions in democratic politics top of their minds. The resulting pressures of democratic competition and accountability may, in turn, foreground particular leadership traits of decision-makers, for example a high need for power, and over time the experience of working in high-politicization contexts may interact with psychological factors to contribute to personality changes in leaders (see Kaarbo 2021). It is similarly open to question if the feedback-rich environment of highly politicized foreign policy facilitates belief change from learning, or if the cognitive and emotional stress of politicization adds to the rigidity of existing beliefs (see Ziv 2018). Moreover, politicization puts a premium on charismatic foreign policy leadership (see Wivel and Grøn 2021) and the sense-making and consensus building that such leadership can provide for democratic audiences. More generally, the politicization of foreign policy may shape what voters value in candidates for the highest office in government, for example placing a higher emphasis on foreign policy experience and expertise, and thus affect the selection of democratic leaders.

Conclusion

This chapter has mapped the contributions and limitations of FPA scholarship in analysing democratic foreign policy and how this connects to IR research on democracies in world politics. As a *subfield*, the key strength of FPA is that it can play a leader role in explaining democratic variance in foreign policy. The main challenge remains to work towards comprehensive theoretical frameworks that integrate agency-centred and institutions-centred research on democratic foreign policy to synthesize available knowledge about different democratic institutions and actors in foreign policy. A promising route to meeting this challenge is to enrich the FPA theoretical toolbox by bringing the subfield into a closer dialogue with

scholarship in comparative politics and public policy. As a *perspective*, FPA can play an innovator role in bringing into view how decision-makers represent their democratic decision context and how this affects democratic foreign policy. To this purpose, it provides a bridge to scholarship in psychology. The challenge for the FPA perspective is to link its focus on individual decision-makers more systematically to scholarship on democratic institutions and actors in the FPA subfield.

Empirically, the FPA research agenda on democratic foreign policy displays a strong focus on military conflict and security and, to a lesser extent, political economy. Like FPA as a whole (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume), it can thus be criticized for having a relatively narrow thematic scope and should broaden out to more diverse foreign policy domains. At the same time, the FPA subfield's emphasis on democratic diversity goes hand in hand with a relatively broad geographical scope that travels well beyond the US context, while the FPA perspective remains more strongly focused on US (and UK) decision-makers. Work on democratic foreign policy in the Global South remains underrepresented, however, again reflecting a wider observation about FPA scholarship in general (Brummer and Hudson 2015).

Going forward, the chapter has flagged up the politicization of foreign policy as an important development that has wide-ranging implications for democratic foreign policy across countries and issue areas, and that directly relates to some of the key analytical commitments and research questions of FPA as a subfield and perspective. FPA research is thus in a good position to explore how politicization affects the international behaviour of democracies and how democratic politics shapes politicization. This serves to exemplify the broader point that bridging the FPA-IR disconnect in the study of democratic institutions and actors can speak to important research agendas in a changing IR.

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CHAPTER 16

Autocratic Institutions and Foreign Policy

TYLER JOST

To study authoritarian foreign policy begs two fundamental questions: do differences in how states govern themselves domestically exert systematic effects on the foreign policies they adopt—and, if so, which domestic differences matter most? A long tradition in international relations (IR) scholarship has argued that whether a state is democratic is key to understanding its foreign policy behaviour, ranging from the types of wars it is likely to fight to its ability to make credible commitments to free trade. For several decades, a coarse distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes dominated the field's understanding of how regime type shaped foreign policy. Yet, this conventional wisdom has gradually shifted towards a more nuanced understanding of authoritarian regimes.

The changing consensus is driven in large part by two trends. The first is a growing number of theoretical models that seriously consider the dynamics of authoritarian politics. Scholarship in comparative politics (e.g., Svolik 2012; Geddes et al. 2018) has proven critical to these new insights. Models of comparative authoritarianism have pushed IR scholars to examine whether differences between authoritarian regimes systematically affect their foreign policy. This chapter organizes this new wave of scholarship according to three important dimensions that distinguish autocracies from one another: (1) the relationship between dictators on the one hand and political elites, the mass public, coercive organizations, and the bureaucracy on the other; (2) the salience of foreign policy issues for these domestic actors; and (3) the foreign policy preferences of these actors. Collectively, highlighting these differences yields the intriguing idea that the foreign policy of some authoritarian regimes might essentially be no different from those of democracies.

The second trend is the proliferation of methodological approaches that have opened up the study of decision-making processes in authoritarian

regimes. While early work on the democratic peace privileged cross-national statistical analysis and process tracing using cases inside democracies (in which data was rich), scholars are increasingly opening the 'black box' of authoritarian decision-making with newly available archival evidence (Braut-Hegghammer 2020; Torigian 2022; Jost 2024), interviews and field research (Weiss 2014), surveys and experiments (Wallace and Weiss 2015; Bell and Quek 2018; Weiss and Dafoe 2019), and historical case studies (Brooks 2008; White 2021).

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first introduces the core puzzle motivating this research agenda: why some authoritarian regimes seem to make systematically different foreign policy choices. Utilizing the theory of the democratic peace as an illustrative example, it discusses some of the theoretical and empirical challenges associated with early scholarship. The second and third sections review two strands in the literature that have sought to address these challenges, the first focusing on authoritarian politics and the second focusing on psychology. The final section considers ways in which future scholarship might explore questions not yet fully answered.

The Puzzle of Authoritarian Foreign Policy

The study of authoritarian foreign policy is rooted in a puzzle: why do the foreign policies of authoritarian and democratic regimes sometimes look quite different? Consider, for example, democratic peace theory.[1] Several waves of IR scholarship have suggested that, in questions of war and peace, the most salient difference between states is whether those who govern are constrained by those who are governed. As an empirical finding, the contention that democracies tend to fight fewer military conflicts with other democracies is, as Levy (1988: 662) famously summarized, 'as close as anything we have to an empirical law' in the discipline. While criticisms linger (e.g., Downes 2009), the empirical pattern is generally well established (Dafoe 2011).

There is still considerable debate, however, about the mechanisms that undergird this finding. Scholars have offered a range of candidate explanations, including shared norms (Maoz and Russett 1993), political accountability (Reiter and Stam 2002), the distributions of goods (Bueno de

Mesquita et al. 2003), and credible signalling (Fearon 1994). Until the early 2000s, however, most theories relied on relatively coarse distinctions between democratic and authoritarian regimes—or features that some democracies possessed but others lacked, such as opposition parties (Schultz 2001).

One of the limitations of this approach was that it had little to say about authoritarian rule itself. Theoretically, there was comparatively little discussion regarding how dictators governed or held onto power.[2] Empirically, most scholars—even those who cast doubt on the logic of the democratic peace—employed either cross-national statistical analyses that generally treated autocracies as the same (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; McDonald 2015) or case studies focusing on decision-making in democracies, particularly the United States. Yet, comparatively few studies directly investigated the counterfactual setting: decision-making in authoritarian regimes. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that democratic peace theory was, true to its moniker, one about the foreign policy of democracies rather than autocracies.

Over the past two decades, however, a new wave of scholarship has opened the 'black box' of authoritarian regimes to explore how institutions and actors shape the foreign policies that autocracies choose. This body of research has deliberately set aside coarse differences between democratic and authoritarian regimes, drawing on a rich tradition in comparative politics and political psychology. The next two sections discuss the core insights from this literature by thematically dividing them into those that emphasize politics and psychology.

The Politics of Authoritarian Foreign Policy

At the heart of the new literature on authoritarian foreign policy is the straightforward intuition that authoritarian leaders (or dictators) want to ensure their political survival.[3] Autocrats do so through a combination of coercion, power sharing, and good performance. Some secure survival through consolidating power such that would-be challengers—either from other political elites or the mass public—cannot credibly threaten to depose them, regardless of the success or failure of their policies. The hallmarks of such regimes, commonly referred to as personalist regimes (Geddes et al. 2

018), are a set of institutions that inscribe the leader's absolute control: unilateral political appointments, emphasis on loyalty over competence, rubberstamp decision-making bodies, personality cults, intensive monitoring of society and punishment of dissent, and so on (Weeks 2014; F rantz et al. 2020).However, not all authoritarian leaders choose to pursue—or are successful in pursuing—the personalist path to political survival. Such leaders instead rely upon a combination of power sharing agreements and strong performance. We can think of power sharing as opening up pathways for four types of actors to influence foreign policy outcomes: political elites, the mass public, coercive organizations, and the bureaucracy. As summarized in Table 16.1, the remainder of this section explores three questions for each actor. First, what are the actor's sources of influence over the ruler? Second, how salient are foreign policy issues to the actor? Third, what are the actor's foreign policy preferences?

Table 16.1 Domestic Actors and Institutions in Authoritarian Foreign Policy

Actor	*Influence Pathways*	*Issue Salience*	*Preferences*
political elites	removal from office, agenda opposition	mixed	cooperative
mass public	mass uprising and protests, policy non-compliance	mixed	mixed
coercive organizations	military rule, military intervention	high	conflictual
bureaucracy	information provision, policy implementation	high	mixed

Political Elites

In non-personalist autocracies, sometimes referred to as collective rule regimes, leaders rule through coalitions with political elites (Svolik 2012; Meng 2020). In a path-breaking study, Weeks (2014) theorized that there are three primary pathways along which political elites shape foreign policy in collective rule regimes.[4] First, when power is shared, elites are better positioned to remove leaders who pursue policies that run afoul of elite preferences and select replacements that share their foreign policy interests. In fact, since the end of World War II, more than two-thirds of dictators who were unseated lost power through a *coup d'état* in which political elites

removed the dictator from office through the threat or use of violence (Svolik 2012: 5). Second, power sharing allows elites to bargain with the leader by threatening to withhold support for the leader's agenda. Dictators wishing to further their political goals might respond strategically through accommodating the elite's foreign policy preferences. Finally, the threat of accountability may itself make dictators more risk acceptant in the foreign policies they choose. Consider an example of a dictator choosing between a status quo distribution of territory and initiating a conflict in which they might gain more territory, but might also lose some of what they have. Personalist rulers, knowing that regime insiders are unlikely to hold them accountable no matter what the outcome, may be more willing to gamble to acquire more territory even when they have a comparatively low chance of succeeding.[5]

While existing literature devotes considerable attention to how political elites in non-personalist regimes exhibit systematically different foreign policies (Weeks 2014; Mattes and Rodríguez 2014), there are two potential questions that are central to the framework but that have nevertheless received comparatively little attention. One question concerns when foreign policy issues are salient for political elites. Torigian (2022), for example, argues that foreign policy performance was not a central consideration in leader selection or removal in the Soviet Union and China. This may be because many foreign policy decisions do not immediately affect elite interests or because elites care more about domestic policy than foreign policy. If elites have a finite amount of political capital by which they can bargain with the dictator to advance their interests, they may choose to prioritize domestic over foreign policy issues. This raises the possibility that foreign policy may be more salient at certain times and for certain elites.

On the other hand, there are several straightforward reasons why authoritarian elites may be interested in the state's foreign policy. For one, a prominent strand of literature on foreign policy attitudes suggests that individuals have relatively stable beliefs and predispositions, even in the absence of information (e.g., Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Foreign policy decisions might also affect the material interests of elites, which would motivate them to take an active interest in foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, one past study finds that leaders in non-personalist regimes responsible for starting wars lose office at a rate over three times higher when they lose a war than when they remain at peace (Croco and Weeks 20

16: 599)—suggesting that elites at least care about major foreign policy outcomes, such as war and peace.

This leads to a second question regarding the nature of elite preferences in non-personalist regimes. Past studies of authoritarian foreign policy tend to divide elite audiences into two categories—civilian and military—suggesting that the latter tends to be more hawkish than the former (e.g., Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012). Yet, while the civilian-military distinction is sometimes a helpful predictor of hawkishness, it is not necessarily the prime determinate of foreign policy orientation (Jost et al. 2021). This suggests that it should be possible that some civilian regimes feature comparatively hawkish foreign policy attitudes. For instance, although ideologies like nationalism (Powers 2022) are not necessarily linked to regime type *per se*, it may be possible to speak of authoritarian nationalism as a distinct phenomenon if elites come to believe that key elements of their political or economic system are central to their identity or worthy of emulation.

Mass Public

While models of collective rule emphasize the balance of power between dictators and elites, models of the mass public emphasize the balance of power between state and society. Many autocracies possess social and technological tools capable of shaping how the mass public behaves, which can improve the state's ability to monitor and repress dissent. Authoritarian elites can also attempt to shape public attitudes on foreign policy. 'Top-down' models of public opinion suggest that citizens rely upon cues from elites to form beliefs about foreign policy issues (Berinsky 2007). In authoritarian settings, the government typically has outsized control over the information to which the masses have access, which allows them to manipulate citizen information through censorship (King et al. 2013), strategic distraction (King et al. 2017), and framing (Pan et al. 2022). In many states, this balance of power may mean that the regime severely discounts public opinion in its calculus for foreign policy decision-making—perhaps to the point of irrelevance.

Yet, authoritarian governments devote an impressive share of state resources to understanding what their citizens think (Weiss and Dafoe 2019), suggesting that many autocracies do not entirely dismiss public attitudes about foreign policy. Why might this be the case? For one, citizens

dissatisfied with foreign policy choices might move to organize protests and demonstrations. Even when the government can effectively subdue such protests, some protests may get out of hand and undermine the regime's legitimacy or public image (Weiss 2014). For another, dissatisfied citizens might be more likely to engage in small acts of non-compliance or be less willing to mobilize in support of state policy. Christensen (1996), for instance, notes that some autocrats are more concerned that the mass public will fail to mobilize in support of the regime's policies (e.g., China's Great Leap Forward) than they are that the public might move to topple it.

How authoritarian public opinion might affect foreign policy hinges on two factors that mirror the discussion of political elites. The first is the extent to which the masses in authoritarian regimes have well-formed attitudes about foreign policy. Some evidence suggests that authoritarian masses care about foreign policy issues, although the evidence is mixed as to its salience relative to other political and economic topics. Pan and Xu (2 018) find that nationalism is a salient dimension in the political ideology of Chinese citizens—and Min and Liu (2016) find that Chinese citizens in some autocracies seek out foreign policy information via the Internet during international crises. Similarly, Treisman (2011) finds that public approval in Russia is linked to foreign policy actions, although these issues often appear to be less salient than economic ones. Finally, Telhami (1993) finds that demonstrations in Middle Eastern countries around the time of the Persian Gulf War suggest public interest in foreign policy, but that issue salience was shaped by economic concerns and did not shape government policies.[6]

A second question regarding how the masses shape foreign policy pertains to citizen preferences. However, there is comparatively little scholarship that theorizes on why the content of public opinion might be systematically different in democratic and authoritarian settings. For instance, it is not clear why autocracies are more likely to feature more hawkish (or dovish) domestic audiences. Bottom-up nationalism is well documented in both authoritarian (Weiss and Dafoe 2019) and democratic (Powers 2022) settings. However, one possibility is that some autocracies may have incentives to solidify control over the masses through institutionalizing nationalistic narratives that nudge public opinion towards more hawkish positions. Some authoritarian regimes promote narratives that emphasize the trauma of past colonial and imperial rule, leading to what Miller (2013) terms a 'post-imperial ideology' that makes states less

willing to compromise during international negotiations. Patriotic education programmes in China, for example, are associated with high rates of nationalist public protests (Wallace and Weiss 2015) and 'soft propaganda' (e.g., entertainment with emotional overtones) can shape citizen emotions and nationalistic attitudes in durable ways (Mattingly and Yao 2022).[7] Still, such behaviour is not exclusive to autocracies and future research should probe these dynamics.

Coercive Organizations

Coercive organizations, such as the military, can also gain influence in authoritarian regimes through several pathways. First, some authoritarian regimes are directly governed by the military (e.g., Argentina under Jorge Rafel Videla; or Pakistan under Yahya Kahn). While military rule has steadily declined since the post-World War II peak in the 1970s, close to one-fifth of the world's countries have passed through periods of military rule during the early 21st century (Geddes et al. 2014). Second, coercive organizations can gain influence through their ability to form explicit and implicit coalitions with elites and the mass in order to oust rulers from power. To be successful, domestic actors contemplating a coup typically need support from military organizations. In fact, by one count, over 96 per cent of coups featured some form of military participation (Chin et al. 2021: 6). Similarly, military organizations can choose whether to support, repress, or stand aside during mass uprisings (Barany 2012; Brooks and White 2022). Thus, the more that autocrats rely on repression to secure political survival, the more beholden they are to military organizations and their preferences (Svolik 2012).

How salient are foreign policy issues to coercive organizations? There are several reasons why salience may be higher for organizations like the military than for political elites or for the mass public. For one, the function of military organizations is more directly tied to foreign policy than the roles that most civilian political elites assume. A wider range of foreign policy decisions, ranging from battlefield operations to the size of the defence budget, touch on the organizational interests of the military. Moreover, coercive organizations often possess more information pertinent to foreign policy than political elites or the mass public. In the case of elites and the mass public, informational asymmetries could lead to deference to

the ruler's decisions. In the case of coercive organizations, however, these asymmetries are often attenuated by their position in the governmental division of labour.

In what direction does the influence of coercive organizations push authoritarian foreign policy? The bulk of evidence suggests that military organizations skew towards more hawkish and less cooperative foreign policy preferences. As such, states directly or indirectly ruled by the military are more likely to initiate international conflicts (Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012; Altman and Lee forthcoming).[8] This is not to say that military organizations are always more hawkish, particularly when military leaders assess that the balance of power is not in their favour or that the prospects for battlefield victory are low (Scobell 1999). Nevertheless, the broader pattern seems to hold empirically (Sechser 2004).

Some authoritarian leaders attempt to curb military influence through organizational strategies, often referred to as 'coup proofing' (e.g., De Bruin 2020; Mattingly forthcoming). Yet, coup proofing introduces pathologies of its own. Adopting organizational strategies to ensure the military does not intervene in politics may, for example, undermine effective decision-making processes (Brooks 2008), increase the propensity for international conflict (White 2021), slow down military adaptation (Fravel 2019), and degrade battlefield performance (Talmadge 2015). It also affects an autocracy's ability to effectively manage mass dissent without resorting to violence (Greitens 2016), which could affect its international reputation. This suggests that coup proofing may yield countervailing effects. On the one hand, decreasing the military's bargaining leverage may mean that authoritarian rulers are less likely to succumb to lobbying campaigns for more hawkish foreign policies. On the other hand, coup proofed states might be prone to foreign policy miscalculations that cause authoritarian regimes to blunder into ill-advised conflicts.

Bureaucracy

A final category of actor that may influence authoritarian foreign policy is the broader national security bureaucracy. In most modern states, the military represents only one of many diplomatic, intelligence, and defence organizations that contribute to the formulation of foreign policy. Indeed, much of the most important institutional variation between modern states

centres less on civil-military relations and more on how different civilians—leaders and their civilian defence, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies—relate to one another (Jost forthcoming).

Bureaucrats in authoritarian regimes matter for two reasons. First, authoritarian rulers depend on bureaucracies to search for and process information needed to make decisions. While leaders sometimes simply look inward to their own deep-seated worldviews (Vertzberger 1990; Saunders 2011), they often look outward for information to help them determine the facts of the problems they confront (Jost et al. 2021). Even in personalist regimes, leaders do not (and could not) attend every diplomatic meeting or collect every piece of intelligence. Second, whether at the negotiating table or on the battlefield, leaders depend on bureaucracies to implement the policies they choose. As is the case in information provision, leaders simply cannot carry out all tasks associated with modern foreign policy. In both information provision and policy implementation, bureaucratic influence follows a decidedly different logic than the first three domestic actors: whereas political elites, the masses, and the military gain their power through coercive means, bureaucracies gain their power through the tasks that are delegated to them.[9]

The high salience of foreign policy issues among national security bureaucracies follows from the same logic as for coercive organizations: foreign policy is central to the tasks that national security bureaucracies perform. The policy preferences of bureaucracies, however, is less straightforward. While the traditional view (Allison and Zelikow 1999) suggests that bureaucracies derive their preferences from their position in the division of labour (i.e., ‘where you stand is where you sit’), recent scholarship has cast doubt on this logic (Schub 2022)—and there are few studies on whether defence, diplomatic, and intelligence bureaucracies in authoritarian countries disagree in systematic ways.

Instead, one of the principal ways that bureaucracy shapes authoritarian foreign policy is through variation in the quality of information it can provide leaders. Jost (2024) argues that political tradeoffs explain why some autocrats get better foreign policy information than others.[10] Authoritarian leaders stand to benefit from adopting institutions that leverage bureaucratic capacity to collect and process more information than they can on their own. Yet, many authoritarian leaders forgo more effective institutions for utilizing and managing bureaucratic capacity. The reason is

that while such institutions offer leaders more complete and accurate information, they also empower bureaucrats. This can pose risks to authoritarian leaders when they fear bureaucrats will form coalitions with domestic political rivals or otherwise oppose their agenda, causing the leader to institutionally marginalize, and sometimes politically persecute, bureaucrats.[11] Such institutions restrict the ability of bureaucrats to relay information they collect and encourages them to prioritize information congruent with the leader's prior beliefs—even when they know it to be inaccurate. This can degrade the quality of reporting the leader receives, the calibre of bureaucrats upon which a leader relies, and the propensity for decision-making groups to drift towards conformity.

The Psychology of Authoritarian Foreign Policy

In addition to drawing attention to the politics of authoritarian rule, the new literature on authoritarian foreign policy has also brought into focus two psychological factors: leader characteristics and beliefs about regime types.

Leader Characteristics

The study of how leader attributes shape foreign policy is not exclusive to authoritarian regimes. If anything, much of the recent scholarship on leader psychology tends to privilege case studies taken from democracies (e.g., Preston 2001; Schafer and Crichlow 2010; Saunders 2011; Kaarbo 2012; Yarhi-Milo 2018; Mintz and Wayne 2020; Davis and McDermott 2021).[12] What matters is not necessarily the difference between authoritarian and democratic rule, but rather that leaders have different orientations towards risk (McDermott 2001), fairness (Kertzer and Rathbun 2015), strategic reasoning (Rathbun 2019), and so on.

Yet, there may be meaningful connections between the authoritarian institutions and leader psychology. Personalist rulers, for example, tend to exhibit distinct backgrounds, experiences, leadership styles, and belies, which tend to be associated with more conflictual foreign policies (Weeks 2014). In particular, male gender (Barnhart et al. 2020), revolutionary background (Colgan 2013a), and military experience (Horowitz and Stam 2014; Jost, Meshkin and Schub 2022) are associated with more hawkish foreign policy attitudes and behaviours. This may explain why many

personalist leaders hold more conflictual (Kennedy 2011) and offensively oriented attitudes (Feng 2007). Put differently, the motives, beliefs, and operational codes (Schafer and Walker 2006; Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) of personalist leaders may be quite different from non-personalist ones. By way of illustration, whereas some argue that Saddam Hussein was predisposed to perceive threats against him (Post 2004: 219), others note that Mikhail Gorbachev generally perceived the world as less threatening (Winter et al. 1991: 236).

Why do these leader-level attributes cluster in personalist regimes? One plausible reason is that the same traits that affect a leader's motivation to consolidate power also affect the foreign policies they adopt. Leaders who possess certain dispositions—such as risk acceptance, narcissism, or belief in the efficacy and appropriateness of violence—may be more likely to attempt to personalize power. Once in office, these tendencies then spill over into foreign policy decision-making. Risk acceptance tends to be associated with more conflictual foreign policies (McDermott 2001). Narcissistic individuals, who exhibit the cognitive need to call attention to their own skills, talents, and accomplishments (Post 1986), are more likely to consolidate power (Glad 2002) but may also be prone to overconfidence that leads them to enter into ill-advised international conflicts (Johnson et al. 2006). Finally, leaders who believe in the use of violence to achieve domestic political goals may see the use of force as an equally attractive foreign policy strategy as well. These intuitions echo Goldgeier (1994), who found that Soviet leaders applied bargaining strategies in international negotiations that were analogous to those that had served them well in domestic political battles.

A second reason that personalist leaders may have systematically different backgrounds is that certain prior experiences could increase the leader's capability to consolidate power. For instance, many personalist rulers—such Idi Amin in Uganda, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Muammar Gaddifi in Libya—had experience in the state's coercive organizations or came to power through revolutionary movements that conferred charismatic authority. While these backgrounds likely improved their ability to personalize power, military, and revolutionary experience (Colgan 2013a; Horowitz and Stam 2014), it also tends to shape the foreign policies that leaders pursue once in office.

Beliefs about Regime Type

A second way in which psychology matters to authoritarian foreign policy is through beliefs about regime type. Whatever one thinks of the theoretical and empirical claims that the academic literature makes regarding how authoritarian institutions affect foreign policy, regime type might still matter if observers of the international environment think it does. There is at least some evidence to suggest that regime type shapes the inferences that observers draw about other states, particularly perceptions of threat (Herma nn and Kegley 1995; Haas 2005; Renshon et al. 2021). In a foundational survey experiment, Tomz and Weeks (2013) show that democratic audiences tend to support military action against autocracies but not other democracies, because the public finds the former more threatening and the use of military force against them more morally justifiable. More broadly, individuals across a number of Western democracies tend to exhibit warmer feelings towards other democratic countries (Gries et al. 2020). Analysis of operational codes suggests that some democratic leaders, such as Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, perceive authoritarian regimes as more hostile (Sch afer and Walker 2006). Hayes (2009) similarly finds that regime type shaped the way that American policy-makers viewed Iran's nuclear weapon programme more negatively than India's. Yet, this generalization seems not to hold for all democratic leaders. Some leaders perceive autocracies as threats only when their behaviour is incongruent with perceived democratic principles—and may argue over what regime features constitute an autocratic regime (Oren 1995).[13]

There are at least two ways to think about the origins of beliefs about regime type. The first is that domestic institutions are reputations. So, if an observer perceives that authoritarian regimes have more frequently resorted to violence, they might assess that other authoritarian regimes are, all else equal, more threatening. Depending on what one makes of the empirical validity of the connection between regime type and international conflict, it is possible to view these heuristics as stemming from a rational learning process (Mitchell et al. 1999), in which observers draw inferences about the likely behaviour of a given state based on the past behaviour of states with which its shares similar characteristics.

It is also possible to see beliefs about regime type as a heuristic to inform their judgements about other states. In this view, decision-makers look for mental shortcuts by which to assess things like whether a state is

threatening. While not all autocracies may be threatening, the heuristic allows observers to make judgements quickly. In this way, beliefs about regime type might parallel other schemas or stereotypes in social psychology (Fiske et al. 2002). Image theory similarly points to how observers may rely upon these images to 'fill in the gaps' in information about another state (Castano et al. 2016). Beliefs about regime type may thus be part and parcel of other images of foreign countries. Image theory holds that leaders and citizens tend to develop stable impressions of other states based on evaluations along three dimensions: relative capability, perceived threat, and cultural status (Cottam 1994; Herrmann and Fischerke ller 1995). Regime type could presumably affect observer perceptions of all three image components.

Future Directions

The study of authoritarian foreign policy has flourished in recent years. Many of the field's advances stem from moving beyond coarse differences between democracies and autocracies—and instead unpacking the inner dynamics of authoritarian rule. Yet, as much as the field has benefited from incorporating insights from comparative politics and psychology into the study of authoritarian foreign policy, these fields continue to advance—and authoritarian rule itself may be changing. This suggests several directions for future scholarship.

The first area might be termed the micro-foundations of political accountability in non-personalist autocracies. As noted above, while it seems to be the case that collective rule autocracies tend to remove leaders who initiate interstate wars that fail at higher rates, there have been comparatively few studies that trace the process by which elite or mass audiences mobilize to remove leaders on grounds of wartime performance —much less the other types of foreign policy decisions that might motivate elite audiences to remove leaders. In the same vein, we do not know why some collective rule regimes choose not (or fail) to remove leaders who blunder into failed international conflicts—or, more broadly, why collective rule regimes sometimes adopt foreign policies that fail, but leaders nevertheless remain in office.

A second area concerns the foundations of foreign policy preferences in authoritarian countries—and the conditions under which collective rule autocracies might adopt more conflictual and less cooperative preferences. Hawkishness, militant internationalism, and nationalism are comparatively understudied in authoritarian contexts. There are important exceptions (e.g., Tessler and Robbins 2007; Fair et al. 2013), particularly regarding the study of nationalism in countries like China (e.g., He 2007; Reilly 2011; Wang 2014; Gries et al. 2016; Johnston 2016) and Russia (e.g., Laruelle 2009; McFaul 2020). However, the bulk of these studies tend to be somewhat divorced from the broader study of foreign policy attitudes. This does not suggest that the hierarchical structure of foreign policy attitudes need necessarily differ depending on institutional context. Yet, more research is needed if scholars wish to take seriously the possibility (if only to dismiss it) that differences in domestic institutions might shape foreign policy attitudes.

Regardless of how foreign policy attitudes are structured, it seems plausible that hawkish factions can rise to power in some collective rule systems dominated by civilians—and that some domestic constituencies stand to profit from some types of international conflict more than others (Lawson 1984). One particularly intriguing possibility is that collective rule autocracies may find ways to insulate themselves from war costs by lowering societal burdens (Valentino et al. 2010), adopting limited military strategies (Caverley 2014), developing novel technologies (Cunningham forthcoming), deferring taxation (Kreps 2018), or choosing covert action (Carson 2018). Another possibility is that some authoritarian regimes may pursue long-term strategies that may promote hawkish or nationalist attitudes. This might stem from long-term characteristics of the regime's history, such as exposure to trauma by colonialist or imperialist powers (Miller 2013). It might also stem from mid- or short-term incentives to exploit hawkish or nationalist sentiments as a type of diversionary strategy that substitutes for other types of regime legitimacy, particularly during elite power struggles (Pickering and Kisangani 2010) or poor economic performance (Carter 2018).

We also have comparatively little research on how authoritarian regimes adjudicate the costs and benefits of exporting their domestic institutions abroad. It is striking that some autocracies have committed to promoting their domestic institutions abroad, but others have not (Owen 2010; Dukalskis 2021). There are obvious answers, such as preference alignment, the

viability of alternative regimes, and the universalistic logic of single-party communist regimes during the Cold War (Hopf 2012; O'Rourke 2018). Yet, if choices surrounding the content of ideology are made purposefully (Goddard 2009), these answers do not necessarily explain why some authoritarian regimes concluded that foreign regimes with similar domestic features advanced their interests, especially given the costs that interventions impart. Similar questions emerge regarding why autocracies perceive threats to their international reputation or domestic legitimacy stemming from the foreign interventions of other states. Some argue that contemporary autocracies are less interested in creating a more autocratic world and more interested in securing one in which their own type can prosper (Weiss 2019).

A third area for future research concerns emerging trends in contemporary personalist rule. Much of the existing literature on authoritarian foreign policy takes regime type—or the power balances between leaders and the four types of domestic actors discussed above—as generally stable. Yet, as noted above, personalist regimes emerge as the result of strategic interactions. Some leaders are better positioned to consolidate power than others (Meng 2020)—and they may think strategically about when to consolidate power through, for instance, elite purges (Sudduth and Bell 2018). Yet, existing scholarship has devoted comparatively little attention to the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making during these periods.

Another important question is whether the contemporary wave of personalist rulers is associated with the same types of experiences and foreign policy attitudes as those of the 20th century, upon which much of our empirical understanding is based. Kendall-Taylor et al. (2017: 8) find that the percentage of dictatorships considered personalist has roughly doubled since the late 1980s. From the perspective of scholars of international politics, however, what is particularly noteworthy about these neopersonalist dictators is that most have come to power through gradual erosion of norms constraining executive power rather than through coups or rebellions. In fact, the rate of coups has generally declined across the globe (Marinov and Goemans 2014). In addition, many of the neopersonalists do not share the same backgrounds in leading social revolutions of the 20th century or working in coercive organizations. As such, it is not clear if the gradual consolidation of power characteristic of neopersonalist dictators

will lead to the same risk-acceptant dispositions that made personalist dictatorships prone to interstate violence in the second half of the 20th century.

Intriguing questions also arise from regimes that are backsliding towards a more authoritarian rule (Hyde 2020; Haggard and Kaufman 2021). One recent study finds that since the turn of the century, approximately one-third of presidents have attempted to evade term limits by amending the constitution, creating a new constitution, or questioning the legality of term limits (Versteeg et al. 2020). Roughly two-thirds of those that attempted to remain in power succeeded. Yet, the foreign policy effects of backsliding have yet to be examined systematically.

It may be possible to study authoritarian neopersonalism and democratic backsliding in a complementary fashion. Indeed, one of the key advances in the study of authoritarian foreign policy is to note that authoritarian and democratic regimes need not be studied in isolation from one another (Kaar bo 2015; Hyde and Saunders 2020). Such cross-institutional comparisons are likely to remain central as scholars continue to advance the field.

NOTES

1. For an overview of this vast literature, see Hayes (2012).
2. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) is an important exception, as are studies of Soviet foreign policy decision-making, such as Goldgeier (1994).
3. I use the terms ‘autocrat’, ‘dictator’, ‘ruler’, and ‘leader’ interchangeably, although others see differences between these terms.
4. See also Mattes and Rodríguez (2014); and Colgan and Weeks (2015).
5. In addition, the way by which autocrats lose power is thought to condition some foreign policy decisions (Chiozza and Goemans 2004), particularly choices about war termination (Goemans 2 012).
6. See also Blaydes and Linzer (2012); and Jamal et al. (2015).
7. Authoritarian elites can also induce more dovish and cooperative attitudes. For instance, Quek a nd Johnston (2017) find that autocratic elites are able to reduce public support for more conflictual action by framing strategies that invoke peaceful identities, the costs of conflict to economic development, and the role of multilateral mediation. See also Weiss and Dafoe (201 9); and Rozenas and Stukal (2019).
8. For dissenting views, based largely upon analysing foreign decision-making in democracies, see Betts (1977); and Gelpi and Feaver (2002).
9. From this perspective, the military is both a coercive organization and a bureaucracy—and the way it shapes policy can follow these two distinct logics.
10. In the parlance of foreign policy analysis, dictators make choices about the decision-making units they utilize (Hermann and Hermann 1989).
11. See also Hagan (1993).

12. For exceptions beyond those referenced below, see discussions of Otto von Bismarck in Rathbun (2019); Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi in Colgan (2013b); Nikita Khrushchev in Lupton (2020); and Mikhail Gorbachev in Holmes (2018).
13. See also Owen (1994: 96–97).

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CHAPTER 17

Legislatures, Political Parties, and Foreign Policy

TAPIO RAUNIO AND WOLFGANG WAGNER

INTRODUCTION

Legislatures and political parties are key elements of domestic politics. This is particularly true for liberal democracies on which we will therefore focus in this chapter. Although closely intertwined in practice they have by and large been studied separately in Comparative Politics (CP) where each of them has grown into a distinct field with its own professional organizations, journals, and conferences. Whereas both fields occupy a central position in CP, their place in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has remained at the margins, echoing the notion that the water's edge poses a barrier to democratic politics. Two debates in International Relations (IR), however, have stimulated research on legislatures and parties and have positioned FPA as a bridge between CP and IR. Since the 1990s, the Democratic Peace debate has drawn attention to legislatures as a possible constraint on executive action. More recently the debate about politicization of international affairs has inspired research on political parties in foreign policy.

We follow the convention in CP and address legislatures and parties separately in this chapter. At the same time, we acknowledge that they are closely intertwined in actual democratic politics. Following King's (1976) classic typology of legislative-executive relations, most parliamentary regimes see a fusion of parliament and the executive, with the cabinet ruling with the support of its legislative majority. Party discipline is strong, and most backbench members of parliament (MPs) of governing parties share the goal of cabinet survival. While this picture still largely holds half a century later, several developments make the equation less straightforward.

Overall, there are strong reasons to question or at least modify the 'politics stops at the water's edge' thesis. Already in the 1970s, Manning (1

979) coined the term ‘intermestic’ to capture issues that fall somewhere between pure foreign and domestic policy. Increasing interdependence and globalization have internationalized issues previously decided in national capitals, such as immigration, trade, energy, and environmental policies or human rights. In addition, the end of the Cold War removed the straight jacket of a bipolar global architecture, giving individual countries more freedom to choose their partners and negotiating positions. What is more, the military’s primary task is no longer territorial defence but ‘wars of choice’ whose wisdom is more controversial. We thus expect political parties to take different positions on a growing number of international issues and legislatures to fight back tendencies towards executive dominance in foreign affairs.

Not only are more issues decided at an international level, they also have more direct distributional consequences for voters and interest groups. International relations are more politicized than before (Zürn 2014; De Vries et al. 2021), providing thus a stronger ‘electoral connection’ from voters to decision-makers in foreign policy (Aldrich et al. 2006; Oktay 2018). Party systems have changed, with traditional parties of the government losing votes and new parties shaking established patterns of party-political competition and government formation. Importantly, many of these newer parties are nationalistic, contesting the expansion of European and international authority, influencing the positions of mainstream parties, but potentially also resulting in a stronger conflict between conservative and liberal forces (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Furthermore, domestic political parties and MPs have more access points to influence international politics than before: they can by-pass domestic executives and form transnational networks and other contacts with like-minded groups abroad. This development is particularly striking in the EU, where the multi-level nature of the European polity facilitates horizontal and vertical coordination between political parties and legislatures.

Examined together, these trends point in the direction of the increasing relevance of foreign policy for citizens and political parties. And higher salience of foreign policy for parties should incentivize MPs to exercise stronger oversight of the executive in various international issues. Whilst largely confirming these expectations, this chapter argues that the study of legislatures and parties is still very much an emerging subfield of FPA. The next section focuses on, discussing constraints on executive action and the

use of different oversight mechanisms. The subsequent section on parties emphasizes the importance of the left-right dimension in structuring partisan contestation in various foreign policy matters. The concluding discussion suggests avenues for future research and calls for more ambitious comparative and longitudinal data, regarding both party behaviour and legislative-executive relations.

LEGISLATURES

Legislatures as Institutional Constraints

Interest in legislatures and foreign affairs soared in the wake of the so-called Democratic Peace debate, i.e. the finding that democracies rarely if ever wage war against each other. The finding rested on the correlation between states' regime type and their involvement in wars and conflicts short of war, without paying much attention to the decision-making processes in democracies. Legislatures were identified as institutions that constrain bellicose executives and whose mobilization buys time to find a diplomatic solution instead of using force (Russett 1993: 38). In the context of this debate, studies of legislative-executive relations served a dual purpose: first, variation in legislative-executive relations allowed the testing of 'further observable implications' (King et al. 1994) of the 'institutional constraint' hypothesis. This hypothesis was designed to explain differences between democracies and non-democracies, but, if correct, it should also account for differences among democracies. Second, in-depth case studies of legislatures in foreign policy-making reveal to what extent the assumptions of the 'institutional constraint' model are actually supported by empirical evidence.

If institutional constraints account for the differences between democracies and non-democracies, then democracies with powerful legislatures should be particularly reluctant to use military force. Empirical support for such a 'parliamentary peace' (Dieterich et al. 2015), however, has been modest and dependent on contextual conditions. In the period between World War I and the end of the East-West conflict, democracies with strong legislatures had indeed a lower general propensity to initiate international disputes. However, the effect is not statistically significant when only disputes involving armed force are considered (Reiter and Tillma

n 2002; Clark and Nordstrom 2005). With a view to the 'wars of choice' after the end of the Cold War, a 'parliamentary peace' effect appears for some missions, such as the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2011 intervention in Libya (Wagner 2018; Haesebrouck 2018), but not for others, such as the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan (Mello 2014). For the 2003 Iraq war, the finding depends on the selection of countries, additional factors and methodological choices (Mello 2012; Dieterich et al. 2015; Wagner 2018). In sum, foreign policy scholarship could not report a straightforward confirmation of the institutional constraints hypothesis to the Democratic Peace debate. Instead, this line of research pointed to a large number of contextual conditions on which the influence of legislative constraint depended, including the type of military mission, public opinion, and party politics.

Given the robustness of the core finding of the Democratic Peace and the popularity of its institutionalist explanation (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999), the modest support for these further observable implications appears puzzling and calls for in-depth studies of legislatures in foreign policy decision-making. The notion of a legislature as an independent veto player that reigns in a bellicose executive has not survived close empirical scrutiny. Instead, legislatures have frequently been readier than executives to take up public cries to use force (Peterson 1996; Auerswald 1999; Elman 2000). Furthermore, case studies revealed what was already well established in CP: party discipline ties together the majority party or coalition in the legislature and the executive with the latter in the driver's seat. As argued in the next section on political parties, the legislature, especially in parliamentary systems, acts as an independent player only when parties are internally divided. One of these rare episodes of legislative independence was the 2013 House of Commons vote on the British government's proposal to use force against Syria's regime after their use of chemical weapons: although the House of Commons had no formal veto power, the Cameron government had decided to put the military intervention to a vote. Opposition came not only from the opposition Labour Party but also from backbenchers in the Conservative Party. Surprised by the outcome, Cameron called off the air strikes. Case study research emphasized, however, that the episode resulted from an untypical absence of party discipline, which in turn stemmed from a miscalculation on the part of the government that did not seriously consider a negative vote

to be possible (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017). More typical are cases in which the government and its legislative majority by and large agree on the appropriateness of using force, which contradicts the notion in Democratic Peace research that a bellicose executive is constrained by a more pacifist legislature.

At closer inspection and notwithstanding party discipline, however, executives are constrained by the governing majority in the legislature, at least at the margins of their decisions. Intraparty channels are used by MPs of the governing majority to voice concerns, which influence executive policy. For example, the German government frequently added a number of caveats to a deployment mandate to secure the full support of its majority in parliament. During the early years of the Afghanistan mission German troops were prevented from searching houses and from supporting offensive operations of partner countries, i.e. they were not allowed to use lethal force unless an attack was taking place or was imminent. Such restrictions resulted from the government's effort to build a broad consensus in the Bundestag. As Saideman and Auerswald (2012) demonstrated, such *caveats* were more likely in countries in which the legislature had an *ex ante* veto power over deployment decisions. Drawing on insights in CP, FPA scholarship has thus contributed to IR by nuancing the causal mechanisms that link domestic politics to international conflict.

Executives can also benefit from strong parliamentary involvement. According to the 'Schelling Conjecture' (Schelling 1960), an executive whose hands are tied by a domestic ratification constraint such as a parliamentary veto can negotiate more favourable outcomes than an unconstrained executive (e.g., Putnam 1988).

Oversight Mechanisms

The Democratic Peace debate has reinforced FPA's orientation 'to issues of war, intervention, and other policies involving security threats and military tools' (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1 in this volume: 10). Whereas war powers and their impact have been comprehensively documented and examined, legislative-executive relations in other issue areas have received much less interest even though they account for the bulk of states' foreign policies. When it comes to actual parliamentary behaviour and use of oversight mechanisms, MPs face a serious problem of informational asymmetry as legislators do not enjoy the same level of information about

foreign affairs as do members of the executive branch. For the most part, foreign policy is not about making laws but about monitoring international negotiations or developments in third-party countries. This underlines the importance of control instruments that facilitate information sharing between the executive and legislature. Parliaments have thus strengthened the procedural rights of committees, and the same applies in the area of foreign and security policy.

Comparative research should draw on theoretical and methodological lessons from studies of the US Congress. Congress has clearly become more assertive in foreign affairs since the Vietnam War. Stricter reporting requirements—the most famous being the War Powers Resolution—force the president to consult Congress prior to decision-making or during international economic negotiations and military conflicts. Congress representatives make use of the variety of tools at their disposal from committee and floor debates, motions, and questions of budgetary control, and, of course, public posturing and grandstanding. Yet not all scholars view the quality of congressional oversight in positive terms (e.g., Lindsay 1994; Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Kriner 2010; Howell et al. 2013; Fowler 2015; Milner and Tingley 2015). Congress has also traditionally been less dominated by cohesive parties than legislatures across the world, and this has opened the door for policy 'entrepreneurs' that have shaped congressional positions on various foreign policy questions (Carter and Scott 2009; Lantis 2019).

Empirical evidence from Europe and other continents is scarcer. Existing research emphasizes (confidential) committee scrutiny, with more public instruments such as plenary debates and question time in a more limited role (e.g., Raunio 2016). Studies on parliamentary engagement in trade (Jančić 2017), energy (Herranz-Surrallés 2017), gross human rights violations (Pegan and Vermeulen 2018), treaty ratification (Lantis 2009), or military interventions (Coticchia and Moro 2020) suggest that large differences in terms of legislatures' formal competences and even more so in established practices of monitoring and influencing government policy. Although variation across issue areas also exists within countries, a recurrent pattern is the weak position of parliaments in Westminster-type democracies such as Britain and Australia (Lantis 2009).

An interesting aspect is decision-making culture and issue variation. In line with the 'water's edge' argument, foreign policy decision-makers often

evoke notions of national consensus, or that disunity at home undermines success abroad. Measuring conflict with reservations added to committee reports in the Swedish Riksdag, Jerneck et al. (1988) demonstrated that while foreign and security policy were characterized by consensus, foreign aid and to a lesser extent general defence policy (which often has strong constituency links, for example through decisions on location of domestic military bases) produced disagreement in the committees. Research on Congress also shows that the executive can avoid legislative constraints through framing issues as security threats (Howell et al. 2013; Milner and T ingley 2015), as attempts at securization (see Sjöstedt, Chapter 10 in this volume). However, comparing the impact of the 'war on terror' on legislative-executive relationship in eight countries, Owens and Pelizzo (20 09) showed that parliaments were not necessarily weakened (see also Scott and Carter 2014). Related to terrorism and defence issues is the tradeoff between access to classified information and public oversight: case studies from Belgium, Canada, and New Zealand indicate that MPs gain access to various military and intelligence information on the condition of keeping it behind the closed doors of committees (Lagassé and Saideman 2017, 2019). At the same time security governance has become more encompassing, with the result that a wider range of parliamentary committees deal with security matters (Neal 2021).

Overall, both comparative projects and case studies suggest a trend towards a 'parliamentarization' of foreign policy, but such findings need to be treated with necessary caution (Raunio and Wagner 2017; Mello and Pet ers 2018). Apart from the general difficulties in measuring the balance of power between executives and legislatures (for more on executives, see Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume), existing research suffers from a lack of robust cross-national data. MPs themselves also seem to acknowledge that the executive must be allowed sufficient autonomy, and committee scrutiny is preferred to plenary debates. At the same time legislators and political parties keep demanding information and are not afraid to publicly challenge the executive, even in hard security choices such as troop deployments. Here the question is not necessarily so much about the influence of the legislature—what matters perhaps more is that the legislature provides a forum for debate where the decisions are justified and explained (Lord 2011). Plenary debates can act as a brake or a moderating force on the executive, especially when there are political

parties offering alternatives and a healthy media covering the debates (Baum and Potter 2015).

Political Parties

Do Party Politics Stop at the Water's Edge?

For a long time FPA scholars and, more broadly, students of IR did not pay much attention to political parties. In line with a realist interpretation of world politics, countries were treated as unitary actors whose core foreign policy interests and identities were shaped by historical events, geopolitics, and the shape of the international system. CP scholars, in turn, did analyse party positions towards the EU but they steered clear of foreign policy. The situation was healthier in the United States, where FPA scholars studied how Congress and partisan factors influenced the foreign policy of the world's leading superpower.

The actual impact of party positions is obviously moderated by several factors. Structural and ideational changes in domestic party systems can facilitate foreign policy changes, as Chryssogelos (2021) shows with illustrative examples from different time periods in Canada, Greece, and West Germany. In multi-party coalition cabinets, compromises are inevitable and hamper the translation of party manifestos into government programmes or policy (Kaarbo 2012; Oppermann et al. 2017; Joly and Dandoy 2018). International alliances and commitments, not least in the context of the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), also constrain parties' policy options (Massie 2016).

Roll-call votes in legislatures provide valuable data about the extent of contestation over foreign policy, also in comparison to domestic politics. For the US Congress, domestic policy votes have indeed been characterized by higher levels of conflict than foreign policy votes (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Hurst and Wroe 2016), although the difference is often small (Wagner 2020; Böller 2021) and less pronounced in foreign aid and trade policies (Prins and Marshall 2001). Moving to Europe, Wagner et al. (2018) reported higher levels of voting unity for military deployments as compared to issues of domestic politics in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Indeed, votes on military conflicts, particularly those where national survival is at stake, are often demonstrations of patriotism and

national unity. International crises thus bring about, at least temporarily, a 'rally-around-the-flag' effect that makes criticism of the government look inappropriate (Oneal et al. 1996). Drawing on a mixture of roll-call votes and survey data, Onuki et al. (2009) in turn found that the positions of Argentinian and Chilean parties were similar in domestic and foreign policy matters, with Chilean parties exhibiting stronger polarization in foreign policy. Finally, Raunio and Wagner (2020) analysed roll-call votes in the European Parliament from 1979 to 2014, showing that in external relations votes the coalition dynamics and cohesion levels did not differ from overall voting patterns.

Doves and Hawks

Party positions in various foreign policy issues can be traced to origins of the parties. Rathbun (2004, 2007) and Noël and Thérien (2008) argued that in global politics the difference between parties of the left and right stems from different core values, such as hierarchy and equality, with the left advocating more egalitarian policies both in terms of economy and security that are more effectively reached through stronger international rules and institutions. Most of the empirical studies have focused on the use of force, with the research from the US and Europe mainly confirming that 'hawks' are more often found among right-leaning legislators and 'doves' on the left. This applies to the two-party system of the US, at least since the Vietnam War, but it is less clear whether the partisan affiliation of the president impacts on the use of force abroad (Gowa 1998; Foster and Palmer 2006; Clark et al. 2016; Lewis 2017). Wagner et al. (2017) showed how ideology impacts preferences regarding both policy and procedures. Utilizing Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, they first demonstrated that across European countries political parties on the right with the exception of the radical right were more supportive of military missions than those on the left. The second stage of their analysis showed that in Germany, France, and Spain, parties on the left tended to favour stronger parliamentary control whereas those on the right tended to prefer a more unconstrained executive.

Examining eighteen parliamentary democracies during the Cold War, Palmer et al. (2004) found that right-wing governments were more likely to be involved in militarized disputes than leftist governments. For the period 1960–1996, Arena and Palmer (2009) concluded that right-wing

governments were more likely to initiate them—a finding confirmed by Clare (2010) for the period 1950–1998, while Bertoli et al. (2019) found that electing right-wing leaders increases the likelihood of countries initiating high-level military disputes. Mello (2014) found that right-wing governments were more willing to engage militarily than their leftist counterparts with a view to the Kosovo conflict and the Iraq war, but not in the case of the Afghanistan conflict. Schuster and Maier (2006) confirmed Mello's Iraq war finding for Western European but not for Central and Eastern European (CEE) democracies. In their studies of liberal democracies' fight against the so-called Islamic State, however, Saideman (2016) and Haesebrouck (2018) did not find support for the influence of government ideology. According to Koch (2009) governments of the left engage in shorter disputes, while Koch and Sullivan (2010: 627) found that 'executives from parties of the political right are less likely to terminate foreign military interventions when public approval of their job performance is low. But left party leaders become more likely to terminate foreign military interventions as their domestic popularity declines, even if they must withdraw short of victory'. According to Heffington's (2018) study of twenty-six democracies, the executive's position on defence had an impact on conflict initiation whereas its general left-right position did not.

Haesebrouck and Mello (2020) examined both party preferences and government behaviour. Comparing twenty-eight countries, they first showed that centrist and centre-right parties displayed highest level of support for military missions, with support weaker towards both ends of the left-right dimension. Drawing on a new data set covering twenty-four countries and eight operations launched between 1999 and 2014, Haesebrouck and Mello then found that leftist governments were actually more inclined to participate in military missions with inclusive goals, such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, while right-wing governments were more inclined to participate in strategic operations. Hence the article demonstrates the need to differentiate between various types of military operations when examining party attitudes towards use of force (see also Haesebrouck and van Immerseel 2020). In addition to these comparative papers, case studies provide further consistent support for the thesis that right-wing governments are more 'hawkish' than leftist cabinets. And troop deployments also benefits electorally right-wing hawkish parties

whilst having the opposite effect on left-leaning dovish incumbents (e.g., Kiratli 2020).

More in-depth studies provide nuanced evidence of the interaction between party ideologies and national contexts. Tracing British, French, and German responses to conflicts in the Balkans, Rathbun (2004) demonstrated that parties on the left were more likely to support multilateral cooperation and endorsed a broader notion of the national interest that included the protection of human rights abroad. However, ideological differences between individual parties and party families were not always consistent or clear-cut, with positions of parties belonging to same party family shaped by factors such as their own historical trajectories, government opposition dynamics or electoral considerations. Analysing the development of the EU security and defence policy in the 1990s, Hofmann (2013) in turn showed how the positions of British, French, and German parties were stable but not simply deductible from their positions on the left-right continuum, especially when considering how complex issues like multilateralism or the deepening of the European Union's foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP/CSDP) often are. Utilizing data from two transnational Voting Advice Applications (EU Profiler and euandi) in the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections, Cicchi et al. (2020) investigated the positions of national parties across the EU on selected foreign and security policy issues. Their conclusion was that parties do not seem to hold specific attitudes about CFSP/CSDP—instead, if a political party supports the EU, it will also support the further development of EU's foreign and security policy, and vice versa.

International Political Economy

Party positions in international trade and development aid are also linked to the left-right dimension, with party preferences explained by the core values and constituents of the parties. Centre-right parties are more supportive of free trade than leftist parties that are more willing to use protectionist measures to safeguard social, consumer, industrial, or environmental interests (e.g., Verdier 1994; Hiscox 2002; Milner and Judkins 2004; Dutt and Mitra 2005; Chang and Lee 2012; Gray and Kucik 2017). Importantly, many of these studies also covered 'non-Western' cases, indicating thus that at least in trade policy the structure of contestation is broadly similar across the democratic world.

Similar differences in core values extend to development policy. Through their beliefs in equality and solidarity, the same party families that are supportive of more egalitarian and extensive domestic social and education policy programmes are also supportive of allocating more aid to developing countries (Lumsdaine 1993). Using such ideological differences as their starting point, Thérien and Noël (2000) examined levels of development assistance among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. They found no support for partisan theory when using the standard indicator of the strength of the left in the cabinet, but did establish a strong and statistically significant relation between levels of foreign aid and cumulative leftist power. Focusing on the European Parliament, Raunio and Wagner (2021) report that opposition to EU's development policy is restricted to the more Eurosceptical representatives, with voting behaviour in aid primarily following the left-right dimension. Their findings also suggest increasing politicization of aid through stronger horizontal linkages between immigration, security, and development policy.

A number of scholars have also explored whether government ideology influences levels and types of aid. Establishing that leftist parties view aid more positively than right-wing parties, Dietrich, Milner, and Slapin (2020: 988) also 'find that leftist parties are more likely to follow through with their electoral commitments regarding aid than parties of the right—that is, their positive mentions of aid are less likely to translate into action'. Other comparative studies show leftist cabinets to be more generous in aid provision and to target more poverty alleviation, whereas right-leaning governments seem more concerned with improving trade relations (Tingley 2010; Brech and Potrafke 2014; Allen and Flynn 2018; Greene and Licht 20 18).

Agenda for Future Research

Scholarly understanding of legislatures and political parties in foreign policy has clearly taken major leaps forward. Yet this remains an emerging subfield in FPA: comparative research is scarce, much of the work has focused on the specific question of the use of force, and beyond students of the US Congress there is relatively little engagement with theoretical and empirical lessons from other academic disciplines. In this concluding

section we highlight four lines of inquiry for future research: (1) the populist challenge, (2) changing cleavage structure, examining (3) political parties and legislatures together, and (4) the need to move from case studies to broader, comparative projects.

Probably the biggest question for both FPA scholars and real-world decision-makers concerns the rise of various populist and radical right parties throughout the world that contest the expansion of international- and European-level authority (see Jenne and Thies, Chapter 13 in this volume). The more power is transferred beyond national borders, the harder the backlash from socially conservative voters and politicians (Norris and Inglehart 2019). These parties oppose the political establishment and combine criticism of internationalization, foreign aid, and opening of borders with a strong emphasis on national interests, territorial defence included (Liang 2007; Verbeek and Zaslove 2017). President Donald Trump was not the only nationalist leader who has defied his country's normal course of action by withdrawing from international agreements and in general disregarding established codes of diplomacy. Leaders with unexpected ideological profiles are elected, and not just in fragile democracies or in countries with less institutionalized political parties. The rise of populism may de-stabilize established patterns of international trade, regional integration, and security cooperation (e.g., Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019; Rivera Escartin 2020)—but it can also result in stronger defence of internationalism by centrist parties (De Vries et al. 2021). In addition to the direction of foreign policy, populists can impact the legislative-executive relationship. In their studies of populist regimes in the Global South, India included, Destradi and Plagemann (2019) show that instead of altering the substance of their countries' foreign policies, the effect of populism concerns mainly procedural aspects, with foreign policy leadership becoming more centralized and personalized in the leaders.

The research reviewed in this chapter has certainly accumulated evidence for a partisan theory of foreign policy: leftist governments are less inclined to use armed force and more inclined to commit to international law and institutions; they also tend to be less supportive of free trade and spend more on development aid. At the same time, we can witness changes to party systems and cleavages across the world. Linked to the rise of populism, party systems and thereby also legislatures have become more fragmented, and parties have to negotiate new coalitions in parliament and

in government. Regarding cleavages, CP scholars have identified significant developments in Europe and beyond. The socio-cultural dimension has become more important, particularly in CEE countries, and, in general, elections are more unpredictable than in previous decades. Recent studies on military interventions have shown that the left-right dimension as well as the 'new politics' dimension are best understood as a bell-curve, rather than a linear function, with support for the missions strongest in the centre of these dimensions. This signals the need for scholars to reach beyond the left-right cleavage and to explore ideological multi-dimensionality (Hofman n and Martill 2021). Examining the socio-cultural 'new politics' dimension appears particularly promising in this respect (see Haesebrouck and Mello 2 020; Cicchi et al. 2020; Wagner 2020). Knowledge of non-Western countries is particularly limited: lessons drawn from the United States or Europe may not apply in other parts of the world without qualification. The cleavages structuring party competition in Europe and other established democracies—the left-right and socio-cultural dimensions—are perhaps not the most important axes of contestation in other continents. Hence there is a clear need for both comparative and in-depth case studies of non-Western cases, from Latin America to Asia and Africa.

Also, scholars other than those studying the US Congress should adopt research designs where party positions are examined jointly with parliamentary oversight. For example, Wagner (2020) analysed both party positions and actual parliamentary votes and speeches in his comparative study on the use of force. He finds that argumentative frames in various foreign policy questions reflect a combination of specific national contexts and party-political affiliations. In terms of control mechanisms, essentially the oversight toolkit appears the same as in domestic matters, from committee scrutiny to parliamentary questions and plenary speeches and votes. Parliaments are clearly not content to sit back, and have arguably become more strongly involved in foreign policy. Foreign affairs and defence committees may have more confidential procedures, but foreign policy seems otherwise 'business as usual' in legislatures. In the introductory section of this chapter, we argued that the politicization of foreign policy should further increase the 'electoral connection' in foreign affairs and provide stronger incentives for MPs to engage in various foreign policy issues. Future research could analyse how various foreign policy items appear in parliamentary questions and the attractiveness of

committees related to foreign policy (e.g., Martin 2013; Rozenberg et al. 2011, 2015; Waddle and Bull 2019). Furthermore, knowledge across issue areas is highly uneven. Because the use of force has been the traditional core concern of IR scholars, we find a long list of issues that remain understudied, including sanctions, arms exports, or the links between energy policy and security. But here we come back to another issue raised at the beginning of this chapter: where does one draw a line between foreign and domestic policy?

The field is still dominated by insightful case studies of highly contested events or time periods that are most likely not representative of foreign policy items handled by parties and legislatures. Existing larger, cross-national data sets may not always be that useful for FPA scholars. For example, the Manifesto Project includes items on 'defence' and 'internationalism', but both lump together a diverse set of issues, and the CHES included an item called 'peace and security missions' in their 2010 and 2014 surveys but not in the most recent round from 2019. Hence there is a need for datasets that document party positions and parliamentary activity or competences on foreign policy issues in a large number of countries over an extended period of time. An interesting example is the new Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database and the International Treaty Ratification Votes Database (Ostermann et al. 2021). The digitalization of parliamentary votes, documents, and debates as well as party manifestos provides a chance to automatize data gathering and thus to build larger datasets with fewer resources. Furthermore, scaling algorithms provide an additional tool to capture party positions. So far only a small minority of foreign policy scholars have explored these new opportunities (see Vignoli 2020).

Finally, FPA scholarship should further analyse legislatures not only as institutions that potentially influence government policy but also as non-state actors in their own right with their own external relations. Parliamentary diplomacy, understood as 'individual or collective action by parliamentarians aimed at catalysing, facilitating and strengthening the existing constitutional functions of parliaments through dialogues between peers on countless open policy questions across continents and levels of governance' (Stavridis and Jančić 2016: 111) is well established and has gained new momentum after the end of the Cold War. Parliaments have approached peers abroad in order to voice concerns and ultimately

influence policy in third states (Fonck 2019: 71–89). Conceiving of legislatures as actors in their own right also contributes to overcoming the state-centrism that has traditionally characterized FPA.

Conclusion

Research on legislatures and political parties in FPA has made important contributions to IR scholarship. The Democratic Peace debate in particular has benefitted from a more nuanced understanding of legislatures and parties and thus democratic politics more broadly. This research has drawn on insights from CP and has demonstrated the value added of bringing these subdisciplines closer together.

Because both legislatures and parties deal with the full range of issues, bringing them into FPA also broadens the scope of FPA beyond the traditional focus on security and defence policies. Immigration, energy, climate change, and global health (see other chapters in this volume) are prominent examples of questions that have become increasingly important in the foreign policies of individual countries and in the work of regional and global organizations. Contestation of this broader foreign policy agenda is not possible to grasp without paying sufficient attention to democratic politics which in turn revolve around legislatures and parties. Scholars need to go beyond the left-right dimension and incorporate other cleavages into their explanatory models. Although constrained, legislatures and ideologies also matter in authoritarian systems (Gandhi et al. 2020). Considering the leader-centrism of such regimes, research could focus more on uncovering the organizational aspects of leadership and the foreign policy narratives of non-democratic executives.

To the extent that IR becomes more problem driven and aiming at policy relevance, it will also benefit from FPA. Future research on the (changing) foreign policy positions of political parties and on the dynamics of executive-legislative relations, together with research on public opinion (see Chapter 14 in this volume), will be highly relevant for IR debates about the prospects of global governance and the future of the liberal international order. But the question is not just about party politics within domestic institutions: both political parties and legislatures are developing more extensive networks of their own, not least in the European context. These

networks are particularly useful for political opposition and further reduce state-centrism in IR. IR scholarship has uncovered how EU, NATO, and international organizations influence national foreign policies, but the party-political dimension of these regional and global forums deserves closer scrutiny.

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CHAPTER 18

Executives and Foreign Policy

JULIET KAARBO AND JEFFREY S. LANTIS

INTRODUCTION

Despite the centrality of states in international politics, the discipline of international relations (IR) often ignores the stateswomen and statesmen and the institutions responsible for generating the foreign policies—the foreign policy executive (FPE) (Hagan 2017)—that are truly at the centre of IR. FPEs are often treated as epiphenomenal in mainstream IR theories—foreign policy outputs are seen as determined primarily by systemic pressures of anarchy, economic interdependencies, and prevailing social norms of appropriateness. Even IR theories that do look inside states, such as some versions of liberalism and constructivism, tend to simplify treatments of executives. They are often viewed merely as proxies for broader conditions—democratic cultures, nationalist ideologies, class interests, and national identities—and not as principal agents who help determine global affairs.

This chapter highlights the critical importance of executives as the policy-making centres of states and seeks to build stronger bridges between IR and foreign policy analysis (FPA) on this topic. We focus on two key themes in FPA research on executives in particular—*power* and *processes*—and how they impact foreign policy. First, we assess research on the foreign policy powers wielded by modern executives—including formal, institutional, and constitutional powers as well as informal powers that come by virtue of executives as political institutions. We examine different ways executives are empowered and constrained and with what foreign policy effects. Second, we address scholarship on executive foreign policy decision-making, focusing on cabinet politics and bureaucratic politics and effects of fragmentation within the executive. Our discussion in this chapter draws from recent research within these themes and includes differences

across leaders and within regime types. This research illustrates FPA commitments to decision-making perspectives and argues that who is 'in the rooms where it happens'[1] is critical to understanding how foreign policy is produced.

We then identify future directions for research within these themes, calling for attention to the nature of states and implications for executive foreign policy powers and a widening of the empirical, methodological, and conceptual lens in analyses of executive foreign policy-making. These developments could strengthen bridges between FPA and IR, as well as between FPA and public policy and comparative politics. Overall, this chapter showcases the distinct perspective that FPA has on executives and illustrates how FPA research on executives, cabinets, and bureaucracies speaks to enduring theoretical, empirical, and policy questions in IR.

Building Bridges: Executives in IR and FPA

To its credit, IR has occasionally acknowledged the significance of executives in states' foreign policies. For example, classical realists such as Morgenthau (1948) paid serious attention to the nature of state institutions, their relationships with societies, and leaders whose diplomatic skills affected states' pursuit of national interests. Neoclassical realism sees state responses to systemic pressures as filtered through leaders and domestic political factors, including domestic institutions (e.g., Ripsman et al. 2016). Similarly, in his IR theory of rationalism, Bueno de Mesquita (1981) claimed that international conflict decisions can be assumed to come from a strong single executive leader making expected utility calculations (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2016).

Other works that straddle FPA, international negotiation, and conflict studies also include promising connections. Putnam put 'chief negotiators' at the nexus of external and domestic win-sets in international negotiations and acknowledged that these 'central executives' may have motives independent of their constituencies (1988: 459). Byman and Pollack (2001, 2019) also made a strong case for 'bringing the statesmen back' into IR, and international conflict studies recently recognized how leaders' experiences may shape policies (e.g., Horowitz and Stam 2014). Inspired by liberal democratic peace research, conflict analyses have attended to regime type,

including variations within democratic and authoritarian executive institutions (e.g., Kurizaki and Whang 2015). Further, perhaps, prompted by the rise of more autocratic leaders, IR scholars such as Jentleson (2018), Drezner (2020), and Nye (2020) have turned their attention to the leaders of FPEs. In short, this seems a propitious time to examine themes and theories that can further bridge FPA and IR in the domain of executives and international politics.

From an FPA perspective, IR attention to the role of executives around the world typically is overly rational, institutional, and objective; operates at an abstract level of regime type; myopically examines great powers; and often assumes narrow, singular motives for foreign policy decision-makers. Unlike IR, FPA began by looking at and inside executives, with Snyder et al.'s (1954) field-setting argument that government decision-makers, their organizational setting, and how they define international situations are critical to understanding foreign policy. Since then, FPA research on executive relationships with other domestic players and on inside policy-making processes has flourished, even as IR theory continued to make broad presumptions about these influences. Seminal works in the 1970s, including Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision*, Janis's (1972) *Victims of Groupthink*, and Jervis's (1976) *Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics*, were milestones in FPA's attention to executive decision-making, and its bureaucratic and psychological characteristics. Research focused on executives has continued the Allisonian tradition of examining bureaucratic politics and Janis's and Jervis's ideas of how decision-makers are susceptible to psychological dynamics at small group and individual levels. Indeed, the psychology of executive decision-making became one of the dominant areas of FPA research (see Chapter 19 by Houghton and Chapter 20 by Dyson, in this volume).

FPA research on FPEs in comparative perspective stresses the multiple motives and tradeoffs that decision-makers face (Hagan 2001). It recognizes different institutions and decision-making processes within regime types, without assuming that leaders and processes are *determined* by organizational structures. FPA scholarship on executives examines a broad range of states, including small states and middle powers, not just the presumed major players in international politics. FPA research examines the multiple interactions of agents within organizational structures and the

importance of subjectivity and path dependent processes at individual, group, and organizational levels (Hudson 2005; Kaarbo 2015).

This chapter examines two key themes in FPA research on executives. First, we survey recent research on executive power and constraints on the executive. These studies generally take an objective perspective, focusing on formal and informal powers, and see executives as active agents pushing against limits to their powers. Second, we turn to executive foreign policy-making processes, with a more micro-level focus on decision-making. These two themes are related as executive powers provide context in which decisions are made and decisions are expressions of executive powers. We leave many topics—such as psychological perspectives on leaders and decision-making, ruling ideologies in executives, and strategic advantages of executive constraints—to other chapters.

Executive Power

The power of the executive institution, its variations, and constraints on executives are critical factors that influence states' foreign policy. FPA scholars have long grappled with the executive's role. In many presidential systems, constitutions grant presidents significant formal foreign policy powers. Presidents often assume the role of commander in chief of the military, appoint ambassadors and national security advisors, nominate individuals for key cabinet posts such as secretary of state and secretary of defence (and thus often set foreign affairs agenda), and negotiate treaties (Goldgeier and Saunders 2018). Taken together, these formal powers render the president a powerful figure in shaping the foreign affairs of many different countries (Rudalevige 2008). Over time, US presidents have increasingly used their 'unilateral' powers—such as issuing executive agreements, national security directives, and memos to interpret law—in foreign affairs (Waterman 2009). Indeed, the pictures painted by Schlesinger (1973) of an 'imperial presidency' and by Wildavsky's (1966) 'two presidencies thesis' (with presidents constrained in domestic affairs but not in foreign affairs) have long dominated our understanding of the executive in foreign policy (Goldgeier and Saunders 2018).

Nevertheless, executives in presidential systems often compete with other players for influence. In a separation of powers system like the US,

different branches of government were assigned different functions to establish clear authority lines and guard against dangers of unconstrained executives. To constitutional experts Crabb and Holt (1980), this design represented an 'invitation to struggle' between the two branches. Congress can push back on executive initiatives, including through legislative and non-legislative challenges, and even the possibility of legislative opposition can pre-empt executive unilateral action (Kriner 2009; Marsh and Lantis 20 18; Lantis 2019).

FPA research has fairly recently begun to explore these dynamics in presidential systems around the world, in settings as diverse as Angola, Brazil, Kenya, Nigeria, Paraguay, South Korea, and Venezuela (e.g., Burges and Bastos 2017; Scholvin 2018; Milani et al. 2019; Ribeiro et al. 2020). Indeed, some very promising comparative analyses of Latin American politics have contributed to this discourse. For example, Neto and Malamud (2015) compare the relative influence of domestic versus international pressures on foreign policies in three regional powers—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—and find variable factors at work ranging from systemic balances of power to executive authority. Similarly, Malamud (2014) highlights how executives can consolidate power even in democratic systems, allowing for fewer veto points that could derail their pursuit of key policy objectives. He also explores the concepts of 'hyper-presidentialism' versus presidentialism and their impact on Latin American foreign policies.

These studies illustrate ways that presidents, working closely with foreign policy advisors, often assert day to day management oversight of the military. In these systems, presidents have made nearly all decisions about fighting wars and the deployment of soldiers, with little input from legislatures. Presidential systems also create potential for an executive, directly elected by the people, to pursue distinctive foreign policy agendas that represent ruptures from prevailing norms (Siaroff 2003). In various ways, presidents, sitting at the apex of FPEs, have exerted their own will and power in establishing what are the vital national interests of their countries, and using their executive powers to affect international cooperation and conflict (Pevehouse 2009). These dynamics seem further magnified in crises, when executives must make rapid decisions affecting international politics (Rudalevige 2008). A comparative analysis of presidential system responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 further

illustrates connections between types of governments and foreign policy responses (Lamony 2020).

Executive power and influence manifests differently in parliamentary systems, where there is no constitutional separation of powers between executive and legislative branches; cabinets are accountable to parliaments that elect them. Prime ministerial and cabinet resources are a function of parliamentary majorities or ruling minority parties or coalitions. As long as ruling parties maintain parliamentary support, most foreign policy is made in cabinets and bureaucracies, with the prime minister (PM) at the helm. Parliaments' role in foreign policy is typically weak, although the balance between executive and parliamentary power in foreign policy varies considerably (see Chapter 17 by Raunio and Wagner, in this volume). PMs enjoy formal powers in their private offices, advisory structures, and cabinet committee systems. In most parliamentary systems, PMs are 'first among equals' and control cabinet and ministerial appointments (and reshuffles), political agendas, and the dissolution of parliament and timing of elections. As party leaders, PMs have patronage and disciplinary powers to maintain parliamentary support (Strangio et al. 2013). PMs can even reshape bureaucracies, merging, for example, separate departments into one. As with presidents, PMs have informal powers as they are the public 'face' of FPEs and the countries' representatives in diplomacy. Some argue that PMs have become 'presidentialized', with more autonomy from the party, control over communication, leadership-centred electoral processes, and pre-eminence in international diplomacy (Poguntke and Webb 2005). For all these reasons, recent FPA research on foreign policies of parliamentary democracies has focused on PMs—their powers and leadership styles (e.g., Brummer 2016; Kesgin 2019).

Yet PMs can also be constrained by parliaments, party factions, bureaucracies, and other cabinet members. PMs may delegate foreign policy to other cabinet ministers, and these ministers may be rivals for leadership. Ministers may also be from other parties, as most parliamentary systems are governed by multi-party cabinets and key foreign policy posts are often held by different parties (Kaarbo 2012). The division of 'executive' power among multiple parties affects foreign policy, although in varying ways. Some have found that coalition cabinets are more peaceful in their foreign policies (Palmer et al. 2004), while others find that coalitions can be more extreme, both more conflictual and more cooperative,

compared to single-party cabinets (Beasley and Kaarbo 2014; Oktay 2014). The reasons behind these differences lie in the decision-making dynamics of coalition cabinets, discussed in the next section.

Authoritarian executives often possess greater foreign policy powers, compared to their democratic counterparts (Weeks 2012). Leaders of personalist regimes typically control all major instruments of state power and eliminate rivals (Geddes 2003). These systems generate expectations of strong loyalty by those around the leader. In other authoritarian regimes, power may be dispersed across a set of autonomous actors, including theocratic regimes, single-party regimes, and systems where power is shared between civilian and military authorities (Hagan et al. 2001).

More recently, FPA scholars have examined how differences in authoritarian executive powers can affect foreign policy. Key factors in authoritarian state conflict behaviour include the relative size of the leader's supporting coalition (Anderson and Souva 2010), whether the authoritarian executive is led by civilians or military officers, and whether the top leader has military experience (Horowitz et al. 2015). Studies of personalistic and highly centralized authoritarian regimes suggest that, under certain conditions, they are more likely to initiate conflicts (Croco and Weeks 2016). These differences in constraints on authoritarian regimes also affect foreign economic policy, including trade and exchange rate policy (e.g., Steinberg and Malhorta 2014) and states' international cooperation more broadly (Chyzh 2014). Research from comparative politics studies suggests that legislatures in authoritarian systems may constrain executives (Weeks and Crunkilton 2018). Foreign policy in authoritarian systems may also be affected by public opinion; military regimes for example, are more likely to pursue diversionary war, compared to party regimes, because they lack legitimacy (Lai and Slater 2006). David's (1991) notion of 'omni-balancing' sees weak authoritarian states attending to both external and internal threats to their survival. Others have extended the conceptualization of constraints on authoritarian executives as ideational and ontological in nature (Darwich 2016). Overall, according to Weeks and Crunkilton (2018), the research on authoritarian institutions and foreign policy demonstrates that 'the widespread image of the unconstrained, unaccountable dictator is flawed: authoritarian governments in fact often face substantial domestic constraints in making foreign policy' (416).

The constraints on presidents, PMs, and authoritarian leaders highlighted here primarily stem from within the system of government—how power is shared between the executive and other governmental institutions and how the power of the executive may depend on the support, cooperation, or subjugation of other key political actors. Executives also face constraints from media, interest and pressure groups, and public opinion, as well as external actors in the international system. FPA scholarship has extensively explored how these actors may influence what the executive does in foreign policy (and this is covered in other chapters of this Handbook). It is also important to note that FPA research on executives sees these potential constraints as non-deterministic. Executives have a number of tools available to them which they can use to counteract and pre-empt efforts to thwart their preferences. Beyond the formal, institutional powers noted above, all leaders at the top of the executive have various informal powers just from being the head of government, even though the nature and effectiveness of these powers will vary across different political systems. Informal foreign policy powers of the executive include securitizing issues as 'threats' and other narrative framing and manipulation strategies that may generate support for policies and may allow FPEs to act outside of or despite domestic constraints (Berinsky 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011; Sjöstedt 2017). In summary, the picture that FPA research paints of executive power is generally consistent with the 're-empowerment' of political executives argument in comparative politics (see Andeweg et al. 2020).

Executive Policy-Making Processes

FPA scholars emphasize that 'the' executive is composed of multiple offices and constellations of individuals identifying problems or opportunities, gathering and interpreting information and policy options, and making and executing decisions that constitute states' foreign policies. In most political systems, the executive consists of tiers or concentric circles of people and offices around the main leader. Other key actors include top advisors, who themselves often oversee government departments. Within each of those agencies reside high-ranking officials and numerous civil servants. Cabinet ministers serve as top-level political appointees who shape foreign policy

decisions, in discussions with the leader at the highest decision-making level and within their own departments.

FPA research examines the micro-level, tracing policy-making processes in the FPE that generate foreign policy outputs. As Hagan has noted, FPE decision-making deviates from rational and unitary assumptions in several ways: decision-makers face tradeoffs among different policy areas and audiences; foreign policy problems are often uncertain, complex, and subject to multiple interpretations; and policy-making is often fragmented which can lead to organizational inconsistencies and political infighting. In this section, we focus on different forms of fragmentation—bureaucratic, ministerial, and party—and how the FPE manages (or mismanages) tradeoffs and interpretations. We leave most of the psychology of decision-making to other chapters in this volume (see Chapter 19 by Houghton and C hapter 20 by Dyson), although we note some connections.

Fragmentation of the FPE along bureaucratic lines has long been an important part of FPA research on executives. Inspired by Allison's path-breaking work (1971), FPA scholars have demonstrated that powerful struggles among government agencies can shape state behaviour. Relevant bureaucratic actors are those numerous executive branch agencies that have any role—intelligence, interpretation, policy development, implementation —in countries' relations with the world. The bureaucratic politics framework focuses on 'the individuals within a government, and the interaction among them, as determinants of the actions of the government' (Allison and Halperin 1972: 43), emphasizing effects of bureaucratic roles, and 'pulling and hauling' among different agencies (Allison 1971). From a bureaucratic politics perspective, tradeoffs in policy-making and different interpretations of uncertain and complex issues are filtered through and amplified by the structural set-up of bureaucracies.

Although it has attracted numerous criticisms (e.g., Bendor and Hammon d 1992), there has been renewed attention given to bureaucratic politics, including in important decisions in US policies on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya (Davis 2006; Marsh and Jones 2017). Recent research has also focused on broadening applications to different countries including Canada, Germany, China, and Japan, and to types of policies this approach can explain, such as economic, environmental, narcotics, and migration (Keane 2016; Wood 2016; Jones 2017; Landau and Achiume 2017; Wong 2018; Pet erson and Skovgaard 2019). Research on psychological dynamics of

decision-making has noted the connection with bureaucratic politics. Yarhi-Milo's (2013: 9) study on selective attention, for example, argues that 'organizational affiliations and roles matter' for assessments of adversary's intentions.

Another theme in recent bureaucratic politics research centres on Allison's adage 'where you stand depends on where you sit'. Responding to criticisms that individual preferences and interests are not determined by their institutional roles, Hollis and Smith (1986) suggested that bureaucratic roles shape self and others' expectations for individuals' behaviours, but these expectations and how much they constrain individuals vary by organizational culture and the role holder's personality. Marsh and Jones (2017) agree, arguing that a restrictive notion of roles 'largely ignores the possibility of an actor possessing multiple (and potentially conflicting) roles in foreign policymaking' (542). The interaction between institutional roles and individual characteristics has also received attention in research on leader personalities (e.g., Cuhadar et al. 2017).

Executives in parliamentary systems certainly experience bureaucratic fragmentation in policy-making (think British political satire *Yes, Minister*), but FPEs can also be divided along party and party factional lines. At times, parties disagree on foreign policy and decision-making can be affected by coalition politics. A coherent research programme on how coalition politics affect foreign policy (Oppermann et al. 2017) focuses on coalition parties as institutionalized ideas (Özkeçeci-Taner 2005), the influence of junior parties (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Greene 2019), portfolio allocation (Oppermann and Brummer 2020), and variations across parliamentary systems (Blarel and van Willigen 2017).

There is less of a sustained research programme on party factions and foreign policy processes, although there is some recent theorizing on this topic (e.g., Martill 2018; Homan and Lantis 2019). While some research on coalitions suggests that multi-party cabinet dynamics are distinct from single-party governments even when single parties are factionalized (Beasley and Kaarbo 2014), there may be some similar effects, and similar to fragmentation along bureaucratic lines. In other words, fragmentation and diffusion of power may generate patterns of policy-making (hijacking of minorities, deadlock, excessive conflict, but also opportunities for creativity and inclusiveness), regardless of the nature of the fault lines. This is the core argument of the decision units project (Hagan and Hermann 2001)

which posits that, in the FPE of all regime types, there are basic patterns of authority that can occur and change across occasions for decision. Decision-making may be dominated by a predominant leader, a small group, and a coalition of autonomous actors. Depending on which decision unit is operative, different dynamics, based on leader personality, groupthink, or bureaucratic politics, will affect policy-making processes.

In this section, we have focused on the effects of organizational, bureaucratic, and party divisions, but it is important to note that psychological dynamics can interact with these FPE policy-making processes. The personal characteristics of leaders, for example, can affect how they manage bureaucratic and party conflicts (Kaarbo 1997; Marsh 20 14). Saunders (2017) argues that the relative experience between leaders and their advisors affects how much influence advisors have over foreign policy and Preston and ‘t Hart (1999) make a direct connection between leader personality traits and bureaucratic politics via leaders’ management styles (see also Mitchell 2005). Multi-party cabinets can experience groupthink or other psychological dynamics (such as minority influence and diffusion of responsibility) associated with small groups (Kaarbo 2012) and bureaucratic divisions can create both intra- and intergroup psychological pathologies (Kaarbo and Gruenfeld 1998).

Repositioning Research on Executives and Foreign Policy

This review of recent research on executives and foreign policy surveys important research programmes, but it only skims the surface. Given the centrality of executives in states’ foreign policies, FPA has paid considerable attention to how executive institutions and their constituent agents and processes affect states’ international behaviours. Whilst we see exciting developments in this recent research, our focus in this section is on how FPA research on executives could further develop. We see significant opportunities for advancement, particularly in connections with cognate fields (such as comparative politics and public policy) and contemporary research in IR.

Executive Power and the Nature of the State

Over thirty years ago, White (1999) commented that while FPA research is 'state-centric', it does not really theorize the nature of the state. White was writing in the context of EU integration, but his challenge to FPA to think more carefully about essential features of states was not directly addressed by FPA scholarship and remains relevant today. States' executives embody the sovereignty, autonomy, and legitimacy of the state, and they control the authority to allocate resources. Yet, if executives are representing and in control of states' foreign policies, it begs the questions: what is the state? How are executives responding to any changes in states? How are executive powers—formal and informal—affecting and affected by dynamics of state-society relations and changing notions of state sovereignty? While there is considerable work in IR, historical sociology, and comparative politics on changes in states, there is little work there or in FPA that directly speaks to the connection between the changing nature of states and executive foreign policy power. There are, however, a few examples that give glimpses into, and provide foundations for, development of this research trajectory.

Recent research on populism, for example, highlights different relationships between executives and societal elements (see Jenne and Thies, Chapter 13 in this volume). Populist leaders and their followers promote a distinction between the 'people' and the 'elite', and celebrate control of states by populist leaders who claim to represent the people. Reimagining the nature of the state in this way can affect foreign policies, as several studies have shown (e.g., Özpek and Yaşar 2018). Populism also raises other questions about the nature of the state. Chryssogelos (2018), for example, notes that some populist leaders claim to represent transnational movements or classes. And some trace the origins of populism to the changing nature of states vis-à-vis globalization (Zürn 2004). While some specific 'populist' leaders have been studied (e.g., Özdamar and Ceydilek 2 020), we know little about the effects of populism and populist leaders on executive powers. One exception is Plagemann and Destradi's (2019) analysis of Indian PM Modi, which found important effects of the centralization of authority that can develop under populist leaders. More comparative research is needed on this issue. How do populist leaders navigate the 'elite' foreign policy machinery of states once they are in power? How much does the juxtaposition between the people and the elite empower populist leaders to gain extraconstitutional powers? How do

leaders frame, as part of their informal powers, foreign policy issues in populist terms and do populist frames constrain what powers executives can do?

Hill's (2013, 2018) recent work on multi-cultural states presents another path for research on how changes in states affect executive powers in foreign policy. Hill argues that demographic trends within states—and related changes in class structures, faith groups, and national minorities generated through past empires and waves of immigration—are neglected aspects of societies that distinctly entangle domestic politics and foreign policy. Diaspora connections to communities abroad, for example, complicate foreign policy, as foreign interventions may spark citizens of the intervening state to join the fight against it and minorities' support for other states may lead majorities to question their 'loyalty'. Multi-cultural states certainly challenges any notions of a single 'national' identity or interest. While Hill's research raises the dilemmas for executives in multi-cultural states, more work is needed on how contemporary multi-culturalism and related strategies of 'assimilation', 'pluralism', and 'devolution' affect executive foreign policy powers.

Finally, how states are affected by changing international and regional dynamics—such as interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977), regional and global governance (Zürn 2000), evolving transnational norms (Ramos 2013), and changing meanings of sovereignty (Philpott 2001)—and how this affects states' foreign policies is another promising line for future research. While there is some research on the foreign policy effects of globalization and international governance (e.g., Keukeleire and Schunz 2015), missing is a sustained research programme on how these dynamics affect executive powers. How are executives constrained, and enabled, by these developments that affect states and state to state relations? How do leaders shape these trends? Leaders, for example, may act as norm stewards, effectively redefining the meaning of norms for governments and multilateral institutions (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009; Lantis 2016). This focus on executives using their powers vis-à-vis global pressures is consistent with FPA's commitment to agency, and a promising way of exploring how executive powers are affecting and affected by changes in the essence of states.

Executive Policy-Making: Widening the Empirical, Methodological, and Conceptual Lens

FPA scholarship on policy-making processes is impressive, and it demonstrates sustained commitment to examining micro-foundations and contingent processes. This is valuable, especially in contrast with the tendency in broader IR to assume unitary actors and rational processes, and the heavily institutionalist focus found in much research on political executives in comparative politics. The conceptual lens focused on executive policy-making that Snyder et al. and Allison introduced many decades before can, however, be significantly widened. We see three important avenues to do so: empirical, methodological, and conceptual expansion of FPA work on executive policy-making.

Empirically, FPA research on executives remains narrowly focused on security decisions. While these are undoubtedly important, allowing FPA to intersect with IR research on conflict, FPA should broaden its attention to include the full range of foreign policies considered by executives. This range is extensive, including global health, foreign economic, immigration, environmental cooperation, and human rights policies. There is some research that takes a decision-making perspective on policies that are not 'traditional' security issues, but this is a decided minority. There is no reason, *prima facie*, to believe that FPA approaches (e.g., on bureaucratic politics or coalition politics) do not apply more broadly. Evidence of decision-making processes on these issues might even be more available than for security policies. Taking up this empirical challenge might allow FPA to speak to a wider range of scholarship and a wider range of policies that policy-makers are interested in, addressing two goals identified by this Handbook.

Methodologically, FPA research on executive policy-making should look for new ways to analyse evidence, as well as new types of evidence. Previous work has largely used process tracing case study techniques, based on historical, archival, journalistic, memoir, and interview data to understand what went on behind closed doors. While each of these types of data have their limitations, FPA scholars have been able to reconstruct decision-making processes 'at a distance', even in contemporary cases (e.g., Badie 2010; Marsh 2014) with remarkable success. There are, however, methodological tools to examine executive policy-making processes that, while used by some, are underexplored. These include counterfactual

analysis (Hansel and Oppermann 2016), techniques associated with historical institutionalism (Mabee 2011), interpretative narrative analysis (Wehner 2020), qualitative comparative analysis (Boogaerts 2018), discourse network analysis (Eder 2019), social network analysis (Potter 2010), and experiments (Christensen and Redd 2004). FPA can also capitalize on its commonalities with the 'practice turn' in IR (as both see IR as 'constituted by human beings acting in and on the world'; Cornut 2015: 1), by adopting methodological strategies from practice research, such as participant observation, ethnography, and analysis of artefacts (Bueger 2014).

FPA research on executive policy-making can also broaden conceptually. For example, most work on FPEs focuses on contestation over policy preferences and on final decisions, but policy-making involves policy generation and implementation as well. Although some scholars have examined other stages of policy-making (e.g., Knecht and Weatherford 2006; Kuperman 2006), more work is needed. FPA research can also borrow from IR research on practices (which brings in ideas from philosophy, anthropology, and sociology) to incorporate concepts such as habits and habitus, social fields, symbolic domination, and patriarchy (Cornut 2015; Standfield 2020). Although practice concepts are successfully employed in diplomatic studies (e.g., Pouliot 2016), they have yet to make strong inroads into FPA. Critical IR ideas on timing have only begun to appear in FPA work (Beasley and Hom 2021), despite obvious connections to policy-making processes (Beasley et al., Chapter 9 in this volume). Work on organizational psychology and management also offers numerous concepts that have largely been untapped in work on FPEs. Keller's (2005) use of managerial grid theory is a rare exception, as is Kaarbo's (2021) work linking research on the psychological effects of organizational power to foreign policy. FPA can also return to previous work on problem representation (e.g., Sylvan and Voss 1998) and can focus on contestation within the executive over national roles (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016), ideas (Ozkececi-Taner 2005), and identities (Hintz 2018; Tsygankov 2019), to move away from the preference-oriented frame that dominates much research. Another return to previous work would look to group processes. The argument that small groups are greater than the sum of their individual members has lain dormant in FPA. Although methodologically challenging,

scholars should revisit small group dynamics in executive foreign policy-making.

Finally, much work on executive foreign policy processes focuses on what happens inside executive groups, as if executives were 'hard shelled'. Here, FPA could benefit from work in public policy to conceptualize executive policy-making broadly to include relationships with actors and processes outside the formal executive. The advocacy coalition framework (ACF), for example, captures activities in policy subsystems comprised of, 'actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are closely engaged with a policy problem or issue … and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain' (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1999: 119). FPA has recently incorporated public policy models like the ACF in its research (Brummer et al. 2019; Lantis 2019; Brummer, Chapter 3 in this volume). We see this as another fruitful way of widening the lens to analyse FPE policy-making.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have reviewed contemporary research on foreign policy powers and policy-making processes of political executives. We have also suggested new directions for research that would address the nature of states and its implications for executive powers and would widen the empirical, methodological, and conceptual lens for examining policy-making. These new directions would build bridges to connect with IR and other fields of study, repositioning FPA research in order to engage a wider audience.

These bridges are worth building. Despite the variation in powers and processes between and within different political systems, executives remain a primary locus of authority for states' foreign affairs. Executives sit at the intersection of domestic and international politics and make the decisions that constitute important international relations. As they filter inputs from both internal and external political environments, what they are like conditions what they do. The more research builds on FPA commitments to focus on decision-making and associated human and institutional characteristics—to understand what goes on in the executive rooms 'where it happens'—the stronger our explanations of IR will be.

NOTES

1. Paraphrasing Lin-Manuel Miranda's 2015 song in the musical *Hamilton.*

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CHAPTER 19

Decision-Making Approaches and Foreign Policy

DAVID PATRICK HOUGHTON

Introduction: The State of the Art

The art and science of decision-making—and therefore the study of *foreign policy decision-making* (FPDM)—has come on in leaps and bounds during the last twenty years or so. Particularly influential on research in the social sciences has been the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose contributions build nicely on earlier questions which had been raised about rationalistic assumptions. In 1954, political scientists Snyder et al. (1954) published a seminal pamphlet, which began to pull apart the notion that we make foreign policy decisions only after a careful consideration of information and options. Outside political science and at around the same time, Herbert Simon—a jack of many trades who found a home in organizational sciences at Carnegie Mellon University—was developing the notions of satisficing and bounded rationality (Simon 1957). These ideas also fundamentally questioned the idea that we undertake a full information search when deciding what to do. And the psychologist Leon Festinger (Fes tinger et al. 1956) was fleshing out the idea of cognitive dissonance, which essentially entails the idea that we discard information which flies in the face of our established beliefs. This violated the notion just mentioned, long popular in conventional economics, that we simply update our beliefs and attitudes when faced with new information—much as a computer might—and threw a sizeable monkey wrench into the rational actor model itself.

Some would look at the history of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and conclude that *plus ça change*, however; after all, many of these seminal contributions are very old by now. Moreover, most undergraduate and graduate courses in the topic continue to be taught in a broadly similar way, beginning with general theories, offering a look at the myriad forces which

make up foreign policy, and framing it all with something very like the ageing but trusty 'level of analysis' device.

There have been major changes in recent years, though, and this caricature of the field is increasingly inaccurate. Traditionally, the focus of decision-making has been on cognitive variables such as the content of beliefs, typified by the operational code approach (see Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) and by the analogical reasoning perspective (Khong 1992). Up until the 1990s this approach was highly dominant, encouraged by what was perhaps a positivist bias within FPA. It was long apparent that emotion is central to human decision-making—take for instance President William McKinley's reluctance to become involved in the Spanish American war in 1898 as a result of the highly emotional experience of seeing soldiers die during the Civil War, or the emotional agonizing that Lyndon Johnson went through over Vietnam in 1965—but emotion was for a long time thought too difficult to study. From this perspective, emotions were clearly an interesting aspect of human thought, but they could not be really be 'got at' empirically.

In what has probably been the biggest change of all, though, the study of emotion is now increasingly placed at the very heart of foreign policy (Renshon and Lerner 2012; Dolan 2018; Smith 2021). Emotions may even provide much of the information that decision-makers use in reaching the conclusion that (say) option *X* should be pursued rather than *Y*, something previously thought to be purely cognitive. As we shall see in this chapter, other significant innovations have occurred as well which have noticeably changed the way that we study decision-making in FPA.

Essence of *The Decision*

FPA, alongside International Relations more generally, is now undergoing what Juliet Kaarbo calls a 'decision making turn', in which a range of ideas from other fields are assisting in a proliferation of ideas (Kaarbo 2015). Naturally enough, in the 'borrowing discipline' of FPA, there have even been explicit collaborations between psychologists and political scientists (see Kahneman and Renshon 2007, 2009), so innovation in psychology has driven much of the innovation in FPA. Moreover, our understanding of

decision-making itself is becoming increasingly sophisticated. Take for instance this statement from neuroscientist Antoine Bechara:

> Decision making is a complex process that relies on the integrity of at least two sets of neural systems: (1) one set is important for memory (e.g., the hippocampus), especially working memory (e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), to bring online knowledge and information used during the deliberation of a decision; (2) another set is important for triggering emotional responses. This set includes effector structures such as the hypothalamus and autonomic brainstem nuclei that produce changes in internal milieu and visceral structures along with other effector structures such as the ventral striatum, periaqueductal gray, and other brainstem nuclei, which produce changes in facial expression and specific approach or withdrawal behaviors. It also includes cortical structures that receive afferent input from the viscera and internal milieu, such as the insular cortex and the posterior cingulate gyrus (and adjacent retrosplenial cortex), and precuneus region [i.e., medial area of the parietal cortex].
>
> (2011, 124)

Bechara is a neuroscientist, but imagine words like these being uttered by a political scientist in the 1960s or 1970s! The invention of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or fMRI) in particular, and the expansion of neuroscience in general offer ideal tools for revealing the role of emotions in decision-making in a more or less objective way. Since we now know what some parts of the human brain do, we can watch those sections of the brain 'light up' in response to a given stimulus. For instance, we can observe disgust in the human brain by looking at whether the amygdala fires up. But there are obstacles, of course. Most obviously, imaging is still notoriously expensive to use in research, and this is likely to have set back many studies significantly.

Not everything about decision-making is complex, of course, since it sometimes involves a rather straightforward process. On visiting an ice cream parlour, for instance, we might be allowed to taste (say) samples of vanilla, chocolate, and strawberry. Decision-making is partly a matter of how given options make us 'feel'. In this simple case we can easily compare the feelings produced by each and then select accordingly (Sharot 2012: 55). Second, choice is a matter of *prediction*, or 'projection into the future' (Bar 2011). In this example we can literally taste what each flavour is going to be like, but in many real-world examples we lack this kind of detailed information in advance, and consequently encounter what might be termed the 'sampling problem'. The list of options has also (helpfully) been provided by the menu here, but this is often not the case in policy-making. We therefore require another mechanism for projection, or what Gilbert and

Wilson call *prospection* (Gilbert and Wilson 2007). We know what we probably want from past experience, and we estimate the probable result of different alternatives in that light. Indeed, there seem to be close associations between remembering and projecting, which appear to take place in the same part of the brain (McDermott et al. 2011).

Although greatly simplified, this example illustrates at least three things about the choice process. First of all, decision-making is about choice between alternatives. Second, because humans are animals, choosing is often a matter of what psychologists call 'hedonic tone', or whether a given option will feel good or bad. It is also fundamentally a matter of projection into the future. Since we do not know what the future will hold, we must imagine what will happen if (say) we choose *X* over *Y*. When we make decisions, we generate alternatives and then choose between them. We do this by engaging in a kind of 'mental time travel' (Boyer 2008), imagining what the consequences of selecting an alternative will be. Common-sense or 'received wisdom' is sometimes enough to do this, as when we imagine destroying a whole area with B52 bombers populated by civilians or religious artefacts. Even more powerful, though, may be somatic markers, which suggest powerful 'dos' and 'don'ts', allowing us to peer into the *likely* future.

Perhaps surprisingly, much foreign policy theorizing has focused on the context in which decisions are made, rather than the character of decisions themselves. At least two of the classic works in this area—Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision* and Janis' (1982) *Groupthink*—focus on the bureaucratic-institutional and group contexts in particular, and consequently we know relatively more about the factors which surround decision-makers than we do about the act of decision-making *itself*. Most recently, however, foreign policy theory has turned 'inward', examining the latter rather than the former. Is decision-making primarily a cold cognitive process or mainly a hot emotional one, for instance? And how, simply put, do we decide whether to do one thing or another?

There have been important changes to our understanding of these issues. Some of this work tinkers at the edges of existing research, exposing gaps in our understanding which might be exploited, while some of it is more fundamental in nature, involving a new focus on what some scholars see as evolutionary roots of behaviour. Most notably, decision-making approaches are today dominated less by the kind of 'cold' cognitive approach which

characterized the field in the 1980s and 1990s (for a good example, see Khong 1992) and much more by 'hot' perspectives which prioritize the role of emotion. This perhaps reflected a positivist bias within FPA research, and a strong preference for things to which firm numbers could be put. It was long thought that emotions were far too vague and imprecise to be susceptible to 'hard' quantification. But it is now realized that in leaving aside emotion, the field had essentially abandoned what actually *made* human reasoning different from *artificial intelligence (AI)*: the simple but often overlooked fact that we 'feel' things in a way that robots and computers cannot. These feelings are difficult to replicate in AI, but they are nevertheless fundamental to decision-making.

Innovations within FPA Decision-Making Research

It used to be said of FPA that it was a field which was 'marking time'. Supposedly there had been nothing new published in the field for many years by the 1980s, and there are those who clearly thought of the field as dying a slow death. Most generations, perhaps, come to believe that there is nothing new under the sun, but this is self-evidently not true of foreign policy theory today (Aldan and Aran 2012; Kaarbo 2015). Surveying recent changes in the way that FPA is conducted, there are in my view at least seven areas where growth has been especially pronounced: the neuroscience of decision-making and the role of emotion; evolutionary or genetic theory and decision-making; the role of group pressure and the presence of 'polythink'; the link between foreign policy and constructivism/identity; the impact of neoclassical realism; the role of feminism and gender studies; and foreign policy in the Global South (see for instance Aran et al. 2021). Separate chapters are available in this volume on these topics, many of which deal with them in far more detail than we can here. So we will focus only on the first three innovations, partly for space reasons but mainly because all of these feature particularly significant changes with regard to decision-making theory.

The major area of innovation in FPA has probably been the focus on neuroscience and the role of emotion in decision-making. Antoine Bechara argues that 'there is no question that emotion plays a major role in influencing many of our everyday cognitive and behavioural functions,

including memory and decision-making. The importance of emotion in human affairs is obvious' (Bechara 2011: 73). This has in turn filtered through to FPA, which has long served as a borrowing discipline. As Dolan notes,

> increasingly, scholars are recognizing the influences of emotion on foreign policy decision making processes. Not merely feelings, emotions are sets of sentimental, physiological, and cognitive processes that typically arise in response to situational stimuli. They play a central role in psychological and social processes that shape foreign policy decision-making and behavior.
> (Dolan 2018: 1)

And yet—within FPA at least—the part played by emotion was not so obvious until relatively recently. In fact, its role is something which many had missed completely until the early part of the 21st century. It is not that FPDM wholly neglected the role of emotion, but the latter was generally seen as something aberrant or dysfunctional, a factor which inevitably *damaged* decision-making. Still influenced by the rational actor model and by hundreds of years of Enlightenment thought, it was widely assumed until recently that emotion usually had a *bad* effect on decisions (for an exception, see Blight 1990). But much research—especially that of Antonio Damasio—has shown that making decisions is virtually impossible *without* emotion (Damasio 1994). This recognition has had an explicit impact on studies of foreign policy.

Much of the running in this area, of course, has been done by students of mass behaviour rather than students of (presumably elite-based) foreign policy behaviour. But another problem in FPA is access to subjects. In most fMRI-based studies, the identity of the subjects does not matter as much as the fact that the subjects being studied are human beings. So this approach has lent itself within political science most naturally to studies of mass behaviour and decision-making (such as studies looking at voting or racial bias) rather than the elites of FPDM. One day, though, it seems feasible that foreign policy decision-makers will submit to going 'under the hood', as it is called. We should also note that some data on this topic probably already exists, though it is likely to be dispersed and covered by medical privacy laws. Even without much access to the techniques of fMRI, however, some scholars of FPDM have found innovative ways to study this area.

Various scholars have found different ways to study the role of emotion in decision-making (Dolan 2006a, 2016b, 2018; Mercer 2010; McDermott 2 018). Robin Markwica, for instance, has produced an important book-length

analysis of the ways that emotion shapes decision-making and coercive diplomacy (Markwica 2018). While realists emphasize *the logic of consequences* and constructivists *the logic of appropriateness*, Markwica presents a third way: *the logic of affect*. Drawing on two case studies in particular—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Persian Gulf conflict from 1990–1991—he throws considerable light on the surprising fact that coercive diplomacy only works in a minority of cases. From a realist perspective, one would expect coercive diplomacy to work 100 per cent of the time, since states should back down in conflicts with an obviously more powerful rival. Anecdotal examples—like Theodore Roosevelt's role in ending the Russo-Japanese war in 1904—appear to back this up. And yet, Markwica notes, such 'backdowns' occur only 17–36 per cent of the time.

While previous scholars might have explained the difference in terms of purely cognitive short cuts, Markwica accounts for it by probing the role of emotions. He discusses five emotions which are absolutely central to decision-making: fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. All of these shape the appraisal and action tendencies of leaders; in other words, they impact evaluations of the situation we are facing, as well as our assessment of potential courses of action. Coercive diplomacy, Markwica shows, thus involves a rather delicate balance. We need to provoke fear in the adversary for it to work, since only then is he or she likely to back down. You can provoke pride and hope instead if you fail to do this. Provoke *too much* fear, on the other hand, and you might produce a sense of humiliation, in which the adversary is likely to lash out at any obstacles. For instance, Nikita Khrushchev's decision early on in the Cuban missile crisis to escalate the situation 'was reinforced by a newly sparked sense of humiliation and anger at what he perceived as Kennedy's offensive behavior and ongoing denial of his identity as the leader or a co-equal power'. Conversely, Khrushchev eventually backed down towards the end of the crisis because of his 'growing fear of nuclear escalation' (Markwica 2018: 175–176). On the other hand, in 1991 Saddam Hussein refused to back down in the Persian Gulf situation because of his intensely wounded pride at the invasion of Kuwait, believing it a source of humiliation—a refusal to acknowledge Iraq's superior status—had now been removed. And for Markwica, it is this dilemma, between provoking too much fear and not producing enough which explains why coercive diplomacy often fails.

A second area of change in the way that we study decision-making in a foreign policy context has been the use of evolutionary and genetic theory to explain decision-making. The work of Kenneth Payne (2018, 2021), for instance, covers an astonishingly large area within the social and natural sciences, offering visions of the future which are disturbing to many. Influenced by research in the fields of psychology and that of biological and evolutionary theory, Payne argues that many of the heuristics and decision-making short cuts which we commonly use—habits which he refers to as 'glitches' in human thinking—are engrained in our natures and emerged over time because they serve useful evolutionary purposes; for instance, our evident bias towards optimism may have been beneficial for the spread of the human species, even though we are often *over*optimistic. 'Heuristics evolve precisely because they work to a greater good for the individual, or rather for their genes. On average, the benefits should outweigh the damage that might ensue through distortions in individual episodes', he argues (Payne 2018: 90).

This aspect of his research is influenced by pioneering work conducted by Dominic Johnson (2004, 2020; Johnson and Fowler 2011). His argument about overconfidence in war—a trait we often call 'hubris'—relies on the claim that overconfidence conferred considerable advantages on our ancestors and maximized our own chances of survival. In this state, we believe that we alone are virtuous, and overestimate our ability to control what happens around us; this bias may have been favoured by natural selection. For instance, just believing that that we alone are virtuous may improve our fighting abilities. Johnson is trained in both evolutionary biology and political science, and he uses evolutionary psychology to try to understand international conflict in general. For instance, he has examined the psychological roots of hubris, this tendency to overestimate our own power and capabilities. Why states go to war at all is something of a puzzle, if human beings are comprehensively 'rational' (Pinker 2021). If they were truly rational and in possession of perfect information, they would accurately assess the limitations of their own power capabilities and thus agree not to fight. But they fight anyway. According to Johnson, this happens because human beings have developed an inbuilt evolutionary bias towards overconfidence (Johnson 2004), a tendency which he also terms 'positive illusions'. These tended to confer various advantages on our ancestors, and thus, 'Humans are fish out of water', Johnson argues,

‘Modern life is far removed from our “natural” environment of evolutionary adaptation’ (42).

Johnson’s later work takes this even further, expanding the focus of study from overconfidence to cognitive heuristics more generally. Most heuristics are regarded as sources of error, leading to less than desirable outcomes like mutual misperception and war. But in an analysis which recalls the work of Gerd Gigerenzer on ‘smart heuristics’, Johnson suggests that this ‘decision trap’ view is only half right, since there are many situations in which heuristics are not only functionally useful, but also improve the decisional outcome (Gigerenzer 1999; Johnson 2020). For instance, the fundamental attribution error—in which we see the actions of others as intentional but our own as constrained by events—may well have proved disastrous in the run-up to World War II, but after the war had begun it arguably sharpened our sense of what Hitler was trying to do. Similarly, the in-group/out-group phenomenon strengthened unity and resolve against Nazi Germany (Johnson 2020: 8). So heuristics are often double-edged swords, and the fact that they have persisted over history suggests that they possess some strong evolutionary purpose.

A third rather interesting innovation in the field—albeit one which is not so much of a departure as the first two—has been the emergence of the ‘polythink’ idea in recent years, which has been popularized in particular by political scientists Alex Mintz and Carly Wayne (2016). Of course, the polythink idea did not spring fully formed out of nothing, and it can be connected to other (more classic) work on foreign policy group behaviour, such as the work of Charles Hermann and Margaret Hermann on small groups, Zeev Maoz’s work on framing, Paul Hoyt and Jean Garrison on manipulation, and Juliet Kaarbo on coalition decision-making (see for instance Maoz 1990; Hermann 1993, 2001; Hoyt and Garrison 1997; Kaarbo 2008). But the polythink idea effectively completes Irving Janis’ work on social pressure. Groupthink, as Janis saw it, is a faulty or dysfunctional process, in which the group first of all reaches a hasty decision and then ‘hunkers down’. Social pressure makes the group members impervious to external thoughts and ideas, which also makes them highly vulnerable to what Janis calls a ‘concurrence seeking tendency’. While the group should be considering all options and alternatives, the desire to reach concurrence and agreement overrides this. People appear to agree, and any remaining debate is closed down by self-appointed ‘mindguards’.

Although it is a relatively new term, ‘polythink’ may be seen as the opposite of groupthink. While some groups may indeed fall prey to groupthink, others can be paralysed by disagreement. The different members of a group may take radically different positions from one another, especially when an issue is highly contentious within society. Some leaders are also most comfortable promoting a diversity of opinion within a group and strongly dislike ‘yes men’, while others may wish to keep rivals inside their own tent (Goodwin 2016). Still others may end up with a diverse group of views almost by accident. When he became US president, Jimmy Carter, for instance, knew that he wanted Cyrus Vance to be his secretary of state, but he also wanted a man he was closer to personally—Zbigniew Brzezinski—to play a major role. In the event, Vance did indeed become secretary of state, and Brzezinski became national security adviser. And while both shared some common beliefs, Brzezinski took a much more strident line on the former Soviet Union. Moreover, they disagreed vehemently on what to do when the Iran hostage crisis occurred, and this eventually led to Vance’s resignation.

Polythink may also interact with leader characteristics in a highly unfavourable way. One leader who seems to have wanted a diversity of opinions within his core decision-making group, for instance, was former President Bill Clinton. Clinton fostered an open climate of disagreement amongst his advisers. This was probably a good thing, in many ways, but Clinton was sometimes disinclined to reach a final decision himself. He would often see too many ‘sides’ to an issue—he may have been a victim of too much cognitive complexity, in this sense—and the result was sometimes ‘analysis by paralysis’. Colin Powell, initially chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Clinton, chafed under the Clintonian style, for instance. Coming out of the more ordered National Security Council system of George W. Bush, Powell complained that he would emerge from two-hour national security meetings with little idea of what decision had been reached, and whether in fact a decision had been reached at all (Powell 1995).

The extreme of polythink may be just as damaging as the extreme of groupthink, and there needs to be some sort of happy medium between the two. Janis suggested just such a medium in his work. Called ‘vigilant appraisal’, he proposed John Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as one example of better decision-making practices. In October of that year, US intelligence agencies had discovered that the

Soviets were secretly placing nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. Behind the scenes, Kennedy and his advisers initially decided that they would have no option but to take the missiles out from the air, in a so-called ‘surgical strike’. But then they pulled back and reconsidered. According to Janis, Kennedy consciously reopened his mind and revisited options which had previously been discarded as ‘unworkable’.

An Area for Further Research: Somatic Markers

For reasons of space, we will focus here on just one innovative approach which might be pushed further than it has been, and we shall suggest that Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis provides one area which might bear fruit in the future. Some empirical work on emotion and foreign policy utilizes Damasio’s work as a foundational base, at least in a loose way (see for instance McDermott 2014), and it is widely accepted amongst students of emotion and neuroscience. As Jonathan Mercer—one of the leading innovators in this area—explains, ‘neuroscientists have led the way in revealing the extent to which rationality depends on emotion. It is now evident that people who are “free” of emotion are irrational’ (2010: 2). This insight, by the way, seems to have first appeared in *Descartes Error* (Damasio 1994).

A somatic marker is a feeling—usually of high intensity and derived from both physiological and psychological forces—which treats a given experience with an event or person as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, and which forms the major part of an emotional memory. These markers then mould decision-making in later instances, acting as a series of powerful ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’. They focus our attention or one thing or another, highlighting the likely future consequences of options. As Damasio puts it,

> the key components unfold in our minds instantly, sketchily, and virtually simultaneously, too fast for the details to be clearly defined. But now, imagine that *before* you apply any kind of cost/benefit analysis to the premises, and before you reason toward the solution of the problem, something quite important happens: When the bad outcome connected with a given response option comes into mind, however fleetingly, you experience an unpleasant gut feeling. Because the feeling is about the body, I gave the phenomenon the technical term *somatic* state (‘soma’ is Greek for body); and because it ‘marks’ an image, I called it a *marker*. Note again that I use *somatic* in the most general sense (that which pertains to the body) and I include both visceral and nonvisceral sensation when I refer to somatic markers.
>
> (Damasio 1994: 172–173)

This perspective always had a strong measure of plausibility to it. Although not familiar at the time with the theory, for instance, the present author interviewed former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance back in 1995 and came across phenomena which 'fit' the approach rather well (Vance 1995). I was interviewing the former secretary of state about his strong opposition to the 1980 Iran hostage rescue mission. Vance had earlier been deputy secretary of defense in the 1960s, during the escalation of the Vietnam war (Houghton 2001). Many of the operations that he and his boss, Robert McNamara, authorized then had involved the use of helicopters and the loss of life, and these experiences had clearly made Vance strongly disinclined to risk their use again, in the Iranian desert. The Iranian rescue mission was critically dependent on the use of helicopters, both in the initial insertion of the rescue team and then to get both rescuers and the hostages out of Iran. Harking back to that earlier experience, Vance noted in his own words that he had seen 'a lot of things screwed up with helicopters'. In the 1995 interview, Vance was initially quite controlled, but the topic of Vietnam made him noticeably emotional (Houghton 2001b). As he talked about the Iran raid, it was almost as if he was back in the White House Situation Room and the Pentagon of the 1960s …

It is strange, though, that Damasio's theory has not so far been used to account for the presence of emotions in FPDM episodes, since there are plenty of examples of powerful emotional experiences shaping subsequent foreign policy behaviour. As a private in the Northern army, for instance, future US President William McKinley—then at the tender age of only 18—was deeply affected by the experience of seeing terrible fatalities during the Civil War. Darting in and out of the lines at the bloody Battle of Antietam, McKinley reportedly brought coffee and food to the injured, but was deeply scarred by the experience (Hoogenboom 1995: 162–164). In later years, he would cite this episode as a strong influence on his desire to avoid what became the Spanish American war of 1898. The drumbeat for war was strong that year, but McKinley repeatedly avoided becoming involved until events forced his hand. Never one of the 'war lovers'—unlike Teddy Roosevelt and Randolph Hearst—McKinley had seen the human cost of war up close and personal, and knew what human beings were capable of doing to each another (Thomas 2011).

Of course, we do not need to go this far back in history to find similar examples. When she was Obama's national security adviser, Susan Rice—

alone amongst Obama's advisers—urged that the United States intervene militarily in Syria in 2013. Why did she feel so strongly? And why was she effectively alone? One answer is that Rice was the lone 'Albright figure' in the administration by 2013 (with perhaps the exception of UN Ambassador Samantha Power). Her morally crusading view of foreign policy predisposed her towards making a pro-interventionist argument, one might argue. One could also posit that she would have argued for this intervention anyway, whereas Obama surrounded himself with cautious realists. But a somatic marker explanation would add more detail as to why Rice felt as she did (feelings that other members of the Obama White House arguably lacked). In particular, the negative and highly emotional experience of Rwanda seems important here. As she later recalled, her experience of Rwanda was not second hand, but direct and visceral. In turn, the Rwandan experience involved an episode which Rice would never forget, in which she witnessed the aftermath of a massacre.

> To this day, I am haunted.
>
> When I stepped off the helicopter, I had no idea what I was about to see. It was December 1994, and I was among a small party of Washington officials who accompanied National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to a church and adjoining school in rural eastern Rwanda. A few yards from the landing site, the ground became thick with decomposed corpses. They were jammed so tight that it was treacherous … this brutal question still loops in my brain: how did we, the U.S. and the international community, let the genocide happen?
>
> (Rice 2019: 143)

Similar regret has been expressed by other participants (or non-participants) in the decision-making, such as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In later years, Albright would describe similar regrets to those of Rice, calling the failure to intervene the greatest mistake of her years in government. Could the slaughter have been stopped with timely US intervention? It is difficult to say definitely, but what we do know for sure is that a small number of African Union troops were left to look on helplessly as a genocide occurred (Albright 2003: 147–155). And much of the tragedy seemed to arise from the way in which our minds work: we construct simple but powerful markers for things which provoke a whole series of negative or positive emotions, and in this case the Somalia tragedy of 1993 loomed extremely large in 1994. We like to think that we approach each decision-making problem *sui generis*, looking at each issue in an entirely rational way.[1] But the perceived outcome of one decision affects another.

Rwanda presents a simple example of how negative markers can affect decision-making. The irony is that if the Somalia experience had been judged a success, the US almost certainly would have intervened in Rwanda.

A purely cognitive explanation of the power of earlier experiences would emphasize the availability and representativeness heuristics (see for instance Khong 1992, on US decisions in 1965 with regard to Vietnam). But we may have misunderstood what makes one situation seem like another, since a *body-based* theory like the somatic marker theory would argue that we recognize situation *B* as 'similar' to *A* because it provokes the same bodily or physiological feelings (e.g., fear or elation) that the original one did. The misery that Robert Gates felt as a young assistant to Stansfield Turner during the Iran hostage rescue mission, for instance, was something which he immediately recalled and felt 'in his gut' in 2011, as the Obama administration considered the possibility of a Bin Laden raid, for example (Gates 2015: 541–542). Clearly the link between cognition and emotion is a more complex one than we have hitherto believed, however, and any proper description of how foreign policy decisions are made must therefore account for both.

Conclusions

A comprehensive decision-making process, according to the rational actor model, goes something like this. While there is a risk of oversimplifying such models—decision-makers were assumed to possess 'perfect information' in the original version of the approach—but modifications have arguably served only to eat away at its core assumptions, and to expose its basic lack of viability. Accepting that people do not usually make 'utility maximizing choices' arguably makes it clear how flawed the basic core of assumptions is.

One obvious benefit of simply 'assuming rationality' on the part of decision-makers though—a tendency which has been avoided here—is that it allegedly becomes more difficult to observe the kind of regularities in behaviour which might aid in the construction of decision-making theories. But does the modern study of decision-making actually abandon the search for regularity in human behaviour? The (perhaps) surprising response has to

be ‘no’. The once radical argument that we are all, in Dan Ariely’s words, ‘predictably irrational’ has now become mainstream. While there has been no ‘*great rationality debate*’ within psychology or political science to parallel that raging inside economics (Dhami et al. 2019), the notion that rational choice approaches fail to comport with empirical reality is more accepted than it was before … And the title of Ariely’s book contains within it a clear answer to the question of regularities. His core argument is that ordinary people regularly commit *predictable* errors—the mistakes are not randomized—an idea which flows naturally from the influence on his work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Those two gifted scholars showed that we regularly use certain heuristics, such as availability or representativeness, in highly uncertain situations. We also know now how people typically behave in response to sunken costs, for instance. We know that people are overconfident and generally overestimate their own capabilities. We know that we often make decisions through comparison, that most people prefer rewards now to rewards deferred; that people overestimate the agency of adversaries or competitors; and so on. In fact, we now know in advance how people will probably behave in many given situations, so theory construction is still eminently possible when using ‘boundedly rational’ assumptions. Faced with *X*, we generally do *Y*, and this happens because the neurology of human beings is similar across cultures.

Take the typical reaction to the well-known trolley dilemma, for instance, originally developed by Philippa Foot in 1967 and augmented by Judith Thomson in 1976 (Greene et al. 2008; Eagleman 2017: 114–119). The neuroscientists Joshua Greene and David Eagleman have found that we tend to behave in predictable ways when faced with ethical dilemmas like this one. In Scenario 1, a train is hurtling down a track, and there is no time to warn workers on the track that the train is coming. If you do nothing, four workers on the track will certainly die. But if you flip a switch, the train will change track and one worker will die. Eagleman has found that most people will in fact flip the switch (this is known as the trolley dilemma). But consider then Scenario 2. Here the situation is almost identical, but in order to save the four lives we must push a large, overweight man in front of the train. If we do that, the train will stop and the four will be saved (this is the footbridge dilemma). Although this is an almost identical scenario—trading one life to save four—most people say that they will not push the man. So why the difference? Drawing on earlier

work by Joshua Greene and his colleagues, Eagleman argues that the real reason lies in the way that each situation recruits *emotion*; while the act of flipping a switch is bland and impersonal, the idea of killing someone by throwing them off a platform is deeply emotional. One solution is personal, the other intensely personal (Greene et al. 2008). But most people will act in ways that are known in advance, in *both* situations of 'predictive power' in ways that could not have been imagined in the 1950s.

This is effectively a foreign policy example, since decision-makers increasingly face very similar ethical dilemmas every day in an age where 'killing by drone' is a major activity, and foreign policy leaders face the dilemma of whether to kill an adversary, knowing that others—perhaps innocent civilians—may be killed too as 'collateral damage' if the strike goes ahead. In fact, human behaviour falls prey to a whole array of entirely predictable cognitive bases. One is *anchoring*, in which we reliably accord too much weight to the first piece of information that comes along. Another is *confirmation bias*, where we privilege data which confirms our existing biases and ignore evidence that does not, while another is *sunken cost bias* —sometimes known as the escalation of commitment bias—in which we persist with a course of action long after it makes any sense to do so. US foreign policy towards Vietnam is often given as an example of overweighing sunken costs, for instance, while the confirmation bias is all too evident in decision-making about the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and Iraq, and may even be found in US decisions relating to the Cuban missile crisis. In the latter case, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) missed a great deal of evidence that the Soviets were placing medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) on the island of Cuba, possibly because it did not want or expect the missiles to be there (Houghton 2012: 135–136). Similar regularities in foreign policy behaviour may be found when decision-makers, confronted with too much information, exhibit a tendency to privilege *negative* data and examples, possibly because such information is more powerful emotionally than positive examples (Johnson and Tierney 2019). Perhaps the only uncertainty is *which* bias will emerge in a particular decision-making case.[2]

While there is still a great deal of argument as to whether or how far humans have really been replaced by machines in the national security sphere—an issue which obviously has potentially radical implications for FPA and for the world it seeks to explain—there may be even bigger

changes coming than we have so far seen in this chapter, due to the revolution in AI (Payne 2021). AI in itself is certainly not new; Herbert Simon and the Carnegie Mellon School have been interested in this aspect of decision-making since at least the 1970s, and there was a major study of this topic as long ago as the early 1990s (Hudson 1991). But advances in this area are increasing apace and may eventually shift the *unit of analysis* away from human decision-makers to machines programmed to identify common problems and implement standard operating procedures in response (something we happily submit to when travelling in an airplane, for instance). As Kenneth Payne argues,

> for the entirety of our existence as a species, we humans have decided the issues about which we fight, and the ways in which we go about it. Tactics in battle and strategy ahead of it are both intimately connected to our biological minds. That is no longer entirely true—now decisions about using force are being made by other means. Grasping the distinction between human and AI decision making is essential for understanding how conflict will be shaped by the advent of sophisticated warbots.
>
> (Payne 2021: 3)

While it may be too early to fully appreciate the nature of that distinction now, we will surely have to grapple with it in the years and decades to come.

So we may increasingly be getting the unit of analysis wrong. In this vein, Payne argues, with the increasing use of AI—which can take decisions without being subject to human cognitive biases—our major decisions in national security are increasingly being taken by machines rather than human beings (Payne 2021). Indeed, they may even come to take decisions about strategy and war without reference to human beings. This is potentially both good and bad. On the one hand, it would do away with the kind of social pressures which give rise to groupthink, and bypass the errors to which human beings are subject. Computers do not make such errors, unless they are programmed to reproduce them. On the other hand, many would see the emergence of autonomous, emotionless decision-making machines as a truly nightmarish scenario until now confined to science fiction novels and movies.

Placing together the new literatures of emotion and decision-making with the literature on robots and decision-making produces even more (potentially disturbing) questions. If warbots are indeed increasingly taking national security decisions rather than human beings, how are they taking

anything resembling ‘rational’ decisions in the absence of emotion? We know from Damasio’s work that the latter is required in order to do the former, but we also know that programming robots to ‘feel’ is exceptionally difficult. The thought of an emotionless ‘Eliot’ computer taking decisions in the national security sphere, then, is something which most people would find troubling.

In keeping with the overall theme of this Handbook, there is manifest need to reconfigure FPA to play a much more central role within the discipline of International Relations than hitherto. The almost exclusive focus on the systemic level of analysis within the neorealism and neoliberalism of the 1980s produced a clear counter-reaction in the form of neoclassical realism by the following decade, but it is clear that neoclassical realism’s greater emphasis on domestic factors—which admittedly pushed things in the right direction—was insufficient to focus the discipline on the individual- and group-level decision-making which is so central to international affairs in the real world. International Relations as an area of academic study can ignore leaders and their decision-making—how they think, what they do and why they do it—only at its own peril.

Notes

1. Note that while this somatic marker produced what many now see as a negative result, this is not necessarily the case, since policy-makers may seek to repeat a ‘success’.
2. The best examinations of these various biases arguably remain Russo and Schoemaker (1989) and Hammond et al. (1998), although both arguably suffer from a profound tendency to see such biases *negatively*, as a sources only of cognitive error rather than evolutionary utility.

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CHAPTER 20

Leader Psychology and Foreign Policy

STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in international relations (IR) theory, commonly referred to as the 'crisis' or the 'end' of IR theory (Dunne et al. 2013), offer opportunities to those who study the psychology of political leaders (Kaarbo 2015). Specifically, IR seems to have lost confidence in two propositions that, until quite recently, could be taken to constitute the mainstream of the field. These apparently destabilized foundations are (1) that paradigm wars fought at the level of abstract general theory offer a productive path towards greater understanding and/or (2) that universal patterns of behaviour are discoverable through the testing of hypotheses across large data sets. As Lebow (2010: 195) bluntly puts it, these models of political science have reached a crisis point because 'none of its theories—especially those in IR—make successful predictions about any of the primary concerns of their fields'.

While such a crisis is of little concern to the world of knowledge *per se*—IR having generated almost no ideas that influence other disciplines (Brown 2013; Rosenberg 2016)—it is big, and potentially good, news for scholars of leader psychology. The loss of faith in abstract general theory has led to tentative incorporation of agent-level variables—such as the psychology of leaders—into the 'big IR' paradigms, particularly in the shift from neorealism to neoclassical realism and in the move away from structural and towards agentic constructivism. The crisis of faith in large-*n* hypothesis testing, too, seems potentially good news for some leader psychology scholars: those who have long argued that human beings are complex and so expecting to detect easily observable and consistent patterns of behaviour across time and context is likely to lead to disappointment.

IR scholars are responding to these developments in several ways, three of which are particularly relevant to students of leader psychology:

(1) Some in IR have de-privileged parsimony and abstraction, seeking to bring its propositions back to earth by including a wider range of variables and mechanisms in its causal models (Bennett 2013). The opportunity here for the leader psychology approach is to advance its concepts and methods as readymade tools that fill in the newly perceived gaps.
(2) Others in IR seem ready to abandon its underlying model of inquiry—one that posits that international behaviour is regular, predictable, and directly observable. A more expansive definition of what counts as science has emerged (Jackson 2010; Guzzini 2013), and the psychological study of leaders can exploit its distinctive advantages—that it wrestles with the inherent uniqueness of how a particular human being navigates a particular situation—rather than having to downplay this core insight in search of general patterns of behaviour that more readily fit the previous mainstream of the field.
(3) A smaller group in IR have begun to recognize its odd situation—that it theorizes about people (policy-makers) doing international politics in ways that those people find unrecognizable or irrelevant—and reorient themselves towards a partnership with the policy communities of states and international society. The opportunity here is to step back from the internal debates of a troubled academic field and try to offer insights to those on the front lines of international affairs as to how they might advance their understanding of international diplomacy.

I organize this chapter around these three routes the leader psychology community may wish to travel in exploiting the opportunities created by the crisis in IR. If choosing to take the first, or *neopositivist*, route (Jackson 2010: 58–82), scholars working on the precise measurement of leader characteristics will seek to educate, or ally themselves with, newly receptive IR theorists. If travelling the second route, *the analyticist* path (Jackson 2010: 123–170), scholars in leader psychology would work within a scientific framework that centres the importance of ideal types and counter-factual reasoning in explanation, in some ways recovering a lost tradition of leader analysis. They would concentrate on the full explanation of specific cases rather than the search for generalization to larger classes of cases. If choosing the third and final route, leader psychology scholars would pursue *policy relevant scholarship* (George 1993), searching for purchase in the world outside academia. I conclude the chapter with an evaluation of the costs and benefits of taking each route. First, however, it is useful to state the central tenets of the leader psychology approach to international politics.

What Are the Principles of the Leader Psychology Approach?

We might define the leader psychology approach as the investigation of a range of individual differences amongst political elites including personality, temperament, motives, cognitive style, beliefs, skills, and expertise (among the classic works here: Walker 1977, 1983, 2000, Herman n 1983, Vertzberger 1990, Rosati 2000; for recent reviews, see Schafer 201 4, Dyson and Briggs 2017, Hermann and Kaarbo 2020). These differences are understood to be sufficiently relevant to political action such that, were a different individual leader to face the same set of circumstances, it is plausible that they might respond in a consequentially different fashion (Gre enstein 1967).

Leaders are conceptualized as sites where the stuff of international affairs —the material, normative, and ideational matter which form the core of general IR theories—are integrated into the perceptions of the situation, action scripts, processes, and ultimately decisions which shape state policy (Snyder et al. 2002). To be a scholar of leader psychology is therefore to embrace the full range of causal possibilities identified by IR theorists, rather than to privilege one in advance of approaching the evidence. A leader in a given situation may act upon national security imperatives as shaped by the distribution of military power, as realists argue. A leader may act in line with the interests of their state's dominant social and economic interest groups, as liberals suggest. They may follow the social imperatives of the norms and ideas of the communities of which they are a part, as constructivists insist. Indeed, the same leader may do each of these things at different times, and at all times will weigh these factors along with many others in reaching a decision.

For a leader psychologist, then, 'big IR' theories are all seemingly correct at various points in time, there always being some choices made by some leaders at some time that make realism, liberalism, constructivism, and the rest appear to be accurate. The distinctive point made by the leader psychologist is that the leader is an active agent perceiving and deciding when, whether, and how to act on material and ideational imperatives, rather than a passive and empty vessel contributing little causal weight to the equation.

It should be stressed that whether a leader makes a difference to a particular outcome is an open not a closed question, and one that must be investigated on a case by case basis. In all instances, leaders matter in that state action depends upon their decisions (or non-decisions). They are always part of the story as a causal mechanism. But only in some cases will the leader exercise an influence, via their weighting of material and ideational inputs, or their introduction of some novel input from their psychological milieu, such that we might say they have acted as a causal variable, perhaps to a sufficient degree that some significant policy action or non-action depended upon their having been in a particular leadership position at a particular point in time (Walker and Post 2003).

An important role for IR theories, then, is to identify inputs to a leader's decision calculus, and to give some sense of how compelling and constraining, on the average, a leader might find them to be. But, for leader psychology scholars, a grand IR theory is a useful beginning but not in itself a sufficient frame for understanding why things happen in international politics. With these basics of the approach established, I now move to consider the routes available to the leader psychologist in navigating the troubled terrain of contemporary IR.

The Neopositivist Route

The guiding principles of a neopositivist approach to leader psychology are that leader characteristics are subsumable within the general class of human behavioural characteristics: leaders hold beliefs and have personality traits that are recognizably similar to the rest of the population. These beliefs and traits are posited to interact with a decision situation to shape behaviour in ways that are, at least in principle, regular and predictable. Leader characteristics are assumed by these researchers to be separate from and antecedent to the behaviours of the leader and, given the power wielded by the leader, these characteristics can exert a discernible influence on the course of events. Finally, the behavioural correlates of leader characteristics are assumed to be sufficiently visible that they can be observed and recorded in a reliable fashion.

The cognate discipline for neopositivist leader analysts is psychology, specifically the cognitive, social, and personality psychology subfields.

Psychology is an experimental science, whereas political science, in its neopositivist guise, is mostly restricted to observational methods. The absence of experimental control in addressing most political situations is especially acute when it is political elites, making highly consequential decisions that are the focus of investigation. The inability to administer diagnostic and priming treatments to subjects of interest and then measure behavioural outcomes in a pristine context without contamination from exogenous variables has prompted significant methodological creativity amongst the leader analysis community, and significant misgivings from critics about the validity of the subsequent results.

Perhaps the most prominent of these methodological innovations has been the development of isomorphic psycholinguistics—the attempt to modify psychological concepts to a political context and measure them via the speech of political leaders (Winter and Stewart 1977; Hermann 1983; Br ummer et al. 2020).

The most well established of these schemes are the operational code approach and the leadership trait analysis approach (Çuhadar et al. 2017; Se menova and Winter 2020; Keller et al. 2020). Both approaches centre upon measurement schemes that regard the speech of political leaders as indicative of their cognitions and, in turn, regard these cognitions as influential in their decision-making (Young and Schafer 1998).

The operational code approach takes the sentence as the unit of analysis, and disaggregates it into a target, subject, and transitive verb: asking, essentially, who is doing what to whom. It establishes a semantic map of the perceptual universe of the speaker on the issue of who is hostile and friendly, and who is more or less powerful. The construct is compatible with a variety of conceptual underpinnings. Consistent with the extant cognitive psychology of the time, the code was conceived of as a set of stable core beliefs that would be resistant to change even in the face of discordant evidence (George 1969). In more recent iterations, and consistent with newer paradigms in psychology, the code is seen as variant across situations and policy domains—targets, reflective more of temporary states of mind rather than of stable individual characteristics. Large-scale empirical investigations indicate that individual actors have set point dispositions (i.e., one leader is disposed towards a more cooperative international posture than another) but with rather wide variance over time and target (W alker et al. 1998; Schafer and Walker 2021 0).

The leader trait analysis approach conceptualizes seven leader traits grounded in psychology and applied to international politics. The accompanying measurement scheme relies on coding dictionaries of words linked to the expression of these traits. The seven characteristics are conceived of as personality dispositions rather than (as with the operational code) as expressions of beliefs and attitudes, and are therefore seen as less variant over time and context (Hermann 2003).

Operational code and trait analysis schemes were originally paired with hand coding methodologies, where investigators would work from a codebook to develop scores on each of the variables for a given sample of political speech. Since 2000, both schemes have more commonly been used with dedicated coding software; this automation has vastly elevated the consistency of scoring and the volume of text that can be processed (Walker 2000).

This consistency of measurement is the central virtue of the automated psycholinguistic schemes. The same sample of text will always return the same result, and so the characteristics and beliefs of political leaders can be measured with objectivity and precision. For an IR field that choses to investigate causal mechanisms within a neopositivist frame, there would seem to be significant value in this.

The promise of these neopositivist programmes is that they are swimming with the tide of much of mainstream US political science and IR theory. Their methods and analyses are legible to the rest of the discipline, and could be incorporated into existing IR theories newly interested in questions of agency without too much rethinking of core ontological and epistemological wagers.

One target of opportunity for leadership psychology scholars is to latch onto the upturn in scholarship on leaders seemingly sparked by Byman and Pollack's 2001 article 'Let Us Now Praise Great Men'. While some have found it hard to understand the attention this piece received—its major points had for decades been foundational assumptions of foreign policy analysis (FPA)—the effect it had in galvanizing a new generation of scholars to work on leaders is undeniable (a good review is that of Kertzer a nd Tingley 2018). Some of these scholars are explicitly grounding their approach in leaders' dispositional characteristics, tying these to variables of interest in IR such as state resolve or perceptions of domestic versus international sources of international instability (Saunders 2011; Kertzer 20

16). One way in which 'traditional' leader psychology might be useful to this new wave is in encouraging a slightly less mechanistic view of leaders, who are often presented in the new literature as falling on one or the other side of a simple (often dichotomous) scheme. This is understandable and perhaps necessary when the primary goal is to speak to general concerns in IR—and this work is exceptional in so doing—but it does on occasion present a less nuanced view of the leader and the situation he or she faces than has been customary in scholarship on the subject.

A second target of opportunity for leader psychology scholars is the neoclassical realism research programme (Rose 1998; Lobell et al. 2009; Wivel, Chapter 6 in this volume). This group of scholars, finding systemic realism to be a dead end, argue that environmental power imperatives are mediated by domestic variables, prominently including the perceptions of the foreign policy executive. The distribution of power sets the menu of options for the state, they suggest, but it is its decision-makers who make the choice from the strategies and actions on offer.

These are assumptions locatable in the FPA subfield since its inception, and so it is therefore essentially costless for leader psychology scholars to align themselves with neoclassical realists. Some have argued that the neoclassical realist approach is so underspecified as to be consistent with any reasonable choice that a statesperson could make in any given set of circumstances (Narizny 2017). The hard work of determining which of several options consistent with the distribution of power was chosen—and why—begins, rather than ends, with the adoption of a neoclassical realist approach.

This can be an advantageous alliance, too, for neoclassical realists, who can begin to answer the charges of *ad hoc*-ism by adopting a more consistent approach to the conceptualization and measurement of their foreign policy executive variable. The operational code approach, in particular, seems to be a very close fit with neoclassical realist ideas. Operational code measures focus upon perceptions of power and hostility—two central realist variables. And both approaches—the neoclassical realist theory and the operational code measurement scheme—adopt a positivist standpoint and are therefore epistemologically compatible.

A case can also be made for an alliance with constructivism (see Kowert and Barkin, Chapter 4 in this volume). As pointed out by David Patrick Houghton (2007), constructivists' focus on subjective perception rather than

material determinism was long anticipated by the foreign policy decision-making scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s. If leader psychology scholars find that their focus on the subjective ideas held by political elites can be made more palatable to IR colleagues by calling this research constructivist, then there seems to be some profit in doing so. As with neoclassical realism, constructivism *per se* is underspecified (Moravcsik 1999), lacking most obviously a theory of which ideas matter when and how these ideas are translated from free-floating constructs into concrete policy actions. Calling leader psychology research constructivist therefore imposes little practical constraint on the substance of the argument. One could raise some quibbles about the compatibility of the epistemological underpinnings of constructivism and leader psychology but, once the goal is to explain specific actions in specific circumstances, it is hard for constructivism to avoid investigating the ideas in the heads of specific decision-makers, and at that point they are forced onto the field of play long occupied by leader psychology.

These alliances had been difficult prior to the crisis of IR theory, as IR scholars continued to insist on the necessity of generalization in service of the ultimate goal of uncovering the one true grand theory. If the current crisis has indeed led to an abandonment of this goal, however, then the more modest assumptions of leader psychologists—that generalizations from specific instances to larger universes are inherently limited by the complexity of elite psychological systems—may be more readily accepted.

A further target of opportunity for the neopositivist inclined leader psychology scholar is the slew of recent IR research that names political leaders as crucial variables but fails to investigate their psychological characteristics (for an extensive review of this literature, see Dyson and Briggs 2017). This recent scholarship assumes that leader actions are significant, but seeks to render these actions predictable through a flat assumption of rationality or through investigation of biographical (not psychological) characteristics that are presumed to condition behaviour (Horowitz et al. 2015).

The flat assumption of rationality allows scholars to study leaders without imposing the heavy research burden of investigating their perceptions and action scripts in specific circumstances. A common approach in this style of research is to specify, via assumption, some utility all leaders are assumed to maximize—such as survival in office—specify

via deduction some behaviours that seem consistent with that goal, and then search a data set for an aggregate correlation between the behaviour and a political outcome. A follow up study is often conducted where one or two cases consistent with the aggregate trend are examined in detail in order to validate the causal chain.

This line of research is valuable and interesting, but it is far from exhaustive of the potential for understanding politics offered by a focus on leaders. In particular, the aggregate-level correlations between an assumedly rationality-driven behaviour and a political outcome often reach statistical significance in large data sets, but are sometimes unimpressive in substantive terms. This is because the rationality assumption is consistent with a wide range of political behaviours, and the specific ways in which leaders conceive of what is rational for their situation is similarly varied. Thus more detailed investigations of how the leader perceived rationality in specific circumstances tend to reveal individual idiosyncrasy and a richer causal story.

Often, for example, the leader faces cross-cutting imperatives, each of which can be construed as pointing a rational agent towards a specific action, yet together (which is how the leader experiences the world) push and pull the leader in different directions (Putnam 1993; Mintz and Geva 19 97; Grove 2021). Then, the leader must decide which imperative to satisfy and which to downplay, with this decision driven by the leader's beliefs and dispositions. The clearest conflict between duelling rational imperatives comes when an action that is instrumental at the international-level conflicts with what is rational from the standpoint of the leader's domestic politics.

Further, some leaders in some circumstances behave in ways that appear to be objectively irrational, and so their cases fall off the regression line of large-*n* studies. These cases are particularly interesting because the behaviours are excellent candidates to have been driven by some factor internal to the leader's psychology. For example, in his interactions with the United States from 1990 to 2003, Saddam Hussein of Iraq behaved in such a way as to bring about the destruction of his regime and, eventually, his own execution. His behaviour was, almost literally, suicidal, and so a frame of instrumental rationality would seem to be unconvincing. Close examination of the case revealed a slew Saddam's idiosyncratic beliefs and perceptions, and these errors proved so confusing to his interlocutors that the United States, itself, began to act in ways counter to its own best

interests. Saddam's psychology as a leader proves indispensable to explaining deviations from optimal strategy in the US-Iraq dyad (Duelfer and Dyson 2011). Thus, the leader psychology can productively align with scholarship assuming rationality in political elites. While the rationality assumption tends to be a useful first cut, and to explain good amounts of the variance at the aggregate level, more detailed examinations of consequential cases can be conducted by leader psychology scholars to explain how, precisely, a personal rationality was constructed by the leader in question.

The Analyticist Route

In the second possible direction for leader analysis to take, we might embrace rather than hide from the distinctive features of the leader psychology approach: that it centres particular humans taking consequential actions in historically unique circumstances. In this second route, the goal is to fully comprehend the distinctive features of the leader in the situation he or she faces, rather than to find the commonalities of the leader situation with other leader situations as part of a search for general covering laws of behaviour. The aim is to properly understand a particular configuration of personality and politics, not to subsume that situation under a broader label.

One way to think about this is as a shift away from the neopositivist model of explanation and towards the mode of investigation of diplomatic history. Diplomatic historians are arguably much closer kin to the leader psychology scholar than political scientists. The focus in a diplomatic history is wrestling with the particulars of consequential international events with primacy given to understanding them fully, rather than flattening out these particulars so that the event can be subsumed under a covering law (Elman and Elman 2003).

A treatment of this difference was given by Martin Hollis and Steven Smith in their important book *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Hollis and Smith (1990) sought to distinguish between two types of scientific analysis. The first, readily identifiable to political scientists as the neopositivist approach, they termed 'explaining'. This involved a researcher seeking to stand outside of the situation under study and attribute to the actors involved a set of materially derived preferences that predict

and explain their behaviour, and by extension the behaviour of all other actors in similar circumstances. The second approach, 'understanding', seeks to see the situation from the inside out, as the key actors themselves saw it, searching via imaginative empathy for the meaning of the situation to the actor, and through these procedures attempting to understand why the actor might have behaved as he or she did. The *understanding* approach makes few claims about the generalizability of an actor's subjective understanding of a situation to other actors in other situations—these must be investigated on their own terms by the same procedures of imaginative empathy.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson re-engaged this distinction between types of inquiry. As part of a project to reclaim the word 'science' as a useful term denoting good faith efforts to produce knowledge, rather than a disciplinary cudgel to privilege one mode of inquiry over all others, Jackson (2010: 123–170) developed an approach he terms 'analyticism'.

The analyticist aims to provide coherent and clarifying understandings of social events through the use of ideal-type concepts as organizing constructs to interpret what happened in particular episodes (Weber 1949: 100). The focus is more on the full understanding of one or a limited number of events, rather than (as with the neopositivist approach) the development of covering laws of behaviour that hold in all similar circumstances. The scientific goals of coherence and understanding stand in contrast to the neopositivist goal of proof (or failure to disprove) and explanation. For the analyticist, relationships of cause and effect are heavily bound to context and to the understandings of the social actors involved. When the context changes and/or the social actors change their understandings of their circumstances and how they are supposed to act in them, then previously apparent cause and effect relationships will no longer hold (Lebow 2010: 5).

The scientific tools of the analyticist are the ideal type, the application of imaginative empathy, and the counter-factual thought experiment. The leader psychologist working within an analytical frame might approach the evidence—a particular leader in a particular situation—and attempt to determine the relative degree of coherence provided to this evidence by the invocation of a psychological ideal type, for example the narcissistic leader, or the black and white thinker. They will recognize at all stages that this leader situation is ultimately unique, that the manifestations of narcissism in

this instance may very well be confoundingly distinct from its manifestation in other instances of which the researcher is aware. The researcher must view the case through the lens of several ideal types, rather than decide *a priori* into which type the evidence must be made to fit. Working back and forth between evidence and ideal types, the researcher constructs the fullest possible picture of how the situation appeared to the leader (this being the role of imaginative empathy), and why, given this appearance, the leader acted as they did.

Other cases are brought into the analysis not as more instances of the same cause and effect relationship, but rather as a store of insight and suggestion to make the understanding of the case under investigation more precise. Finally, the leader psychology scholar may usefully run mental counter-factual thought simulations, considering the balance of possibilities for a similar outcome to the case if the leader had been of a different ideal type (Weber 1949: 173).

There is much to attract the scholar of leader psychology to an analyticist approach. In particular, such an approach neatly solves the fundamental paradox of neopositivist leader analysis: that one is trying to apply probabilistic concepts and aggregate modes of explanation to circumstances where the specifics of the situation matter a great deal (Powell 2017: S266). We assume, if we choose to be leader analysts, that individuals differ from one another and that these differences are sometimes of significant consequence. Yet the neopositivist view has us softening these differences in order that we might fit the leader of interest into a generalized explanatory framework. Moreover, the probabilistic nature of neopositivist explanation points us towards aggregate causal effects across a large number of cases assumed to be similar to one another in some fundamental respects. Yet, in leader analysis, what happened in the particular case—which is likely to be of extreme historical significance in and of itself—is often the most important object of scientific inquiry.

It might be objected that psychology—the source discipline for the leader psychology scholar, is a positivist science, and so using its concepts and theories in a non-positivist framework makes little sense. Yet contemporary models of personality are extraordinarily complex, positing multiple interacting layers of traits, beliefs, attitudes, motives, and narratives. The manifestation of a personality trait is posited by psychologists to be mediated not only by other personality traits, but also by a plethora of

experiences and social and situational cues, to the point that a model positing a strong effect across a variety of different individuals and different circumstances is unlikely to produce convincing empirical results, even if it is conceptually solid (Gildea 2020: 9). Psychologists have as their explanandum the human population—they are interested in aggregate effects that relate to specific situations only in terms of probabilities. They also, as noted earlier, have experimental control over their investigations.

The leader psychology scholar is operating in a different context and with a different goal. Their interest is the political elite making consequential decisions. Aggregate effects and probabilistic explanations are much less useful in fields of study with a low-*n* where each instance is of grave significance.

The seemingly more modest goal, of providing a coherent understanding of the reasons why a particularly consequential leader did a particularly consequential thing, may be the only truly achievable scientific goal in this area. In the heyday of 'big IR', the difficulty of aggregating leader psychology explanations into generally applicable covering laws was regarded as the failure that disqualified the approach from mainstream respectability. 'Lack of generalizability' was an easy, go-to argument for excluding leader analysis scholarship from the discipline's high-visibility venues. But if 'big IR' has collapsed, does that also emancipate leader psychology scholars from pursuing its goals, goals that were always unsuited to the distinctive characteristics of the leader psychologist approach?

The leader psychology field has a rich heritage of analyticist scholarship (Lasswell 1930; Neustadt 1991; Burns 1978). This approach dominated at the inception of leader analysis, before being set aside as the field of FPA followed the general disciplinary trend towards positivism. The classic work, both in substance and method, was Alexander George and Juliette George's *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*. Although the term was not *à la mode* at the time, George and George acted as analyticists. They had a deep knowledge of ideal-type psychological constructs and the minutiae of Wilson's life, and worked back and forth between the two as might detectives trying to solve a particularly complicated case.

> All this mass of material the biographer lets flow freely into him. He is the medium through which the chaotic raw data are digested, ultimately to be rendered back into an orderly verbal recreation of an intelligible human being … what kind of person he was, what his characteristic attitudes and defenses were and how they developed, what made him anxious, what gratified him, what goals and values he adopted, how he went about pursuing them.
>
> (Quoted in Winter 2005: 20)

These studies, which required tremendous experience, knowledge, and sensitivity from the researchers, who had to become expert in personality theory as well as the details of the person's life and the situations he or she faced, were incredibly time consuming and offered little prospect of being sensibly or rapidly aggregated into a large data set. Thus they offered non-replicable studies, without 'well-defined variables' and 'objective measures' (Winter 2005: 21). From a position of some prominence in the 1950s and 1960s, the approach fell from favour as positivist ideas overtook not only political science, but the field of leader analysis as well.

The research requirements, including extensive work with primary sources, were largely abandoned as too onerous. Such an approach, argues Jack Levy (2003: 59–61), creates an 'important practical problem' in that studying the primary sources for each case makes it 'simply not possible' for a scholar to build up a large data set of comparably studied instances. As the discipline moved towards valuing large-*n* studies above other methods, and as expectations for the rapid production of published research outputs were ratcheted higher and higher by the neoliberalization of the university, the desirability, in career terms, of engaging in years and years of research on a 'single case' fell precipitously.

These reasons for the abandonment of the George and George style of analyticism are, of course, specific to the positivist mode of inquiry and the disciplinary dynamics of late-20th- to early-21st-century political science. If one takes Patrick Thaddeus Jackson's argument seriously—that IR scholars are now open to different modes of creating scientific knowledge—then it may be viable for leader scholars to return to the model of intensive understanding of small numbers of vital cases, rather than flattening these cases into readily comparable data points in pursuit of large-*n* covering laws.

The Policy-Maker Route

The third choice leader psychology scholars might make is to appeal not to disciplinary colleagues, but to the actors of international politics themselves—policy-makers and the surrounding milieu of analysts in the intelligence and think tank communities (George 1993).

The underpinnings of IR have always contained an unresolved tension. On the one hand, there has been a desire to mimic the modes of investigation and knowledge production of the natural sciences. On the other, and unlike in the natural sciences, the subjects of investigation are actually capable of explaining why they do what they do, and are often willing to do so, if approached in a reasonable manner. To put it in the crudest possible terms, one cannot ask a particle if it is a wave, but one can ask a policy-maker whether he or she believes in power politics.

Why has this not always been the major mode of inquiry for scholars of international politics? While classical realists concerned themselves directly and consistently with providing guidance and advice to policy-makers, this connection was severed once the discipline of IR became self-consciously scientistic (Bessner and Guilhot 2015: 87). The rationale often given for ending the practice of interacting directly with policy-makers is that these actors may not understand why they acted as they did, and/or they may not tell the truth about it. Therefore scholars, distant from the action in all respects, must apply their theories to uncover the truth.

An alternative explanation, which I would like to diffidently suggest here, is that we do not ask policy-makers about some of our IR theories because when they hear about them, they do not find them to be accurate or insightful. One is reminded of the encounter between former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and a game theorist, where the latter explained his interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. McNamara just looked on in shock. ‘That’s not the way it was’, he said. ‘It was not a game and there were no chickens’ (Blight 1992: 135).

In my experience interviewing policy-makers, it is generally not fruitful to have them try to understand their actions and experiences in the terms of IR theory (even when de-jargonized), as these seem alien depictions of their world. Occasionally, someone will bring up Hans Morgenthau or Machiavelli, but mostly they will do so as folk wisdom rather than as an endorsement of a scientific theory. Much more often one is met with some

version of McNamara's response: 'It wasn't like that' or 'It doesn't work that way'.

One gets much further when speaking of actor-specific dynamics, such as perception and misperception, for example. And most relatable of all, to the policy-maker, is the portrayal of the world in the terms of leader analysis. That is to say, policy-makers experience international politics as being about personalities and interests, with the latter mediated through the former. As Henry Kissinger once said, 'As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make' (quoted in Byman and Pollack 2001: 108). Or as Robert Jervis (2017: 4) puts it, 'political leaders are less prone than scholars to homogenize people and … they devote serious attention to trying to understand the goals and perceptions of those with whom they are dealing'.

We might approach a re-engagement with policy in two ways: (1) by trying to understand the world of leader to leader interaction; and (2) by trying to provide scholarship that is helpful to policy-makers who need to understand their own contemporaries.

With regard to the first, the goal would be to try to reckon with international politics in the way that it is experienced by its practitioners: as a world of agents whose goals and *modus operandi* vary and must be investigated rather than assumed (fascinating work in this area is now being done by Keren Yarhi-Milo and collaborators, see Yarhi-Milo 2013; Holmes and Keren Yarhi-Milo 2016). Because of this, political leaders are avid consumers of information about their counterparts, and so it is important to understand the mechanisms of leader analysis within government that seek to meet this demand. Indeed the greatest concentration of leader psychology scholars may not be in the world of academia but rather in that of policy-makers—who must constantly make intuitive judgements about their interlocutors—and intelligence analysts, who try to craft useful profiles as intelligence or diplomatic product to support their policy-maker clients.

Understanding these dynamics can add to the verisimilitude of academic accounts of foreign policy, and avoid some mistaken analyses. For example, much was made of President George W. Bush's first meeting with Vladimir Putin, wherein the media reported that the wily Putin had ostentatiously worn a crucifix in an attempt to hoodwink the religious American president. In fact, Bush had learned the story of Putin's crucifix from a pre-meeting

leader profile, and used it as a way to establish a rapport with the Russian president. It was less about Bush's naiveté, and rather a lot more about the dynamics of leader interactions—which begin, as do all interactions, with attempts at small talk (Dyson and Duelfer 2020: 777–778).

Second, understanding these leader to leader and policy-making dynamics can sensitize us to important causal factors in foreign policy explanations. The goal of a policy-maker is less to think in abstract strategic terms about some given situation, and more to try to see the situation through the eyes of the other leader—an act of intuitive empathy that is second, nature to high-level politicians. In this quest, the policy-maker, especially if possessed of any degree of direct familiarity with their counterpart, will act as their own leader analyst and privilege their mental picture of their counterpart over the kinds of strategic analysis that might be offered by their intelligence service or, indeed, outside academic observers.

Sometimes this can lead to good foreign policy outcomes, as when President Kennedy had the benefit of the former Russian Ambassador Tommy Thompson's counsel during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thompson had spent a lot of time with Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev, and intuited that Khrushchev had bumbled his way into a nuclear standoff—an image that was closer to the truth than the analysis hawks were offering Kennedy of a Khrushchev engaged in tightly orchestrated strategic brinksmanship (Morris 2003).

On other occasions, an insistence on acting as their own leader analyst can lead policy-makers into trouble. President George H. W. Bush reacted to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessments that Saddam Hussein was likely to invade Kuwait by calling other leaders in the Gulf region, such as the president of Egypt, the king of Saudi Arabia, and the king of Jordan. Relying on their own personal experience with Saddam, they each told Bush that the latter was bluffing, and that the Americans should not make things worse by issuing strong statements or engaging in deterrence-focused military maneuvers. Of course, the analysts at CIA, looking at the data, had reached the correct conclusion about Saddam's intentions (Karabell and Zelikow 2006: 199).

The above might help scholars to see into the world as it looks to policy-makers, and thus produce more accurate analyses of their behaviour and, by extension, of international politics more generally. But can academics contribute more directly to policy-making? Scholars of leader psychology

might look to the work of Alexander George for a model of how to do this. George argued that academia could best contribute to policy by taking its abstract models and applying them to specific leaders and circumstances in a timely, jargon free manner, and suggested that, couched in this way, academic products might have greater utility for policy-makers.

In particular, George (1993) argued that questions of war and peace—the central concern of IR scholars—were less important to policy-makers than questions of diplomacy—in particular, coercive diplomacy. Defined as the ability to compel some other actor to act in a way you want them to, coercive diplomacy depends on accurately understanding the goals and interest of the other. These have to be investigated rather than assumed, and so George believed that the academic production of 'actor-specific behavioural models' on, for example, the best mode and intensity of deterrence or compellence in a given situation, would be of great interest to policy-makers.

Conclusion

In the foregoing, I have suggested three possible paths for the field of leader psychology in the study of IR. Each approach presents a set of advantages and disadvantages.

The neopositivist path carries the greatest likelihood of success if the goal of the leader psychologist is to engage the wider field of IR. With an easily understandable and still widely accepted approach to scientific explanation, and a good number of 'off the shelf' tools and methods, this brand of leader psychology seems well placed to situate its studies under the rubric of a more agent-friendly crisis era discipline. I would caution scholars choosing this route that the exchange is likely to be one way. When David Patrick Houghton argued for an alliance between cognitive leader psychology and constructivism (2007), his piece garnered a lot of attention from the FPA subfield but almost none from general IR scholars. Nonetheless, the neopositivist approach is well placed to take advantage of the new IR interest in causal mechanisms and middle-range theories.

The analyticist route perhaps maximizes the distinct advantages of leader-focused investigation, while simultaneously minimizing the possibilities of synergy with the disciplinary mainstream. I would like to

stress a further disadvantage here: that the emphasis on imaginative empathy and deep immersion in a single leader situation makes this approach especially time consuming and hence irrational in a productivity-driven environment. To imagine oneself into a particular high-politics situation requires a deep familiarity with many such episodes, as well as reserves of knowledge in politics, psychology, and history. Ideally, too, the analyticist researcher will have some lived experience, if not as a policy-maker then at least as having spent some time around them and within their milieu, as well as in the archives that hold the documentary traces of their activity.

The academic path for those interested in policy and policy-makers is sometimes fraught, as much of the academy values policy-related publications and activities less than activities targeted at other academics. Further, producing practitioner facing scholarship runs somewhat against the tide of the sensibilities of the contemporary political science department, reproducing, as it does, a focus on the 'masters of the universe' of high politics rather than adopting the critical or emancipatory perspectives that are now ascendant (Brown 2013: 494).

Crises and revolutions in IR theory have been declared before, and a cynical observer would note that much the same basic set of approaches always re-emerges after the revolution, albeit sometimes under different names. Even during the current widely proclaimed era of crisis, empirical analysis of journal submissions shows that the citation camps surrounding the 'big theory' paradigms remain largely alive and well (Kristensen 2018). While, then, there are many opportunities to be found in the current tumult of IR theory, and it is certainly exciting to the leader psychology scholar to see some of the old certainties of 'big IR' crumble, it remains, in my judgement, most likely that scholars of leader psychology will continue to be in a distinct and lonely minority. The best argument for studying leaders is what it has always been: not the likelihood of productive and prestigious association with other parts of the discipline, but rather the sincere and learned belief of the leader psychology scholar that individuals in positions of high power are the most consequential actors in world politics.

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PART III

FOREIGN POLICY STATEC RAFT

CHAPTER 21

Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

ATSUSHI TAGO

INTRODUCTION

Public diplomacy, a term which entered the International Relations (IR) lexicon in the 1960s in the US, has been a major tool of foreign policy statecraft over the last half century. The use of a variety of cross-border political communications and social exchanges is considered a key means to pursue an important foreign policy goal—gathering favourable views from all over the world towards a country and formulating an international environment where the majority of the foreign nations hold positive attitudes towards it.

During the two World Wars and the Cold War, the term 'public diplomacy' was more commonly referred to as *propaganda*. By the end of the Cold War and after the widely known concept of 'soft power' was coined by Joseph Nye (1990a, 1990b), public diplomacy entered a new age (Melissen 2005; Manor 2019), and that is most true in the age of 'digital diplomacy' which sees the expansion of technologies to communicate directly with people in foreign lands. Governments worldwide have specialized departments and agencies in charge of public diplomacy, or at least there is an awareness among them that professional engagement is necessary to do public diplomacy well.

Governments who are engaging in public diplomacy try to persuade the world that (1) the country they represent makes a positive contribution to international society and should be liked; and (2) the country's enemy and/or potential rival states make a negative contribution to the world and should not be liked. Public diplomacy, in short, is thus involved with psychological processes of framing and persuasion, and public and political communication is a key tool for the governments to affect the 'hearts and minds' of the people in foreign countries. Rather than military capabilities

and economic statecraft, like sanctions and international loans, political and social engagements with foreign countries through information (i.e., public diplomacy) is cheaper for a government (and thus is used more frequently in daily international engagements) and often becomes the core source of state power. If successfully done, public diplomacy can persuade a state's friends and allies to help it achieve what it wants, and prevent its enemies from getting what they want.

This chapter briefly traces the history of the study of public diplomacy in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). It then goes on to argue how the phenomenon and study of public diplomacy can be connected to IR theories. After that, it will explain how we can categorize the statecraft of public diplomacy and how they can be studied, especially with newly emerging methodological tools such as quantitative text analysis and online survey experiments.

A Brief History of the Study of Public Diplomacy in FPA

During the two World Wars, propaganda was a form of informational warfare. It is here that we can find the origins of public diplomacy (Cull, Culbert, and Welch 2003). Propaganda posters and radio broadcasts were used to influence foreign people, with the target audience ranging from enemy soldiers, the general public in an enemy country supporting a political and military leader to continue the war, governments and people in neutral states, and the governments and people in allied/friendly countries. Information could change people's minds and behaviour.

In the case of enemy soldiers, it could change their motivation to fight. Desertion could be promoted by the effective use of propaganda posters. In influencing neutral countries, information also mattered. The inherent virtues of one country and the vices of its enemy, aired on the radio, could change public opinion in third-party countries into siding with the country engaging in such propaganda. The information might increase *de facto* support for its war effort. Moreover, propaganda was necessary to maintain staunch relations with allies. In seeking to counter an enemy's information attacks that are being aimed at weakening alliances, effective information must be targeted to the people in allied states to sustain their belief that the enemy is in the wrong and must be defeated.

After the World Wars, the Cold War was dominated by a competition in propaganda between the two superpowers, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). To gain support for either liberal capitalism or communist-socialism, the US and the USSR each mobilized their resources to make themselves look better than the other (Shaw and Youngblood 2017). From sports to space, information making each side look better was translated into a variety of languages and transmitted by the media. Cultural exchanges were a key component of their propaganda.

In the mid-1960s, the American career diplomat, Edmund Gullion, who saw the propaganda competitions as a rather barren and dubious approach to foreign policy, coined the term *public diplomacy* and in so doing tried to distance overseas governmental information activities from that of propaganda, which had by then acquired serious negative connotations (Cull 2008). Public diplomacy also developed as a different concept from public relations (PR), which usually refers to a government's actions aimed at communicating policy messages to its *own* domestic public.

While some scholars tend to emphasize the difference between propaganda and public diplomacy (Melissen 2005: 16–18), we cannot deny their conceptual closeness and connections, and it is difficult indeed to distinguish the two concepts analytically. While it has been suggested that the difference between the two exists in terms of informational direction, Melissen (2005: 18) sees propaganda as a one-way information transmission and public diplomacy as a two-way communication process, in most cases, as will be seen later, governments engaging in 'public diplomacy' take the position that in transmitting their information, as the sole arbiters of authentic information, it should be received and comprehended as the only truth. No matter what we call it, as a key foreign policy statecraft, public information activities targeting foreign audiences will be considered public diplomacy in this chapter.

Scholars of IR and Political Communication have engaged in a variety of studies on the topic. Historical analysis and case studies used to be the mainstream methodological approach in Public Diplomacy studies (e.g., Hansen 1989; Tuch 1990; Manheim 1994; Cull, Culbert, and Welch 2003; Melissen 2005; Mor 2006; Forster 2015; Metzgar 2017; Darnton 2020). However, as behavioural methods and data such as cross-national surveys and records of foreign visits by state leaders become available, we are now seeing more scientific studies on public diplomacy.

For instance, Yusaku Horiuchi, Benjamin Goldsmith, and co-authors have conducted multiple scientific studies on soft power and public diplomacy. In their study appearing in *World Politics*, they asked 'do the views of their publics about U.S. foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world' (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012). Goldsmith and Horiuchi examined the question by using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries and information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003. Their regression analysis uncovered that foreign public opinion had a significant and large effect on troop commitment to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. They concluded that public opinion about American foreign policy in foreign countries affected their policies towards the US and the effect was conditional on the salience of the issue for the public.

In another empirical study that appeared in *Journal of Politics*, Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) asked 'have U.S. public diplomacy efforts during the post-9/11 period successfully improved foreign publics' appraisals of U.S. foreign policy?' By estimating the effects of high-level US visits to foreign countries on public opinion in those countries, they argued that American political leaders' credibility in the eyes of foreign publics is critical in shaping each country's attitudes towards American foreign policy. Empirically, their data analysis suggests that the effects of the visits were initially significantly large and positive. However, they also noted that it weakened once the 2003 Iraq war had begun and international media had started reporting on the negative aspects of the 'War on Terror' (2001–). Also, interestingly, they found some evidence that high-level visits eventually produced a backlash effect.[1]

Further, some scholars consult web search records for evidence tracing the effect of mediated public diplomacy. Tamir Sheafer and co-authors (2013) show societal value orientation in different countries primes different sets of values, which are then applied as a criterion for assessing the importance of foreign states. They used global web metrics to measure the visibility of foreign countries gauged by searching web portals in fifty-seven countries. The data show that countries systematically differ in recognizing proximity, such that democracies base their judgement on similarity in shared democratic principles, whereas authoritarian countries focus on affinities in religious culture. This type of cross-national data is

promising in showing how states prioritize a target country by what type of informational message they consider will generate a positive image of their own country in conducting public diplomacy.

As shown above, the key dependent variable of public diplomacy studies is *public opinion* (often called *attitudes*) towards a country, usually generated by asking if they favour, like, or feel positive about a country. Also, as was the case for Sheafer's work, some other variables might be used to study how a country is doing in public diplomacy engagements (such as *visibility of foreign countries on websites*). This suggests that public diplomacy research has been engaging the literature on public opinion within the FPA framework and how states utilize new technologies to promote positive images of the state via information dissemination. How good a state is at adopting those new technologies affects how are good it is at public diplomacy. Indeed, among the variety of FPA studies on public diplomacy, it may be that we are seeing many cases (i.e., countries) that are good at it while it may be that we lack knowledge on cases that failed.

Public Diplomacy and IR Theories

How then do those public diplomacy activities and research on public diplomacy connect to general IR theories?[2] A case could be made that they can be as well connected to a rationalist tradition as to a social constructivist framework.

Under the United Nations Charter, states have promised not to use secret treaties as a means of creating formal international agreements. The United Nations Security Council, which is supposed to be responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, meets in public and officially works out its resolutions at a public venue. The General Debates at the United Nations General Assembly are open processes, and other major international meetings (e.g., G7/G8/G20 Summit meetings) are public events, which welcome reporters to cover and report on them through mass media. Diplomatic interactions are now also carried out in public (Clemens 2011).

In IR theories, rational choice model traditions emphasize the value of information, for instance, as the audience cost arguments prevail (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007a). While most studies have only looked at domestic

audience cost, some research considers foreign audiences to be as important as domestic ones. On the use of military force in a short-term crisis situation, the foreign public is considered a valuable target for information (Thompson 2009). Governments are eager to transmit positive news about themselves to foreign media (Baum and Potter 2015).

To effectively communicate with a counterpart government, a political leader will issue public statements (McManus 2017), which will be openly seen by the audience both in domestic and foreign countries. While public statements could bind the hands of the leaders, the effects of the statements would not end there. They would be witnessed by foreign audiences and the stated information judged by them. Depending on how international incidents and resulting policies are framed and justified, foreign audiences may support the country or they may side with its enemy (Kohama et al. 2017). Information issued by that government may thus matter in formulating coalitions in crisis situations.[3]

From a longer term perspective, gaining a positive perception of ones country by foreign governments and people (i.e., foreign audiences) is an important asset for a country, increasing its positive image internationally. A positive image brings higher status and reputation in international society, and the higher status and reputation can generate a better international environment in which to achieve one's international political goals (Tomz 2007b; Renshon 2017).

In a social constructivist framework, by contrast, public diplomacy can be seen as one potential mechanism for norm diffusion and identity transformation (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Graham 2014). In many cases, public diplomacy refers to a particular international norm and moral standard in order to rationalize a country's policies and even its existence to the world. Also, public diplomacy efforts tend to categorize a particular position and group of countries/people as legitimate and positively aiding world peace and stability, while at the same time categorizing the opponent or other group(s) as a source of global problems (e.g., see how the US categorizes China in a negative light by arguing that the latter's government is ignoring international law and acting against democratic norms; while at the same time China frames the US as having a dysfunctional political system and a pronounced social divide). Public diplomacy activities could provide an emerging norm and standard, and help in framing particular countries/people as having a legitimate existence. In this regard, the

empirical studies on naming and shaming (Tingley and Tomz 2021) can be seen as studies on public diplomacy.

Beyond naming and shaming, Graham (2014: 536) argues that

> constructivist scholars may find new ways to investigate the connection between language and power, and especially the salience and nature of persuasion in IR, by looking at public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a mode of official self-representation for states, and the perceptions and objectives that foreign policymakers draw on in making public diplomacy policy provide a novel view on how states constitute their own identities vis-a-vis other actors in the international system.

Based on this account, public diplomacy could help formulate state identity and cultural self-image. If that is the case, the constructivist framework might be an important theoretical base to study public diplomacy and evaluate its effects in IR.

As the public diplomacy research in the FPA framework could be done using both rationalist and constructivist approaches and could be potentially connected in an empirical setting, there could be a future public diplomacy study to *bridge* the two general theories in IR. For instance, themes like status and reputation, both of which could be rationally and socially constructively studied, could be a good example for such an attempt.

Statecraft and Public Diplomacy

As a tool of statecraft, public diplomacy usually targets people's 'perception' of a country in general or a particular international policy that might be salient and attract attention in the world. For instance, Germany and the UK usually rank highly in 'soft power score rankings'[4] and this is based on their general national image.[5] By contrast, the British image following Brexit, or the German image with a long-serving and strong leader (i.e., Angela Dorothea Merkel) making a moving speech over the COVID-19 crisis could generate both an overall national image and a particularly positive perception over a country's policy position based on how this is framed and how it is portrayed in the media. Additionally, the target of public diplomacy can be narrowed by subgroups. In some cases, a particular public diplomacy strategy may only target the elite; alternatively, it may target some people with a common religious, ethnic, or national

background such as Jewish, Korean American, or Armenian American people in the US.

In terms of the instruments of this statecraft, government statements and the PR package are the basic tools of public diplomacy. These can be utilized in the event of a particular international incident and policy decision that might affect other parts of the world. A national branding strategy—an example can be seen in the Japanese Washoku (Japanese traditional food) movement that is now included in the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and mainly targeted at the international food industry and foreign 'gourmets'—is also a government-based public diplomacy effort that aims to spread a positive image of the country and its culture. Foreign visits/conferences may also be a chance for international informational engagement as a part of public diplomacy. They are relatively short-term activities. In the long run, cultural exchanges, such as exporting movies, manga/animé, and foods, can be considered a means of public diplomacy. In a similar vein, sports and other types of mega-events can be a chance of gathering international media attention and can be used as a means of public diplomacy. Similarly, a scientific achievement (e.g., a scholar receives a Nobel Prize) or having prestigious higher education institutions can be a source of effective public diplomacy by increasing the chance of spreading a positive image of the country/nation via those involved in that field of knowledge or those institutions.

These instruments can be categorized as either (1) informational or (2) behavioural, based on how they can be used to this end. In informational instruments such as a government's PR activities or the export of movies, direct human contact is unnecessary, and social contact minimal. By contrast, behavioural instruments require some direct human contact, such as through educational or cultural exchanges. In the case of educational exchanges, particular students are selected or targeted (such as for the Fulbright programme), while in cases of cultural exchange, such as Japan Day in Düsseldorf/NRW and Brazilian Day in New York, they are events in which anyone can join, being much less targeted by definition.

Based on these two features (i.e., targeted or not) and the two kinds of instruments (informational and behavioural), we can categorize four types of public diplomacy statecraft (Table 21.1). The categories are ideal types, and in many cases, a particular policy can be categorized into more than

one type (e.g., foreign aid such as humanitarian relief campaigns and disaster recovery assistance can be categorized as both targeted and non-targeted activities, but they are both part of the behavioural approach). The distinction of targeting and differentiating instruments can be important to understand the challenges of the empirical analysis of public diplomacy as a form of statecraft.

Table 21.1 Four types of public diplomacy statecraft

Instruments Targeted	Informational	behavioural
Yes: Specific People	Gov. PR / Social Networking Service / National branding[a]	Educational exchange/ Foreign visit and aid
No: General Public	General news / Social Networking Service / Culture export	Cultural exchange / Foreign visit and aid

Source: Author.

[a]On national branding and public diplomacy, see Rasmussen and Merkelsen (2012).

When a state targets audiences in foreign countries, the government will use a PR package. They will hire a PR firm and create a social networking portal identifying the people who they wish to be the main target of the informational campaign. For this type of public diplomacy outreach, the evaluation of who the target audience should be might be relatively easily done by using experimental methods (such as checks beforehand by conducting A/B tests—the term used for 'experiments' in businesses -- as many PR companies do). However, the success of such targeted-behavioural public diplomacy can be difficult to evaluate since it tends to be via a long-term engagement and may not fit with an experimental type of assessment. While, for example, Metzgar (2017) is a rare attempt to uncover the long-term effect of the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching) programme, it does not allow us to scientifically evaluate the effect of the policy (even though Metzgar considers the JET programme to be one of the most successful examples of public diplomacy).[6] In general, evaluation of the success of long-term, behavioural public diplomacy efforts faces more empirical challenges than other types.

How then can we study public diplomacy and better evaluate its effectiveness? This is a tough question to answer. With new technological innovations such as quantitative text analyses and online experiments, based on a rationalist framework of international information transmission, we have recently seen more scholars using web-based text data and experimental methods to study public diplomacy. These allow us to evaluate the effects of the mainly informational side of public diplomacy efforts.

A study by Elad Segev and Menahem Blondheim (2013), for instance, uses both quantitative text analysis and network analysis to uncover the impact of America's global standing across popular online news sites. They first collected text data from news sites in eleven different countries (the US, the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Russia, China, Japan, Iran, Egypt, and Israel). These countries were selected on the basis of having a large number of online users and as representing cultural and media centres for smaller countries on their peripheries (Tunstall 2008). Their network of news links from news sites around the world clearly indicates that the US is positioned at the centre of the world's informational network.[7] It is mentioned in 20.7 per cent of all news links, compared to the next highest countries, the UK and France, both mentioned in 7.3 per cent of all news links. Also, it is mentioned together with 177 countries, compared to 156 and 155 countries for the next highest (the UK and France). As this successfully shows, an informational *network* is a key concept to capture how public diplomacy can work in the real world, in particular, in this digital age.

Related to this type of text analysis, Elad Segev's work *International News Online: Global Views with Local Perspectives* (2016) shows that the constant framing of countries as positive or negative is associated with corresponding global views that can last several years or even decades. Segev collected news text from 2009 to 2014 and identified the centrality of the US in world news reports; also, he showed a positive (the Spearman correlation was 0.314) and significant relationship between the amount of positive news regarding the US and favourable views towards it among ten other states in the analysis. A similar study was done by Wayne Wanta, Guy Golan, and Cheolhan Lee (2004), who found that the more media coverage

a nation received, the more likely respondents were to think the nation was vitally important to American interests; and the more negative coverage a nation received, the more likely respondents were to think negatively about that nation.

Those studies suggest that we live in a world with an American informational bias. While former President Trump did critically damage American value and its media reliability with his mounting fake news, world media reports are still mainly influenced by American news agencies and their reports (which is why former President Trump's impact on media reliability warrants further study from an international perspective). To evaluate the informational aspect of public diplomacy efforts, we must be aware of the reality of this US bias as being the baseline. This means that China and Russia are embarking on their international public diplomacy in a hostile environment and their information usually receives suspicious and doubtful reactions from many in the world. To obtain greater credibility in the information they broadcase, RT (Russia's state-funded news outlet) 'hosts industry heavyweights like Larry King, Chris Hedges, and Ed Schultz, whose contributions serve to boost the channel's legitimacy' (Elswah and Howard 2020: 624) and they often cite CNN, the BBC, and other Western media reports in addition to their own information based on Russian views. Given this baseline of media bias, an evaluation of public diplomacy success should begin with knowledge of what kinds of informational bias a particular media has. In this regard, increasing the number of quantitative text analyses of world media reports is a welcome and good place to start for us to be able to seriously think about public diplomacy policy evaluations.

In addition to the text analysis approach, experimental designs (including quasi-experimental ones) allow us to conduct a variety of novel studies in public diplomacy evaluations. For instance, Kohama et al. (2017) developed an experiment to measure how the general public would evaluate foreign governments' messages in an early state crisis situation and connect the study to public diplomacy. The team in a separately published study (Kohama et al. 2017) also conducted a quantitative text analysis of governments' formal messages and international media reports over fighter jet scramble and near-miss incidents between China and Japan, which occurred on multiple occasions in 2014. They found three key patterns—denouncement, self-justification, and silence—in those incidents, and used

an experiment to see what kinds of information announcement would garner foreign public support. They consistently found that the denouncement messages attracted the highest levels of support from the foreign general public as compared with either justification or no comment. Their robustness check experiments in the US and South Korea found that general doubts about a country (in this case, China for the US and Japan for South Korea) brought a floor effect and diminished any experimental effect of the denouncement—in other words, the foreign general public was not found to be affected by the government message if there was absolute distrust among the foreign people with regards to that country.

Furthermore, Agadjanian and Horiuchi (2020) ran an interesting online survey experiment to measure how much damage former President Trump, who could be seen by allied countries as an unreliable and irresponsible American leader, caused among those allied countries. They performed an experiment in Japan. The results suggested that while the source cue (i.e., Trump attribution) caused negative perceptions about the US, the policy content (cooperative vs. non-cooperative) had a greater effect in shaping opinion about the US. The interaction effects analysis showed that Trump attribution only had significant negative effects when the US policy approach was non-cooperative. The authors concluded that foreign citizens rely more on policy content in transnational opinion formation, and these findings demonstrate that even under a presidency that has alienated foreign countries and seemingly undermined US stature in the world, foreign opinion of the US does not hinge entirely on its political leader. That is, former President Trump has not irreparably damaged the American image abroad.

On behavioural instruments of public diplomacy, the efficacy of foreign aid as a tool of public diplomacy statecraft can be evaluated with scientific data and an appropriate causal inference strategy. Benjamin Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood (2014) used an instrumental variable to evaluate how American aid promoted a positive view towards the US among aid recipient countries. In 2003, the Bush administration started a foreign aid programme called the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The identification strategy for causal inference used instrumental variables measuring the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS problem in aid recipient countries. These instruments were strongly correlated with the amount of PEPFAR funding allocated across countries, but they were

likely to be uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity. Also, by using a large multinational survey with a battery of questions, the authors undertook multiple placebo tests and examined whether the treatment variable had a significant effect only on public opinion about the US. The evidence suggests that PEPFAR substantially improved perceptions of the US in recipient countries, and they are robust to model specifications. Such foreign aid can help build positive views about the donor country.

Research Agendas Ahead of Us

While there is an increasing amount of fine research on public diplomacy, there are still more areas to study. In particular, we have the following list of research agendas ahead of us.

National vs. Local Public Opinion

Up to now, public diplomacy studies have been focused on national public attitudes towards a country. This could have been due to the data availability since most public opinion surveys (e.g., Pew Research Center and Chicago Council on Global Affairs) cover the entire nation. In many cases, national public opinion in general could be just enough to evaluate public diplomacy statecraft; in some cases, local public opinion might be different from the national average and should therefore be studied separately. The following examples imply the importance of this point in future research.

First, the competing views provided by Allen et al. (2020) and Hikotani e t al. (2020) tell us that there may be differences in how American military public diplomacy is seen by the national and local public. In their *American Political Science Review* article, Allen et al. (2020) use large cross-national surveys to support their argument that American military presence abroad increases positive views of the US, since US military forces function as a public diplomacy agent via social contact and economic incentives.

While Allen et al. (2020)'s finding is important as a large data collection effort, Hikotani et al. (2020) offer counter-evidence by conducting replication data collection and extended experiments for the Japanese nation in general and in Okinawa, where the 70 per cent of American bases are concentrated. The newly collected data in Japan (both entire-nation and

Okinawa) suggests that NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitudes are prevalent and the greater the concentration of American forces in the area, the less the populace favour the American military; their presence does not help foster a positive American image.

Second, another study on Japan demonstrates the importance of differentiating between nation-wide and local public opinion. Atsushi Tago and Kazunori Inamasu (Tago and Inamasu 2016) published a blog when the former President Obama visited Hiroshima in 2016. They performed a series of surveys on a nation-wide Japanese sample of about 1,000 people, and on a similar number of people currently living in Hiroshima. They asked if the respondents supported President Obama's visit to Hiroshima itself, if they saw sincerity in the visit, and whether they saw the visit as a sort of apology (even though the White House denied this). The data revealed important findings throughout the nation as well as in Hiroshima focus samples. First of all, the visit was widely welcomed by both national and Hiroshima respondents. Of the national sample, 89.7 per cent of respondents supported Obama's visit, and in Hiroshima, 94.1 per cent. Also, people saw sincerity in the visit: 73.1 per cent of the national respondents answered yes to the sincerity question and 75.1 per cent of the Hiroshima sample did the same. In general, people in Hiroshima viewed the visit favourably and welcomed it.

Those studies tell us that national average opinion might be different among the most affected people in comparison to where public diplomacy is targeted or happening. It is therefore very important to distinguish the national average from those most affected by the foreign engagements. Also, it is not just a national vs. local divide that must be considered; in global public diplomacy studies, we must admit that there is a huge data divide between advanced democracies and others. Many of the existing studies have been performed in advanced democracies like the US, Japan, and South Korea. Unfortunately less information is available from the autocracies and countries less accessible to researchers. We need to do more to obtain data from these previously neglected regions.[8]

Variety of Informational Tools

In most existing public diplomacy research, words and texts are the dominant objects to be studied. Both quantitative text analysis and most

experimental studies have used words and texts provided by governments to influence people's perceptions of a country. However, in an age of public diplomacy through social media networks, foreign publics can have direct access to the pictures and movies provided by foreign governments. The ways in which such visual information changes the views of foreign publics is still undertested.

Language barriers always prevent foreign general public members from understanding what another country's government is saying. Visual information, by contrast, can appeal to those who may not understand a foreign language but who receive the message in a more accessible way. In this regard, an experiment using short videos made by a government agency is a promising area of future research in the study of public diplomacy. For instance, Asaba et al. (2020) offer an interesting study using American military-made short videos for their experiment materials. The thirty-eight-second video on the need for Korea-Japan cooperation significantly changed people's attitudes towards their counterpart country (i.e., South Korea for Japan and Japan for South Korea), compared with a control (placebo) video that featured US-Australia military drills. The videos were uploaded on Facebook and this type of experiment using real government-made visual information may open up new research opportunities.

International Organizations and Public Diplomacy

States may not be the only entities investing in PR; international organizations like the United Nations, WHO (World Health Organization) and WTO (World Trade Organization) are engaging in public diplomacy to gather international public support for the organizations. They present the importance of their activities and legitimacy of their organization by making and circulating a variety of PR materials. Kelley and Simmons (2019) and the special issue of *International Organization* reflect this type of thinking.

International organizations by their nature lack the resources of sovereign states. As such, they need to conduct global PR campaigns to ask people to donate money and support the activities that the organization is operating. The polls conducted by the Pew Research Center show how international cooperation through the United Nations (UN) and other agencies are welcomed (Bell et al. 2020).

Backfiring in Public Diplomacy

Up to now, this chapter has not asked whether public diplomacy efforts might backfire (i.e., activities that are intended to generate positive attitudes among the foreign general public end up generating negative responses from those exposed to the public diplomacy engagement). For instance, d'H ooghe (2007) evaluates Chinese public diplomacy and finds backlash moments when the Beijing government was seen to be hiding information. In a similar vein, Brannagan and Giulianotti (2018) show that the Qatar government could not fully utilize its opportunity to gain soft power promotion via the World Cup football competition and other international events because the foreign media started to focus on human rights problems in the country. This negative aspect of attempts at public diplomacy is rarely studied with data-oriented evidence; future studies should change with an effort to discover the instances in which public diplomacy backfires are most likely to occur.

Subgroup Targeting and Public Diplomacy

Related to the previous point, it is necessary to determine the best target of public diplomacy activities, as there may be different reactions among the information receivers, varying between positive, neutral, and negative. It is thus important to confirm if there is an interaction effect for a particular group that might lead it to react to a public diplomacy particular strategy a country might take. In Asaba et al. (2020), the authors confirmed that the thirty-eight-second American military-made video worked most effectively for left-wing Koreans and right-wing Japanese.

An interesting problem here is about the relationship between subgroup targeting and backfiring. For instance, for American Jews, some information produced by the Israeli government to justify the Israeli position over the Palestinian issue may be persuasive and win the hearts and minds of the information receivers. But the exact same information might offend many Arab Americans and other pro-Palestinian people in the world. As information can be shared easily through social networks and over the Internet, this structure of dilemma between the subgroup targeting and backfiring can be seen in many cases. There should be more research on this in the future.

Public Diplomacy in an Age of Fake News

Graham (2014) in her article entitled 'Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion' in *International Studies Review* argues that emotional expression is key to studying public diplomacy.[9] This may be an important point, especially when we face increasing levels of fake news, which could strongly appeal to our emotions. In an age of fake news and misinformation, we need to understand how people respond to foreign information in trying to gather support for a country or a country's policy position.

Fake news studies are accumulating in American Politics and Comparative Politics fields. Unfortunately, however, this is not fully elaborated as a research agenda in IR. Fake news is something that scholars should not ignore. The problem in IR is about truth judgements. For the Palestinians, for the Jews in Israel, for the Japanese and for Koreans, the 'truth' is different; their identity could be based on their making an opposite interpretation of the facts. Therefore, fake news is hard to determine and it could be one of the main reasons why public diplomacy studies have not studied fake information. However, as a new research agenda, misinformation in public diplomacy can be an interesting theme where an experimental type of study could be conducted to see how people see foreign governments as possibly manipulating information.

FPA Research on Four Types of Public Diplomacy Statecraft

Finally, it is important to ask what sort of FPA research could explain how a state differentiates between the two features of public diplomacy (i.e., targeted or not) and the two kinds of instruments (informational and behavioural) of public diplomacy (see Table 21.1). While the categories are ideal types, the distinctions of targeting and instruments provide theoretically interesting questions and should be explained empirically. For instance, a particular political regime (e.g., democracies) may frequently utilize some sets of instruments due to their rule of law reasoning and motivations, while other political regimes might not rely on those instruments. Or, bureaucratic politics might better explain those differences since targeting/non-targeting, for instance, could be highly context-driven processes and it would depend on how bureaucracy functions in that country in making foreign policy over public diplomacy.

Conclusion

Public diplomacy has become a key tool of statecraft in this age of open diplomacy (Clemens 2011).[10] Governments invest a lot of resources in their efforts to promote positive attitudes among the foreign general public. In IR, this phenomenon can be studied either by a rationalist or constructivist tradition. With increasing technological advancements, we are now able to gather more data to evaluate how public diplomacy can work and avoid its backfiring. The author hopes this short chapter offers a guide for future public diplomacy studies and a move towards a more scientific and transparent research approach.

Notes

1. For more empirical evidence on high-level visits and public diplomacy, see Goldsmith et al. (2021).
2. For more on the debate on the '-isms' in International Relations theories, see Tago (2017).
3. Studies on coalitions (e.g., Tago 2007; Vucetic 2011) empirically suggest that the legitimacy and framing of a military operation, and socially formulated common identity (e.g., the Anglosphere) matter in efforts to gather more states to join in a coalitional effort.
4. Statista Research Department (2022).
5. According to their coding rules, 'countries were ranked based on objective measures of government, digital, culture, enterprise, engagement, and education as well as subjective polling data on cuisine, tech products, friendliness, culture, luxury goods, foreign policy, and livability'.
6. Additionally, Allen et al. (2020) carried out a cross-national survey study on military public diplomacy, analysing how American troop deployment on foreign soil would affect the troops' recipient countries' perceptions of American people and governments. While this study is important, its design may be considered problematic and their findings too optimistic, as argued later in this chapter.
7. Boudana and Segev (2017) offer a related study to uncover how journalists contribute to generate political bias and how information flows in the world's news network.
8. See Henrich (2020) on our data bias in social science studies using surveys and experiments. According to Henrich, we are studying 'WEIRD' people, who are raised in a society that is Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic.
9. The USC (University of Southern California) Center on Public Diplomacy has a tag, 'public diplomacy and fake news', and the information linked there can help formulate a new research based on the fake news. See https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/tags/fake-news
10. In Clemens's words, 'the most successful US foreign policy of all time, the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, was proposed, jointly planned, and implemented in full public view'.

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CHAPTER 22

Positive Sanctions, Incentives, and Foreign Policy

TIMOTHY M. PETERSON

Classic work on economic statecraft explores the means by which states can leverage economic strength to achieve ends of foreign policy (e.g., Hirschman 1945; Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1985). A large literature explores the causes and consequences of negative sanctions—i.e., punishments for engaging in behaviours proscribed by sanctioning states (see the contribution by Martínez Machain and Allen, Chapter 23 in this volume). Yet despite the colloquial understanding that honey catches more flies than vinegar (Newham 2000), scholars pay far less attention to positive sanctions—i.e., rewards for or inducements to encourage preferred behaviour (Nincic 2011). At first glance, this asymmetry in attention is puzzling given that positive and negative sanctions are in many ways analogous; both are instruments of economic statecraft in which one state (the sender) forces another state (the target) to choose between maintaining some target preferred policy or enjoying some economic benefit provided by the sender (Baldwin 1971). In fact, positive sanctions potentially offer senders more flexibility in the design and execution of coercion while simultaneously reducing the risk of a target backlash that could frustrate the sender's broader foreign policy efforts (Mastanduno 2012).

Despite the apparent benefits of positive engagement, it is generally understood—or at least believed—that major global powers such as the United States more frequently threaten and impose economic restrictions than offer and supply economic inducements (Nincic 2011). However, the extent to which negative sanctions dominate foreign policy-making is not clear despite what has become conventional wisdom. A casual survey of international behaviour suggests that incentives such as foreign aid are used frequently. Indeed, a recent survey of the literature suggests that most states are involved in foreign aid as donors, recipients, or both (Apodaca 2017).

As such, a renewed examination of what positive sanctions are and when we see them is warranted.

The two major aims of this chapter are to explain the disparity in research output on positive vs. negative sanctions, and to highlight ways in which application of the positive sanctions tradition could enrich other research in International Relations (IR). Towards this end, I begin by reconsidering the distinctions between positive and negative sanctions. I re-evaluate the apparent asymmetries in the nature of positive and negative coercion, with attention to what influences the sender ’s choice to use one or the other. My re-evaluation suggests that prior assessments of inducements as more flexible and less costly than negative sanctions could be overly optimistic, possibly paying insufficient attention to the domestic constraints faced by foreign policy decision-makers (Milner and Tingley 2016), particularly with respect to public opinion (Risse-Kappan 1991). However, I also argue that the dearth of research on positive sanctions is most likely not a result of this fact, but rather persists because comprehensive data on positive sanctions are considerably more difficult to obtain. The difficulty even in identifying positive sanctions means that the study thereof has been limited, with some exceptions, to case study designs. Conversely, approaches to the study of punishments are diverse.

Next, I consider the research on foreign aid, perhaps the most salient—or at least most easily observed—example of an economic inducement. I explore trends in the study of aid that are complementary to the study of positive sanctions, as well as those that are divergent. This analysis highlights the key challenge to the systematic coding of data on inducements: identifying true sender intentions. Indeed, while the foreign aid literature has explored the (in)effectiveness of foreign aid with attention to donor goals, these goals often must be inferred due to a lack of transparency by foreign aid donors (Qian 2015).

I conclude by suggesting useful avenues for future research, as well as by suggesting strategies to overcome the difficulty associated with collecting comprehensive data on positive sanctions. I stress the utility of at least indirectly identifying sender goals to use foreign aid by exploring individual and group preferences—for which survey experiment methods could be useful. I also suggest moving beyond the transaction-based perspective common in the International Political Economy approach to the study of foreign aid, instead considering aid as a long-term investment

intended to alter a target's policy trajectory. Towards these ends, I suggest that leveraging a foreign policy analysis (FPA)-style approach that incorporates actors across multiple levels of analysis—from foreign policy decision-makers and individual citizens to international audiences—can enrich our understanding of the consequences of aid throughout the international system.

Identifying Positive Sanctions

'Positive sanctions' are more or less synonymous with 'economic inducements', 'economic engagement', and the use of 'carrots' (Mastandunno 2003), describing the provision of an economic reward—or the promise thereof—by the sender in exchange for some policy change by the target. This definition complements the more adversarial method of economic statecraft: negative sanctions involve the imposition of an economic penalty—or threat thereof—by the sender in retaliation for target resistance to policy change. The attachment of economic value to the benefit provided by the sender to the target is essential to the classification of economic statecraft, which otherwise would be difficult to distinguish from other categories of international politics, e.g. the security-autonomy exchange inherent in alliances between states with highly asymmetric capabilities (Morrow 1991). Economic engagement can also be considered distinct from international cooperation (Fearon 1998), though the potential for side payments to secure cooperative agreements highlights the at times blurry borders between these phenomena.[1] In order to clarify a relevant theoretical domain, I view economic statecraft explicitly as an exercise of power in which there is usually—though not necessarily—an underlying asymmetry in economic capabilities favouring the sender.

Economic inducements can be further distinguished by their time horizons. A short-term inducement or one-time payment is often viewed through the lens of a *quid pro quo*, or what Nincic (2011) calls *transactional* inducements. Long-term engagement, or what Nincic (2011) calls *catalytic* inducements,[2] are investments aimed at transforming the target state in a way that will be beneficial to the sender in the future. For example, inducements such as democracy and development aid could help facilitate the institutionalization of liberal norms that would put the target

state's long-term interests on a trajectory compatible with the sender's.[3] Mastanduno (1999) notes that these forms of inducements may be unconditional (or perhaps minimally enforced), but nonetheless help produce a transformation of target leader preferences that aligns with sender interests. Indeed, this goal might have motivated broad US engagement with Western Europe and Japan during the Cold War, and constitutes a fundamental behaviour of a liberal hegemon (Ikenberry 2011).

The distinction between positive and negative sanctions is not always clear. For example, once a sender has imposed economic restrictions and time passes (e.g., in the case of the US embargo of Cuba), a highly restricted environment could become accepted as a new status quo, such that the removal of sanctions effectively becomes an inducement.[4] Similarly, Hirschman (1945) argues that inducements are a means to establish economic ties—such as aid, trade, or investment—that could render the target increasingly vulnerable to the sender over time. Thus, the sender uses incentives in order to facilitate the use of negative sanctions in the future. And given that senders often mix carrots with sticks in order to increase the effectiveness of coercion attempts (e.g., Solingen 2012), separate consideration of these two methods of economic statecraft could lead to an incomplete understanding of influence.

Solving the Puzzle of Economic Statecraft

Baldwin (1971) notes that the target's calculations are fundamentally the same in the case of a positive or negative sanction; it comes down to the choice between some preferred policy and some economic benefit bestowed by the sender.[5] However, Mastanduno (2012) suggests several areas in which positive and negative sanctions differ in ways that should encourage senders to use incentives (see also Newham 2000), particularly emphasizing the more favourable tone and increased flexibility of positive sanctions. The puzzle of economic statecraft centres on the fact that, despite these theoretical asymmetries suggesting that positive engagement should be preferred by senders, negative coercion is more prevalent. Indeed, negative coercion arguably is a first resort in the foreign policy of major powers such as the United States. Accordingly, I reassess the theoretical mechanisms

underlying these asymmetries, and particularly the benefits of positive sanctions for senders.

Cognition and Culture

First, Mastanduno (2012) argues that the target's psychological resistance to threats of punishments constitutes an advantage for senders to use positive engagement. While Drezner (1998) provides a careful consideration of how conflict expectations influence the effectiveness of economic statecraft, it is equally important to consider how senders might cultivate good will and favourable expectations over time via calculated use of inducements. Incentives can be attractive and encouraging while punishments provoke fear, hostility, and resistance—features that can spill over beyond the specific issue under dispute. Sender demands backed by threats of punishment could introduce an audience cost for target leaders who demonstrate weakness by complying, or alternatively an audience benefit (i.e., rally effect) for those who hold firm (Galtung 1967).

These points highlight the role of cognitive factors in the use of economic statecraft, as rather than carry out a strictly economic cost-benefit analysis, leaders and their backers—including the broader public within democratic states—could view rewards vs. punishments in fundamentally dissimilar ways.[6] Notably, the optimistic view of ideational benefits of positive sanctions follows from a focus on the cognitive mindset of actors within the target. However, there is reason to suspect that actors within the sender could hold different attitudes. In particular, the US—the dominant sender since World War II (Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan et al. 2014)—often experiences negative public perceptions of positive inducement. Research suggests that inducements might be seen as a sign of weakness, while negative sanctions signal strength (Drury 2005).[7] Other work has found that unreciprocated cooperation can harm leaders (Colaresi 2004).[8] And recent experimental evidence finds that, while citizens are generally supportive of positive and negative sanctions that are successful, they are more forgiving of failed punishments and more critical of failed inducements (Davies and Johns 2015).

Considering the source of these attitudes, recent research argues that emphasis on negative sanctions follows from the fact that the US has a culture that favours punishment over inducement in order to enforce good

behaviour (Nincic 2011).[9] Beyond these long-standing punitive inclinations, many in the US during the post-World War II period were sensitive to the pejorative view of inducements as appeasement that could lead to further blackmail. Thus, a strict policy of containment at the outset of the Cold War set the US on the path towards a policy of punishment (Nincic 2011). While approval of engagement might have permeated this punishment-oriented mindset in the optimistic period following the Soviet Union's collapse, a preference for punishment likely returned after the 9/11 terror attacks. Indeed, this mindset also dominates the contemporary populist backlash to globalization seen in the US and other Western states. As such, it is little surprise that a recent article examining US economic statecraft following the 2016 election notes that 'the Trump administration has eschewed carrots in favor of sticks' (Drezner 2019: 19).[10]

Flexibility

Mastanduno (2012) also notes that, whereas the use of negative sanctions requires leverage over the target, typically in the form of pre-existing economic ties (Hirschman 1945; Wagner 1988; Peterson 2020), positive engagement in theory requires only a sufficient source of sender funds and its willingness to offer a reward or inducement. While Drezner (1999) argues that high transaction costs disincentivize the use of carrots in many cases, other work has pointed out that senders do not know the extent of costs they must endure to convince the target to acquiesce to a negative sanction, whereas an inducement is a known price to secure target compliance (Knorr 1975; Dorussen 2001). Senders such as the US likely have resources that can be employed in a variety of ways, including foreign aid in dollars, preferential market access,[11] or arms transfers. Resources for coercion can be considerably less fungible. If the sender threatens to restrict economic ties, then only existing flows can be interrupted (and potential new ones prevented). And senders could face resistance from domestic firms who benefit from economic exchange with the target. Relatedly, incentives can more easily be conducted unilaterally, which allows the sender more flexibility in the design of the sanction while also preventing the possibility of (negative) sanctions busting by third parties (Early 2015).[12]

However there are parallels between sanctions busters and competitors for economic inducements. Sanctions busters harm sender goals by reducing the target's cost of defiance. Analogously, a competing sender can offer similar economic inducements for more palatable policy concessions. While this issue might have been less salient in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when the United States was an undisputed global leader, the rise of China has facilitated an alternative source of incentives that targets could approach for better terms. China's use of economic engagement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America could be viewed in these terms, as China's provision of foreign aid, loans, or investment often carries fewer conditions than does engagement by the US or EU. For example, China commonly offers infrastructure loans in exchange for access to resources such as oil (Alves 2013).[13]

Targeting

Beyond the points from Mastanduno (2012), the distinction in ability to target positive and negative sanctions could shed further light on why positive sanctions are not preferred over negative sanctions. At first glance, positive sanctions could appear more attractive to senders given that they can be used to bribe target leaders directly. Further, to the extent that target leaders could pass on the costs of broad economic restrictions to their population, punishments could fail to coerce. However, there are reasons to doubt this potential benefit of positive sanctions given that negative sanctions increasingly are targeted at elites and leaders in the attempt to avoid harming the most vulnerable citizens in the target state (Drezner 2011). Interestingly, inducements can also be targeted directly at citizens, bypassing leaders. Dietrich (2013) argues that aid donors intentionally bypass engagement with poorly governing state leaders, instead disbursing foreign aid directly to citizens who can benefit or to international organizations that can better ensure aid is used to benefit citizens. The author in this case considers by-pass aid not to be a positive sanction, as it follows directly from aid donor refusal to engage with target leaders. Yet, this behaviour could fit the definition of a long-term investment aimed at transforming the target state, in accordance with theories of positive sanctions.[14] As such, it is important to consider the sender's time horizons in order to understand its preference for (targeted) negative or positive

engagement. Furthermore, inducements could be more difficult to direct at citizens without at least tacit approval of the target state government. For example, attacks on aid workers (by government or non-state actors) could prove a hindrance on the effectiveness of bypass aid (Narang and Stanton 2017).

Observability

The discussion above highlights a number of theoretical distinctions that, taken together, could explain why senders use inducements less often than punishments. However, I argue that negative sanctions get more attention not (only) because they appear to be more common in practice, but because scholars are less able to collect systematic data on economic inducements. Data on imposed (negative) sanctions are available from Hufbauer et al. (2007), as are UN targeted sanctions data from Biersteker et al. (2018). Detailed case-level data on threats as well as imposed sanctions are available from Morgan et al. (2014). In all cases, data on negative sanctions are relatively easy to document because sender leaders generally make public statements in which they demand target policy concessions, backed by a threat of economic restrictions, or else an announcement of the punishment. Sender states typically have a bureaucracy that makes available detailed information about restrictions by which individuals and firms must abide. In the United States, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) takes this role. OFAC regularly adds entities to the specially designated nationals (SDN) list, specifying restrictions on commerce with those listed, as well as the penalties associated with violation of sanctions. OFAC is also tasked with enforcement via imposition of civil penalties and through investigations can uncover violations over which criminal charges could be filed, data on which is also made publicly available.

A comprehensive list of inducements is considerably more difficult to obtain, leading to an emphasis on qualitative analysis of historically important cases (e.g., Newham 2000; Dorussen 2001; Martin 2002; Mastanduno 2003; Nincic 2011). While studies have attempted to isolate major influence attempts by the United States (Sislin 1994), such efforts excluded large swaths of cases in which regularized interaction—such as the provision of foreign aid—carried explicit conditionality or implicitly served sender strategic interests.[15] Further, given the potential for private promises,

data on realized inducements might overlook examples of attempted positive engagement—at least unless archival evidence later surfaces.[16] Baldwin (1971) notes that we see examples of positive coercion that successfully convinces the target, along with negative coercion that fails to convince the target. As such, it might be difficult to overcome selection effects if promises tend not to be made public.[17]

Foreign Aid: An Example of Positive Sanctions?

There is a huge literature on the use and consequences of foreign aid. And though relatively few studies in this area are cast explicitly in the framework of positive sanctions as discussed above (but see Apodaca 2017), there are a number of common focal points.

A common approach to the study of foreign aid involves applying the selectorate model that centres on leader policy-making aimed at satisfying their winning coalition and securing their place in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). This approach is compatible with positive sanctions theory in assuming explicitly that foreign aid is a means to coerce target policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009). This exchange is considered with respect to domestic politics, as senders (donors, in the language of the model) agree to an aid transfer that satisfies—or at least does not harm—their citizens, while targets (recipients) accept aid as compensation for dissatisfying their citizens with policy favourable to the sender. Whereas these studies of foreign aid generally apply the rational model of decision-making (Allison 1971), other models of foreign policy decision-making could be elucidating here given their focus on other factors affecting this process. For example, prospect theory (Tversky and Kahnemann 1981) or poliheuristic theory (Mintz 2004) could provide useful insights into deviations from rational actor model expectations. Indeed, the relatively narrow focus on the rational actor model might be responsible for the fact that selectorate-based approaches to foreign aid, while generally compatible with the transactional, *quid pro quo*, style of inducement, largely ignore the long-term investment model.[18]

A large body of research examines the effectiveness of development or democracy aid in terms of whether aid achieves its stated purpose. However, mixed findings in this area likely stem, at least in part, from the

fact that true donor motivations to use aid are often not transparent (Qian 2015). A review of the foreign aid literature by Apodaca (2017) notes that donors often use aid to further security and economic interests. In terms of security, sender goals could include obtaining military basing rights, maintaining foreign nations as allies, and securing friendly regimes in power. Economic goals could include the opening of foreign markets to trade or investment, or the direct subsidization of the donor's own firms via tying aid to the purchase of goods and services from the donor. Even humanitarian aid can serve the sender's strategic and economic goals. For example, US disaster aid can improve long-run trade relationships between donor and recipient (Peterson 2017).

The utility of the positive sanctions approach to the study of aid lies in emphasizing that outcomes should be evaluated with reference to donor goals. However, a major challenge centres on the identification of true sender goals amid potentially misleading stated aims. Nonetheless, studies of aid effectiveness have benefited by application of this logic. Notably, the track record of aid in furthering democracy looks better when isolating allocations specifically intended for democracy promotion efforts (Scott and Steele 2011). Similarly, Bearce and Tirone (2010) argue that Western development aid was generally ineffective during the Cold War because donor demands for economic reform were essentially unenforceable; the need to keep recipient states aligned with the West against the Soviet bloc was sufficient to keep funds flowing regardless of performance. However, one could argue that the aid was in fact an effective inducement, just towards preserving political alignment rather economic reform. In the same vein, research has explored strategic incentives underlying democracy aid, finding that the US targeted democracy aid to states bordering the Soviet sphere during the Cold War (Meernik et al. 1998), and to states bordering its adversaries during recent years (Peterson and Scott 2018).

Next Steps

While research suggests that negative sanctions might be more common than positive engagement (Nincic 2011), economic inducements are nonetheless an important and arguably overlooked aspect of international relations. A synthesis of the points raised above leads to a number of

suggestions for future work that apply the positive sanctions tradition to the study of foreign aid and other areas of IR research, as well as to overcome data limitations inherent to the study of positive sanctions.

FPA is an actor-specific approach grounded in human decision-making (Hudson 2005). The study of foreign aid can be enriched by considering human actors across several levels of analysis. Moving beyond a focus on unitary states can provide intriguing insights, particularly with respect to aid as a long-term investment. Indeed, as noted above, the popular aid-for-policy model largely ignores the possibility that senders are engaging in long-term investments. Perhaps the short-term focus is justified with respect to (some) leaders, but long-term strategies are reflected in the behaviour of professional bureaucracies such as the US State Department.[19] A growing literature examines the enduring culture of the US foreign policy establishment (Porter 2018), which could easily facilitate long-term strategic planning. It is not a stretch to assume that agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would engage in long-term investments in a target state towards the end of promoting a new trajectory that, through path dependence, brings the target into closer alignment with US interests. Reconsidering US foreign aid effectiveness from this perspective could uncover new insights.

The individual level of analysis is also important to address cognitive explanations of preference for reward vs. punishment. A fruitful line of future research could use experiments to overcome the limited and non-systematic data available on inducements. Such an approach could address the difficulty in isolating incentives from sanctions, particularly with respect to evaluations of the status quo (Dorussen 2001). For example, scenarios could be contrasted where the sender desires to change a status quo or reverse a recent change. This distinction might condition the attitudes of individuals. Indeed, the apparent preference for punishment over inducement might be a consequence of focus on a ‘shock’ of bad behaviour by the target. Emphasizing a long-standing behaviour might alter these results. Also, the specific effects of inducements could be explained in detail. A previous study on negative sanctions finds that citizens approve of them for reasons beyond policy change, for example punishment and the prospect of third-party deterrence (Heinrich et al. 2017). Similar mechanisms could be at play with respect to positive sanctions. And while a punitive US culture has been cited as a cause of its favouring negative

sanctions, future work could explore whether variation exists among the most notable senders in preference for inducements vs. punishments. All of these possibilities imply the utility of applying previous research on the role of public opinion in US foreign policy (Holsti 1992; Baum and Potter 2008), and reconsidering how citizen attitudes are formed (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Milner and Tingley 2011; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Mutz and Kim 2017).

Extending recent advances demonstrating the third-party effects of negative sanctions to the study of positive sanctions can improve our understanding of foreign aid. The drawback of positive engagement discussed by Baldwin (1971) is that it can provoke blackmailing behaviour by targets. North Korea is often used as an example of such behaviour, given its recurrent demands for aid in exchange for slowing its nuclear weapons development (Drezner 1999). More optimistically, the potential for multilateral signalling in this case can serve as a mechanism to inform states throughout the international system that the donor attaches value to specific policies. The literature on negative sanctions has demonstrated how reputation effects associated with sanctions could secure proactive policy change by third parties seeking to avoid a similar fate (Peterson 2013, 2014, 2021; Miller 2014). Extending this logic to the case of aid, perhaps third parties witnessing a mutually beneficial inducement might seek to obtain a similar arrangement. Given that the study of foreign aid has largely been dominated by strictly bilateral bargaining approaches,[20] this alternate perspective of wider influence via multilateral signalling produces new insights.

Similarly, the idea of ‘weaponized interdependence’ (Farrell and Newman 2019) has received renewed interest as the US and China square off in an increasingly competitive relationship. However, much as during the Cold War, the prominence of great power rivalries and zero-sum thinking does not obviate the importance of incentives, particularly between major powers and developing states over which these powers compete for access. Recent work has begun to explore China’s use of economic statecraft (Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2012), particularly within the traditional sphere of US influence (Urdinez et al. 2016). Future work can reconsider the provision of foreign aid as an economic inducement from the perspective of great power competition.

Finally, the study of negative sanctions likewise could benefit from consideration of theoretical models developed to understand positive sanctions. The long-run investment approach to the use of incentives has an interesting parallel in the use of technically 'ineffective' negative sanctions that could in reality be intended for ends other than immediate policy concessions by the target. While research has started to explore third-party deterrent effects of negative sanctions, we know less about temporal deterrence—the ability of negative sanctions to delay or even prevent targets from repeating some bad behaviour such as an armed aggression or human rights crackdown even if they fail to reverse the immediate policy that led to sanctions. For example, could sanctions against Russia over its annexation of Crimea be intended as an investment to prevent similar behaviour in the future?[21] Lessons learned from research on the investment model of positive sanctions (Mastanduno 1999; Nincic 2011) could be usefully applied to questions like this one.

NOTES

1. Further overlap exists in the need to coordinate and enforce agreements.
2. Mastanduno (1999) uses a similar classification, distinguishing tactical (immediate) from structural (long-term) engagement.
3. This logic applies particularly if the sender is a democracy. One could envision a non-democratic sender structuring incentives towards different ends.
4. A positive sanction can be considered a case where the sender wishes to change an established status quo, offering an economic benefit for the target to comply (Drezner 1999). Given that negative sanctions and threats thereof tend to follow specific behaviours by the target that spark sender disapproval, negative sanctions often can be thought of as sender demands for restoration of the status quo. However, nothing stops a sender from using positive sanctions to restore the status quo, or from making demands that targets change long-established practices.
5. This comparison between the value of engagement with the sender and the political value of maintaining an independent policy is crucial, as Blanchard and Ripsman (2008) note that the magnitude of economic effects are by themselves insufficient to determine the effectiveness of economic statecraft. Instead, these costs must be considered in light of the political costs and opportunities generated for the target.
6. Notably, cognitive models of foreign policy decision-making emphasize the role of elites and policy-makers (e.g., Allison 1971; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Simon 1985; Hermann 2001; Mintz 2004; Stein 2008; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Hudson 2014), where the public at best functions as one of many factors decision-makers might consider, if not entirely minimizing the role of the public (Jacobs and Page 2005). More recently, the role of public opinion has received greater attention (Milner and Tingley 2016). Further, the contention of elite domination of public preferences has been challenged by recent work demonstrating empirical evidence in support of a bottom-up mechanism (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017).

7. One implication of work on domestic consequences of sanctions is that, on the one hand, negative sanctions can cause a rally effect in the target state, bolstering target leaders who act contrary to the policy preferences of the sender (Galtung 1967); while, on the other hand, the sender's public could reward the leader for demonstrating action against a target state perceived to have engaged in proscribed behaviour (Whang 2011). As such, negative sanctions could be mutually beneficial for sender and target leader standing with their citizens.
8. Notably, the key variable here did not necessary capture economic inducements *per se*, but rather the initiation of cooperative events.
9. As noted above, work on foreign policy decision-making emphasizes culture within organizations rather than among the general public. Interestingly, recent work by Porter (2018) on the so-called 'blob', referring to the US foreign policy bureaucracy, contends that its professional culture emphasizes liberal internationalism and US superiority, but does not necessarily dismiss the use of carrots as well as sticks towards these ends. If so, then the cultural elements that affect the choice between positive or negative sanctions could be located in the general public rather than among elites. Although elites might nonetheless have influence, such effects could be difficult to disentangle from those of the media and the public itself (Baum and Potter 2008).
10. Since this article was written, the Trump administration have offered inducements to a number of Middle Eastern states in exchange for a normalization of relations with Israel.
11. Research finds that trade agreements can be leveraged by more powerful states to coerce developing states to improve human rights, so long as treaties include enforcement provisions (Hafner-Burton 2005).
12. In the case of financial sanctions, the US is likely in a unique position to impose penalties unilaterally given that no other state is both willing and able to replace the US central role in the international financial system.
13. However, China might be engaging in behaviour predicted by Hirschman (1945). China's recent acquisition of the Hambantota port from Sri Lanka has led to claims that China is capturing developing states in debt traps (Var and Po 2017).
14. Other work looks at more direct attempts by the US military to use money to target individuals in efforts to change hearts and minds (Barbieri 2017), and a similar investment approach to altering the trajectory of a (newly democratic) country.
15. The endeavour to code inducements holistically would likely entail, for example, in-depth analysis of strings attached to foreign aid. Incentives that are documented in trade agreements or other publicly available treaties also could be coded—at least to the extent these side payments are disclosed. However, any effort to collect data on economic inducements is likely to rely on a piecemeal approach. Perhaps the best hope for researchers to code comprehensive data on positive sanctions—including promises as well as realized inducements—would be to design an algorithm to scrape together media stories searching for key words. Such a task would be time consuming, requiring skills in machine learning and text-as-data tools, and likely necessitating the labour of multiple research assistants. And this task might return scholars to a focus on major influence attempts that are deemed newsworthy.
16. For example, Drezner (1999) notes that a private offer of aid by President Lyndon Johnson failed to compel the North Vietnamese to end the Vietnam War.
17. That said, private threats are possible as well. However, leaders have an incentive to make threats public when 'playing to the home crowd' Whang (2011) or leveraging audience costs (Fearon 1994). There could be a disincentive to make promises public given possible public backlash.
18. A bargaining approach tends to account for long-run changes via focus on commitment problems wherein cooperation cannot succeed because one side fears the future strength of the

other. For example, Drezner (1999) argues that fear of a target growing stronger via inducements de-motivates senders who might otherwise consider using carrots in lieu of sticks.

19. Given the insight of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision-making that sees outcomes as a function of complicated political processes (Mintz and DeRouen 2010), it could be useful to consider what organization-level factors affect time horizons, as these could affect the nature of inducements offered.
20. One of the consequences of the trajectory towards a bargaining-focused approach in the study of foreign aid is that theories focus on credible signalling of information. Actual differences in preferences and strength tend to be subsumed into the bargaining process rather than theorized explicitly. However, the process by which this arguably more mundane information is communicated internationally matters if one wants to understand the third-party effects of economic statecraft. We can potentially improve our understanding of the consequences of foreign aid by considering these informing effects.
21. Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine would suggest that these sanctions were ineffective even towards this end.

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CHAPTER 23

Coercion and Foreign Policy

CARLA MARTÍNEZ MACHAIN AND SUSAN HANNAH ALLEN

Introduction

Coercion has been described as ‘the art of influencing the behavior of others by threats’, (Ellsberg 1968). Attempting to employ this influence effectively is at the heart of international relations (IR). Coercion is a key element of the foreign policies of all countries as they pursue their national interests via various tools of statecraft, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, air strikes, or the threat of military force. However, not all types of coercive tools are appropriate in all situations.

In this essay, we explore exactly what coercion is, when coercion is used, what strategies can be employed, and when coercion succeeds. We also highlight how scholars of foreign policy analysis understand coercion, when that understanding overlaps with general studies of IR and when it diverges. Finally, we suggests some important ways that foreign policy analysis can inform and improve our understanding of coercive processes in the international system.

What Is Coercion?

In order to get what they want in the international system, states often turn to coercion. Blechman and Wittes (1999) have argued that for the United States it has been particularly difficult to achieve coercion purely through the threat of force. They note that even in cases that were considered to be diplomatic victories, military forces were used demonstratively to achieve the desired outcomes. In particular they argue that in the post-Cold War era, the United States had to make up for perceptions of weakness that other world leaders formed of it during the Vietnam War. In this era of US foreign

policy, threats have not been enough to coerce, and the United States has had to turn to military force. This is thus an example of coercion being at play in the foreign policy of a major power.

The concept of coercion is one that is used widely in both IR and foreign policy (and the work that straddles both fields). Though the general ideas behind the concept are mostly constant across fields, there have been some minor yet crucial differences in how coercion is conceptualized. Because definitional differences can in turn lead to differences in theories and findings, we begin by discussing variation in the conceptualization of coercion.[1]

From the foreign policy perspective, scholars such as Alexander George have discussed the concept of 'coercive diplomacy', where states can get what they want in the international system through diplomacy, as long as those demands are 'backed with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be considered credible and potent enough to encourage compliance' (George 1994: 13). Importantly, George notes that the term coercive diplomacy refers only to defensive strategies, which involve getting another state to stop something that it is currently doing, as opposed to having it do something that it is not already doing. This latter case, where states are forced to do something against their will based on a threat, is referred to by George (1994: 7), as 'blackmail diplomacy'.

Whether coercion is military or non-military, the logic is the same: there are two actors, a sender, and a target, and the sender threatens the target with a punitive action in order to get it to alter its behaviour in some way. Since coercive diplomacy relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force to affect the actions of other states (George and Simons 1994), it is important to recognize that the ability to effectively threaten is not equivalent to the ability to actually physically compel an opponent or to punish that opponent.

As Jentleson (1999) argues in his review of Freedman (1998), an effective definition of coercion should include both military and non-military forms of coercion, as an effective definition shows how coercion does not necessarily have to be done through violent means. What is necessary is the threat of some type of harm, but that harm can be done without the use of force, as is the case in the use of economic sanctions.

Drezner (2003: 654) defines economic coercion specifically as 'the threat or act by a sender government or governments to disrupt economic

exchange with the target state, unless the target acquiesces to an articulated demand'. As the global economy has become more interdependent, threats or the ability to disrupt international financial or information systems have the potential to become strong coercive tools (Drezner 2021).

In contrast, military coercion involves the threat of military consequences in order to change an adversary's behaviour (Pape 1996). Military coercion is a tool that has been used by states, often effectively, throughout history. In many cases, the threat of military action during a crisis prevents the escalation of the crisis to war (Karsten et al. 1984; Pape 1996). As Pape (1996) notes, military coercion can be an appealing policy tool for leaders because it is perceived as being quick and effective in achieving outcomes. As we will note further on in this chapter, though, there is significant variation in when military coercion is indeed effective.

While some would narrow the harm that is threatened in coercion (for example, to include only threatened harm against civilian populations), an inclusive definition of coercion should not be limited in the threatened harm. Coercive powers must convince their opponents that they can credibly and capably carry out the threat, regardless of the legitimacy of the threat, in order to alter an opponent's behaviour. Coercion can take place by threatening a nuclear attack against a population centre, but also by threatening conventional bombing against military targets, against the industrial infrastructure, or threatening economic sanctions that affect the leader's own assets. In fact, as Pape (1996) notes, coercion is most likely to be successful when targeting military assets. Broadening the definition of coercion to include various threatened harms also moves scholars away from a moralistic view of coercion in which it is associated with the killing of civilians. This allows the scholarship to instead focus on the effectiveness of coercive threat, rather than its morality. Byman and Waxman (2002: 33) argue that often coercion is not achieved by a 'sudden appearance of the threat of force', but rather that 'relative changes in the threat of force' are what will drive coercion and in turn the change in the adversary's behaviour.

Coercion alters an opponent's cost-benefit analysis, raising the costs of engaging in an undesired action enough so that the opponent no longer wants to do so. Coercion is about changing the policy choices of another party by altering their decision-making process (Pape 1996; Byman and Waxman 2002). By its nature, coercion involves two actors, the one that is

attempting to influence the actions and the target of said attempt. Thus, coercion is a strategic interaction in which both actors make policy choices based on their expectations of the other's actions (Byman and Waxman 2002). A noteworthy point to consider when it comes to coercion is that the most effective forms of coercion will be those that are unobserved. Schelling (1980: 5) notes that the strategy of conflict involves not only the use of force but also the threat of force, and that achieving coercion through the threat (rather than the action) of war is part of the study of conflict. If coercion works effectively, then the threat of the punitive action will be enough to obtain the desired outcome, and we will thus not actually observe the punitive action take place (Drezner 2003).[2] This means that in many cases the effectiveness of coercion will be understated, as any analyses that rely on observing punishment will invariably undercount effectiveness (Morgan et al. 2009).

In discussing forms of coercion, ways in which states alter or influence each other's behaviour, it is important to distinguish between deterrence and compellence, which are two concepts often discussed in IR and foreign policy analysis.

Deterrence

Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence* has perhaps been the most influential presentation of the concept of deterrence. Deterrence involves one actor preventing another from engaging in a given foreign policy action (that they would otherwise want to engage in) by threatening a negative consequence if that action is taken (Schelling 1966; Art 1980). Thus the aim of deterrence is to maintain the status quo and prevent an opponent from changing it by threatening to retaliate if they do. The concept of deterrence gained prominence when it became a cornerstone of American foreign policy during the Cold War. Schelling (1980) explored the various ways in which states could commit themselves to carrying out a threat if an undesired action was taken, such as tripwire mechanisms. Of course, along with the credible threat of action if the opponent carries out an undesired action, there must also be an accompanying credible promise to not harm the opponent if they follow the deterring state's preferences (Martínez Machain et al. 2011).

While deterrence has a clear place in our understanding of foreign policy, it is important to note that some traditional IR scholars, such as Pape (1996) would not consider deterrence to fall under the category of coercion. Pape (1996: 4) defines coercion as 'efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits'. He explicitly notes that deterrence would not fall under this category, but that compellence, which we discuss in more detail in the following section, does. Pape (1996) references Art (1980), who notes that a state's ability to deter another may differ from its ability to compel it (he notes that both are more challenging than simply defending against an adversary). At the same time, Pape considers deterrence to be the 'flip side' of coercion, acknowledging the close connection between the two (Pape 1996: 4).

Compellence

As Pape (1996: 2) notes, deterrence as a form of coercion is only effective when a state can predict threats. When threats are unexpected, coercive states have to react to them, often once an undesirable action has already been taken. This is particularly true in interactions between states and non-state actors or minor powers. In that case, deterrence can no longer be used as a tool, and states must engage in 'compellence'. The term compellence refers to actions that are taken in order to make another state engage in an action that it otherwise would not have, which includes the cessation of a given action. Schelling (1966: 72) defines compellence as taking an action 'that can cease, or become harmless only if the opponent responds'. If the compellence involves the use of military force, Art (1980: 7) defines it as 'the deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken'. Compellence can involve actually using violence (or another non-violent form of punishment) against an opponent, or simply threatening to use that punishment if the opponent chooses to continue engaging in the undesired action. More than deterrent strategies, compellent acts are direct and definitive. As result, compellent strategies work differently. Rather than threatening and waiting to see what one's adversary will do, states hoping to compel must act in order to force their adversary to flinch and change its course of action.

At this point it is important to note that in distinguishing between deterrence and compellence, scholars must decide whether to focus on the

actions of the sender or of the target in making that distinction. For example, Art (1980) notes that 'the distinction between compellence and deterrence is one between the active and passive use of force'. In this case, the determination between one or the other depends on whether the sender actually used force or not. But what about cases in which the threat of force is used to get another state to change the actions that it is *currently* engaging in? For example, what if a state threatens another with a military intervention if it does not stop repressing its citizens, and the target indeed ceases the repression? Is this deterrence because the threat was not carried out and force was not actually used, or is it compellence because the aim of the action was to *change* a behaviour that the target was currently engaging in?

Perhaps because of issues like this it is useful to have a broader definition of coercion, such as Freedman's (1998: 3), which is 'the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices'.

Who Decides When to Coerce?

Previously we discussed some differences in how coercion is defined in foreign policy analysis, as compared to in IR. Beyond the definition, a key difference in how the two fields have approached the study of coercion is in who the decision to coerce is attributed to. Traditionally, foreign policy analysis has used an actor-based approach where the leader is viewed as the one who actually makes the decision to coerce. In contrast, much of the IR literature has, in the tradition of realism, viewed the state as a unitary actor, and thus presented the decision to coerce as one made by the state as a whole, or by a multilateral coalition. For example, when Pape (1996: 3) refers to coercive air power, he asks, 'Can air power alone persuade *states* to alter their behavior?' (emphasis added). This is representative of the view that even though we know that there are leaders and multiple individuals within a government making decisions, we can treat the state as a unitary actor when studying coercion.

Other work, such as Art's, refers to both states and individual leaders when discussing deterrence. In the same paragraph, Art (1980: 9) notes that 'a *state* can be as confused or as clear about what wishes to prevents as it can be about what it wishes to stop' and that 'some *statesmen* communicate

more clearly than others' (emphasis added). There is thus no theoretical distinction made between actions that are taken by the state as a unitary actor or actions that are taken by the leader. What is common is that both are treated as unitary actors, without a discussion of bureaucratic factors that may have influenced the decision.

The coercive actor is often defined in an even broader way, going beyond a state and framing a set of states, such as a coalition or an alliance, as being the coercer. For example, Byman and Waxman (2002) discuss Operation Desert Storm and note 'Classifying the air campaign as successful coercion, however, assumes that *the coalition's* objective was simply an Iraqi expulsion' (emphasis added). Here, even though the target is an individual ('in Operation Desert Storm, the behavior sought from *Saddam Hussein* might have been Iraq picking up and peacefully retreating from Kuwait', emphasis added), the implication is that his actions will determine the state's actions. It is thus interesting to note that in the coercion literature, scholars have mixed the 'unit of analysis' level when identifying targets and senders of coercion. As in this case, the sender can be a coalition of states and the target an individual.

Though the authors are clearly aware that there are different preferences at play inside a multi-state coalition, they operate under the assumption that at least in this particular action, the coalition's actions can be treated *as if* it were a rational unitary actor. The question then becomes, when do states (or even coalitions) get treated as unitary actors and when do the characteristics of leaders come into play? Did Byman and Waxman (2002) refer to Saddam Hussein the individual and the coalition as a broader unit because Saddam was an autocratic leader and the coalition was made up of democratic states whose leaders better reflected their population's preferences? Was the reference to Saddam just stylistic shorthand? Regardless of how this particular choice was made, the decision of who to represent as the coercer and who as the target is one that can have implications for the study of coercion.

This stands in contrast with work such as that of Allison (1971), which through the organizational process and bureaucratic models, explains how the US came to use coercion during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963. Allis on (1971) notes how the individual characteristics of the members of Kennedy's administration influenced the outcome. More recently, foreign policy theorists such as Blechman and Wittes (1999: 5) also note how the

characteristics of individuals can affect the decision to use force for coercion, noting for example, that ‘there is a generation of political leaders throughout the world whose basic perception of U.S. military power and political will is one of weakness’. Thus, in this approach, the characteristics of individuals begin to matter. The step from this to thinking about an individual leader being the coercer is a short one. Indeed, Blechman and Wittes (1999) consider the possibility that the personal reputation of individual presidents could affect the effectiveness of the threat, though they find little evidence for this and instead suggest that the reputation of the United States as a whole is what was driving the lack of threat credibility in the post-Cold War era.

Echoing Art’s distinction between deterrence and coercion, Yarhi-Milo (2018) uses the case of US President Jimmy Carter as an illustration of individuals making decisions to coerce, and of him drawing a distinction between deterrence and coercion. Yarhi-Milo (2018) turns to primary documents in which Carter discusses the issue of the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan. Yarhi-Milo shows how Carter believed that coercing the Soviets to leave Afghanistan was more challenging than deterring them from further escalating the conflict. The emphasis in this analysis is on Carter’s personality traits and how those affected his willingness to use force for coercion in order to build a reputation for resolve. Thus, in this case the agency of coercion is placed on the individual rather than on the state as a whole. Focusing on the resolve of individual leaders and how it might influence the coercive process has been an important area for new work—both in IR research and foreign policy research (e.g., Kertzer 2016; Lupton 2020).

More recent work has bridged the gap between these approaches, showing how the decision is taken by individual leaders, but expressing how those leaders’ choices are both influenced and constrained by domestic and international institutions. A recent surge in scholarship highlighting political psychology and focusing on individual leaders has helped to bring together both state and individual-level explanations for foreign policy decision-making, and by extension coercion (e.g., Potter 2007; Saunders 2011; Gallagher and Allen 2014; Horowitz et al. 2015; Kertzer 2017; Horowitz et al. 2018).

Coercive Strategies

While traditional studies of IR have developed explanations for the various coercive tools, such as armed interventions or economic sanctions, foreign policy analysis takes a more holistic approach that focuses less on the tool itself and more on its aims, which drives the choice between the different tools (Morgan and Palmer 2000). Not all coercive strategies are equally efficient under different circumstances. Once the decision is made to coerce a target, the sender must decide what type of coercive tool to employ and how to use it. Different forms of coercive pressure send different signals to the target about how displeased and how resolved the sender is (Drury 2005). Thus, the first decision that potential coercers must make is about which tool to use, such as diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or military force, as there are distinct ways that leaders can use military and economic pressure.

Military Force

Much has been written about war, but in the coercive foreign policy context, we begin from Clausewitz's famous premise, that war is a continuation of policy by other means. Nearly all military missions have a coercive element to them (Pape 1997), but military force is rarely a political message in and of itself (Freedman 1998). Military planners might aim for command of the air (Douhet 1942) or command of the sea (Mahan 1911), but such efforts are a step to influence bargaining. Strategy is what links war to policy, making the use of force an instrument of policy (Sloan 2016).

Military strategies themselves are a part of foreign policy in the sense that they serve to convey information to an opponent (Smith and Stam 2004). Though the strategies of ground, naval, and air power have been studied separately, the common thread that ties them together as coercive tools is that they are all ways in which states can impose costs on an opponent and convince them to change their behaviour. To begin with ground troops, these forces can be used to pursue manoeuvre, attrition, and punishment strategies (Antal 1992; Stam 1996). Manoeuvre and attrition are focused on countering an enemy's military forces. Manoeuvre strategies that emphasize mobility over firepower and attrition are the reverse (Reiter and Meek 1999). Using these strategies, a coercive power can minimize an opponent's

ability to inflict costs on the opponent, limiting its ability to resist the coercive demand being made. Punishment strategies, which can also include aerial bombardment or guerrilla warfare, are distinct as their political goals are more explicit. Using this strategy, a coercive power imposes costs on an opponent until it capitulates to the demand.

Focusing specifically on air power, Pape (1996) highlights three strategies that can be pursued—punishment, denial, and decapitation. Punishment strategies increase costs on a target by threatening to inflict pain on an adversary's population or economy. Denial strategies target an enemy's military resources and aim to negate the adversary's plans for military victory. Decapitation strategies focus on removing or isolating leaders—changing the leader with a view to changing the opponent's policy. Further work on air power has expanded on the ways in which air power can be used to influence opponents, but still focuses on how coercion is achieved through manipulating the opponent's cost-benefit analysis (Pape 1996; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Allen 2007; Allen and Vincent 2011 Martínez Machain 2015; Post 2019).

More recently, scholars have begun exploring the unique impact of naval power (Feldman et al. 2021; Crisher and Souva 2014; Gartzke and Lindsay 2020). Work on the use of naval power highlights strategies suggested by theorists Mahan (control sea lanes) and Corbett (using navy assets to project power inland) (Crisher 2017). Controlling sea lanes is a denial-type strategy, while projecting power inland could be used for denial, punishment, or decapitation. While naval strategy has remained fairly consistent over a long period of time, technology and tactics are constantly evolving, creating opportunities for new options to use naval power coercively (Gartzke and Lindsay 2020).[3]

Finally, a brief mention should be given to nuclear power and the coercive influence of these massive but seldom used weapons. During the Cold War, at least from the US perspective, the strategic emphasis when considering nuclear weapons was on deterring the Soviet Union. More recently, however, scholars have begun to consider whether nuclear weapons can be used to coerce (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013). Most of the evidence, however, points to the ineffectiveness of nuclear weapons as a tool of coercion (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2017).

Economic Sanctions

For coercive economic sanctions, the strategies are often broken into those that are comprehensive and those that are targeted. Our modern idea of economic sanctions has its roots in the medieval siege when attacking forces hoped to seal off a walled city so completely that the population inside would be starved into submission (Simons 1999). This comprehensive approach to sanctions was dominant until the 1990s.

Foreign policy analysis theories on coercion, and on who the actor being coerced actually is can help us to understand the effects of either comprehensive or targeted sanctions. One of the greatest weaknesses associated with comprehensive sanctions is that these policies often have the largest impact on those citizens in the target state who are least able to sway their government to make concessions and end the sanctions. In essence, a comprehensive sanction that harms the population as a whole is treating the target state as a unitary actor. Despite having limited political impact, these comprehensive sanctions often have negative effects on the health and well-being of targeted populations (Allen and Lektzian 2013). For example, estimates of high child mortality in Iraq under sanctions led to a major outcry and criticism in both the scholarly and policy communities (Garfield 1999; Mueller and Mueller 1999).

The experience of sanctions in Iraq and other countries during the 1990s led to a rise in the use of targeted sanctions. As noted earlier in our discussion of the foreign policy analysis focus on individual leaders as actors, targeted sanctions consider what it is that individuals value in aiming to coerce them. Both national governments and international organizations employ targeted sanctions, against individuals and entities, more frequently than comprehensive forms of sanctions (Early and Cilizoglu 2020). The strategic logic behind targeted sanctions is that arms embargoes can be used to hobble militaries (Brzoska 2008), financial sanctions can freeze leader-specific assets (Drezner 2015), foreign aid reductions can limit undesirable domestic policies in target countries, and travel bans can limit the mobility of political elites.

Despite this shift in the actors at whom sanctions are directed, however, there is little systematic evidence that targeted sanctions are significantly more effective tools than traditional sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Drezner 2011; Biersteker et al. 2016; Rosenberg et al. 2016). Financial sanctions appear to be the most effective of these tools (Drezner 2015; Rose

nberg et al. 2016), but translating economic pressure into political change continues to be a challenge, despite the popularity of sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2009).

Coercion plays a large role in the literature on IR, but often coercive tools are considered in isolation. Central to understanding how coercion fits into the literature on foreign policy is the notion of foreign policy substitutability (Most and Starr 1984; Clark and Reed 2005; Palmer and Morgan 2011). States want to maximize coercion while minimizing cost, given the available resources (Morgan and Palmer 2000). States will choose the policy instrument that yields the greatest leverage for the lowest cost—which leads to the obvious question of which tool is best for the job.

The Coercion Toolkit

When an international crisis arises, leaders, to some degree or another, have at their disposal diplomacy, economic sanctions, or military force as tools of statecraft. These options can be ranked in terms of severity. Disputes often open with diplomatic action, but as the tensions escalate, one or both states may up the ante, opting perhaps to use economic sanctions (Baldwin 1985). Should sanctions fail to alter the positions of the two sides and the dispute escalate further, the use of military force is likely (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Leng 1993). The full range of policies available affects the cost-benefit analysis that leaders engage in when they select the tools and related strategies for coercion.[4]

An important future direction for both IR and foreign policy research is to strengthen both theories of coercive substitutability as well as empirical models to do so. A first step in this direction is efforts to incorporate the impact of threats into research on coercive outcomes. Since coercive diplomacy relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force to affect the actions of other states (George and Simons 1994), it is important to recognize that the ability to effectively threaten is not equivalent to the ability to actually physically compel an opponent or to punish that opponent. Research in this vein on sanctions (Bapat and Morgan 2009; Morgan et al. 2014) and military force (Sechser 2011; Slantchev 2011) presents examples of the direction this work is heading. Some work explicitly modelling the tradeoffs suggested by substitution theory has been done (examples include Clark and Reed 2005; Clark et al. 2008; and Allen and M

artínez Machain 2018) but as empirical models grow increasingly complex and more data are available, the ground is ripe for more work in this vein.

When Does Coercion Succeed?

When assessing the effectiveness of coercion from a foreign policy perspective, it is important to consider not just whether the target changed its behaviour, but the cost at which the coercion was achieved. Regardless of the tool that is used, coercion is a diplomatic strategy backed up by the threat of force. For coercion as a policy to succeed, coercive powers must carefully consider their own cost-benefit analysis, as well as that of their opponent. This includes taking into account the nature of the demand, including its size, the credibility and strength of the accompanying threat, and the magnitude of the adversary's desire to resist the demand (George and Simons 1994). These three factors are all interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For example, smaller demands are easier to achieve with a limited commitment of forces.

In turn, a series of contextual factors can also influence coercion's effectiveness. These include the type of demand (Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Hufbauer et al. 2009), the length of the coercive effort (Allen 2005, 2007), the regime type of the target (Lektzian and Souva 2007; Allen 2009, 2007; Grauvogel and Soest 2014), and the relationship between the two states (Drezner 1999). Determining the appropriate metrics for assessing coercion can thus be difficult (Baldwin 1985; Kirshner 1997; Allen 2005), and it is particularly complex in a foreign policy analysis setting in which the political costs of leaders are considered. In recent years, the literature on a number of forms of coercion has moved away from a simple dichotomy between success and failure to a more measured consideration of the conditions under which coercion can succeed.

From an IR perspective, sometimes it has been enough to assess whether or not a certain coercive tool can be used to change another state's behaviour (Pape 1996, 1997). From a foreign policy perspective, it is often just as important, if not more important, to assess how coercive tools can be used to advance policy goals (Baldwin 1985; Elliott 1998; Mueller 1998; Byman and Waxman 2002). 'The power to hurt is bargaining power, to

exploit it is diplomacy', wrote Schelling (1970). Without the accompanying foreign policy goals, coercion fails to serve a political end.

Perhaps one of the strongest pieces of evidence that coercion's success is determined by political cost avoidance is the considerable evidence in the literature that sanctions episodes that end at the threat stage tend to have a higher success rate than imposed sanctions (Peterson 2013; Whang et al. 2013; Morgan et al. 2014). In an ideal coercive episode, a credible and capable threat can modify the behaviour of the other state without a single shot being fired (or economic sanctions being implemented, etc.). Coercion, therefore, is very appealing to leaders, offering a low cost way of altering the behaviour of other members of the international community.

Coercive influence works when the costs associated with a particular threat override the value of defiance. This includes considering the credibility of the threat. The conditions surrounding coercive episodes are seldom ideal, however. For example, effective mobilization can minimize the likelihood that a crisis will escalate to war (Lai 2004; Tarar 2013). Yet mobilization is not always a credible signal; Post (2019) finds that air only mobilizations are less successful in coercion. In addition, the same acts may provoke different responses from different adversaries in different circumstances. Establishing and maintaining credibility is an on-going process rather than a discrete act or event (Byman and Waxman 2002).

Conclusions

In this essay, we have discussed the different ways in which scholars have defined coercion as a foreign policy action. The major distinctions and differences between these definitions depend on whether a threat is actually carried out or not, and on whether the aim is to prevent the target from taking a given action or to force them to stop a behaviour they are already engaging in. A way forward for research is to develop commonly held definitions of what constitutes coercion—is it only compellence or does it include deterrence?—as well as more uniform frameworks for assessing policy effectiveness.

Defining success in a foreign policy context requires a consideration of a political cost-benefit analysis. When attempting to coerce successfully, one of the greatest challenges is ensuring that the threat (whether it is carried

out or not) translates into political change (Kirshner 1997; Byman et al. 1999). In addition, humanitarian suffering in the target state can harm the coercer politically at home, particularly in democratic states. Excessive harm of a target country's population might then diminish coercive effectiveness or the perceived legitimacy of a coercive effort (Peksen 2009, 2011; Allen and Lektzian 2013; Drury and Peksen 2014; Hultman and Peksen 2017; Reeder and Smith 2019; Allen et al. 2021).

States have used negative coercive pressure since the days of Thucydides and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future as a way to advance their foreign policy agendas. Scholars of foreign policy can offer useful tools to improve our understanding of these measures. As is apparent throughout this chapter, much of the IR scholarship on these topics has flourished in isolated silos as research explores whether air power, or sanctions, or third-party interventions work. Foreign policy analysis can offer a broader view and a more holistic approach to understanding what coercion is and when it can be an effective way to change state behaviour.

Notes

1. Throughout this chapter our focus is on coercion from a foreign policy perspective, but at times we reference more traditional IR studies. In those cases, we attempt to highlight the differences for the reader.
2. In the specific case of deterrence, Art (1980) argues that the use of force shows that deterrence has failed.
3. When studying coercion and its effectiveness, particularly from the quantitative perspective, the availability of relevant data sets has been crucial in moving the field forward. Existing data sets cover coercive instruments including uses of air and naval power. They thus buttress efforts to understand how all these coercive military strategies impact coercive outcomes (Sechser 2011; Crisher and Souva 2014; Allen and Martínez Machain 2018, 2019; Saunders and Souva 2020).
4. We note that scholars have also examined the strategic choices that must be made regarding third-party intervention (Regan 1996; Pickering and Kisangani 2009; Aydin 2010). Third-party decisions about whether to intervene in partial or impartial ways have major consequences for the course of civil wars (Gent 2008; DeMeritt 2015) as well as for their outcomes (Jones 2017). From a foreign policy perspective, a third-party intervention is a coercive action in which a third actor, the intervener, is the one attempting to get the target to change its behaviour, sometimes in support of the target's opponent. Interventions may take the form of the various coercive tools as well: diplomacy, sanctions, aid, or the use of force (Regan and Aydin 2006).

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CHAPTER 24

Resolve, Reputation, and Foreign Policy

ROSEANNE W. MCMANUS

Resolve and reputation are crucial concepts in foreign policy statecraft. To those who study international security, the concept of resolve represents both danger and opportunity. The danger is that underestimating an opponent's resolve can lead to war. On the other hand, if a state can successfully convince its opponents that it is resolved to fight, then it may be able to get what it wants without actually fighting. Therefore, resolve also presents an opportunity to achieve foreign policy goals peacefully. Thus, for any state involved in an international confrontation or rivalry, one of the primary goals of its foreign policy should arguably be to convey resolve. One way, although not the only way, to accomplish this is by developing a reputation for resolve through past actions. This chapter summarizes the current state of research on resolve and reputation in foreign policy and how it has evolved. It points to three developments in the study of resolve and reputation that create opportunities for more input from the foreign policy analysis (FPA) perspective: (1) greater focus on domestic politics, (2) greater focus on leaders, and (3) greater focus on individual psychology. It also considers how analysing resolve and reputation can open up a dialogue between FPA and other disciplines. Finally, it suggests directions for future research and how FPA can contribute, with an emphasis on how better understanding foreign policy bureaucracies and the nuts and bolts of foreign policy decision-making can shed light on emerging questions about resolve and reputation.

Core Concepts and Findings

Resolve and reputation are independent concepts, but are closely intertwined in the study of foreign policy and international security. Resolve is typically defined as willingness to use military force or take some other

costly action. A reputation is an expectation about an actor's future behaviour, based on traits the actor is believed to have. Much of the literature about reputation is concerned with reputations for resolve, which is why these concepts are often linked. However, actors can also develop reputations for other traits, including honesty in their communications (Sartori 2005; Jackson 2016), restraint in their ambitions (Cebul et al. 2021), upholding treaty commitments (Gibler 2008; Mattes 2012; Miller 2012; Narang and LeVeck 2019), and repayment of sovereign debt (Tomz 2007).

The concept of resolve has always been central to the study of foreign policy statecraft. There was an upsurge in interest in resolve during the early Cold War, as scholars considered how to make nuclear threats credible, despite the high cost of carrying them out (Ellsberg 1959; Schelling 1960, 1966). Interest in the concept of resolve increased again in the 1990s when Fearon (1995) identified incomplete information as one of the rationalist explanations for why adversaries are sometimes unable to reach a bargain that both would prefer to war. Although incomplete information can exist about both resolve and capabilities, capabilities are usually at least partially observable. Resolve, therefore, is the biggest puzzle. Yet while incomplete information about resolve raises the danger of war, it also presents an opportunity. If a state can convince an adversary that it is resolved to fight, then it may be able to persuade the adversary to back down and prevail in bargaining without actually fighting at all. If a state that is not truly resolved to fight can convince opponents that it is, then it can do better in bargaining than it would in a counter-factual world where resolve is fully observable. On the other hand, since all states have an incentive to exaggerate their resolve, they cannot simply declare that they are resolved and expect to automatically be believed.

Before considering how countries can credibly persuade others of their resolve, it is helpful to more thoroughly examine the nature and sources of resolve. Although resolve has generally been defined as willingness to fight, few scholars have considered where this willingness comes from. Kertzer (2016) is the first to systematically consider the sources of resolve. He argues that resolve comes from a combination of dispositional traits—including time horizons, risk tolerance, concern with honour, and willpower—and the costs and benefits at stake in a particular situation. Therefore, resolve has both dispositional and situational components. This implies that individuals (and perhaps countries) have general tendencies to be more or less resolved

based on their dispositional traits, but their resolve will still vary somewhat among situations. Several other scholars have also considered the dispositional and situational characteristics that affect resolve. Self-monitoring (Yarhi-Milo 2018) and concern with honour (Dafoe and Caughey 2016) have been identified as leader characteristics that contribute to greater resolve. Regime type may also function as a country-level dispositional characteristic that affects willingness to fight (e.g., Weeks 2014). Greater relative military capabilities (Kroenig 2013) and greater salience (Clare 2007) are some situational factors that contribute to resolve.

Based on this information about the sources of resolve, how can states convince observers that they are resolved? One option is acquiring a reputation based on past behaviour. The possibility of acquiring a reputation for resolve hinges on the argument that resolve derives in part from an actor's disposition. If this is true, then past willingness to fight should indicate that an actor has the dispositional traits necessary for resolve, increasing expectations that the state will fight in the future. Because establishing the belief that one is willing to fight can reduce the future necessity of fighting, Schelling (1966: 124) famously called a reputation for resolve, 'one of the few things worth fighting over'. Some subsequent research cast doubt on the notion that states can acquire reputations based on their past behaviour (Hopf 1994; Mercer 1996; Press 2005). However, a more recent wave of research has found evidence of reputations for resolve forming based on past behaviour using statistical analysis (Sartori 2005; Peterson 2013; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015; Crescenzi 2018), surveys and survey experiments (Renshon et al. 2018; Lupton 2020), and historical case studies (Harvey and Mitton 2016; Lupton 2020). The most recent research is concerned with *when* and *how* reputations for resolve matter rather than *whether* they matter (Jervis et al. 2021). For example, some recent research has explored whether reputations adhere to leaders as well as states, finding that they do (Wolford 2007; Renshon et al. 2018; Wu and Wolford 2018; Lupton 2020).

Yet developing a reputation for resolve through past behaviour is not the only way to convince observers of resolve. As noted above, resolve is likely to vary between situations, meaning that even states without past resolved behaviour may be able to convince others that they are highly resolved in a particular new situation. The statements and actions, such as moving troops or expending assets, that states use to convey their resolve are referred to as

‘signals’ of resolve. Because of incentives to exaggerate, rationalist scholars beginning with Fearon (1994, 1995, 1997) have argued that in order to convey resolve credibly, a signal of resolve must be costly. Since less resolved states are less willing to pay the signalling cost, sending a costly signal raises estimates of the probability that the state is resolved enough to fight.

The cost associated with a signal can take various forms. The most well-known costs are sunk costs and hand-tying costs (Fearon 1997). Sunk costs are paid up front, usually in the form of military expenditures. Hand-tying costs are paid at a later time, and only if the state that signalled resolve backs down. The most prominent form of hand-tying costs is domestic audience costs. These are political costs—ranging from reduced public approval to removal from office—that the domestic audience may impose upon leaders who signal resolve and then back down (Fearon 1994). Quek (2021) proposes two additional types of signalling costs: installment costs, which are fixed costs that will be paid in the future; and reducible costs, which are paid upfront but can be offset by fighting. In addition, other scholars have proposed that signals of resolve can be credible due to indirect costs, such as the risk of damaging a state’s reputation for honesty (Sartori 2005) or the risk of bargaining failure or escalation (Trager 2017). Recent scholarship has begun to test the effect of signals of resolve directly, finding that signals change beliefs about resolve (Trager 2017; Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018; Katagiri and Min 2019) and are associated with better conflict bargaining outcomes (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014b; McManus 2017). In contrast, Altman (2017) disputes the importance of signalling resolve, arguing that the coercive bargaining situation envisioned by signalling models rarely occurs in reality.

In sum, states often use their foreign policy to cultivate the perception that they are resolved, since this can deter attacks against them and help them achieve their aims in coercive bargaining. One way to establish this perception is by developing a reputation for resolve based on past behaviour. However, signalling and other situational factors are also likely to play a role in assessments of resolve.

The literature on resolve and reputation is methodologically diverse. Many scholars have used formal models for theory building (e.g., Fearon 1994, 1995; Schultz 1998; Sartori 2005). Some scholars have tested the predictions of theories about resolve and reputation using quantitative

observational data (e.g., Schultz 1999; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015; McManus 2017), but the difficulty in quantifying the concepts of resolve and reputation poses a challenge to this approach. Since Tomz (2007) pioneered the use of a survey experiment to investigate the existence of audience costs, survey experiments have rapidly gained popularity and become a dominant method in the field (e.g., Kertzer 2016; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Renshon et al. 2018; Nomikos and Sambanis 2019; Kertzer et al. 2020; Lupton 2020). Some scholars also utilize laboratory experiments (Tingley and Walter 2011a, 2011b; Quek 2016). Experiments reduce concerns with measurement and can provide evidence of causal relationships, but raise potential concerns about external validity. Finally, historical case studies are often utilized, frequently in conjunction with other methods (Hopf 1994; Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Yarhi-Milo 2014; McManus 2017; Yarhi-Milo 2018; Lupton 2020). Case studies can provide deep understanding of particular historical situations, but it is not always clear if the findings apply to other situations as well. Although all of the methods mentioned have pros and cons, the methodological diversity of the resolve and reputation literature allows for a balanced approach in which scholars use different methods to test each other's findings.

Evolution of the Literature and Connections to FPA

Although the concepts of resolve and reputation are crucial to foreign policy statecraft, most scholars who have studied these topics have historically approached them from a rationalist perspective rather than an FPA one. Early rationalists like Schelling (1960, 1966), who were the first to theorize about the importance of resolve and reputation, wrote mostly in generalities with few references to particular foreign policy cases or the actual process of foreign policy decision-making. From the 1990s through the early 2000s, the literature took an even stronger rationalist turn, as most theory building was driven by formal models. Fearon's (1995) bargaining model of war demonstrated the importance of incomplete information about resolve, and Fearon's (1994, 1997) work on signalling and audience costs opened the door to studying how states could signal resolve. Later work focused in on more specific rationalist mechanisms for audience costs (Smith 1998; Guisinger and Smith 2002; Slantchev 2006) and other methods

through which signals of resolve could be credible (Kurizaki 2007; Trager 2017). The literature on reputation has been less uniformly rationalist, as reputation critics such as Mercer (1996) have long considered psychological factors, but even this literature took a somewhat rationalist turn. For example, Sartori (2005) formally modelled how bluffing might damage a state's reputation, and Sechser (2010) formally modelled when states are most likely to care about their reputations.

The rational choice perspective has made undeniably valuable contributions to the study of resolve and reputation. It has helped to establish the pivotal role of resolve in conflict bargaining in a clear and rigorous way, and it has given us a baseline for expectations about foreign policy behaviour that other approaches can build on. Yet the assumption of the rational choice perspective that states are rational utility maximizers, as well as the tendency of the rational choice perspective to adopt either a unitary actor assumption or a greatly simplified view of within-state actors, are difficult to reconcile with the FPA perspective. The premise of FPA research is that foreign policy decision-making is driven by the agency of individuals, who do not always behave rationally (Hudson 2005; Thies and Breuning 2012). FPA scholars cite the importance of personality (Walter, Schafer, and Young 1999; Kaarbo 2018), emotions (Dolan 2016), cognitive complexity (Foster and Keller 2014), groupthink (Schafer and Crichlow 2010), and even biology (McDermott 2014) in explaining foreign policy decision-making. The FPA and rational choice perspectives do not so much disagree as talk past each other, with different focuses and different aims.

In the last ten to fifteen years, the literature on resolve and reputation has begun to shift. Although rational choice remains an important part of the literature, new perspectives are increasingly being incorporated. In keeping with a discipline-wide trend that places less emphasis on fidelity to a particular paradigm or approach and more emphasis on problem-focused research, there is increased dialogue between the rationalist perspective and other perspectives. This trend has created new openings for the FPA perspective to contribute to the resolve and reputation literature. The remainder of this section will highlight three specific trends in the study of resolve and reputation that provide new openings for engagement with the FPA perspective: (1) increased emphasis on domestic politics, (2) increased emphasis on the influence of individual leaders, and (3) increased emphasis on the psychology of policy-makers.

The first shift in the approach to studying resolve and reputation relates to the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy. The earliest scholars who wrote about resolve and reputation generally had little to say about domestic politics (e.g., Schelling 1960, 1966; Snyder 1961). However, from the mid-1990s onward, game theoretic models increasingly began to incorporate a domestic level. Fearon's (1994) domestic audience cost theory, which linked international resolve and credibility to the domestic audience's ability to punish a leader for backing down, is largely responsible for starting this trend. Other formal models of domestic audience costs soon followed (Smith 1998; Guisinger and Smith 2002; Slan tchev 2006). Taking a slightly different approach, Schultz (1998) formally modelled the effect of the domestic political opposition's decision to support or oppose a government's threat on the threat's credibility. Other scholars tested the implication of these formal models that democracies should be able to make more credible threats because of greater audience costs (Partell and Palmer 1999; Schultz 1999; Downes and Sechser 2012). Other scholars found evidence that more subtle regime attributes, such as media freedom, enhanced the ability to convey resolve (Slanchev 2006; Pott er and Baum 2014).

This focus on domestic politics is an area of overlap between the rational choice perspective on resolve and the FPA perspective. Yet the rational choice perspective on domestic politics remains less nuanced compared to the FPA perspective. For formal modellers, this is a function of both necessity, since complex game theoretic models are difficult to solve, and preference, since the goal of the rational choice perspective is to strip a situation down to its fundamentals in order to analyse it more clearly. Yet even most supporters of the rational choice perspective would agree that it does not offer an entirely realistic depiction of the domestic political environment. This provides an opening for FPA to contribute to the study of resolve and reputation with a richer analysis of domestic politics. FPA scholars have the option of either developing entirely unique theories or building on rational choice theories by adding more nuance. Two examples of scholars who have taken the latter approach are Weeks (2008) and Weiss (2013). Building on Fearon's (1994) and Shultz's (1999) rationalist work on audience costs, Weeks (2008) and Weis (2013) develop more nuanced theories about what is required to generate audience costs and delve into the

politics of autocratic regimes to explain how these regimes might be able to generate audience costs as well.

Another recent trend in the study of resolve and reputation is an increased emphasis on the role of individual leaders. Research has found that leaders' individual biographical experiences influence their propensity for international conflict (Horowitz et al. 2015; Carter and Smith 2020) as well as their willingness to contribute to collective defence (Fuhrmann 2020). Saunders (2011) also finds that leaders' personal threat perceptions shape their country's strategy for military interventions. Furthermore, Goemans (2000) and Croco (2015) show that leaders' fear of punishment contributes to their resolve to keep fighting even when it is no longer in the interest of the state. In addition, McManus (2018) shows that signals of resolve sent by leaders personally are important for extended deterrence. These findings fit with the longstanding view of the FPA perspective that foreign policy is not just made by states but by individuals.

Despite increasingly noting the importance of leaders, the literature on resolve and reputation has so far given relatively little consideration to how leaders operate within the larger foreign policy bureaucracy. Exploring this topic more deeply could be another opportunity for the FPA perspective to contribute to research on resolve and reputation. One example of a scholar who has already taken such an approach is Saunders, who analyses the importance of leaders' bargaining with elite audiences (Saunders 2015); and how previous foreign policy experience enables leaders to better manage their team of advisors (Saunders 2017) in making decisions about use of force. Another example is Yarhi-Milo (2014), who explores how and why leaders and intelligence analysts evaluate adversaries' intentions differently. A final example is Schub (2020), who considers how the different information available to different government agencies and a leader's decision regarding which agencies to consult affects decisions about war and peace.

Arguably the most important recent development in the study of resolve and reputation, and also the development that brings the study of this topic most in line with the FPA perspective, is the 'behavioral revolution' (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). The behavioural perspective draws insights from psychology and analyses the preferences, beliefs, and decision-making of elites and the public. The behavioural approach to the study of resolve and reputation has expanded rapidly in the last decade to the extent that it now

rivals the rational choice perspective in prominence. One contribution of the behavioural perspective is a deeper understanding of the psychological reasons why the domestic public imposes audience costs on leaders who back down (Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Nomikos and Sambanis 2019) and why certain individuals are more concerned about reputation than others (B rutger and Kertzer 2018; Yarhi-Milo 2018). Another contribution is a better understanding of what makes individuals resolved (Kertzer 2016). A final contribution is establishing that observers of signals of resolve do not always interpret them as predicted by the rationalist literature (Tingley and Walter 2011a; Quek 2016) and that observers' own psychology and foreign policy orientation affect how signals are interpreted (Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018; Kertzer et al. 2020).

These findings have revolutionized the literature on resolve and reputation, showing that our understanding that has been derived from formal models is only partially accurate. The increasingly widespread integration of psychological approaches into the literature on resolve and reputation opens up the opportunity for greater dialogue with FPA, which has a long history of integrating psychological findings into FPA. The literature cited in the prior paragraph has already taught us a great deal about how individuals process signals of resolve and form beliefs about reputation. However, the vast majority of this literature is experimental, which might raise concerns about external validity. One useful role for the FPA perspective might therefore be to look for evidence of these same psychological processes in real-world historical cases. Some examples of scholars who are already doing this are Holmes (2018) and Wong (2019, 20 20), who analyse historical accounts of foreign policy interactions by applying findings from psychological experiments.

Connections to Other Disciplines

As it has evolved, the literature on resolve and reputation has drawn from several disciplines outside political science, including economics, psychology, and history. The formal models that rationalists have used to study resolve and reputation have roots in economics. For example, a classic game theoretic model from economics that has influenced the study of international reputation is the chain store model, in which a monopolist

attempts to deter other businesses from entering a market (Selten 1978; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982). Political scientists who have used this model as a basis for their own formal models or empirical research on international reputation include Sartori (2005), Slantchev (2011), Tingley and Walter (2011a, 2011b), and Renshon et al. (2018). As another example, the concept of signalling as a way to reveal private information originated in a formal model about education as a signal of productivity by an economist (Spence 1973). As a final example, the models of conflict bargaining used by international relations scholars to study resolve are related to models of labour conflict from economics (Bacharach and Lawler 1981).

Although these rationalist models offer limited potential for dialogue with FPA, there is also a robust field of behavioural economics that analyses how psychology causes individuals to deviate from the behaviour predicted by rationalist models. The contribution of behavioural economics that is most relevant to the study of resolve is Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which can help us determine when individuals are most likely to be resolved. For example, it suggests that resolve is likely to be greater when a state is in danger of losing something than when it has the opportunity to gain something new. As noted in the introductory chapter (Kaarbo and Thies, Chapter 1), FPA was one of the first subdisciplines in political science to incorporate the insights of Prospect Theory. Therefore, as both behavioural economics and the FPA perspective contribute to the study of resolve and reputation, there is also potential for dialogue between FPA and economics.

In addition to incorporating insights from both rationalist and behavioural economics, scholars studying resolve and reputation have also incorporated insights from psychology. For example, Mercer (1996) uses the fundamental attribution error to explain why it is difficult for countries to develop reputations of irresolution with adversaries. Yarhi-Milo (2018) uses the concept of self-monitoring to explain why some leaders care more about reputation than others. Kertzer (2016) uses character traits and methods of measuring them identified by psychologists to analyse what makes leaders resolved. Kertzer et al. (2020) use the concept of motivated reasoning to explain why observers interpret signals differently. Again, the incorporation of political psychology into the study of foreign policy is a hallmark of the FPA approach, so these links to psychology also suggest opportunities for

dialogue with FPA. In particular, FPA may have a role to play in explaining how individual psychological biases interact within a foreign policy team.

Finally, the study of resolve and reputation is also linked to the discipline of history due to the popularity of historical case studies as a research method. Case studies are the oldest method of studying resolve and reputation, and they have retained a place in the literature today, often being used in combination with other methods. Political scientists have used historical case study research to analyse whether reputations develop (Hopf 1994; Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Lupton 2020), whether leaders suffer audience costs when they back down (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Tranchtenberg 2012), the success of coercive strategies (Altman 2018), and how leaders can convey resolve in face-to-face meetings (Wong 2019, 2020). All of this work builds on the work of historians, with a particular focus on World War II and Cold War history. A promising new trend in the study of resolve is the quantitative analysis of historical foreign policy documents, using a text-as-data approach (Katagiri and Min 2019). This enables large bodies of documents to be studied more efficiently and arguably with less potential for the researcher's biases to influence the analysis. Because of the prominence of historical research in the study of resolve and reputation, bringing the FPA perspective to the study of resolve and reputation can also enable FPA to forge more connections with the history discipline.

Directions for Future Research

Despite the progress that has been made in studying resolve and reputation, unanswered questions remain. In their recent review of the literature, Jervis et al. (2021) argue that it is necessary to take into account different points of view when evaluating perceptions of resolve and reputation, and to further investigate the reasons for differences in these perceptions among observers. Since this line of research is psychologically oriented, it represents a major opening for FPA to contribute to the study of resolve and reputation. One way in which the FPA perspective could be particularly useful is by enabling us to not only analyse how people process information related to resolve and reputation as individuals, but also how the structure of the foreign policy bureaucracy affects the processing of information. For

example, how does an individual's place in the bureaucracy affect how they evaluate reputation and resolve? And how are these individual evaluations aggregated to influence the foreign policy evaluations and decision-making of an entire nation? As noted above, scholars such as Yarhi-Milo (2014), Saunders (2015, 2017), and Schub (2020) have begun to explore such questions, but more work remains to be done.

Another topic that future research could explore is the choice among different options for signalling resolve. Formal models often leave the precise nature of signals of resolve unspecified, and survey experiments typically focus on threats. Recently, however, some research has begun to identify and compare the effectiveness of additional signals of resolve, such as nuclear deployments (Furhmann and Sechser 2014), leadership visits (McManus 2018), and covert actions (Carson and Yarhi-Milo 2017). McManus and Nieman (2019) develop a latent variable measure of overall signal strength, derived from various individual signals including alliances, visits, statements, exercises, troop deployments, and arms sales. Furthermore, while the signalling literature has typically focused on public signals of resolve, recent work suggests that private signals may also be able to convey resolve equally or even more credibly than public signals (Kurzaki 2007; Trager 2017; Katagiri and Min 2019).

With so many signalling options available, it is important to consider how states decide among different signalling options, as well as the implications of these decisions. Some research has considered the determinants of the decision to send individual signals, such as alliances (e.g., Gibler 2008; Mattes 2012; Miller 2012; Narang and LeVeck 2019), visits (Lebovic and Saunders 2016; Ostrander and Rider 2019), statements (McManus 2017; Blankenship 2021), troop deployments (Martinez Machain et al. 2021), and nuclear deployments (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014a). Yet with a few exceptions (Milner and Tingely 2015; McManus and Yarhi-Milo 2017), little research has considered the determinants of the choice among multiple signalling options. Since the choice to send one signal is unlikely to be made in isolation from the choice to send other signals (Morgan and Palmer 2000), further exploration of this topic is important. Furthermore, the question of which signal to send is linked to the prior topic of variations in how observers interpret signals because states should have the incentive to send a combination of signals that is influential to the largest possible number of people. The FPA approach can be useful in gaining insight into

how states choose among different signalling options. With the possible exception of verbal statements, most signals require coordination across the foreign policy bureaucracy and sometimes even with the legislature. Therefore, FPA can help us understand how the individuals within these institutions interact to produce signalling decisions.

Another topic on which further research could be beneficial is the relationship between resolve and reassurance. Although research on conflict bargaining in recent decades has focused predominantly on the benefits of conveying resolve, there is also a strand of literature arguing that it is possible to be viewed as overly resolved, potentially sparking a cycle of fear and arms racing commonly known as either the 'security dilemma' or the 'spiral model' (Herz 1950; Jervis 1976). To break such a cycle of fear, states can send costly signals of reassurance (Kydd 2005). Cebul et al.'s (2021) survey experiment demonstrates that assurances are most credible when a state has developed a reputation for restraint. The importance of conveying reassurance in conjunction with resolve may pose a dilemma for states. Kydd and McManus's (2017) formal model finds no inherent contradiction in making statements of both resolve and reassurance, but other types of signals, such as the amount of arms to build, exist on a continuous scale, meaning it may be difficult to signal more resolve without signalling less reassurance. Similarly, past actions that help an actor develop a reputation for resolve may undermine the actor's reputation for restraint. A further complication is that not all individuals are equally persuaded by reassuring signals (Kertzer et al. 2020). Future research should further investigate what allows reassurance to be credible, the extent to which there is a tradeoff between resolve and reassurance, and methods of overcoming this tradeoff. Since the spiral model is largely driven by cognitive biases, particularly the tendency to attribute adversaries' actions to the worst possible intentions, the FPA perspective's focus on psychology may be able to shed light on these questions. For example, an FPA approach might analyse how individual bias in favour of or against trusting signals of reassurance are aggregated through the foreign policy bureaucracy.

Taken as a whole, many of these directions for future research suggest a need to better understand foreign policy bureaucracies and the nuts and bolts of foreign policy decision-making. Some research on resolve and reputation treats the state as a 'black box,' while other research accounts for the influence of domestic politics or individual psychology on resolve and

reputation. However, with a few exceptions (e.g., Yarhi-Milo 2014; Saunders 2015; Saunders 2017, Katagiri and Min 2019; Schub 2020), there has been very little detailed analysis of how the nuts and bolts of the foreign policy process influence resolve or beliefs about resolve and reputation. This is a major gap in understanding, since the foreign policy process is fundamentally bureaucratic. Some aspects of bureaucratic decision-making that seem mundane on the surface can actually have important implications for understanding resolve and reputation. For example, Lindsey (2017) argues that the personal background of the diplomats who are assigned to communicate with a particular country affects the credibility of the communication. Therefore, it is necessary to open not only the black box of the state, as scholars have been arguing for decades, but also the black box of the bureaucracy within the state. This is a challenging task because of classification restrictions and other limitations on information availability, and it is particularly difficult to accomplish in a cross-national manner. Nonetheless, this type of research would be highly valuable for moving the study of resolve and reputation forward.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the evolution and interdisciplinary connections of the resolve and reputation literature, with an emphasis on how FPA can contribute to this literature. Over time, the resolve and reputation literature has evolved in ways that create more natural opportunities for dialogue with the FPA perspective. In particular, it has increasingly incorporated insights from psychology and has become more pluralistic with regard to both methodology and theoretical approaches. After several decades of research, there is little doubt that both resolve and reputation have important effects on international outcomes, and we have learned a considerable amount about how countries can signal resolve and build a reputation. Future research on resolve and reputation is likely to seek out more nuances regarding how individuals perceive resolve and reputation differently and how these various individual perceptions aggregate and influence foreign policy decisions. The FPA approach is well positioned to lead the way in analysing such questions.

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CHAPTER 25

Strategic Narratives, Soft Power, and Foreign Policy

ALISTER MISKIMMON, BEN O'LOUGHLIN, AND LAURA ROSELLE

The Origins and Evolution of Soft Power and Strategic Narratives

Strategic narrative analyses address how power and influence can be understood in debates surrounding soft power and foreign policy analysis (FPA). After assessing research on soft power as an influence, we suggest that strategic narrative offers a more comprehensive framework to explain whole circuits of communication over long periods, and how all kinds of actors make sense of their past, present, and futures. This allows the explanation of core international relations (IR) concepts like legitimacy, authority, and the likelihood of actors forging new projects to overcome shared problems. Thus, strategic narrative helps link FPA and IR. First, we explain what soft power and strategic narrative are and how they are situated within FPA and IR, and we describe how both draw on a wider set of knowledges about power and persuasion. Second, we demonstrate how strategic narrative is practiced by a wide range of state and non-state actors, all in ways that bear upon how we theorize in IR. In particular, this addresses the long-standing criticism of FPA as being too state-centric. We argue that the conducting of foreign policy-making is changing to adapt to these new international communication pressures and opportunities. Finally, we outline how analysis of strategic narratives can explain how state and non-state actors are responding to current and future policy challenges. Attention to these narratives and how they circulate offers a pathway to understand the conditions within which policy will be made, legitimated, and contested.

Nye's original use of the term 'soft power' was to seek to explain how the US could exert influence globally following the end of the Cold War (Nye 1990, 2004). Whilst cultural attraction and the promotion of political

values had been important for both the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Cold War featured the primacy of military deterrence and containment efforts by both sides. Hard power took the form of military assets and alliances intended to produce insecurity in the enemy and security among those in the alliance, reinforced by competing economic systems. By the end of the Cold War, it was also clear that if a state amassed products of cultural attraction, then policy-makers could influence how others felt about their country. The existence of unintended hard and soft power raised the question of how currently passive 'assets' could be mobilized (Chitty 2017).

The end of the Cold War broadened the scope for global mobilization of many forms of exchange, less hindered by the divisions of a bipolar world. This entailed building communication into statecraft in a particular way. It was not just communication *about* statecraft, but communication as a broad field *of* statecraft. Statecraft in the 1990s witnessed the development of capabilities through diplomacy and public diplomacy (see Tago, Chapter 21 in this volume), capabilities with the aim of projecting an attractive set of values and actions to overseas audiences—elite or public. States with multiple historical and contemporary relations engaged in a form of polyphonic statecraft, focusing on a diversity of domains and audiences including, for example, development aid programmes, international broadcasting, and trade partnerships. State communication efforts were hybridized: states had to use a blend of traditional media and digital technology. Nonetheless, in these settings, state actors have tended to operate in silos. In soft power terms, the attractiveness of states was promoted by ministries in their distinct policy fields. It was unclear how such targeted promotion could bear upon the conduct of foreign policy and broader efforts to build alliances, authority, and legitimacy. Many states seemed to lack the communication of a coherent strategy that would steer IR in a certain direction.

The concept of soft power has sparked considerable debate since Nye launched his idea and the end of the Cold War. Underlying these debates are disagreements on both how soft power might be operationalized within policy contexts, and how its conceptual claims fit within the wider canon of IR and FPA. Christopher Layne's (2010) critique highlighted what is at stake within IR more broadly—and FPA critiques of IR. First, he suggests that as 'foreign policy decision making is mediated by domestic political

institutions and bureaucracies and filtered through the prism of the national interest', it is challenging to assert Nye's core assertion that attractiveness is a key attribute in international affairs (Layne 2010: 53). This is an argument that many FPA scholars would agree with. Layne's second concern is that linking international legitimacy to soft power conceptually overlaps with existing literature in constructivism and offers little novelty. Third, Layne questions the methodological and conceptual robustness of the concept, raising the difficulty of isolating soft power as a key variable in determining an outcome in international affairs, which is reflected in much of the wider literature on soft power (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Bakalov 2020). Layne's scepticism hones in on his conception of the nature of power and influence. Wilson suggests that to counter such scepticism, 'Soft power advocates need to be more convincing that their particular strengths can advance the national well-being, and be much more Machiavellian about how to do so' (Wilson 2008:122).

This links to a core challenge of understanding soft power in an FPA context. Much of the criticism of soft power as a concept has focused on the extent to which it can be instrumentalized in foreign policy, as well as the challenges associated with demonstrating its effects. Eriksson and Norman point to soft power's symbolic value in foreign policy (Eriksson and Norman 2011). Kroenig et al. 'argue that to apply soft power effectively states must communicate to an intended target in a functioning marketplace of ideas, persuade the target to change its attitude on a relevant political issue, and ensure that the target's newly held attitude influences international political outcomes' (Kroenig et al. 2010: 412). Perhaps the biggest challenge facing FPA when engaging with the concept of soft power is being explanatory in its contribution to understanding policy outcomes. Bakalov (2020: 513) suggests soft power needs to be situated in the wider context of IR theory, arguing, 'the problem of causal inference based on the existing actor-centred models is remedied by a shift in analytical focus from static actors to dynamic processes that trace the interplay between soft and hard power'. We have argued that analyses of soft power overwhelmingly focus on soft power 'assets' or capabilities and how to wield them, not on how influence does or does not take place, which relates to a wider understanding of how power and influence functions today (Roselle et al. 2014). The wealth of literature on soft power indicates that it has become a catch-all term that has lost explanatory power, just as hard power once did.

We argue that the concept of strategic narrative gives us intellectual purchase on the complexities of international politics today, especially in regard to how influence works in international affairs. Thus strategic narrative analysis helps build a bridge between FPA and IR by setting narrative construction about the international system, identity, and policy within a communication ecology. Studies such as Singh and MacDonald's (2017) reinforce the need for broadening our understanding of soft power in order to capture the dynamics of influence.

'Power' in soft power depends on the free decisions of overseas citizens and their leaders to choose whether a country is worth engaging with, and how. A country's soft power may be limited. It may be undermined if that state is also using subversive and violent action overseas. A country can have an attractive culture and lifestyle, but if, for example, it sends assassins to kill scientists or officials in another country, this can lead it to be viewed with suspicion and deemed untrustworthy in the eyes of overseas audiences. Foreign policy must be joined up or coordinated to minimize this disparity in its reputation. However, sometimes a country's intelligence agency may feel it needs to assassinate someone on national security grounds; or its healthcare ministry may tell its government to find ways to direct needed assistance away from other countries towards its own. Audiences overseas will see this behaviour and judge.

We have argued that soft power research has been 'hijacked' by the task of counting assets (Roselle et al. 2014: 70). Nye recently suggested to the UK Parliamentary Soft Power Committee, on which O'Loughlin sat, that soft power research had become 'mesmerised by concreteness' and drawn to producing indexes of who is deemed attractive (Nye 2013: n.p.). Soft power research was not trying to explain how relationships between countries are managed or explain how mechanisms of attraction or influence worked. At best, Nye suggested, soft power analysis could identify when societies hold shared meanings of an issue or dilemma, which would constitute a 'milieu' in which cooperation could become possible (Nye 2011: 97).

For that reason, the study and practice of strategic narrative involves analysis of the formation, projection, *and reception* of narrative. Formation refers to the steps by which a narrative is arrived at—a series of debates, the presentation of policy choices, and the refinement of pre-existing narrative. Projection refers to the mechanisms or means chosen to communicate the

narrative to targeted or diffuse audiences by: direct use of social media by a leader, indirect use of news reporting, campaigns, websites, and so on. Reception analysis opens the field up because when audiences receive a narrative, they interpret it, discuss it, post online about it, and compare it to other narratives. Reception analysis is not a snapshot audience survey. Narrative describes how humans give meaning to experience through time, defining a sequence of events and processes, in a way that 'appeal' or 'attraction' do not conceptualize or address. This overlaps with core concerns of FPA and IR, illustrating how narrative analysis contributes to bringing FPA and IR into a more productive dialogue.

Strategic narrative is rationalist in the sense that it is characterized by the effort to induce a behavioural response from relevant audiences. However, the process is richer than short-term cause-effect: this induction or persuasion may take a decade or a generation. We define strategic narrative as a 'means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors' (Miskimmon et al. 2017: 6). Strategic narratives describe a path through time involving a set of actions to overcome dilemmas that will lead a constituency to a preferable outcome. In IR the study of strategic narrative often begins with the narratives projected by states, but narrative is produced and circulated among a full range of actors, often within the foreign policy-making process. It is for the researchers to decide which actors are most relevant for answering their question.

Narrative analysis supports research in FPA because it shows what steps or sequences of events people understand as constituting international politics. People come to believe they inhabit a sequence and have hopes about what is still to unfold. Assumptions about what actors did in the past inform expectations about how they will act in the present and future. This is where the analysis of strategic narrative comes in. This enables FPA to develop very concrete explanations of the legitimation, contestation, or disruption of foreign policy; of why some foreign policy ideas become acceptable and appear feasible while others do not. Those narratives might rest on different standards of evidence and interpretation, different kinds of faith, different cultural traditions, and different power hierarchies that shape which narratives get heard and which silenced. Even so, there remain actors

seeking to use narratives to advance their strategy for a nation or organization, and this explains much of how foreign policy works.

Kai Oppermann and Alexander Spencer have demonstrated the role of narrative in FPA through their studies on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and Brexit (Oppermann and Spencer 2018; Spencer and Oppermann 2020). Their work highlights how narrative shapes policy actors' view of politics and provide frameworks for understanding issues as they develop, which echoes Hajer's work on environmental policy from the 1990s (Hajer 1995). These studies demonstrate how narratives within policy discussions demonstrate power and influence in action, determining how actors understanding past events, how policy responses are shaped and defined, and how the meaning of unfolding events becomes embedded.

In this way, strategic narrative helps bridge IR and FPA because it can show how communication on specific policies becomes interpreted through wider IR concerns about cooperation and conflict, about the identity of different actors (see Julka, Chapter 11 in this volume), about how legitimacy and authority function for different populations, and about how actors understand the wider directions world order may be taking. This enriches FPA as well as illuminating the concrete instances of policy-making through which wider IR concerns become understood. We continue the chapter by outlining how a strategic narrative approach can uncover the dynamics of influence in international affairs.

Soft Power and Strategic Narrative: Different Kinds of Knowledge and Different Forms of Policy Relevance

There are three components to strategic narrative research. First, the researcher analyses the formation, projection, and reception of narratives. The research question may be particularly focused on one of these stages. For reasons of costs or lack of data he or she may not be able to evidence all of these stages. Sometimes the three stages are accounted for collaboratively: a collection of authors explained the three stages for the EU and China in order to provide a holistic understanding of how those two great powers might find possible points of cooperation or contention in the coming decade (Miskimmon et al. 2021).

Second, analysis focuses on three kinds of narrative: narrative about the international system, narrative about the identity of the self or others, and narrative about policies or issues. A general finding has been that when actors agree on how the system is organized and about the history and characteristics of the self and the other, then it becomes feasible for them to agree on a policy narrative and specific roles each should take on that policy (Miskimmon et al. 2017). When actors have very different narratives about the past, present, and future of the system, or contentious differences in how they characterize one another, then agreeing how to manage a certain policy problem becomes difficult.

Third, since strategic narrative research involves examining communication alongside policy action then researchers can examine how actors try to shape the infrastructure of communication itself. Efforts to establish wholly free global flows of information run up against states prioritizing Internet sovereignty and insulated communication systems. This affects who receives what narratives. The explanation of which narratives circulate and convince which audiences can make the communication infrastructure itself an object for analysis.

Strategic narrative research needs to be mindful of the presence of narratives that are not deliberately created with a particular strategy in mind. States have narratives, but often narratives overtake states. The narratives of civilizational progress, of climate change, or of economic development were not created by any one state, yet these narratives inform assumptions about how states should behave and what expectations they should present to their domestic publics. Not all narratives are strategic, and the effect of these narratives on foreign policy can still be researched.

We propose a spectrum of approaches in the use of narrative. These map onto theoretical positions in IR (Miskimmon et al. 2017) which also address FPA questions and concerns. At a ‘very thin’ end we find rationalist IR studies that treat narratives as offering roadmaps or templates to justify particular policy goals that serve an actor’s interests. The phrase ‘whose story wins’ expresses the assumption of a bargaining between actors that will lead to one or some winning out. How narratives shape experience is not part of this analysis. In ‘thin’ strategic narrative analysis, the researcher locates any bargaining within a longer temporality in which different actors become socialized in different ways. The study of how narratives form within multilateral organizations is one such example. This presents a

greater workload but it does allow researchers to establish higher plausibility about why certain actors come to take certain positions and maintain specific narratives about where a system or certain policies should be heading. In ‘thick’ analysis, attention is also paid to forms of reflexivity and emotion: how actors reflect on, and are moved by, narratives or events. Analysis can extend to include how actors use various media—traditional and digital—to stir controversy or even indicate that a situation is ‘unprecedented’ and only they can find a path forward (see e.g. Wagner-Pacifici 2020). Finally, at a ‘very thick’ end, we outline poststructural, feminist, and hermeneutic approaches to narrative analysis that use interpretive methods to identify the assumptions, motivations, and reactions to narratives used by actors in IR (e.g. Daigle 2016). This analysis allows an understanding of why narratives emerged at certain times, and why those assumptions and motivations might have aligned with the sense-making of other actors, making cooperation possible.

These theoretical positions are important because each has an epistemological commitment (Steele 2010). Each privileges specific forms of data as offering evidence of specific concepts deemed to play a role in the theoretical understanding or explanation. This will have a bearing on the choices FPA scholars must make if they want to use a strategic narrative focus to strengthen their own analyses.

Soft power research produces positivist, ‘objective’ data about who likes which country. There is not a spectrum of approaches. But this rapidity of findings means soft power researchers run the risk of their research being used by policy-makers in unintended ways. The publication of a report or article containing a set of survey-based rankings can be used by policy-makers for purposes that the researcher might not agree with. A government might use a soft power rankings table to proclaim, ‘We are popular, so our foreign policies must be attractive’, despite the fact that their attractiveness might be due to social and commercial ties built up over a generation, and not due to that government’s current foreign policies. In a recent report on the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy, Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, argues that soft power can act as a buffer to cushion the negative impact of foreign policy decisions. He suggests,

> For all the criticism the UK government has received as a result of its messy withdrawal from the EU, and its mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, Britain also retains considerable reserves of soft power: the ability to engage internationally and influence global outcomes irrespective of the government's diplomatic efforts at persuasion or coercion.
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> (Niblett 2021: 17)

Since strategic narrative research involves analysis of the content of a narrative and its formation, projection, and reception, findings are often complex and multi-layered. There is no table of rankings. There are less parsimonious explanations of why a narrative might be attractive, persuasive, or align with those held by foreign publics. This makes strategic narrative research more difficult for policy-makers to use and appropriate. For strategic narrative research to inform policy, it takes months of dialogue and an ability for both researchers and policy-makers to explore complex, often interpretive analysis. In contrast, soft power research offers immediate data and rankings that policy-makers and their marketing teams could use. Since this is research in the public sphere, where all claims are politicized, it requires courage for scholars to take responsibility for how their soft power research is used (for more on how this is a wider problem for IR scholarship, see Steele 2010).

Soft power is met with some scepticism by those who feel any communication in IR is likely to contain deceit. For Nye the core thesis is that a state's attractiveness moves others to cooperate with it. However, boosting attractiveness then becomes an important part of statecraft. States must use techniques that draw upon marketing to 'sell' an image, ensure this image is distributed to target audiences, and research how those audiences' perceptions or understandings of that state are influenced by it. Since it will be attractive features and values will be given precedence in any marketing material, not ugly or offensive ones, this use of soft power can be criticized as representing an intentional strategy to present an incomplete image, and to use that image to induce particular behaviours in the target audiences. Equally, the structural power of commercial media companies to decide which content gains large audiences gives some states an enduring advantage in indirectly projecting soft power and an appealing image of its society.

Strategic narrative analysis steps beyond the examination of attractiveness. For example, it can be used explore the narratives different actors hold about how the international system works, how power is distributed, and thus how responsibility for addressing problems can be

assigned or contested. While analysts *could* identify what model of international system those actors find *attractive*, that is not the same as identifying how those actors believe the international system operates and how they concretely act in it based on those beliefs.

The limitations of focusing on attractiveness relates to a further problem: governments can realize that the use of soft power is to some extent beyond their control. A government can control public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy campaigns to target specific audiences. A government cannot control all representations that are made of their country, whether created within their country or abroad. How a country appears in overseas news, how appealing its cultural icons, how liked their cuisine—these are all beyond a government's control. That appeal might emerge and consequently make a trade deal or student visa attractive to another state or its inhabitants, but that appeal will have been generated through a diffuse range of representations. There is still much to be understood about the impact of soft power and efforts to influence third countries. Soft power can be worked on, campaigns can seek to boost a country's soft power, but soft power is the butterfly that escapes the net. Liberal countries may even find that degree of openness normatively positive, as a range of voices and images can flourish. A strategic narrative can appeal in a much more focused way, and communicate a role both for the country seeking to be persuasive and the country where listeners sit. Narrative has a different grip on experience to soft power's 'appeal' and 'attraction'. A recent study on how young people in Israel/Palestine viewed EU diplomacy efforts focused on how young people narrate the EU; to what extent they view the EU as effective; and, indeed, what expectations they have of how the EU will act in crisis situations (Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2019). The study demonstrated that feeling listened to in foreign policy is important because it helps the EU to manage expectations about what it is likely to do. Israel and Palestine represent societies in which the EU can struggle to manage expectations, either under- or overcommitting, and this can detract from EU credibility, in the eyes of these societies' elites, news media, and the participants in the study. The management of expectations in IR entails the management of feelings, since those feelings build and harden individuals' characterization of actors.

Strategic narrative research questions the assumption that sheer attractiveness, and the appeal of core features of a state and society, will

bring cooperation from other states/societies. It puts strategy and intention at the focus of policy-making from the outset. Yet this makes the research much more intensive, and making an impact *on* policy much more difficult. We have been invited to advise policy-makers in many countries who wanted something of a snapshot analysis of which country might have a more coherent narrative, or which narrative might be popular in a certain population. To bring 'thicker' narrative analysis to bear on policy takes an investment of time by both researchers and policy-makers. O'Loughlin has collaborated with the British Council over many years to evaluate how they project a UK narrative and how audiences engage with it in different countries, through education, art fairs, workshops, and so on. This has entailed an openness and generosity by the policy-makers and a vast amount of travelling by the research team, which in turn generated a huge volume of data as well as dialogue about narrative. FPA scholarship can consider which policy teams they might be able to work or collaborate with, including policy-makers and practitioners, in order to generate such data.

Seeing beyond the black box of foreign policy-making to understand the reception of foreign policy ideas is increasingly important given the contestation at the heart of international debates on the emerging international order. In his latest book, John Ikenberry argues that, 'Cold War Liberalism offered a narrative that put liberal internationalism at the service of an activist American foreign policy' (Ikenberry 2020: Kindle loc. 4741). Ikenberry further argues that a shared narrative of liberalism's past and future, symbolized by a security community, worked to hold the West together. In the post-Cold War era, Ikenberry suggests that the 'hollowing out' of the West as a security community has made it, 'easier for leaders to offer alternative narratives of the American national interest', bringing on a crisis in the liberal international order (Ikenberry 2020: Kindle loc. 5495). Changes in material conditions and a contestation of the ideas that shape our understanding of international order lie at the heart of strategic narrative.

Lawrence Freedman articulates that the result of narrative contestation in politics has shaped debates to place the struggle for power at the core of political communication. He suggests,

> The impact of these ideas, whether framing paradigms or discourses—or propaganda, consciousness, hegemony, belief-systems, images, constructs and mid-sets for that matter—was to encourage the view that a struggle for power was at root a struggle to shape widely accepted views of the world. In the past, a similar understanding had led socialists to prepare for long campaigns of political education, conducted by means of pamphlets and lectures. This was now a media age and the opportunities to shape and disseminate opinions and presentations of the truth were now many and various.
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> (Freedman 2013: 432)

Researchers focusing on conflict and development argue that the causes of conflict are more complex than whether actors are following or ignoring a particular narrative. The causes are born of different groups competing for control of and access to resources, and not whether they accept or reject a narrative that, for example, climate change is worsening the environment (International Crisis Group 2020). A particular narrative may be just spin: misleading. Those in more interpretivist IR can also point to strategic narrative research being complicated and difficult. For instance, the degree of coherence in an identity narrative can bring mixed interpretations. Some societies and some groups, for example, may welcome a degree of open contestation among a political elite and public supporters because that shows that identity and foreign policy are being formed in a democratic, participatory way that reflects the diversity of the culture. If this brings a little narrative inconsistency or risk, then this is appealing because it shows identity narrative is not the object of monolithic control by a dominating leading subject. In contrast, other audiences may find a consistent narrative appealing because it shows a degree of predictability and strong leadership in that country, suggesting the country's behaviour in IR will conform to expectations and thus make the country more predictable to engage with. When and how these different interpretations of narrative coherence matter is a question for empirical investigation (see reactions to UK foreign policy in Colley 2019; and reactions to Russian foreign policy in Crilley and Chatterje-Doody 2020). This implies that the search for a coherent narrative is not and should not be the simple goal in IR. Identifying and explaining these complications and contests may instead make for a richer FPA and IR.

How Strategic Narrative Is Practiced by a Range of Actors, Opening Up FPA and IR

In line with efforts to broaden the scope of FPA, we argue that *any* actor can use a narrative, whether that is seeking public support or persuading foreign governments to cooperate either with foreign policies on specific issues or much more long-term narratives about the future of the international system (Antoniades et al. 2010). There will be variability in how well they know their target audiences, how they monitor those audiences' own narratives, and how persuasive and welcome the narrative will be to those audiences. Still, those actors have the opportunity to narrate. A range of publications have considered how a range of kinds of actors use strategic narrative (see the symposium convened by Shepherd 2015 and the thematic issue by Levinger and Roselle 2017).

Researchers can examine how corporate actors effectively project a strategic narrative about the future of an economy, whether local, national, regional, or global. They may be asked directly by states to communicate that a certain path is preferable, but even independently a corporation has an interest in suggesting what direction is optimal for workers, investors, consumers, and any regulators. It may be that a large corporation's narrative conflicts with the narrative of its home state yet it is powerful or independent enough to manage the situation and retain its narrative. This might appear to the state to disrupt its foreign policy narrative. Corporations may intentionally or accidentally form overlapping narratives about sustainability or work-life balance that have implications about how they narrate a society's ideal identity. The same is true for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who, in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, are also often distanced and independent from state support, and speak for themselves but also form coalitions and networks that promote common narratives. Corporations and NGOs may partner with a state for a specific soft power campaign, but since they often exist for decades they can play a far greater role in constituting how an issue or society is understood because they play active roles in determining how a society changes and how relations across countries are managed.

Archetti (2017) and Kruglova (2020) have studied how terrorist organizations use narrative to recruit. Both combine narrative with brand

analysis because the latter allows researchers to understand the appeal to a person's emotion and desire. Potential recruits may not agree with the organization's goals or grievances but the organization's website or publications may depict a lifestyle expressing a particular experience of strength, importance, or vitality that is seen to be on offer *with* the organization. The organization uses 'hooks' at that initial stage (Kruglova 2020: 17), and it can then later direct the recruits towards the narrative containing the organization's preferred political goals or a promise of certain material benefits. Asking how a state's narrative is formed offers a means to open up how foreign policy is made. In some states the latter may be entirely formed by state employees around the executive. In others, non-state actors—clubs, salons, media debates—can be where important foreign policy narratives are formed, tested, and consolidated (e.g. Verpoest 2021). Historical comparison of narrative formation also opens up the various ways foreign policy has been made in different local and geopolitical contexts.

We may also find that the genre or template of narratives emerging from a culture rarely changes. This means that any political narrative must align with underlying assumptions about how the world works. It is again not the state that necessarily holds these together. Conspiratorial narratives may operate as strategic narratives in new ways due to the use of social media and the ability of citizens to produce and share their version of events on a potentially huge scale (Madisson and Ventsel 2021). However, conspiracies have for millennia stemmed from religious beliefs, mythologies, entertaining and commonly-shared stories, creating categories of understandings which means any new events are likely to be read through the template of "how things work" and "what the hidden elites do not want you to know". Wertsch's (2008) focus on schema narrative templates—frameworks that are imposed on news as politics unfolds—is useful here.

This entails an examination of the narratives held among various publics. While sociologists and anthropologsits could do this in focused local areas previously, digitalization has now produced a mass of data generated by ordinary citizens in almost any country on almost any topic. Social media sites or below-the-line comments and discussions offer contained spaces to analyse how narratives are evidenced, contested, and negotiated. Such data can be mixed with data gathered in structured surveys, focus groups, and interviews, in which particular narratives can be tested and discussed.

Producing systematic coding of the core functions of narrative in digital data is a next step. Researchers must identify system, identity, and issue narratives; scene, actors, dilemma, tools, and ending; and contestation within the stages or circuits of a narrative's formation, projection, and reception. This is an opportunity we have discussed with digital communication scholars but is yet to have been put into practice. Any combination of these methods would allow a richness of narrative data that is unprecedented in scale and focus.

Opportunities in the Field of Strategic Narrative Analysis

First, there is an opportunity is to use strategic narrative analysis to bridge FPA and IR. In the West, identity politics has developed in a way that has created a contestation of race, gender, and other issues in domestic politics but also greater alertness to implication of these in international problems. In the UK, mistreatment or expulsion of the Windrush generation of migrants from the Caribbean generated intense contestation about historical narratives across oceans. Implication in others' problems and histories is something that state leaders may feel they should address, but do not always do.

This example shows a need for analysis of such identity narratives over time. Widening participation in anti-racist politics can revive memories and grievances from domestic experiences of racism, in turn inspiring a return to legacies of race and geopolitics, not least colonial pasts that have structured the global economy and status hierarchies of race. On this, Richard Pithouse writes, 'the catastrophe from which we are all derived is not solely a matter of material dispossession and accumulation' (Pithouse 2 016: n.p.). It also involves cultural and ideological categorizations that have endured for centuries. Strategic narrative becomes a better lens to identify how this works than that of soft power. Soft power research might turn to qualitative methods to elicit why citizens of one country dislike citizens in another, and what grudges or admirations have endured over time. But capturing how citizens connect past, present, and future is exactly where narrative analysis becomes effective. It is evident that the past is thoroughly informing expectations on how others will behave in the present and therefore whether these others are worth engaging with in the future. It is

also impossible to change how race is understood in world politics, and how foreign policy can be conducted with a full account of this, without identifying and giving public space and attention to this range of narratives.

This has huge potential. Narrative analysis provides an opportunity for FPA and IR scholars to allow citizens who may have troubled or difficult experiences due to a particular foreign policy to tell their stories. Those stories allow the citizens to express what they feel are key past events and how they characterize the different actors within them, leading to researchers gaining an understanding of how those citizens view the terrain or landscape in which the foreign policy has been applied. Critical scholars have noted that sometimes those narratives do not emerge in a simple one-to-one, hour-long interview, but through a series of interactions, some of which might be social and involve more people. Daigle writes that IR knowledge can be 'co-constructed with interlocutors through a process that is non-linear and uncertain' (Daigle 2016: 27). Gallagher suggests that even arguments or conflicts in an interview or social setting involving participants can produce or elicit narrative (Gallagher 2016). If the scholar's aim is to include marginalized voices in IR research then the use of more anthropology-based methods may allow them to include a wider range of participants. This use of a broader range of methods demonstrates the different ways in which IR and FPA can be conceived by actors in practice. Indeed, the same approach can demonstrate the assumptions and biases among policy elites themselves, which are allowed to emerge when the interaction extends over days and weeks of meetings and workshops (Cohn 1987). These included assumptions and biases that could potentially have been consciously held back in a conventional interview situation or in policy documents (Cohn 1987).

Exploring these questions of how history and identity shape current foreign policy debates provide FPA and IR research to can make use of consideration of how social memory works. In the 20th century, Maurice Halbwach's (1992) work looking at the concept of collective memory captured how a social collective like the members of a nation-state could hold a shared memory. He showed how it happened through people participating in a shared social life, through which stories were told, media stories were consumed, and national institutions produced standard accounts that shaped how people remembered together. There will likely be variations between groups within that collective but enough overlap for a

conversation about a common set of events and concerns to work. In this dialogue, the present could be joined to a difficult past, a sequence of events showing fallibility, resulting in caution about future action. A narrative is something that any individual within this nation-state might dispute, but a study of institutionalization, culture, and community can show how such memories can take a general hold. Foreign policy scholars interested in why people are willing to support certain narratives about a country's role can thus engage with the sociological, anthropological, or psychological studies of how memory forms in practice. For instance, how is the state's foreign policy narrative viewed within the social groups that participates in a particular collective memory? Does a perceived degree of alignment mean a particular policy has public support and legitimacy? Why have some memories become 'stickier' or more entrenched than others, and among which groups? How do entrepreneurial actors try to use particular memories as tools to contest the assumptions by which foreign policy is guided and to set foreign policy within a different national and international narrative?

The 21st century has seen greater attention given to how collective memory works as digital technology has vastly expanded the availability and scale of what is recorded, with the digitization of material archives and subsequent provision of a mass of data that allows for prediction or speculation of possible future scenarios and timelines. Migration flows and refugee mobility result in resettlement, with memory becoming sustained and contested across borders in the most local, everyday settings. As such, new imaginaries can transcend national boundaries and communities, and they are increasingly replaced by digitally enabled 'multitudes', leading Hoskins to argue that collective memory has been replaced by 'connective memory' (Hoskins 2017: 85). While indicating a potential for political disruption, this also opens up new opportunities for tracing how strategic narratives can circulate in conditions in which the past, present, and future are generated and made meaningful in new ways. Indeed, this means strategic narrative work becomes an important space for a reconsideration of memory and remembering. Since memory and remembering are vital conditions for the legitimation of foreign policy, and are seen as resources to draw on by those seeking legitimation, then memory and narrative stand as an important bridge towards understanding how foreign policy can contribute to wider changes in IR.

Narrative analysis can highlight how different parties, perhaps even different cultures, make a different sense of the same thing—the same event, catastrophe, grievance. This then has a bearing on the public legitimation of a foreign policy. A word or image stands for a concept (Hall 1997), but strategic narrative analysis can show how different audiences attribute different meanings and concepts to the same word or image. In times of colonialism it may be that the newly arrived, conquering party makes no effort to understand the narratives and values of those being conquered, and assuming that their own framework is the only valid and relevant lens through which to interpret what is happening; and as long as they achieve dominance then the other's narratives remains irrelevant to them (Hall 2018). Subsequently, it might be that this new leader refuses to acknowledge another leader's or society's interpretation of this now past event, and this act of ignoring that will appear to be out of deliberate ignorance (cf. Salecl 2020). This hypothetical sequence of events can help us identify the conditions under which not listening would be deemed a political strategy. It also shows how work would be needed to listen and engage in dialogue to then reach a shared meaning, if possible, so that both parties could have a sense of talking about generally the same thing.

To this end, IR can draw on translation studies which hold contextual knowledge about why words or images have certain meanings in different cultures. This might be especially important where evaluative or abstract words have different meanings or wider connotations, leading to offence being easily be given. To be in a 'just war' or a 'society in transition', for example, can both mean different things. A certain sign on a summit poster or website might refer to a very different concept for the various guests, some being from a culture that socializes people to hold a historical narrative in which that particular sign signifies, say, a terrible event. Even a sign of an inanimate object like a mountain or wall may mean opposed and even conflicting things in different societies. This means that effort is needed in each communication to avoid or overcome differences. Simply having the intention for a word or image to mean *X* does not mean one's audiences will understand that and agree that this is the case.

Conversely, difference could be a rich contributor in inducing various parties to explain their differing historical narratives to one another. The awareness of a lack of fixed meanings can create a forum for exchange and reciprocity, and recognition of the (accidental) *excess* of meaning in what

anyone says. We must identify IR in which differences have been maintained yet mutual knowledge between two parties has increased; an agonistic ‘agree to differ’, based on learning why each differs, replacing any potential sense of antagonism. One foreign ministry can infer what another foreign ministry is trying to say, and even how it is trying to say different things to different domestic or international audiences. This is a matter of interpretation, not a science, but it enables mutual learning.

This navigation of difference in meaning also opens up the possibility for learning how knowledge of the past, present, and future is produced in another society. What forms of knowledge are accepted for claims to count as valid? Who is allowed a voice within a particular society to speak credibly and with due attention and authority about historical sequences of events? This approach encourages an understanding of how power works in that society—power to shape the society’s narrative that will then be projected abroad. All of this work shapes the conditions in which foreign policy is made and legitimized. By tracing these processes, strategic narrative research can strengthen explanation approaches to foreign policy.

Strategic narrative research demonstrates how a whole cultural framework of another can be viewed through a mixture of that other’s movies, political stand-offs, religious tales, tales of travellers, and so on. The research can confine itself to one type of text for a study, but it can also be opened up to include an investigation of all of these rich frameworks through which we think of another country or region. It opens up our attention to the metaphors and analogies that become a community’s shortcut to create a mythical ‘image’ of itself or the other that sits within other wider narratives. This is not to say all identities become split into a binary of us/them or good/bad, since there are many kinds of equivalences and differences that imply a more multi-dimensional assignment of value. Attention to wider cultural frameworks from which narratives are crafted also reveals the arbitrary, mixed manner in which ‘truth’ is put together, and allows an analysis of how this changes over long timespans.

Conclusion

Strategic narrative, not soft power, is the route to explaining communication’s role in the conditions and actions of foreign policy. This is

particularly important as communication technology makes possible more complex communication in the world today. Drawing on knowledges about power and persuasion, a strategic narrative analysis can identify underlying claims about how the international system is structured and works, how identity is constructed, and what makes policies legitimate. Strategic narrative sets out the past, present, and future, thus shaping what is perceived to be possible in foreign policy decision-making. Attention to these narratives and how they circulate facilitates an understanding of the conditions within which policy can be made, legitimated, and contested. Linking FPA and IR, a strategic narrative analysis highlights the importance of understanding how the international system and the actors within it are conceived and how this shapes their foreign policy decision-making.

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CHAPTER 26

Socialization, Recognition, and Foreign Policy

MARTIN EGON MAITINO AND FELICIANO DE SÁ GUIMARÃES

INTRODUCTION

Socialization and recognition should be seen as intertwined concepts, but most of the studies have analysed them separately. In this chapter, we review these concepts following the spirit of this Handbook. Our goal is not to produce a simple backward looking review but rather to analyse socialization/recognition jointly and relate them to the main subfields of foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature. We review the literature on socialization and recognition, establishing bridges between them and FPA literature, and exploring new research agendas in both concepts, especially in terms of their international implications.

In this sense, we show that socialization/recognition can gain by applying FPA concepts and instruments in three different ways. First, by using an FPA focus on the decision unit level and how state agents act to enact and perform foreign policies, socialization and recognition research could understand how specific foreign policy actors can revert, accelerate, or block socialization and recognition processes. Second, FPA's focus on social actors as active agents of foreign policy could help socialization and recognition studies sharpen their understanding of how social actors can use the international arena to influence socialization and recognition schemes. Third, FPA's methodological plurality has the potential to move away socialization and recognition research from the excessively theoretical and small-*n* analyses that dominate both fields today to more comparative and large-*n* approach.

This chapter is divided into four parts. First, we review both concepts focusing on the main contributions in international relations (IR). Second, we debate the missing relationship between socialization and recognition, and how this divide can be overcome. Third, we relate both concepts to

FPA's main subfields (national roles, public opinion, bureaucracies, parliaments/parties, etc.) and explore a research agenda for both concepts using FPA literature. Finally, we conclude suggesting potential pathways for future research.

Socialization and Recognition—Brief Conceptual Trajectory in IR

Over the last thirty years, the idea of states being socialized has been discussed by nearly all main traditions in IR theory, with varying degrees of emphasis from neorealism to constructivism. While the socialization research agenda results have been mixed and the empirical basis relatively narrow (overly focused on European institutions, and on the diffusion of human rights and liberal democratic norms), conceptual work on state socialization and its mechanisms remains widely influential.

Particulars in definitions vary widely, reflecting researchers' preoccupations and emphasis on different dimensions of the socialization process. Nevertheless, most accounts of socialization share a common core: an actor being socialized by another actor or structure, some content being socialized (norms, values, preferences, roles, etc.), and a previously existing community (Guimarães and Maitino 2019: 6). For Johnston (2008: 20–22), there are two key aspects of the concept. First, socialization processes are generally directed at (and experienced by) 'novices'—that is, actors who are not yet considered 'full members' of a social group. Second, socialization regards the 'internalization of the values, roles, and understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a member'. In IR, this ideational, attitudinal, normative, and behavioural content of socialization is frequently simplified to 'norm internalization' (e.g., Alderson 2001; Checkel 2005).[1]

Most conceptual debates revolve around empirical identification. As socialization is often represented as both process *and* outcome, with activity and its results fused in a 'unitary reality' (Long and Hadden 1985), separation of dependent and independent variables is hindered. Although recent literature has focused in exploring socialization processes and mechanisms (see Checkel 2005; Johnston 2008; Beyers 2010), it is not always easy to identify social activities that aim to transform novices into

members. While socialization can proceed through ostensible mechanisms such as teaching, shaming, or conditioning membership to norm compliance, it also proceeds through less visible pathways, as in social cues, role bargaining, or mimicking (see Johnston 2008; Thies 2012).

A central point of contention concerns whether material reinforcement (rewards or punishment) should be regarded as a socialization strategy or excluded from the concept. This reflects an attempt to differentiate between behaviour caused by *strategic adaptation*—instrumentally rational behaviour caused by changes in the environment—and actual *internalization*, implying a change in preferences and interests inducting behaviour even in the absence of environmental incentives (Checkel 2005: 809). Johnston (2008), however, argues adaptation to material or social reinforcement could be seen as social influence cases, a mechanism that is relevant in itself. Other materially based strategies, such as the use of violence and coercion, can also work as mechanisms of socialization, often with long-term effects over individuals (Checkel 2017), but arguably over states as well (Fritz 2015).[2] One should not, then, exaggerate distinctions between instrumentally rational action and socialization. As Checkel (2005, 2017) himself notes, strategic adaptation may work as socialization in a micro-context, giving rise to internalization as institutionalization, cognitive dissonance, and self-persuasion have 'lock-in' effects.

There is also debate when specifying the content of socialization. Individual-level studies usually focus on attitudinal and ideational change—in IR, this usually means measuring adoption of supranational values or identification to international organizations (see Beyers 2010; Wetzel 2013)—but this cannot be easily transferred to states as they are corporate actors (Alderson 2001; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). In this context, norm adoption and violation by-pass the theoretical problems of treating the state as a person and are arguably easier to spot, allowing for more precise empirical identification and facilitating comparative research (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006) and statistical modelling (Greenhill 2010). This framing also contributes to the rift between studies of individual and state socialization, hindering dialogue between these two strands of research, an issue that demands further attention in IR, as will be discussed below.

Thies (2010, 2012; Thies and Nieman 2017) proposes an alternative approach to the individual vs. state dilemma. Drawing on FPA and role theory, Thies equates socialization to role location—the process through

which an actor locates a suitable role in the social structure.[3] It puts socialization as a central determinant of foreign policy, involving both individuals and state responses. International pressure and interaction shape the making and enactment of national role conceptions, as 'socializers' may recognize a state's foreign policy conceptions and behaviour or reject them as inappropriate, which may elicit foreign policy change or stigmatization as a non-compliant member of the community.

More recently, the concept of socialization has taken a different turn. The engagement with postmodern and postcolonial theory, and the rise of China and other 'rising powers' in the international arena brought new questions to the study of state socialization. A research focus on 'progressive norms' and reductionist perspectives on socialization had led to a bias favouring the socializer perspective and misrepresenting the socializee—in particular, those who actively reject, reinterpret, or resist certain norms (Epstein 2012). The lack of attention to socializee agency was also emphasized by the discussion on the changes in the community caused by the inclusion of new members (Terhalle 2011)—a 'two-way' socialization process acknowledged in conceptual debates (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 293; Thies 2003: 547), but ignored by most empirical research.

Focusing less on institutions and more on the production and reproduction of the 'state society' and the Liberal International Order, scholars argued socialization research should pay more attention to related social processes in the international arena: if 'socialization' meant the *inclusion* of states in international society, symbols of *exclusion* ascribed by 'stigmatization' processes (and actors' reactions to those symbols) should also be studied (Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2014). This lens highlights how differentiation within international society occurs not only within a material distribution order but also in a symbolic, recognition order (Nel 20 10; Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2020). Actors seek recognition of certain qualities, competencies, achievements, and identities within a specific group (Geis et al. 2015), but, within such groups, some characteristics are more valued than others, giving rise to a status hierarchy. Thus, socialization and recognition can become intertwined through states' strategies to manage their identities within this symbolic order.

Recognition studies drew on political theory and social psychology to understand how interaction constitutes actors as acknowledged members of the international state society. They also aimed at 'struggles' for others'

recognition of their identities and status claims, and the consequences of these phenomena to the production, reproduction, and transformation of the international order (see Agné et al. 2013; Daase et al. 2015; Visoka et al. 2020).

Academic and public interest in the notion of recognition as a central aspect of politics has grown steeply since the 1990s. Through the works of social theorists such as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, the human need for recognition (of one's qualities, identity, agency) shed light on the causes of social conflict and social and political resistance (Taylor 1994; Honneth 1996). As individual identity is shaped intersubjectively, recognition is necessary for self-worth and self-esteem through relations with others. The experience of disrespect, humiliation, and violation of one's identity came to be seen as a significant—and morally justified—motivation for resistance. While this has clear implications for conflict resolution, the importance of recognition debates to IR was hampered by the discipline's primary focus on states. The transfer of individual-level mechanisms to corporate actors creates a certain uneasiness, as states do not *feel* emotions in the same manner as persons, and the best way to solve this problem is still a matter of debate in the literature (see, e.g., Lindemann 2013; Honneth 2014; Iser 2015).

Nonetheless, many IR scholars have addressed the subject, using recognition to explain identity formation and state motivation in world politics (Lebow 2008; Murray 2010, 2014, 2018; Wolf 2011; Lindemann and Ringmar 2014; Coggins 2014; Duque 2018). Status-seeking behaviour and rising power revisionism, in particular, have been explained by reference to notions of respect, disrespect, and the struggle for recognition (Nel 2010; Wolf 2011; Duque 2018; Murray 2018). Thus, even the causes of war can be seen as deriving from recognition—or, more precisely, from *mis*recognition. The divergence between an actor's status and identity self-perception and the Other's recognition of such claims frequently gives rise to feelings of disrespect and impulses of action to forcefully 'correct' the wrongs (see Ringmar 1996; Murray 2014). As the lack of recognition is a motivation for war, the struggle for recognition is seen as a possible pathway to peace, collapsing hierarchies and giving rise to more moral international relations (see Wendt 2003; Honneth 2014).

However, the possibility of using recognition as a panacea for many other world affairs issues seems unlikely in the face of empirical findings in

psychology (Greenhill 2008) and of the psychoanalytical 'gap' between Self and Other, that is, the structural impossibility of actors being recognized as they wish to be (Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi 2019). Indeed, the frustration this can engender may structure the ideal of sovereignty, sustaining states' desires to increase their capacity to act autonomously (Epstein et al. 2018). Notwithstanding, Geis et al. (2015) argue that such a positive view of recognition gave rise to a bias in the literature, as academics tend to see recognition only on emancipatory terms, that is, recognition generally producing benevolent normative results as opposed to cases of 'bad' or 'instrumental' recognition.[4]

Despite the growing interest of IR scholars, the application of recognition as a social and political concept in IR has remained mostly unconnected to International Law (IL) discussions, where debate about the formal recognition of statehood is well developed (Agné 2013; Geis et al. 2015; Visoka et al. 2020). When looking at actual practices of demanding or granting formal recognition to states, governments, or other collectivities, however, legal precision gives room to fuzziness: policies of 'gradual recognition', engagement without recognition, and even 'markets' of recognition and de-recognition come to the forefront (Bailes 2015; Biene and Daase 2015; Newman and Visoka 2018; Visoka 2020a), giving rise to new normative and empirical questions.

These also provide contact points with the socialization literature. If mutual diplomatic recognition between states is an inherently social 'acknowledgment of each other's status as members of international society' (Coggins 2014: 39–42) and part of the constitution of IR subjects, what happens when states are recognized by some peers, but not all of them? Does the recognition of *de facto* states depend on great powers' decisions, as 'primary socializers', or is that only valid under the assumption that smaller states will follow great powers' decisions?

Geis et al. (2015) maintain that scholars concerned with these issues have largely failed to link existing insights into the politics surrounding statehood's formal recognition to social and political theoretical readings. Indeed, the ambiguity of political practices of recognition mentioned above is highly apparent in discussions of secession or state recognition: while it can mean emancipation and self-determination of peoples, recognition can also backfire and generate new modes of exclusion, resentment among peoples, and constant political instability in the geographical vicinities.

Improving Dialogue between Socialization and Recognition Research

Studies of international socialization and recognition share the general approach of analysing IR as a social interaction environment. Recognition studies in IR deal with how actors desire and struggle to have their identity, status, narratives, contributions, and, ultimately, their agency acknowledged and respected by others. Socialization research tries to explain how socializers shape actors' understanding, perceptions, and behaviour into conforming to group expectations. While most research on recognition in IR focuses on identity and status seeking, and socialization scholars are mainly concerned with the propagation of norms, both concepts are directly related to the process of actors, usually states, constituting themselves as subjects in the international system or within particular subsystems (see Gre enhill 2008; Thies 2012; Bartelson 2013).

Despite the interest in similar issues, dialogue between the literature on socialization and recognition remains somewhat timid, perhaps due to epistemological and ontological differences. The socialization agenda was mostly driven by 'conventional constructivists', which adopted a more positivist epistemology and tried to establish an empirically oriented programme. This leads to a greater focus on testing causal hypotheses regarding mechanisms and conditions of success for socialization rather than considering the general consequences of socialization for IR. Recognition research, on the other hand, is more critical and theoretically oriented, drawing heavily from non-positivist traditions of thinking in political and critical theory, philosophy, and psychoanalysis.[5] While general and ethical implications of recognition for IR are theoretically better developed, the concept's empirical applications seem more fragmented.

The focus of the empirical investigation is generally different as well—while the socialization agenda frequently adopted the socializer perspective and tended to look at narrower environments (such as international organizations, see Bearce and Bondanella 2007), recognition theory mostly deals with the international social system in a broad sense and gives more attention to those demanding recognition than those granting it. Although this division is schematic, the general differences in focus and approach may have obfuscated productive dialogue. While some scholars connect

recognition and socialization by engaging critically with early research on norm internalization (Epstein 2012; Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2014), few scholars are interested in empirically investigating how socialization can draw insights from recent research on recognition and vice versa.

By looking at foreign policy behaviour, the agendas' intersection may become more apparent, as the empirical instances of the concepts frequently overlap. Acts of 'legal recognition'—the formal acknowledgment of an aspirant entity as a sovereign state—and actors' strategies to achieve such recognition provide, perhaps, the most evident of such common preoccupations. The recognition of a political entity as sovereign is, arguably, the clearest example of recognition in international politics and a central aspect of the constitution of actors in the international society (Agné 2013; Visoka et al. 2020). It is also the subject of important research on socialization in FPA, focusing on the interaction between aspiring states ('novices') and established states ('socializers') who accept, reject, or shape novices' claims to statehood and particular foreign policy roles (Thies 2012; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018). The same can be said of research on status in IR: the desire to achieve a certain status as a foreign policy driver and the granting or withholding of status recognition are important issues in both agendas (Ringmar 1996; Wolf 2011; Murray 2014; Wohlforth et al. 2018; Guimarães and Maitino 2019). A more directed focus on these and other empirical instances of the phenomena may foster theoretical development and help bridge the concepts more clearly.

Implicit conceptual connections should also be explored more explicitly. Withholding or offering recognition (of identities, status, or merely foreign policy narratives) is acknowledged as a socialization mechanism but analysed under different labels—as instances of 'social influence', 'intangible reinforcement', or 'shaming' (Schimmelfennig 2005; Johnston 2 008). A closer engagement with recognition theory would drive socialization scholars to ask how social influence leads socializees to comply with group expectations and whether the *motivation* for novices to enter the group and accept socialization lies in their *desire for recognition*.

This is particularly important in reinstating socializee agency, allowing for a better understanding of 'failed socialization' or resistance to international pressure. It could help to explain unexpected cases, such as Paraguay's continued recognition of Taiwan, choosing a 'friendship' status despite economic costs, general international behaviour, and Chinese

pressure (Long and Urdinez 2021). It also raises new questions about the implications of such desire for socialization processes. Is it a pre-requisite or a facilitator of compliance to group expectations? Is this equally relevant for socialization when we vary the one granting recognition? If fully achieving recognition is indeed impossible (Epstein et al. 2018; Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi 2019), how does failed recognition affect socialization processes?

Another related line of inquiry is understanding how established and powerful states may withhold full or legal recognition, even if actors—in general, non-Western states—conform to socialization demands. This is pointed out by recent research (Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2014), but deserves further development, as it can shed light not only on the historical making of the international system but also on various contemporary processes, such as membership to international institutions, the achievement of great power status, and acts of state/government recognition and de-recognition.

Socialization/Recognition and FPA research

In the introductory chapter to this Handbook, Kaarbo and Thies argued that FPA, seen as an IR subfield, has become a multi-layered and conceptually complex research area, examining the many agents and institutions, cultures and identities, interests, and perceptions that influence foreign policies. For them, FPA stresses the role of central decision-making units and the subjective understandings of leaders. In this context, how do socialization and recognition operate within such a level of analysis? How do leaders or bureaucrats respond to socialization schemes or recognition endeavours? How do they use foreign policy narratives, decisions, and actions to secure or repeal socialization and recognition processes? Furthermore, how can FPA contribute to the development of socialization and recognition studies?

Indeed, most studies interested in understanding the role of foreign policy on recognition or socialization have benefited from FPA as an actor-specific approach, rejecting characterizations of the state as a general, unitary actor and, instead, grounding research in ‘human decision-makers acting singly or in groups’ (Hudson 2005: 1). In this sense, since studies on socialization and recognition were ‘imported’ into IR from cognate disciplines such as

sociology and psychology, a significant problem has emerged: can concepts initially designed for the analysis of individuals or social groups within a state be adequately applied to collective actors interacting in the international arena?

Establishing a solid theoretical basis for this travel across levels of analysis has been a major problem for the literature, as noted above, on state vs. individual socialization and the possibility of state recognition. In FPA, these problems are considerably mitigated. As FPA and most social sciences share the same foundational level, insights from sociology and psychology were somewhat quickly introduced to the discipline through attention to decision-making units and leaders' subjective understandings.[6] In addition to this, the FPA approach is almost by design focused on bridging analysis levels, from the individual, through the domestic, to the international, which helps the understanding of socialization and recognition schemes as well. Moreover, since both socialization and recognition have flourished using sociological and constructivist perspectives in IR, it is only natural that most studies that used FPA instruments to analyse such concepts have appeared in the FPA subfields of role theory, identity politics, and status seeking.

Indeed, while many discussions on recognition and socialization took place in IR theory, some typical FPA studies have tackled these concepts as well, although less intensely. There is a good number of studies about socialization using FPA literature. Many of the mechanisms described by the socialization literature, such as social influence and persuasion, were described and explored in FPA using role theory (Thies 2003, 2005, 2012; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018; Guimarães and Maitino 2019). Most studies analyse the foreign policy of both socializees and socializers regarding socialization, 'especially the initial stages when the domestic leader selects a national role conception and attempts to enact it through foreign policy behavior' (Thies 2012: 27–28). Also, a fair number of studies on recognition and status seeking have used FPA literature (Ker-Lindsay 2012; Coggins 2014; Paul et al. 2014; Wehner 2015; Carranza 2017; Renshon 2017; Duque 2018; Newman and Visoka 2018; Wohlforth et al. 2018; Long and Urdinez 2021).

These efforts, however, are far from representing a dense research agenda in which both concepts are either analysed from several FPA main subfields simultaneously (national roles, public opinion, bureaucracies,

parliaments/parties, leadership profile, etc.) or by one subfield in particular, with the exception maybe of role theory.[7] In this sense, we argue that the idea of creating a more fruitful dialogue between socialization and recognition using FPA approaches has the potential of innovating the concepts (and FPA itself) in at least three distinctive ways.

First, looking more carefully at the decision-making units, FPA literature could give analytical refinement to the concepts of socialization and recognition about the role typical foreign policy actors (diplomats, bureaucrats, political leadership, etc.) play in these processes. Since socialization/recognition are agent-based phenomena, the plethora of FPA models focused on state agents would more clearly distinguish how specific actors think and act to socialize or recognize other states (legislators are different from bureaucrats who in turn are different from leaders).[8] In this sense, the literature would continue to gain by developing more solid micro-foundations to socialization/recognition studies, disaggregating the state level into a more refined and micro-agent level. We believe the use of FPA bureaucratic models would help to understand these micro-processes.

In one of the few exceptions, Morin and Gold (2016) have shown the importance of analysing socialization processes at the individual level and how these individual agents can be persuaded of the importance of internalizing international norms. Yet, the internalization mechanisms of norms and values typical of socialization schemes are still somewhat vague (Flockhart 2006; Johnston 2008; Thies 2012). It is likely that socialization is perceived and performed differently among state actors. While domestic bureaucrats might accelerate the internalization of international norms that originated in regional integration processes (Checkel 2005), legislators might have a more resistant approach due to their sensitive constituencies, as indicated by Schimmelfennig (2005). Thus, disaggregating these processes based on multiple FPA models of bureaucratic structures and organizational processes could help the literature narrow down the mechanisms through which socialization occurs and the role of different state actors.

The same argument is valid for recognition. We still know little about how different state agents operate to grant or deny recognition within the state structure. There are many very good descriptive analyses of diplomats, legislators, and other public officials recognizing (or denying recognition) to other states (Ker-Lindsay 2012; Ringmar 2015; Loda and Doyle 2019),

but none of them use specific FPA bureaucratic models. On the other hand, in the agenda of status recognition, the situation is different altogether. As we mentioned before, there is a growing use of FPA literature to understand status (Wolf 2011; Coggins 2014; Renshon 2017; Duque 2018; Long and Urdinez 2021).

However, Carlsnaes (2012: 311) argues that since bureaucratic models in FPA are generally focused on interaction among organizational players with competing preferences, they usually do not explain the organizational outputs (recognized / not recognized). These models are more interested 'in the actual pulling and hauling that is politics'. Thus, understanding the micro-processes occurring backstage in granting/denying recognition within state structures would open up a promising, theoretically more precise, research agenda on the causes of recognition, but not so much on its consequences.

Another related issue is the role of leadership styles in foreign policy-making. There is a vast literature showing that leaders' styles and personalities have a significant impact on several foreign policy issues (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Byman and Pollack 2001; Saunders 2011; Jervis 2013; Çuhadar et al. 2017; Kaarbo 2018). However, the role key decision-makers have on socialization or recognition processes is still underexplored.[9] Understanding how specific leadership styles and leader personalities affect socialization/recognition processes would most definitely improve both concepts.

Second, in the last twenty years, FPA has moved from mostly studying state agents to facing social actors' influence broadly speaking. It is now common to analyse non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interest groups, and corporations in foreign policy-making. Oddly, recognition and socialization moved in the opposite direction when brought to IR: while in sociology and political theory these concepts frequently focused on non-state collectives and institutions, in IR, most studies focus on the state level. Incorporating these original insights into IR through FPA and new perceptions brought forth by the FPA approach provides an excellent opportunity for theoretical development.

To be sure, non-state actors are present in both recognition and socialization studies in IR but are rarely given theoretical primacy.[10] Early research on socialization, for instance, stressed the role played by NGOs in norm internalization (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, the

influence of NGOs was downplayed and came to be seen more as part of a mechanism through which states are socialized than a worthy question in itself (see Checkel 2005). A greater connection to FPA—as well as to public policy analysis—might help fill this gap, as related strands of research focused on norm diffusion and policy networks proceeded to investigate the agency, motivation, and strategies of these NGOs and other policy entrepreneurs (e.g., Gordenker and Weiss 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Betsill and Corell 2008; Weisser et al. 2013). Analogously, social actors are considered in IR recognition studies, but mainly through a problem-solving lens (Visoka 2020b), focused on conflict resolution or efforts to achieve independence (e.g., Biene and Daase 2015). Little is known in terms of their international behaviour and foreign policy in power.[11]

Furthermore, FPA's opening up of the state allows for a better understanding of the dynamic between government and misrecognized groups *within* the country in foreign policy. The analysis of misrecognized domestic groups brings problems of 'failed socialization' to the forefront: grievances and feelings of inadequacy, which sometimes lead to violence, are frequently related to inadequate demands and framings in socialization within national groups, generating exclusion and stigmatization instead of inclusion.[12] Perhaps more interestingly to IR scholars, these inadequate demands and framings may be connected, in actuality or only through political discourse, to international processes of socialization and recognition being promoted by international organizations, NGOs, or other countries. This allows for a better understanding of various phenomena, from populist challenges to the Liberal International Order driven by domestic groups who feel inadequately recognized due to a loss of privilege to diaspora and ethnic lobby groups' pressure for foreign policy to adequately reflect their home country's image (Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2020; Guimarães and Silva 2021). Disaggregating the state and looking at domestic groups also allows for a better understanding of some policy dilemmas, as achieving international recognition from significant others may imply denying internal recognition (or being able to socialize other groups into a particular way of thinking).[13]

Third, FPA has been characterized by methodological plurality, from in-depth qualitative approaches to the use of large data sets. Socialization and recognition, in general, are not characterized as such and even less when it comes to foreign policy (Checkel 2005; Renshon 2017). Single case studies

using interpretive or causal methods (such as process tracing) are common, though not always compliant with methodological best practices. Most importantly, these do not exhaust the possibilities of new approaches and how other methods can unveil overlooked aspects of the phenomena. Other qualitative methods, such as interviews, life histories, and participant observation, for instance, can help uncover individual perceptions and emotions—being particularly useful for understanding the problematic relationship between individual and group socialization/recognition (e.g., Li ndemann 2018; Keys and Yorke 2019; Jones 2020).[14]

We are not arguing, however, that quantitative methods should be abandoned. Past studies focused on testing the effects of socialization (through intergovernmental organization, or IGO membership) on state behaviour (Pevehouse 2002; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Greenhill 2010; Chyzh 2016), but more diverse research questions using quantitative methods can help create new agendas (see, e.g., Cohen 2017; Moncrief 201 7). The use of survey panels, for example, could foster an agenda paying attention to the long- vs. short-term effects of socialization/recognition, especially when thinking about socializing individuals or the support for recognition among individuals (Morin and Gold 2016; Murdoch et al. 201 9). Relational data on social networks also provide ways to measure status recognition and identify relevant socialization communities (Li 2010; Duqu e 2018; Lee 2019), allowing exploration of novel puzzles. These methods can, and should, be integrated with qualitative approaches (e.g., Cohen 201 7; Thies and Nieman 2017), albeit paying attention to their respective logics of inquiry.

Indeed, the use of small-*n* still predominates on both agendas. Somewhat oddly—as recognition/socialization are mid-level theories—mid-level methods are still missing with some rare exceptions (e.g., Schimmelfennig e t al. 2006). More intense use of these methods, such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), could help appropriate generalizations. While some mid-level approaches are unfit for interpretive research, comparison can still help identify studies' theoretical implications (Yanow 2014; Pachec o-Vega 2020).

In this chapter, we sought to discuss the concepts of socialization and recognition in the light of FPA studies. We made two general arguments. First, socialization and recognition should be analysed jointly. The overlapping of their research agendas is evident in foreign policy-making, as both processes rely on foreign policy actors and behaviour to be executed. Second, both concepts could gain theoretically and empirically by incorporating FPA diverse models and methods into their analyses, expanding the research agenda to new lines of inquiry in which typical foreign policy actors (diplomats, leaders, NGOs, etc.) are decisive.

As for the overlapping research, we showed that the process of recognizing political entities as sovereign actors is a distinctive foreign policy aspect analysed by socialization studies, although they do not call such mechanism 'recognition' *per se*. Socialization studies could gain by using recognition research on intent or resolve to understand *why* novice states struggle to join a specific community of nations. Understanding novices' motivation to enter a group and accept socialization norms usually lies in their desire for recognition (legal, status, or otherwise).

When discussing recognition as a two-sided story, we pointed out a new line of inquiry in which one seeks to understand why and how powerful states withhold legal or status recognition from non-Western states, even after these less powerful actors have conformed to previous socialization demands. Do other factors such as race or prejudice influence socialization and recognition processes? And if so, how do they manifest themselves in foreign policy-making?

More importantly, we argue that socialization/recognition research could gain from incorporating more FPA models and concepts in three different ways. First, the unit-level dominance on FPA analyses could refine the more generic approaches on socialization/recognition. For instance, the subfield of bureaucratic politics is interested in understanding micro-processes that analyse the leaders, narratives, and day to day decisions affecting foreign policy. In a similar vein, we showed that socialization/recognition studies could use FPA analyses on social actors to move away from state-centric approaches. While studies on recognition/socialization always considered non-state actors, they rarely gave them theoretical or even empirical preference. In the last twenty years, FPA research has done the opposite

with increasing sophistication. Social actors' demands on socialization or recognition processes are most certainly different than state actors, and this contrast should affect both mechanisms and results of socialization/recognition efforts. Third, socialization/recognition studies have been too timid in their methodological experience. The preference for theoretical and dominant case study orientation could be expanded to a more diverse qualitative and quantitative methodology. Since FPA has significantly expanded in this direction, developing a series of new models and databases, socialization/recognition studies could use some of these approaches to improve how we understand mechanisms and the net results of socialization and recognition processes. These models could show, for example, that binary outcomes— socialized/not socialized—are not so common and that more advanced metrics would point out specificities and possible gradations in these processes that have never been observed before.

NOTES

1. 'Norms' one should note, are usually interpreted in broad terms in these discussions, ranging from practices to behavioural prescriptions and shared interpretive schemas (see Alderson 2001: 422).
2. Somewhat surprisingly, the role of violence in socialization has not been much explored in IR, probably due to the literature's tendency to focus on persuasion. Even when socialization is related to hegemonic domination, this aspect is downplayed, as 'power as socialization' is contrasted with 'power as coercion' (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Exploring the long-term effects of experiencing violence, as it has been done in the study of individual socialization, might be an interesting agenda.
3. Roles are here understood as 'positions within a group or any socially recognized category of actors' and 'repertoires of behavior, inferred from others' expectations and one's own conceptions, selected at least partly in response to cues and demands' (Thies 2003: 545).
4. On recognition going awry or being used strategically, see Heins (2015) and Freedman (2021).
5. As examples, see *International Organization*'s special issue on socialization (Checkel 2005); on recognition, see special issue of *Review of International Studies* (Epstein et al. 2018) or the symposium in *International Theory* (Agné et al. 2013).
6. Interestingly, similar approaches to the problem were put forth in recognition studies, although with no mention of FPA. Wolf (2011) focuses on decision-makers representing states, as they are exposed to various pathways where disrespect plays a role. Honneth (2014) argues the validity of recognition-based arguments to states is mediated by decision-makers' use of 'justifying narratives', interpreting and reflecting collective grievances.
7. In the area of public opinion, for example, there are very few studies analysing domestic attitudes towards foreign policy actions in the areas of socialization or recognition (with exceptions of Beber et al. 2014; Shelef and Zeira 2017).
8. For a review of FPA organizational models, see Jones (2010).
9. There is only a handful of studies on leaders' role on recognition (Wolf 2011; Gallagher 2018).
10. Notable exceptions on recognition/status research are Heins (2015); Stroup and Wong (2017).

11. Some exceptions can be found (Charountaki 2020; cases in Visoka et al. 2020).
12. For related work, see Lindemann's (2018) analysis of French jihadists' perception of being unable to contribute to society giving rise to misrecognition.
13. This is clearly described in Goerzig and Hofmann's (2015) analysis of Palestine-Israel relations, disaggregating Fatah and Hamas.
14. This also brings attention to social rituals and practices, dialoguing with anthropology and IR's 'practice turn' (see Adler and Pouliot 2011).

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PART IV

TYPES OF FOREIGN POLIC Y ACTORS

CHAPTER 27

Foreign Policy of Emerging Powers

SANDRA DESTRADI AND LESLIE E. WEHNER

INTRODUCTION

Emerging powers have become one of the main topics of research in International Relations (IR) since the early 2000s as these international actors pose challenges to the dominant position of the US, the 'liberal international order', and thus to the polarity of the international system. Choosing a sentence like this to start this Handbook chapter is not random, as our purpose is to show the dominant lens through which the research agenda on emerging powers has been advanced since the early 2000s. The study of emerging powers has been approached predominantly from a realist angle, reflecting the concern of policy analysts and IR scholars about the eventual impact of new rising powers on the stability of the international system (e.g., Mearsheimer 2014). Even when the study of emerging powers has been conducted from an institutionalist approach, these actors have been mostly analysed as unitary entities to unpack the ways they challenge and/or contribute to global governance (see, e.g., Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Gray and Murphy 2013). Likewise, some constructivist accounts also tend to black box the state to analyse emerging powers' social construction of power, the types of roles they enact, and the set of beliefs that are typical of rising powers (see, e.g., Thies 2015; Miller 2016; van Noort 2019).

Yet, there are several features in emerging powers' foreign policies that are hard to explain with the predominant realist, institutionalist, or state-centric constructivist perspectives. Among them are the varying trajectories of rise of emerging powers as well as ambiguities and inconsistencies in these countries' approaches to global governance. The reluctance of emerging powers in contributing to the provision of global goods while striving for great power status (Destradi 2017), the coexistence of

cooperation, competition, and conflict among some of them, the distinct features of their exceptionalism (Nymalm and Plagemann 2019)—all this cannot be adequately analysed without delving deeper into the domestic drivers of emerging powers' foreign policies.

Therefore, this chapter aims at delineating a new research agenda on rising powers rooted in foreign policy analysis (FPA). We aim at going beyond system-level approaches, opening the black box of the state and showing the added value that FPA can bring to the study of rising powers—with foreign policy understood as an actor-centred perspective in which individuals alone, in groups or as parts of organizations, are the most relevant actors in the process of foreign policy-making (Hudson 2005).

Furthermore, we seek to make sense of the so-called phenomenon of rising powers by unpacking common characteristics that are specific to the foreign policy of this type of actor. It is key to detect and analyse common features of emerging powers as they are a rather heterogeneous group. A caveat to make is that when we talk of emerging powers, we refer to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) states in particular, as most research on rising powers concentrates on this set of states, either as a group or individually. Within the BRICS, we focus on key actors within the state that are able to shape, facilitate, constrain, or affect foreign policy. For instance, leaders, political parties, ideologies, and domestic interest groups, as well as subnational actors within the state (paradiplomacy) are expected to shape and affect the trajectories of rise of these states. 'Digging deeper' into the influence of such domestic actors is key to understand the elements that facilitate or hamper rising powers' governments in achieving their goals, as well as the consistencies and inconsistencies that BRICS states show on the international stage.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, we survey some of the existing literature and show how realist accounts and other traditional IR approaches cannot provide compelling explanations for some foreign policy aspects of emerging powers. Second, we introduce and advance what an FPA approach can offer to the study of emerging powers. We focus on the above-mentioned set of domestic actors. Third, we propose four key themes on which new research from a foreign policy perspective is needed: status seeking, autonomy, domestic contestation, and international attributions of responsibility. These themes are suggestive of a new research agenda and are thus not meant to exhaust or limit future research

possibilities on rising powers. However, we show their centrality to the foreign policy-making of emerging powers. Finally, we conclude by highlighting possible links between FPA and established IR accounts in order to set up a fruitful and more nuanced research venture in the study of emerging powers.

Top-Down Perspectives on Emerging Powers—and their Limitations

To scholars who take a system-level perspective on international politics, there are obvious concerns about the potential threat that rising powers pose to the current international order as well as to the dominant position of the US. Theories such as power transition theory and offensive realism emphasize the potential disruption that a rising power can generate in the structure of the international system—albeit with different interpretations with regards to the unavoidability of revisionism and of emerging powers pursuing predatory behaviour to challenge and displace the existing dominant power (Organski 1968, Modelski 1987, Mearsheimer 2014; see also Schweller 2018). This way of analysing possible conflict when a rising power grows excessively and threatens the hegemon's dominant position has been mostly focused on the case of China and the US (Breslin 2013; Br ooks and Wohlforth 2016). Recent studies on the so-called 'China threat' assess an existing 'Thucydides Trap' and focus on whether conflict between both actors is down to destiny or whether it can be avoided (Allison 2017; Moore 2017).

Moreover, the top-down approach has been used to analyse the rest of the BRICS, especially with regards to their own regional spaces.[1] Regional contestation of rising powers has been one of the topics on the research agenda relating to emerging powers (see Ebert and Flemes 2018). To analyse why emerging powers have not been able to act as regional leaders, most authors also adopt a top-down approach, as one of the conclusions is that the regional power lacks structural and ideational capacity to attract followership (see Malamud 2011; Flemes and Wehner 2015; Lobell et al. 20 15; Ebert and Flemes 2018). Other approaches show the limits of realist accounts in the study of emerging powers. Yet, they still treat the state as a black box. For example, this analytical choice is made by many authors

who assess emerging powers' contributions to multilateralism, asking to what extent they seek to transform or to reform the multilateral system so that it reflects their new international clout, and their set of interests and values in specific issue areas of global governance (see Hurrell 2006; Kupchan 2012; Gray and Murphy 2013; Destradi and Jakobeit 2015; Stuenkel 2015; Cooper 2016; Paul 2016). In several of these studies, emerging powers are conceptualized as a rather homogeneous group with common preferences vis-à-vis the 'liberal international order'. Constructivist accounts, by contrast, study BRICS states' narratives, the identity aspects informing their foreign policy, and the role conceptions of BRICS as well as their promotion, making, and adoption of norms in the international system (Liping 2001; Johnston 2007; Mielniczuk 2013; Shih and Yin 2013; Acharya 2014; Harnisch et al. 2015; Wehner 2015; van Noort 2019). While these studies obviously go beyond systemic concerns, many of them focus on the state level without much connection to the domestic sources for those narrations, identities, norms, and roles.

Therefore, even the studies that show the limitations of realist accounts in many cases end up paradoxically adopting themselves a top-down approach to the study of emerging powers. This is not to say that there are no studies that delve deeper into the domestic sources of the preferences of emerging powers, but comparative analyses of this kind remain an exception (e.g., Schirm 2016; Ogden 2017). The vast majority of studies uncovering the domestic drivers of emerging powers' foreign policies are single case studies carried out by country experts (see, just to mention a few examples, Burges and Chagas Bastos 2017; Miller and Sullivan de Estrada 2017; Breslin and Xiao 2020).

Why are systematic and comparative analyses of emerging powers that focus on the domestic drivers of foreign policy necessary? We argue that there are several elements in emerging powers' foreign policies that conventional IR approaches cannot convincingly explain.

For one, the rise of new powers has not led to military conflict with established powers as realists would have expected (Mearsheimer 2014). Thies and Nieman (2017) contribute to this debate by showing that the BRICS have not produced severe structural disruptions when locating their role conceptions in the international system. Another blind spot concerns the relationship between economic growth and foreign policy activism. The entire literature on emerging powers is ultimately based on the assumption

of a straightforward relationship between them, and indeed most definitions of ‘rising’ powers entail references to economic growth (for an overview and discussion of definitions, see Mahrenbach 2019). Yet, such a link between economic development and foreign policy is not always straightforward. For example, Brazil adopted foreign policy activism way beyond the heyday of its own economic ascent during the 2000s. It overstretched its foreign policy presence in different multilateral institutions and regions of the world, even when it had started to show signs of economic stagnation and domestic political problems (Schenoni 2019). Similarly, South Africa has remained internationally and regionally proactive despite being the smallest economic grower within the BRICS group and even when facing political corruption issues and an economic slowdown under Jacob Zuma’s mandate (Alden and Wu 2021). Yet, we lack explanations for such instances of foreign policy overcommitment (as well as for the reluctance of other emerging powers to engage more extensively, see below) due to the lack of in-depth comparative analyses of the domestic sources of foreign policy in these countries.

Moreover, emerging powers do not adopt one single strategy in their rising trajectories. The theoretical reduction of realist accounts to a national interest or its similar constructivist sister of national identity does not allow us to unmask the complex and multifaceted international strategies these actors pursue. For instance, China and the US showed coexisting patterns of competition and cooperation even under the presidency of Trump. Previously, both actors have adopted policies of competition as much as of cooperation, and have even accommodated each other in relying on mutual patterns of socialization (Glaser 2015; Thies 2015; Paul 2016; Shifrinson 2020). Assuming India to be only a balancer of China from the US vantage point is also misleading as China-India relations also show simultaneous patterns of conflict, competition, and cooperation (Ogden 2017). While both actors have unresolved border disputes and compete with each other over spheres of influence in Asia, they have been able to develop cooperation ties within the BRICS forum and on selected global governance issues. In addition to the multifaceted strategies that emerging powers display, they also show reluctance to take responsibility over some global governance issues (Destradi 2017). BRICS use creative status-seeking strategies to be part of the club of great powers, yet at other times, they present as developing countries, which gives them the leeway to avoid taking full

responsibility for global goods provision in fields such as multilateral trade negotiations, climate change mitigation, and the management of economic crises. While conventional IR theories have problems making sense of such contradictions and ambiguities, FPA offers the means to shed light on these blind spots. An FPA approach can thus provide possible explanations to phenomena like the gap between economic growth and foreign policy activism, the lack of open confrontation between states, the multifaceted strategies advanced by emerging powers, and the inconsistencies and ambiguities that BRICS show as international actors.

A Foreign Policy Approach to Emerging Powers: New Actors

FPA offers a broad array of options to open the 'black box' of the state. In this section, we propose to refocus the analysis of emerging powers' foreign policies on a set of actors who have, at least to some extent, been neglected in the conventional literature on rising powers so far. We argue that focusing on individual leaders, on the specificities of political parties and their ideologies, on subnational units like states in federations, and on domestic interest groups has the potential to generate new insights into the drivers of emerging powers' foreign policy decisions and preferences.

The study of leaders and decision-makers has a long tradition in FPA (Karbo and Hermann 1998; Hermann et al. 2001; Schafer and Walker 2006). While the employment of a certain degree of personalization and centralization in decision-making has become an overall trend across countries in recent years, this seems to be particularly pronounced in emerging powers. In the BRICS states, we have recently seen the emergence of 'strong(man)' leaders, across different regime types, who have at times contributed to remarkable foreign policy shifts. For instance, the change of leaders in South Africa seems to be a key factor in its changing positions regarding issues of global governance, the level of involvement in regional crises, and the type of relationships and commitments towards the African region (van der Westhuizen 2016). This phenomenon of personalization in decision-making also includes the authoritarian regimes of Xi Jinping's China and Vladimir Putin's Russia (Frantz et al. 2020). Several scholars have noted that Xi Jinping has played a major role in making China's foreign policy more muscular and in

developing major new foreign policy initiatives, first and foremost the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (e.g., Hu 2019; Zhao 2020). Similarly, Russia's increased willingness to take risks in foreign policy, as epitomized by the annexation of Crimea, has been explained by focusing on psychological factors (Forsberg and Pursiainen 2017).

The rise of populism in emerging democratic powers has also contributed to this trend towards increased personalization and centralization of foreign policy-making (Destradi and Plagemann 2019). By claiming to be the sole possible representatives of the 'true people', populists in power end up concentrating foreign policy in their own hands. Moreover, their anti-elitism leads to a rejection of traditional foreign policy elites—most notably diplomats, and by extension foreign ministries (Destradi and Plagemann 2019). The longer term consequences of a more centralized and personalized foreign policy still need to be studied systematically. Yet, we can assume that the side-lining of those actors who have been trained to negotiate and make compromises, as well as the marginalization of foreign policy expertise might ultimately contribute to making foreign policy more erratic and less predictable. For emerging powers, all this might matter even more than for other countries. As they gain more room to manoeuvre in world politics thanks to their increased leverage, the governments of emerging powers have greater freedom to reshape their foreign policies. Under more centralized and personalized leadership, however, this might lead to sudden shifts and turns in foreign policy, as epitomized by cases such as Brazil in its approach to global climate governance under populist President Bolsonaro (Petrone 2019). Yet, we also see instances of relative continuity in foreign policy despite the formation of populist governments, as in the case of India under Narendra Modi, who adopted a tougher stance on bilateral relations with Pakistan and China, but otherwise did not change the broader contours of Indian foreign policy (Basrur 2017). In any case, given the growing centralization and personalization of decision-making, it seems imperative to devote greater attention to how different leaders interpret structural conditions and ultimately make sense of the processes in the 'rise' of their countries.

Leadership studies in FPA offer a rich set of methods to do so (see Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume). Leadership trait analysis (LTA) can shed light on how personality traits of the leader and their leadership styles shape and affect the selection of specific roles for their countries, e.g. as regional

leader, anti-globalist, friend, enemy, and so on (Wehner and Thies 2021). As two of the seven traits of LTA, leaders' need for power and their own belief in their ability to control events can account for how leaders respect or challenge constraints (Hermann 1980, 2003). LTA can therefore reveal whether the leader of an emerging power perceives the existing structure of the international system as something that cannot be surmounted or as something potentially facilitating their country's rise. This, in turn, can provide explanations for why some states punch above or below their perceived status (Kesgin and Wehner 2021). Similarly, operational code analysis (OpCode) can help to determine if a leader from a rising power perceives the external environment as hostile or friendly (see Walker 1990, Schafer and Walker 2006, Walker et al. 2016; see also He and Feng 2013). This, in turn, may help us to understand why a rising power sometimes adopts more cooperative and others more conflictual positions towards its regional neighbourhood, the international system, or key friends/rivals. All this reveals that focusing on leaders might lead to insights that top-down IR approaches cannot provide when trying to explain BRICS foreign policy variations.

This point on the need to focus on individual leaders relates to another set of actors whose study deserves greater attention if we want to explain what shapes the foreign policies of emerging powers: political parties. For instance, the African National Congress (ANC) has contributed to the ambiguity on the type of relationship South Africa should develop with Western powers as well as China and Russia. The ANC has sometimes acted using a Cold War era frame when influencing the state's foreign policy as the party's recommendation was to avoid too close a relationship with the US and France because of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist sentiments, while the party did not question the existing relationships with China and Russia. Further, the ANC pushed the president to downgrade the status of its embassy in Israel to that of a liaison office as a way to show South Africa's disapproval of Israel's policy towards Palestine. However, this party resolution has not been implemented by the government due to internal party division on this matter (Nganje and Ayodele 2021). While these examples give a hint of the importance of political parties in the foreign policy-making of rising powers, much more is needed to unpack the different ways political parties influence a rising power's foreign policy strategy. Intra-party competition can result in a lack of support for

governments' foreign policy positions as well as for ambiguous patterns of behaviour. Moreover, little is known about the effects of governing party coalitions in the foreign policy of rising states. For example, Brazil's government under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff was supported by a coalition of parties and so was the government of populist leader Jair Bolsonaro; yet the effects of governing party coalitions on Brazil's foreign policy have not been studied systematically so far.

Ideology also shapes the foreign policy of emerging powers. Hinich and Munger (1994: 10) define ideology as a 'complex, dogmatic belief system by which individuals interpret, rationalize, and justify behaviour and institutions'. Ideologies reflect 'core principles about how society should be organized, including how resources should be distributed and where power appropriately resides' (Voeten 2021: 5). Relatedly, ideologies offer orientation and identity and can be expected to influence the goals and normative principles of a country's foreign policy (Calin 2010). Scholars of China have obviously long dealt with the impact of ideology on Chinese foreign policy, yet a better understanding of the implications of certain nuances of China's foreign policy discourse is needed. While China's claims of being a 'different great power' might be considered mere rhetoric (Wang 2015), in some cases they might end up constraining Chinese foreign policy, forcing the government to stick to its promises in order not to lose legitimacy, for example in relations with African countries (Alden and Large 2011). A deeper understanding of the impact of notions of hierarchy in Confucian thinking (Bai 2012) or of the specific, possibly sometimes contradictory, features of Chinese exceptionalism (Nymalm and Plagemann 2019) would certainly help in explaining some features of Chinese foreign policy that systemic approaches cannot adequately grasp.

Similarly, when it comes to populist governments in emerging powers, like those of Bolsonaro in Brazil or Modi in India, we need a better grasp of the 'thick ideologies' that accompany the 'thin-centred ideology' of populism (see Mudde 2004; Jenne and Thies, Chapter 13 in this volume). In the case of Bolsonaro, his thick ideology has been labelled as a mix of Christian fundamentalism and right-wing nationalism (Hunter and Power 2019), but the foreign policy implications of such ideology are not yet entirely clear. India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the party of Prime Minister Modi, builds on the long-standing ideological tradition of Hindu nationalism (Jaffrelot 1996), an ideology primarily focused on the domestic

transformation of India into a Hindu state based on the notion of *Hindutva* (Hindu-ness). However, Hindu nationalism also entails notions of Hindu victimization and fear of Muslims, or a celebration of strength and 'masculinity' which can be expected to have substantial implications for foreign policy. Indeed, Hindu nationalists' views on international politics are frequently described as conforming to a realist understanding 'whereby diplomacy and defence are two sides of the same coin' (1991 BJP manifesto, quoted in Ogden 2010: 310). A deeper understanding of the specificities of party ideology in emerging powers might therefore provide helpful hints in explaining these countries' foreign policies.

Further, what emerging powers have in common is that they are large countries with numerous smaller neighbours, and that they certainly play a major role in influencing their respective regional neighbourhoods. In this process, their foreign policy is not always entirely driven by the central government. Rather, subnational units like provinces or states in federal systems have frequently come into play. A small but growing body of literature in FPA has focused on 'paradiplomacy' (Cantir 2020 and Chapter 31 in this volume). With reference to emerging powers, existing studies have highlighted the activism of subnational units, mostly in economic policy: Chinese provinces like Guanxi have fostered economic relations with neighbouring countries (Cheng 2013), and Brazilian municipalities as well as South African provinces have become independent players in foreign policy (Salomón 2012; Nganje 2014). This process to some extent has run parallel with emerging powers' international rise and economic success, and in several cases it has contributed to a democratization of foreign policy through the inclusion of subnational governments, as in the case of South Africa (Nganje 2014). Yet, some of these achievements might have been offset by the above-mentioned trend towards centralization and personalization of foreign policy-making (Cardoso 2019). In any case, what is definitely needed is a more systematic comparative assessment of the impact of subnational actors' preferences, which should take into account national specificities but allow for some generalizations. In fact, the analysis of subnational actors' policies and of their—often conflictive—interactions with the respective central governments might help us to approach an explanation for some of the otherwise inexplicable turns in emerging powers' foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis their neighbours. In the case of India, for example, the states of Tamil Nadu and of West Bengal

have had a substantial influence on New Delhi's at times zig-zagging approaches towards Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, respectively (Plagemann and Destradi 2015). The impact of regional parties as junior partners in coalition governments (Blarel and Van Willigen 2020) and the issue of party-political alignments between central and state governments (Sharma et al. 2020) have been studied for the case of India. More comparative research might help to uncover the reasons for emerging powers' often reluctant approach to regional politics, which in many cases seems to be related to difficult relations between the centre and subnational governments.

Finally, an FPA approach to emerging powers would need to analyse the domestic pressures that these governments face by digging deeper into the role of domestic interest groups (Oppermann, Chapter 15, and Jost, Chapter 16, in this volume). Particularly when it comes to the provision of global public goods, emerging powers have often been accused of being unwilling to take on more responsibility and pursuing a reluctant, inconsistent approach. Emerging powers have sometimes been highly strategic in claiming that they are developing countries and therefore cannot contribute to the costs of global goods provision, for instance in trade negotiations (Narlikar 2020). China, for example, has a long tradition of ambivalence, playing different and competing roles, sometimes that of a great power and others that of a developing country (Thies and Nieman 2017). However, beyond strategic uses of such ambivalence, emerging powers' governments have also experienced different kinds of domestic and international pressures, which might have contributed to generating role conflicts. The domestic compulsion of creating millions of jobs per year for its growing population has obviously put pressure on the Indian government in its effort to industrialize—despite this being at odds with climate mitigation (Ebinger 2016). At the same time, environmental civil society organizations can play a role in promoting climate change mitigation, including in emerging powers (Never and Betz 2014). Also within apparently monolithic authoritarian regimes, the very process of 'rise' has induced a huge diversity of actors to put pressure on governments to accommodate their needs. Studies on China's policies from the South China Sea to the Arctic have shown that even within the Chinese military and security apparatus, there is a broad diversity of interests and an intense competition for influence on foreign and security policy (Jones and Hameiri 2021; Kossa 2020). Overall,

we need a better understanding of the ways in which pressure groups, lobbies, and other domestic actors try to influence the foreign policy of emerging powers. The very process of 'rising' offers new opportunities for foreign policy activism and can therefore be expected to unleash new domestic debates about what to do with newly available capabilities and international influence. A recent strand in the literature on emerging powers has claimed that these countries are experiencing a process of 'state transformation', with their foreign policies being characterized by growing fragmentation, pluralization, and decentralization as well as by an internationalization of state apparatuses (Hameiri et al. 2019). To what extent this collides with the above-mentioned trend towards centralization and personalization is an object of further research. In any case, role theory (see Breuning, Chapter 12 in this volume) might be a useful analytical lens to grasp some of the inconsistencies that we frequently observe in emerging powers' foreign policies.

A Future Foreign Policy Research Agenda on Rising Powers

Our discussion of relevant domestic actors in emerging powers' foreign policy has already hinted at a range of issues that might form a future research agenda on emerging powers. In this section, we aim to delve deeper into four themes that deserve further research from an FPA perspective and that might help us in building bridges between FPA and IR in the analysis of emerging powers. They are status seeking, autonomy, domestic contestation, and international attributions of responsibility.

First of all, the very concept of 'emerging powers' is frequently associated with that of climbing a hierarchical ladder in international politics. Emerging powers are usually associated with an aspiration to become members of a 'club' of great powers (Narlikar 2013)—Hurrell (2006) even terms them 'would-be great powers'. Thies and Nieman (2017) refer to emerging power as a status or master role position from which these actors adopt a series of other functions (auxiliary roles) that underpin this new status. Status seeking has therefore been a major driver in emerging powers' foreign policy, and some important studies have indeed dealt with the various strategies that emerging powers can employ as they seek to achieve great power status (e.g., Larson and Shevchenko 2010).

Future research should consider developing a deeper understanding of the above-mentioned actors and drivers of foreign policy, and relating them to the analysis of status-seeking strategies. For example, the specificities of certain party ideologies can be expected to play a role in how status seeking unfolds: countries governed by parties whose ideologies call for a restoration of national grandeur can be expected to pursue more offensive status-seeking strategies. On the other hand, status seeking can motivate emerging powers' governments in contributing to global goods provision in order to show that they are behaving like 'responsible' great powers—thereby potentially offsetting the more detrimental impact of other factors like the populist centralization and personalization of foreign policy-making (Destradi and Plagemann 2019). Moreover, and as mentioned before, a focus on leaders' and the use of LTA and OpCode can provide alternative avenues of research to understand the overall variations of states' status-seeking strategies from the leader vantage point within a specific state or across several. We therefore need a more nuanced understanding of how different domestic actors understand status seeking and of the extent to which they will be likely to endorse and support status-seeking strategies.

As emerging powers seek to achieve new statuses in the international system, they face the foreign policy dilemma of adopting a more autonomous vs. more dependent foreign policy from their own regions, regional peers, or key states such as the US as global hegemon. For instance, South Africa faced such a dilemma of autonomy vs. dependency when mediating in the crisis in Zimbabwe in 2003: when it followed the demands of the US rather than those of the audience of African states, the latter referred to South Africa as the puppet of the West (Prys 2009). The US has also tried to make India a soft balancer of China—a role that India has refused to play, as it wants to avoid being dependent on a single international partner (Thies and Nieman 2017). However, faced with an increasingly confrontational China with which it has an unsolved border conflict, India has been moving closer to the United States on matters of security in recent years, but it has been wary of seeking for the 'Quad' (United States, Japan, Australia, and India) to be transformed into anything like a military alliance (Rajagopalan 2020). At the same time, India's rise has not been accompanied by a more active policy within its region: Prime Minister Modi has promoted the slogan 'neighborhood first', however over the past years India has lost influence vis-à-vis China in most of its

neighbouring countries and has not developed into a regional leader (Paul 2019).

Brazil's foreign policy has usually faced a dilemma between regional and US expectations (Wehner 2015), and of whether South America as a region is after all needed in furthering its emergence as a world power (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006). Brazil as a rising power has adopted a more autonomous foreign policy vis-à-vis the US by utilizing different tools and instruments (Milani et al. 2017), while under the leadership of Jair Bolsonaro it prioritized a dependent foreign policy from the US under Trump (Saraiva 2020).

Although emerging powers' dilemma of autonomy vs. dependency is evident, what is less clear is which actors within the rising state (leaders, parties, coalitions, the bureaucracy, interest groups, etc.) are influencing these foreign policy decisions. In fact, these actors might have very different incentives in favouring autonomy vs. dependency: autonomy may be popular for some domestic actors but costly for groups that have links with the US as a global hegemon. It may be welcomed by regional peers but criticized by the US, and this will have consequences in terms of status seeking, as the rising state needs social validation to achieve great powerhood. Further studies will need to explore the tradeoffs between autonomy and dependency in terms of the status-seeking strategies of emerging powers. While autonomy and dependency are expressed in the behaviour of the state, there is also a need to drill further down into these two principles to see how states and their leaders make sense of them. Sovereignty is a principle often emphasized by emerging powers, and the wish for an 'independent' foreign policy can take different shapes. A state can, for example pursue an actively independent foreign policy role, seek to become a norm entrepreneur in multilateral settings, or adopt postures that are more isolationist in nature. Autonomy from the US may take the form of neglecting a follower role, but this may create a need to be more dependent on regional peers, as an equal partner or regional leader; both latter options involve different skill sets and foreign policy strategies. FPA offers a theoretical and methodological toolbox to unpack the drivers and actors that shape emerging powers' foreign policy in the autonomy vs. dependency dilemma.

As seen previously with status-seeking strategies, the choice between autonomy and dependency in foreign policy involves winners and losers at

the domestic level. More generally, the way in which an emerging power deals with the very fact of 'rising' will inevitably be subject to domestic contestation within political parties, coalitions, and at the subnational level as much as within the different bureaucratic agencies of the state apparatus (see Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume). These contestations may affect the rising trajectory of the BRICS as well as their choices overall and corresponding set of foreign policy tactics towards their regions, regional peers, and Global South / Global North states. We suggest that existing FPA literature should inform new studies on BRICS domestic contestation with regards to their rise, their international roles, and the foreign policy choices and strategies implemented by these rising powers. C antir and Kaarbo (2012) show how foreign policy agendas and principles are usually subject to contestation. These authors document how domestic contestation affects and shapes states' performance of their foreign policies. Not all analyses on BRICS should follow a role theory path as the above work does, but they should certainly rely on the existing FPA literature to analyse domestic deliberations and (in)consistencies in the rising process of BRICS that come from domestic contestation of the process of rising.

Finally, further research on emerging powers will need to address the crucial issue of responsibility attributions. As emerging powers have become more powerful, this has led to calls for them to take a larger role in the provision of global public goods. The main argument has been that 'with power comes responsibility'—as, for example, US President Obama put it when calling for India to play a constructive role in its region and contribute to climate change mitigation (Obama 2015). Such responsibility attributions have been resented by emerging powers as an expression of interference from great powers, and as evidence of a still skewed power hierarchy. Indeed, emerging powers have often responded by pointing out the historical responsibilities of the Global North—most famously for climate change, but also, for example, for failed interventionist policies in the Global South (Kenkel and Destradi 2019). Struggles over responsibility and contrasting responsibility attributions are therefore an inherent part of emerging powers' process of rising. FPA can contribute to a better understanding of the origins of emerging powers' preferences and discursive strategies by focusing on domestic actors, but also, for example, on the ideational and ideological foundations of emerging powers' approaches to global governance. Long-held norms of non-interference,

specific historical experiences, and deep-seated anti-imperialist ideas or notions of exceptionalism might play a larger role in the rejection of responsibility attributions than mere cost-benefit considerations. Future FPA research has the potential to allow for a better understanding of such dynamics as compared to conventional IR approaches.

Conclusion

Conventional top-down research on emerging powers in IR has made important contributions to our understanding of these countries, but it has substantial limitations when it comes to making sense of emerging powers' ambivalence and reluctance; of their ability to flexibly combine cooperation, competition, and conflict in their mutual relations; or of the peculiar features of their exceptionalism. In this contribution, we have argued that FPA offers useful tools to address these issues. In particular, it allows us to focus on a range of actors who have been neglected in conventional IR, but who might play an important role in shaping emerging powers' distinctive (and often zig-zagging) trajectories of 'rise'. Faced with a growing centralization and personalization of foreign policy across regime types, scholarship on emerging powers should devote greater attention to leaders and their personalities. But also political parties and their specific ideologies as well as subnational governments and domestic interest groups need to be better included in research on emerging powers. Ultimately, a deep knowledge of specific cases beyond the Global North—and thereby close collaboration with Area Studies—is necessary in order to avoid the overgeneralizations that have at times characterized conventional IR scholarship on emerging powers. In the spirit of a global IR (Acharya 2016), closer collaboration with researchers and institutions in emerging powers will also be useful in this regard, even though growing authoritarian tendencies in almost all emerging powers are a worrying trend that might hamper deeper academic cooperation.

Future FPA-oriented research on emerging powers would make valuable contributions to our understanding of (often not straightforward) status-seeking strategies, emerging powers' quest for 'autonomy' in foreign policy, domestic contestation over what 'rise' means and how it should take place, and struggles over attributions of responsibility in world politics. At the

same time, the FPA field would benefit from new theoretical and empirical findings of the new research agenda herein proposed on emerging powers. Key insights on issues like struggles over responsibility attribution, status seeking, or autonomy vs. dependency might be applicable to a larger set of other cases, including smaller countries in the Global North—think of, for example, Eastern European countries like Hungary or Poland in their interactions with the EU. Thus, a systematic analysis of emerging powers from the angles proposed in this chapter would enrich FPA beyond traditional Western-centred forms of theorizing while also offering possibilities to bridge Global North and Global South foreign policy studies. The study of rising powers from an FPA angle would ultimately contribute to the diversity of this field of study and offer a robust nexus to IR scholarship.

Notes

1. For a detailed overview of existing research on emerging powers, see Wehner (2017).

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CHAPTER 28

Foreign Policy of Small States

DIANA PANKE AND BALDUR THORHALLSSON

INTRODUCTION

A glance at the more than 190 sovereign states in today's system reveals that states differ in size. While there is agreement that size is an inherently relational concept, what exactly constitutes the basis for size differences and where exactly to locate the threshold between being small or large has been and still is subject to academic debate. Some argue that the size of a country's population determines whether it is large or small, while others focus on the size of its economy, and yet others one military capabilities, to name but the most important determinants (c.f. Katzenstein 1985; Habeeb 1 988; Thorhallsson 2006b). Moreover, setting a threshold for what exactly constitutes smallness is an equally contested ground, often leading small states scholars to acknowledge that determining state size is subject to social construction (c.f. Panke 2013b). Some authors nevertheless provide a threshold, often considering states with fewer than ten or fifteen million inhabitants as being classified as small (c.f. Archer and Nugent 2002). Irrespective of the exact definition adopted, small states scholarship has pointed out that the actorness of small states on the international level is characterized by features which distinguishes them from larger states. This chapter elaborates on these insights and discusses how foreign policy analysis (FPA) might benefit from small state approaches by acknowledging that small states differ in their international actorness from larger counterparts in important respects.

In the next section, the chapter reviews the international relations (IR), small state, and FPA literatures with respect to the actorness of small states. In doing so, this section introduces five small state approaches, each shedding light on different particularities of the actorness of small states and discusses how they are linked to IR theories and whether there are FPA

approaches taking the core feature of smallness and its specific implications for state behaviour in international affairs into account. The *shelter-seeking approach* points out that small states lack the capacity to become international-level leaders and are in need of shelter provided by larger states, and regional and international organizations (IOs), in order to cope with domestic weaknesses associated with their size. The *neutrality approach* is where small states as actors on the international level differ from larger counterparts in pursuing a strategy of neutrality in international affairs by which they explicitly avoid taking sides whenever dispute or conflict arises. Another strand of small state scholarship points out that small states as actors on the international level are prone to *hedging*, by which they pursue economic, social, or military aims through seeking to cooperate with multiple regional powerhouses or hegemons at the same time. The *capacity-related approach* stresses that small states often pursue similar substantive goals in bi- or multilateral negotiations than larger states, but face capacity-related challenges in doing so. Finally, small states' actorness on the international level often involves *status-seeking behaviour*, by which small states try to obtain or ascertain recognition and legitimacy, which larger states can take for granted. The section argues that while some IR approaches differentiate between large and small states thereby being able to capture differences in the actorness of smaller and larger states respectively, FPA approaches do not usually make such a distinction (exceptions are discussed below).

In the third step, the chapter argues that although the FPA literature does not often explicitly theorize on differences between larger and smaller states, it can benefit from a linkage to the small states literature. For instance, one core insight of FPA approaches is that the domestic level is central to foreign policy decision-making. Hence, when theorizing on foreign policy activities FPA approaches could take into account that domestic capacities, challenges, and opportunities differ between larger and smaller states and impact on how they engage at the international level. On this basis, this chapter outlines how FPA approaches would benefit from taking into account that small states not only face capacity-related challenges that larger states rarely encounter, but also that they differ in the strategies and substantive goals that they tend to pursue at the international level. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and considers what FPA in turn could offer to the small state literature.

States not only steer their international affairs to a great extent unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally on an *ad hoc* basis, as well as within IOs, they are also the major actors in the bulk of IR theories and of great importance in FPA approaches as well. But do these approaches acknowledge differences in state size in general, or small states as actors in international affairs in particular, and if so how? This section examines how IR and small states approaches deal with the actorness of small states and links each bundle of approaches to work on FPA.

(Neo)Realism, Sheltering, Hedging, and Neutrality

Among the most prominent IR theories that explicitly differentiate between larger and smaller states are *realism*, and its structuralism variant *neorealism* (Waltz 1979). They focus on state power as a core driving force in international affairs and take into account that power is inherently related to the size of states. While all states strive for power, not all are equally equipped to further their position in the international system (Morgenthau 1948; Herz 1951). Smaller states have smaller militaries, and as such small powers have greater difficulties in expanding their influence vis-à-vis other greater powers; neither can they pursue their substantive interests on the international stage as easily as larger states with greater forces. In neorealism, small states—like large ones—need to prioritize security in order to secure their on-going existence. Power is the means of balancing a strategy to achieve security, lack of power being a reason smaller states tend to be in greater danger of being attacked and likely have fewer options towards engaging in balancing strategies (Vital 1971). Thus, while neorealism explicitly considers small states as actors in international affairs, it is the great powers who call the shots.

There are three different approaches in the small state literature that can be linked to realist and neorealist notions of how power and power differentials between small and large states influence the behaviour of small states in IR. These approaches include small states' use of the *shelter-seeking strategy*, the *neutrality approach*, or the *hedging approach*.

The *shelter-seeking approach* literature claims that traditional IR theories fail to take account of the broadly domestic incentives behind small states'

behaviour in the international system. Small states not only have less capacity to become leading actors in the international system, they are also in need of shelter provided by larger states, as well as by regional and international organizations, in order to cope with domestic weaknesses associated with their size (Thorhallsson 2019).

Small states' chances of domestic prosperity and survival in the international system depend on the nature of the shelter they find. According to the small state literature, small states need to compensate for their integral structural weaknesses, as discussed above. The aim of a shelter-seeking state is to reduce risk of vulnerability before a possible crisis event, to get help to absorb shocks when crisis does hit, and to get assistance in rebuilding after a crisis event.

Shelter-seeking behaviour of small states is defined by their need for three forms of shelter: political, economic, and societal. Political shelter relates to military and/or diplomatic backing, and international law and norms that are beneficial for small states. Political shelter-seeking behaviour is in place to ensure small states' security, a basic requirement for survival, and makes them better equipped to defend their interests and have a say in the international system. Small states seek economic shelter in order to make up for a small and volatile domestic market. Economic shelter may take the form of a common market, favourable market access, a currency union, direct economic assistance, or help from an external financial authority (Thorhallsson 2011). Furthermore, small states seek societal shelter from larger states and regional/IOs to overcome problems associated with a small marketplace of ideas in small societies. Small states are not ideal places for innovations and academic practices if they are not interlinked with other societies. They need to be in constant interaction with other cultures, ideas, and ideologies in order for their societies to progress. Societal shelter-seeking behaviour of small states prevents them from isolation and social stagnation (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2019). Shelter relations with larger states and the international community, at large, ensure transfer of new ideas, messages, norms, and values to the small entity, according to the centre-periphery model by Rokkan and Urwin (1983).

The shelter-seeking approach diverges from the traditional IR theories in four important ways. First, shelter theory rejects the basic assumption of neorealism that all states are the same and have to deal with the same challenges and opportunities in the international environment. The theory

claims that small states are fundamentally different units from large states and behave according to a different logic. Accordingly, small states differ from their larger counterparts in terms of capabilities. Second, small states seek shelter as much for domestic reasons as for external ones. They seek shelter to secure the resources needed to achieve a successful, functional society. Shelter provides them with the means to compensate for inbuilt structural weaknesses and solve difficulties related to the running of a successful state apparatus. Third, small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation, such as membership of regional and IOs, compared with large states. The traditional IR literature tends to focus on small states' political and economic vulnerability in the international system and overlooks laws and norms that are favourable for small states in the international system. Fourth, the social and cultural relations of states have been neglected by the traditional literature. This is particularly problematic for studies of small states. They are in greater need of constant integration with other cultures and ideas in order make up, for example, for their lack of indigenous knowledge compared to larger states. Small states flourish through close-interaction shelter relationships with larger societies/states. Shelter theory claims that small states are in as much need of the societal shelter provided by larger states and regional/IOs, as they are of economic and political shelter (Thorhallsson et al. 2019).

However, there are always some internal and external costs associated with shelter provided by more powerful players in the international arena. Shelter relationships may have significant domestic consequences for the smaller entity in the relationship and restricts its behaviour in the international system. A small state will have to evaluate risks and opportunities associated with a shelter relationship before it moves into such a relationship. The opportunities will of course have to be greater than any associated costs/risks in order for them to single out a possible shelter relationship.

According to the *neutrality approach of small states*, neutrality is a strategy common to small states that allows them to be drawn into conflicts that they otherwise cannot easily navigate successfully. Especially the Cold War period, the small state literature has taken note of the option of small states adopting this hiding strategy (Fox 1959; Vital 1967; Smed and Wivel 2017). The neutrality policy of small states, such as Austria and Finland, in the political struggle between the two superpowers was considered to

guarantee their survival and provide them with economic opportunities. Moreover, small neutral states, such as Switzerland and Sweden, were regarded to have considerable leeway in the international system. Moreover, neutrality served the Scandinavian states of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden well during the First World War (Ørvik 1953), although it failed to prevent the former two from be taken over by a hostile power during the Second World War. Nevertheless, it is commonly acknowledged that small states can and sometimes will adopt the strategy to hide. They do not take side in the power struggle between competing powers or block of states and do not form an alliance or seek shelter from larger states or particular regional and IOs (such as military or economic alliances) (Hanhimäki 1997). A neutrality strategy can pay off provided that the small state can convince larger powers to respect its status as neutral (Palmer 1984), and hiding or taking a neutral stand in a power struggle between competing powers can be beneficial for small states. For instance, a number of small EU member states (without close historical ties with the United Kingdom) and the small member states of the European Economic Area (EEA) that remain outside of the EU (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) sought a hiding strategy in the Brexit negotiations. They would only vaguely state their preferences and would free-ride in the negotiations. They did not want to be caught up in the power struggle between the larger EU member states and the United Kingdom, and chose instead to hide behind the negotiation position of the Union (Wivel and Thorhallsson 2018).

The *hedging approach of small states* is where, in contexts of power politics, small states can opt not only for neutrality or sheltering, but also for the use of a hedging strategy in an attempt to maximize benefits and limit costs when dealing with larger states. A hedging strategy consist of an attempt to spread a small state's 'bet' by taking shelter from a more powerful state but at the same time seeking to form coalitions on certain issues with other states based on their common interests (Wivel 2021). For instance, small EU states with close political and economic ties with the United Kingdom (states who were often in agreement with the UK in the EU) advocated for a soft Brexit and 'started to hedge their diplomatic bets by creating new coalitions within the Union, while continuing to signal their support for EU integration and avoiding direct opposition to Germany and France' (Wivel and Thorhallsson 2018: 275). For instance, this was the case with Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands (Sorensen and Wivel 201

7). They had lost an ally within the EU (O'Leary 2017) and sought to create a faction of like-minded states in order to have a say on the Brexit negotiations and the EU policy in general. Also, Iceland, an European Free Trade Association (EFTA) / EEA state and a close ally of the UK, advocated for integrating the United Kingdom into EFTA while holding firmly to its membership in the EEA (Reid 2016; Chan 2017; Wivel and Th orhallsson 2018).

While few *FPA approaches* explicitly theorize on how power differentials between states influence foreign policy agendas and activities of small states, some acknowledge these differences in theory and or empirics. For instance, Veenendaal (2017) studies the foreign policy of micro-states in international negotiation arenas, most notable the United Nations General Assembly, based on a patron-client model. When examining Russia's foreign policy towards the Baltic, Götz also discusses small states' sheltering and hedging endeavours (2019). A third example of a study resonating well with power politics is Schuster's and Maier's work on small states foreign policy choices concerning the American-led war on Iraq (2006).

Liberalism, Two-Level Approaches, and Capacity-Related Small State Scholarship

Liberalism is often used as a broad term in IR theory associated with two-level approaches, by which the international level is linked to the domestic arena (Doyle 1986; Moravcsik 1997; Panke and Risse 2007). Liberal approaches open the black box of states as unitary actors and zoom in on domestic structures, practices, and policies. Most importantly, *two-level approaches* theorize that national interests are first formulated in the domestic realm and form the win-set that a state seeks to pursue on the international level (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993; Moravcsik 1997). The position and size of win-sets can differ from issue to issue between large and small states alike, but the strategies with which states can seek to make others move in the direction they are seeking can differ between larger and smaller states. All states can use the uncertainty of others with respect to their respective true domestic interests in international negotiations, but larger states can make use of their larger capabilities (economic resources, financial capacities, etc.) in bargaining strategies. Larger states can offer side payments and have greater capacity to make credible threats (such as

ending a cooperation or working with other states instead) than smaller states. Thus, two-level approaches implicitly acknowledge that smaller states can have greater difficulties in successfully influencing international policies and norms in line with their own interests.

This two-level approach fits well in judging the *capacity-related approach of small states*. On the one hand, small states are characterized by their small economies, slim ministries, and small staffing as well as limited administrative capacities (Thorhallsson 2006b; Panke 2010a; 2013a). Thus, small states tend to operate on the basis of smaller budgets, fewer staff in ministries back home, and a smaller diplomatic body in general, with fewer diplomatic missions and embassies abroad (Habeeb 1988). This can reduce the chances of small states becoming active shapers of international politics (Katzenstein 1985; Hey 2003; Ingebritsen et al. 2006; Thomson et al. 2006; Thorhallsson 2006a; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006; Panke 2010b). With fewer attachés, policy and legal experts, and fewer administrative support staff in their ministries of foreign affairs (MFA), smaller states have greater difficulties in quickly formulating their national positions vis-à-vis external events and for items on a negotiation agenda within IOs (Panke 2010a, 2013a). Quickly updating these positions in the course of external developments and especially negotiation dynamics in international arenas is equally difficult—especially if there are many issues going on simultaneously for which external national positions are required. This is problematic since having a national position is a necessary condition for becoming an actor on the international level. When small states' MFAs and line ministries are unable to quickly support the formulation of a national position or even to develop a position at all, such states are more likely to remain silent in international affairs and—for instance—not to take the floor in international negotiations, which, in turn, prevents them from exerting influence on any international norms or policies (Panke 2014). Moreover, since small states tend to have a much slimmer diplomatic body than larger ones, the number of delegates that can represent the small state position in international affairs in general, and in IOs in particular, is more limited (Panke 2013b). Larger states can operate on the basis of a division of labour in international affairs, and bring legal and policy experts to the negotiation table. Thus, larger states often participate with large delegations and much expertise, while smaller state diplomats are often on their own and need to be all-rounders covering a wide range of topics themselves (Ha

beeb 1988; Kremenyuk 1991; Berton et al. 1999; Plantey 2007). Moreover, since larger states have more diplomatic staff and a higher number of embassies, they can establish and maintain large networks and reach out to a larger number of actors when trying to promote their national position in international affairs. Small states' networks with third-party embassies tend to be less extensive, and the number of diplomats that can use these networks in order to promote the small state position is much more limited. As a consequence, larger states tend not only to be more vocal in international politics in general and in international negotiations within IOs in particular, they also tend to be more influential in this respect than smaller states (Thomson et al. 2006; Zartman and Rubin 2009).

On the other hand, small states have advantages over their larger counterparts. Most notably, smaller states often have denser domestic networks and higher degrees of informality within and between ministries (Laffan 1998, 2006). This can speed up the process of constructing national positions, not across the board, but for those issues that are of greatest importance for the small state concerned. Hence, if small states engage in prioritization and concentrate on a few select issues rather than all of them at once, they can swiftly formulate national positions and act upon them, particularly if they concentrate their diplomatic capacities on the high-priority issues (Katzenstein 1985; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Panke 2010 b). Moreover, since small states often need to prioritize rather than trying to cover all foreign policy issues at once and in equal depth, they can be regarded as neutral brokers on the international level—especially with regards to issues that are not high on their own list of priorities (Bjoerkdahl 2008; Panke 2011). However, taking a neutral brokerage position as a small state only works when the state is indeed neutral: being a neutral mediator in international affairs is not a good strategy when needing to pursue one's own positions. Finally, in smaller states the autonomy of diplomatic actors to engage in external affairs is often greater than in larger states that are better equipped in terms of staff and budgets for their MFA and other relevant ministries (Laffan 1998). As a consequence, smaller states often exhibit more flexibility in adjusting foreign policy stances to negotiation dynamics or swiftly changing environments and situations compared to larger states in which established internal hierarchies and division of labour in the executive branch of government tend to prevail (Panke 2013a).

While many FPA approaches theorize on capacities, they usually regard very specific resources as relevant for the conducting of foreign policy: military or security capacities (e.g. Sullivan et al. 2011; Götz 2019; Kim 2019). By contrast, limited administrative or political capacities, such as small diplomatic corps or understaffed ministries back home, that hamper small states' international range of activities do not feature prominently in FPA studies (for a notable exception, see Hey 2003).

Constructivism and Status-Seeking approaches

Liberal approaches can be combined with rationalist as well as constructivist ontology. While rationalist approaches assume that actors pursue their exogenously defined interests based on strategic rationality and cost-benefit calculations, *constructivism* regards actors as being socially constituted and embedded in structures of norms, ideas, and identities (Ruggie 1998). Thus, actors operate not on the rationalist logic of consequences, but on a social logic of appropriateness or communicative logic. Since actor and structure are mutually constitutive, constructivism is based on the notion that reality is not an objective phenomenon just out there, but rather that it is subject to a process of social construction. This social construction of reality takes place in the domestic realm, for instance during the formulation of national positions, as well as in the international realm, for instance during international negotiations. Thus, *liberal constructivist* approaches zoom in on how domestic actors make sense of developments on an international level and engage in domestic (and potentially international) discourses on how best to respond to international challenges and opportunities (Risse-Kappen 1995; Panke and Risse 2007). These approaches do not explicitly distinguish between larger and smaller states and differences in their domestic construction of interests. Yet, liberal constructivist approaches can take into account that smaller states might have different perceptions of which international developments are threatening and how the threat looks like, compared to larger states. Likewise, liberal constructivist approaches can take into account that smaller states might have different foreign policy identities and national identities than larger states, leading to different role conceptions as well.

There is a vast literature on *status-seeking behaviour* of states in the international system, which links to constructivism, which focuses on reputation and related social norms. This literature mainly looks at large

states and seems to assume that small states behave as large states, or it simply ignores small states (for instance, see Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Paul et al. 2014). However, recently, scholars have turned their attention to the importance of prestige for small states in the international community. Status is regarded as more important for small states than large states because the former are unable to compete or interact with other actors in the international system in any other way. Furthermore, small states are less concerned with physical security and practical benefits. A small state needs to make a special effort to enhance its prestige, whilst a large state can simply operate in a routine manner and gain status (Wohlforth et al. 2018).

Small states will take on demanding tasks to gain status among both their fellow small states and larger states. For instance, the Nordic states have managed to become active actors in the international system through their status seeking. They gain prestige through their mediation services, and peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (De Carvalho and Neumann 2015). The behaviour of Nordic states is less associated with insecurity, maintenance of national security, or economic interest and more on gaining prestige (Jakobsen et al. 2018). Indeed, the pursuit of prestige is arguably their main goal (De Carvalho and Neumann 2015). Furthermore, Ekengren and Möller (2020) have developed a theoretical framework specifically to analyse small states' attempts to gain a seat on the UN Security Council. They claim that small states become candidates for a seat on the Council in order to have opportunities to shape decisions, improve networks, and gain status. Small states' ambitions to improve or maintain status is as important in their bid to get elected to the Security Council as the possibility to have a say in the Council and improve their political networks. Larger states' bid for a non-permanent seat on the Council is related to their attempts to confirm and maintain their existing perceived status, whilst small states' aims are associated with quests to enhance their status.

There are some *FPA approaches* that not only take constructivist insights into account in general, but apply these to small states in particular. For instance, Long and Urdinez (2021) have studied how status-seeking motivations impacted Paraguay's decision to recognize Taiwan (thereby alienating China), and Newman and Visoka (2018) studied the role of reputation seeking in Kosovo's foreign policy. Also, a few FPA approaches draw on liberal constructivist insights as well as role theory, and are thus able to capture how emerging and changing identities of small states impact

their foreign policy approaches in the medium and longer term (Thies 2012; Simon 2019).

In sum, in IR and its related scholarship, states have been and still are the major actors. Yet, not all states are the same, and small states are confronted with specific challenges and opportunities when turning into actors on the international level, which means they often pursue specific aims on the international level. While there are exceptions, FPA approaches do not usually take the specifics of small state actorness into account. Thus, the subsequent section will discuss how these different strands of small state literatures can set an agenda for future research in FPA by acknowledging that the small state actorness on an international level can differ from that of larger states with respect to capacities, strategies, and aims.

How FPA Approaches Could Benefit from Small State Scholarship

The preceding section has pointed out that small states are different units compared to large states. They do not only differ from larger powers in terms of capabilities; they are characterized by unique domestic features which underline their aims and strategies in the international system.

At present, most FPA approaches do not explicitly take into account special characteristics of small states and their strategies in the international system. Most often, small states' IR are simplified and believed to follow the same logic as those of large states. FPA has an opportunity to incorporate findings of the small state literature into its frameworks. The fact that FPA recognizes the importance of domestic features of states in relation to their foreign policy behaviour provides an opportunity for FPA to reach out to a neglected subject, small states, and extend FPA research. Incorporating the latest theoretical developments in the growing subfield of small state studies into FPA would not only strengthen the theoretical basis of FPA but also widen its scope within IR.

There are different avenues for the FPA approach to overcome its implicit large state bias in theoretical terms, as each of the five small state approaches suggests a different take on small state actorness. First, the conventional approach highlights that small states differ from larger ones in their more limited administrative, financial, and economic capacities, and

argues that small states therefore face capacity-related challenges in how to conduct themselves on the international level. FPA approaches could benefit from this strand of scholarship by becoming more sensitive to the capacity requirements for active participation in bi- and multilateral international negotiations. For instance, swiftly developing or adjusting a national position in negotiations beyond the nation-state requires being well equipped for diplomatic missions abroad as well as having well-equipped MFA and and other relevant ministries back home back home. If the latter suffer from capacity shortages, they might not be able to formulate a national position in time for the beginning of international negotiations or they might be unable to cover all the issues on the negotiation agendas of the international or regional organization the small state is a member of (Panke 2010a; Panke et al. 2018). Thus, especially under conditions of regime complexity, capacity shortages reduce the chances for small states to conduct an effective foreign policy across multiple international negotiation arenas. In other words, FPA approaches taking the capacity constraints of small states seriously would not only be in a position to explain the international inactivity of small states in some respects, but also it would able to capture how practices in the capital cities as well as in the diplomatic corps of small states seek to counteract these challenges, for instance by giving their diplomats a great deal of leeway in how to conduct any negotiations and which positions to pursue; or by aligning themselves with larger states' positions on a variety of topics, thereby piggy-backing on their negotiation efforts. This would fit in well with FPA work on bureaucratic politics (e.g. Kaarbo 1998; Drezner 2000; Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume).

Second, FPA approaches could benefit from incorporating core insights from the shelter-seeking approach. If they take into account that in order to counteract weaknesses associated with their size, such as challenges to domestic prosperity or international security, small states can seek shelter from larger states as well as regional and international organizations. Thus, rather than pursuing a broad array of different national positions on the international level, small sheltering states tend to engage in a prioritization of goals and seek to obtain specific support for a prioritized aim by actors equipped with more capacity and power. As of yet, many FPA approaches do not systematically link the domestic process of foreign policy agenda setting to shelter-related prioritization, which omits important dynamics of

small states foreign policy approaches that could, however, be easily captured as well.

Furthermore, unlike larger states, smaller states often take into account that they cannot turn into international leaders to the same extent as large states, and opt for a strategy of neutrality. Thereby small states avoid balancing or bandwagonning behaviour whenever disputes or conflicts are looming. Neutrality as a strategy is, although empirically prevalent amongst small states, barely looked at in FPA approaches, as it is often regarded as mere lack of activity and a lack of substantive interests rather than representing a calculated, purposeful action. By drawing on the shelter-seeking small state scholarship, FPA could capture the actorness of small states in international affairs in a more comprehensive manner.

FPA approaches could also benefit from a fourth strand of small state scholarship, looking at how small states as actors on the international level are prone to hedging. Hedging is a complex approach in international affairs, as it allows small states to pursues their economic, social, or military aims through multiple alignments with larger states or hegemons, thereby safeguarding themselves from one-side exploitation. Thus, FPA approaches that take hedging into account would be well placed to capture the interdependencies of small states foreign policy decision-making across issue areas and in relation to a broad array of larger states. In particular, FPA studies that shed light on decision-making tradeoffs between different foreign policy aims of a state as well as different constituencies pushing for different and mutually incompatible foreign policies (see Oppermann, Chapter 15, and Houghton, Chapter 19, in this volume) could benefit from incorporating hedging into the analysis.

Finally, FPA approaches could broaden the set of foreign policy goals that states pursue on an international level, by drawing on small states' recognition-seeking approaches. The latter capture how small states' actorness on the international level can take a status-seeking form. Thus, rather than pursuing a substantive aim or goal when engaging with other states, for instance in international negotiations, it is the IO membership or participation in a negotiation itself that is what the small state might strive for, as this allows it to obtain recognition or legitimacy from other actors. FPA approaches on status, role, and identity (see Breuninng, Chapter 12, Julka, Chapter 11, and Maitino and De Sá Guimarães, Chapter 26, in this volume) could easily incorporate this perspective and explicitly theorize on

how small states place greater emphasis on their external reputation than larger states.

In sum, the small states' literature commonly focuses on the state as the main actor in charge of foreign policy and illustrates specific challenges, opportunities, and substantive aims that small states pursue internationally. However, most FPA approaches do not differentiate whether the state under examination is small or large in size and could be criticized for not bringing other world actors more explicitly into its analyses, as discussed in the introduction to this book. Nonetheless, a more salient problem, from the small state studies' perspective, is the lack of discussion within the FPA on the nature of statehood (as discussed by White 1999). Theorizing on statehood, the nature of the state, and acknowledging that not all states are 'functionally undifferentiated' units are essential in order to understand foreign policies of small states. For instance, in addition to the small states' approaches/theorizing discussed above, Simpson (2021) has presented a theory of disfunctionality in which a functional account of statehood is proposed. By looking at the cases of Monaco and Luxembourg, Simpson argues that micro-states are so restrained by their small size and lack of capabilities that they 'contract out' some of the state's functions to other actors in the international system. This touches on the core assumption of FPA and small state studies that domestic features of small states are of fundamental importance in order to understand their relations with other states and behaviour in the international system. Addressing emerging small states' theorization in FPA would help shed a light on variations in statehood and sovereignty, and how these impact states' behaviour in the international system, as discussed in the introduction of this book. In other words, small state studies can strengthen the theoretical foundations of FPA and make FPA more applicable to IR. IR needs the small state studies and FPA's link between domestic and international politics.

Furthermore, a number of small states are dealing with significant and different policy challenges compared to large states. For instance, sea-level rise and ocean heating are threatening the basic survival of small island states and the prosperity of other small states that rely on maritime resources. Most small states are also not well equipped to deal with 'new' security threats and solutions, such as drones and hybrid warfare. They do not have the knowledge and the latest technology to defend themselves from current and emerging security challenges (Brady and Thorhallsson 20

21). Small states also continue to deal with ‘old’ risks associated with their small size. The fluctuating nature of a small market economy in a globalized world still carries a considerable risk for developed and developing small states, as became evident in the 2008 international financial crisis. Besides, aggressive larger powers continue to threaten the survival of small states. The latest experience of small states neighbouring Russia, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia reminds us of ‘old’ security threats that a number of small states in the world still experience. Incorporating the tools of the small state literature into FPA would make it possible for FPA to offer a more realistic explanation for small states’ foreign policy choices than is found in more traditional IR literature. Taking into account the inbuilt structural weaknesses of small states and their different foreign policy strategies compared with those of large states creates a unique opportunity for FPA to establish its approach as one of the core subfields of IR, a subfield that would provide the tools to access the behaviour of the majority of (small included) state actors. IR has failed to take into account the domestic decision-making of small states and that small states adopt different foreign policy strategies based on their own assessments. Small states’ internal decision-making is at the core of small state studies that further link the field with FPA. Hence, a new research agenda, embracing new theoretical frameworks and findings in small state studies within the FPA, will reposition the FPA in IR. Such an inclusion would also help to move the FPA beyond large Western powers and their challenges that have been the focus of much research in FPA (see FPA in other parts of the world by, e.g., Brummer and Hudson 2015; and Grove 2018).

Conclusions: Summary and Reflections on How Small State Approaches Could Benefit from FPA

The FPA and small state studies literature have so far only indirectly used each others’ findings to analyse small state behaviour in the international system. They would both benefit from incorporating core elements of each other findings in their analysis of small states.

This chapter has identified five approaches in small state studies which could be used to enable FPA approaches to explicitly capture small states as international actors. The five identified approaches are referred to as: the

capacity-related approach (small states—like large ones—pursue national interests) (Panke 2010); the shelter-seeking approach (small states seek shelter provided by larger states and regional/IOs) (Thorhallsson 2010, 2011); the neutrality approach (small states try not to get involved in international disputes but aim for neutrality and trying to hide) (Fox 1959; Vital 1967); the hedging approach (small states spread their bets by taking shelter provided by a more powerful state while also forming coalitions with other states on certain issues) (Wivel 2021); and finally, the status-seeking approach (small states pursue identity-based goals, that is recognition and status) (De Carvalho and Newmann 2015). Also, FPA's recognition of one of the common claims of small state studies regarding the nature of statehood, that all states are not functionally undifferentiated units, would strengthen its distinctive field within IR. Furthermore, a more explicit focus of FPA on new security challenges of states acknowledging that small states are worse equipped to deal with them than larger states would further reinforce the FPA standing in IR.

The FPA literature can also more explicitly benefit scholars of small state studies. First, FPA recognition of the significance of domestic characteristics of states strengthens the core theoretical base of small state studies, i.e. small states' foreign policy cannot be understood without taking into account domestic features of each and every state in question. For example, FPA research on bureaucratic politics could add to the understudied field on the impact of the special characteristics of small states' public administration (including foreign service) on the foreign policy of small states. Small state studies needs the FPA emphasis on domestic affairs, and closely combining the FPA domestic approach to small state studies would strengthen its standing in IR.

Second, the identified five approaches in small state studies would benefit from the existing FPA studies on the same or related topics. For instance, reputation seeking in Kosovo foreign policy and status-seeking motivations behind Paraguay's foreign policy decisions benefit the status-seeking approach within the field of small state studies. Studies on the shelter-seeking and hedging approaches of states would benefit from including a consideration of the importance FPA work places on very specific resources, such as military and security capabilities, pertinent for foreign policy decisions. Also, the FPA ability to draw on different IR approaches, such as role theory and liberal constructivist, could lead the

way for small state scholars to combine different theoretical frameworks with their sometimes explicit focus on small states' vulnerability. For instance, recent FPA studies on the patron-client relations of micro-states with larger states in IOs could open up a new research agenda and new approaches within the field of small state studies. Finally, the capacity-related approach highlighting small states' limited administrative, financial, and economic capabilities could conveniently be combined with and benefit from FPA work on bureaucratic politics.

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CHAPTER 29

Foreign Policy of Middle Powers

GIAMPIERO GIACOMELLO AND BERTJAN VERBEEK

Current global power shifts require a reconsideration of the role of so-called middle powers in the international system: the relative decline of American hegemony, the parallel rise of China and, potentially, India as great powers, and the problems Russia is facing in exercising effective hard power in its war against Ukraine entail a lot of uncertainty for the future. Generally, changes in the global distribution of power present incentives to other states in the system: they may seek to advance their position, globally as well as regionally. Some states may seek recognition as a middle power, which subsequently may affect global and regional politics significantly. Because the hegemon is likely to suffer decline not only in hard power dimensions of security, but in all kinds of issue areas, other states have the opportunity to step up their role: even relatively small states may claim leadership in specific issue areas, such as climate change, or human rights (see Panke and Thorhallsson, Chapter 28 in this volume). From the perspective of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) subdiscipline, changes in the international political system invite states to consider positioning/repositioning themselves, thus ushering in potential internal conflicts regarding the preferred course to take. This contribution contends that current global power shifts offer opportunities for states to strive for recognition as an aspiring global middle power, a regional middle power, or as a niche (domain) middle power. The specific choices states make partly depend on actors and institutions within the state, thus requiring us not only to look at changes at the global level, but also to apply insights from FPA by opening up the ‘black box’ of the states involved.

Recognition of these dynamics suggests a different approach to the concept of middle powers: traditionally falling somewhere in between clearly defined great powers and reasonably recognizable small states, the middle power category, although much debated, has been a dustbin

category of left over states in the international system. This contribution contends that the study of middle powers can be advanced by recognizing the nature of power in the contemporary international system and complementing social constructivist and rationalist approaches to International Relations (IR). In particular, today's middle powers not only have access to salient elements of hard power but also to sources of soft power, allowing them more freedom of manoeuvre in the international system.

Regarding hard power, the current emphasis on the power to project (e.g., through naval and cyber capacities) enables some states to play a more recognized role alongside great powers. This element ties in with traditional rationalist IR approaches. Soft power is a double-edged sword (Nye 2008): on the one hand, because they have to practice what they preach, it makes great powers more vulnerable and less agile to do whatever they please; on the other hand, soft power can strengthen the leverage of other powers, thus changing the dynamics of asymmetric interdependent relations between states. Overall then, the nature of power in the contemporary system offers opportunities for states other than the great powers to advance their interests. However, the actual choices such states make related to the role they seek for themselves and the recognition of such roles by other states require additional insight from a social constructivist perspective, and from tools offered by the FPA subdiscipline.

This chapter investigates middle powers in the 21st century by developing a notion of middle powers built on mutual recognition of roles as well as on changing notions of hard and soft power. Then, it will present illustrative cases of three types of middle powers that are present in the contemporary international system: aspiring global powers, regional powers, and niche powers.

Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary Middle Powers

Systemic theorizing on IR in the rationalist tradition usually focuses on the so-called great power states: unlike other states, great powers possess the material capabilities to carve out considerable autonomy in the international political system. On top of that, the distribution of such capabilities across great powers determines the structure of the international political system,

thus affecting the dynamics between great powers; the more great powers the system contains, the more it will be characterized by uncertainty and by a risk of (even violent) conflict (Waltz 1979). Constructivist systemic theorizing would point to the impact of collectively shared ideas on great power interactions, and even to the possibility of a dominant so-called systemic culture (Wendt 1999). When zooming in on individual great powers, constructivists often adopt an FPA perspective in focusing on domestic actors and ideational elements that are constitutive of a state's preference or definition of its national interest (cf. Weldes 1999; Hopf and Allan 2016).

To some degree, middle powers have been the 'orphans' of IR theory (see also Holbraad 1984; Cooper 2011; Thies and Nieman 2017: 1–38). This is, among other things, related to the relative ease with which power capability indicators distinguish between great and small powers. Middle powers remain a kind of rest category, defying theorizing. This is reflected in the abundance of terms that refer to states that are neither great nor small powers, like regional power, pivotal power, and emerging power. Ultimately, such terms represent different research questions: regional powers are indispensable in understanding regional balances in power politics; pivotal powers not only impact regions, but also the global economy; emerging powers seem to challenge the status quo—locally, regionally, and, potentially, globally. Theorizing about middle powers is also complicated by the tendency to describe them by their behaviour rather than to theorize what behaviour can be expected given their status and environment, and then assess to what extent their behaviour matches such expectations. A risk of circular reasoning is present: a middle power is defined by the behaviour it displays, which is itself borne out by the state's status as a middle power.

In order to better understand the notion of middle power this contribution proposes to address three issues: first, the nature of power in the 21st century, in particular its material and immaterial components; second, the nature of the contemporary international political system; third, the origins of preferences. The discussion surrounding these elements suggests that making sense of middle powers requires overcoming the rationalist/constructivist and international/domestic divides in IR theory. On that basis, this chapter proposes that the current system hosts three types of middle powers: aspiring global powers, regional powers, and niche powers.

All three types are middle powers in the sense that, for different reasons, they cannot be classified as either great or small. Indeed, states that were traditionally classified as small powers, with little leverage on the international scene, may prove to be niche powers (see below). Importantly, these middle powers' foreign policy is the product not only of changing incentives from their environment, but also of internal dynamics that underlie their preferences.

Changes in the Nature of Power in the 21st Century

Traditionally, power in world politics has been conceived in terms of material capabilities, such as population size, arms, military expenditure, technology, and size of gross domestic product. Underlying this conception is a relational approach to power (cf. Lukes 2004), often labelled hard power: by threatening to use its hard power, a state could change the cost-benefit calculation of another state and make that state behave in a way it would have preferred not to. This notion of power also allowed for distinguishing great power states from other states. It thus helped define the structure of the anarchical international political system (Waltz 1979). Critics pointed to the possibility that the system was not only characterized by relational power differences between individual states, but also by differences in structural or meta-power—the power to define the rules of the game and its qualified, legitimate players (Strange 1996). Hegemons or superpowers were able to define the nature of institutions governing a subset of states or most states in the system: they did not need to engage frequently in relational power games to promote their interest (Keohane 1984), although, for example, in the Cold War the Soviet Union and United States ultimately would not shy away from applying military or economic pressure, respectively, on their allies to steer them in the desired direction.

During and after the Cold War this notion of hard power was challenged: first, wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ukraine had proven that a superpower's military capabilities may be insufficient to defeat a weaker, yet determined, enemy. Second, the intensification of globalization since the mid-1980s challenged the notion that states were monopolizing power in the international system: especially shifts in structural power in global production and finance from states to businesses and financial investors had consequences for the relational power both between states and between states and non-state actors, businesses in particular (Strange 1996). Third,

the proliferation of nuclear weapons suggested that contemporary hard power may be dispersed more evenly across some eight states, at least two of which defy the classification of great or even middle powers (North Korea and, allegedly, Israel), having created a different subset of nuclear powers.

This criticism coincided with a plea to incorporate ideational elements into the notion of power. This plea came forward from two angles: for one, FPA scholars had long explored the role of cognitive beliefs and roles (e.g., Holsti 1967; Jervis 1976; Walker 1987), but had cast them mainly as tools to explain deviations from rationalist expectations of state behaviour in the system. Since the 1990s, constructivists expanded on this by pointing out that beliefs and roles were not isolated state traits 'out there', but the product of social construction, based on shared notions between states or between actors within and across states. Indeed, constructivists argued that shared ideas may constitute a form of power: shared ideas allowed states to present themselves as likeable and worth following. In relational power terms, a state succeeds in making another state adopt its own foreign policy preferences on the basis of presumed shared values. This is what has famously been labelled soft power (Nye 2008) and it has produced the refinement of public diplomacy in which states engage in persuading other states in sharing foreign policy preferences. Soft power also has consequences for notions of structural power: shared ideas set the conditions under which (sets of) states interact and may both enable and constrain their behaviour. A shared idea might empower a state to follow or refuse to follow another state's foreign policy request; at the same time, foreign policy that does not fit, or even contradicts, the presumed shared idea will weaken the status of the deviant state, and thus may render its hard power capabilities less effective.

Middle powers have to operate in a system where hard power and soft power elements coexist. With respect to soft power, all states in the system have become sensitive to the impact soft power games may have on furthering their preferences. Even hegemons like the US prefer soft power over hard power in advancing their interests: the attractiveness of a country's values or perceived common identity makes for a less costly and less risky instrument of governance than the use or threat of sanctions or violence. Soft power comes at a price, however: because states are only reliable when they themselves observe the values that they profess and

would like others to embrace, states wielding soft power are more vulnerable to criticism from domestic and transnational actors, even more so when they have political systems that offer access points to such domestic and transnational actors. Because soft power is less costly than hard power, most states invest in soft power (cf. Chitty 2017). Importantly, it offers an opportunity for middle powers to promote their foreign policy objectives. At the same time, these powers run the risk of becoming 'rhetorically entrapped' (Schimmelfennig 2001) and to have to oblige domestic and transnational actors to a larger degree than they might otherwise wish to.

Regarding hard power, the impossibility for some states to reach the highest levels of material capability traditionally classified them as middle rather than great powers. Today, hard power is often defined in terms of the so-called power to project: i.e. demonstrating the potential to employ military means in an effective way. Two relatively recent developments in the power to project are relevant to spotting contemporary middle powers: naval capacity and cyber technology. In the near future, space power may further alter hard power relations.

Naval, Cyber, and Space Capabilities

The application of hard power is decreasingly directed at unilaterally encroaching on another sovereign state and holding on to (parts of) its territory. Although such situations still occur, as when Russia invaded Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2022, respectively, states increasingly intervene by imposing air control and by targeting vital facilities, often in multilateral cooperation schemes. In this type of armed conflict the power to project requires the pricy ability to extend one's reach via so-called blue navies, by commissioning aircraft (or helicopter) carriers, assault ships, and submarines; and via airborne precision weapons, such as hypersonic weapons and armed drones. The 21st century has witnessed a remarkable increase in the number of states that are prepared to engage in such long-term, heavy investments. Although the naval supremacy of the US remains undisputed, thirteen other countries have engaged in programmes to expand their navies with aircraft or helicopter carriers: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and the UK. At the same time, other than the US, about eight

countries claim to have developed hypersonic weapons: Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, North Korea, and Russia. Many more countries have invested in producing drones.

A second dimension of projecting power can be found in the nature and rapid development of cybertechnology, the impact of which has been quickly recognized in the IR discipline (e.g., Eriksson and Giacomello 2007; Nye 2010; Crouchil 2012; Dunn-Cavelty and Mauer 2016). This has given rise to a (loose) notion of the 'cyberpower' of states. Cybercapabilities are considered a valuable force multiplier for globally operating actors, particularly for middle powers that have the resources and thus may substantially benefit from investing in this sector to improve their global standing. Indeed, cyberspace offers a 'rich environment for the projection of power and influence', so that '[e]ntities of all types—nation-states, corporations, terrorist and criminal organizations, and non-profit groups' find it quite inviting (Rowland et al. 2014: 3). Over the past ten years, it has become common practice to 'rank' countries based on indexes derived from various indicators such as technological development, cybersecurity legislation, and the like; and while no index is perfect, they do seem to give some rough indications about the countries' standing in, say, cyberspace (see Table 29.1).

Table 29.1 Cyber Powers Ranking

Country	GCI 2020	NCPI 2020	NCSI 2020
United States	1	1	20
China	33	2	88
Russia	5	4	24
United Kingdom	2	3	22
France	9	6	11
Germany	13	7	6
Canada	8	8	35
Japan	7	9	41
Australia	12	10	36
Netherlands	16	5	17
Sweden	26	13	12
Israel	36	11	33
Spain	4	12	8
Italy	20	28	19
S. Korea	4	16	31
Turkey	11	22	56
Switzerland	42	17	23

Sources: Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI), International Telecommunication Union 2020, (https://www.itu.int/epublications/publication/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-HTM-E/); The Belfer National Cyber Power Index (NCPI) 2020 (https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/NCPI_2020.pdf); National Cyber Security Index (NCSI), (https://www.ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/?order=-ncsi).

In addition to information gathering (or, espionage) and its purely military applications (or, cyberwarfare), the most prized utility for cyberspace is that it offers an avenue to spread a state's ideas, beliefs, and narrative—or to discredit those of other states. A state may thus appear politically stronger or more appealing than traditional hard power indicators would expect it to be. This has worked for middle powers like Turkey and Iran—in recent years both appeared more influential than their economies or technology level would have predicted. It has also worked for non-state actors like ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which appeared more formidable and resilient than it actually was (e.g., Pennington and Krona 2019).

Although the effectiveness of cybercapabilities should not be overstated or hyped (Borghard and Lonergan 2019), cyberspace and cyberpower are 'attractive' for all international actors: '[c]yberspace is an equalizer', as '[i]t offers all actors speed and reach, anonymity and protection, and the ability to create and participate in virtual economies and wield cyber weapons, all with a low buy-in cost. This drastically alters the power equation' (Rowland et al. 2014). Cybercapabilities are *modest* tools for international politics

(cyberwarfare is a different story), especially tempting for states that aspire to a larger role at relatively low cost. Indeed, no nuclear arsenal or aircraft carrier group is needed to be a ‘great’ cyberpower.

Space Power

Space exploration and exploitation constitute the latest domain facilitating the development of technological multipliers/indicators for being a relevant ‘power’. Indeed, states like China, India, Japan, Russia, and the US boast the most advanced space technologies, but the domain is so critical and in demand that even smaller powers may ‘punch above their weight’. This is the case, for example, for Luxembourg, which in the last ten to fifteen years has put (public-private) space programmes, most notably for orbital satellites, at the centre of its foreign policy. Luxembourg, does not possess a national space agency with its own launch capacity, but it offers its jurisdictional space (and low taxes) to multi-national space entrepreneurs and private companies (Eriksson and Giacomello 2022).

Clearly, countries that are normally seen as ‘middle’ powers invest considerably in space (see Table 29.2). The right positioning in space brings not only economic benefits, from telecommunications, data exchange, Earth exploration, and weather forecasting, but also military benefits. The latter include battlefield communications, spying, as well as access to the knowhow gains in vital sectors like delivery vectors (for rockets and missiles) and payload (for various types of warheads). Space policies that bring this technological multiplier clearly would appeal to states that aim at becoming a ‘middle power’ or at maintaining such status.

In sum, in terms of traditional hard power capabilities, an increasing number of states beyond the great powers are thus heavily investing in their power to project, by investing in navies, cyber technology, and more recent space technology. This begs the question of what this evidence reveals about middle powers. Roughly a dozen powers are prepared to invest heavily in order to advance their ability to be a power to be reckoned with in IR. At the same time, tools of soft power offer a relatively less costly strategy for similar powers in advancing their interest. Developments in soft and hard power thus open up more opportunities for states other than great powers to engage in power games in the international political system. From an FPA perspective, the puzzle needs to be addressed as to why some

states decide to engage in such heavy, long-term investments while others do not. This requires insights into the domestic dynamics underlying the relevant decision-making as well as an investigation into the origins and motives for these states' preferences.

Table 29.2 Middle 'Space' Powers

Countries	Satellites in Orbit	Space Budget (US$ million)	National Space Agency
Australia	31	290	ASA
Canada	68	323	CSA/ASC
Germany	74	2,404	DLR
Italy	35	1,088	ASI
The Netherlands	11	166	SRON
S. Korea	25	721	KARI
Spain	31	445	INTA
Sweden	11	141	SNSA
Turkey	14	315	TUA
Iran	2	134	ISA
Japan	205	3,323	JAXA
EU	93	2,429	ESA

Sources: Satellites by countries and organizations (https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=&t=country); Euroconsult, World government expenditures for space programmes (https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/product/government-space-programs/); Wikipedia, List of government space agencies (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_government_space_agencies).

Origins of Middle Powers: Motives and Preferences

In the middle powers literature, the concept of satisfaction discrepancy suggests an important distinction between states that are content with the status quo and those that seek to change it. This branch of studies is based on the power transition theory approach that investigates power changes in the international system (e.g., Tammen et al. 2017). In that literature middle powers are identified as status-quo-oriented states, whereas it labels revisionist states as emerging powers (Jordaan 2003). Rather than disputing labels, it is important to examine two issues: first, why some states are content with the status quo, whereas others want to challenge it; second, to what type of status quo the term 'satisfaction discrepancy' is intended to refer to. The latter issue is related to the observation that middle powers may seek to preserve or alter the status quo in different geographies (globally, regionally, or locally) or in different issue areas (finance, trade,

climate change, human rights, etc.). This chapter contends that middle powers position themselves in relation to the global balance of power, the regional status quo, or the specific niche domains. These elements may be related: for example, a state may be too weak to affect the regional balance but still be more effective regionally as a niche power in a particular regionally relevant issue area.

The issue of why states are revisionist or status quo oriented touches on the core question of what constitutes a middle power. A rationalist approach would suggest that the distribution of capabilities (globally, regionally, or locally) would reveal which states are neither indispensable in the balance of power nor too small to be ignored by the great powers. Such an identification, however, cannot stand on its own. It can only represent the beginning in terms of gaining an understanding of the foreign policy choices such states might make, let alone whether they might be content or dissatisfied with the status quo in a given area or domain. Such an understanding requires additional insight from FPA, particularly social constructivist FPA. Whether a state is to be classified as a middle power is related to two ideational elements. First, its own definition of the role it seeks for itself in world politics. Second, the extent to which such a role might be recognized by other actors in the area or domain where that state considers itself a middle power. This thus involves a double process in terms of giving meaning (the notion at the heart of constructivism): it is an internal process of finding a desired role (potentially fed by demands from actors in the domestic and international environment); at the same time, it is an external, constitutive process in which a state's desired role is recognized, ignored, or rejected by the other actors that state wants to position itself in relation to (see Maitino and Guimarães, Chapter 26 in this volume).

Once there is significant congruence between a state's internally generated role and its externally accepted role, stable patterns of expectation can guide the interaction between the state and the relevant others. These dynamics help us to understand if such a state is then content or dissatisfied with the status quo: it may feel mistreated because other states do not recognize its desired status or do not reciprocate its status with a treatment merited by such acknowledged status. Adding this constructivist element implies that *middlepowerness* is partly a matter of desired and (un)reciprocated status. It requires an understanding of the domestic origins

of the desired status as well as the attitude of the significant others. Which states constitute such significant others is related to the specific role a middle power seeks to carve out for itself: if it aspires to be a great power, it will predominantly look for recognition from the existing and accepted great powers; if it aspires to be a regional power, it will seek approval from actors in that region (great and small alike); if it yearns to be a niche power, many other actors related to the chosen issue area (state and non-state alike) will be important in conveying this niche power status to them.

It is here that the literature on middle powers could profit from the scholarly tradition of FPA. On the deepest level, FPA scholars have examined the origins of national identity of states (see Julka, Chapter 11 in this volume) and how identity develops over time, thus setting the stage for the internal debates about a state's role in world history and in the developing international system to take place (e.g., regarding several middle powers, see Hopf and Allan 2016). Building on those identities, other scholars show how such deeply felt notions tie in with more concrete national role conceptions (Breuning, Chapter 12 in this volume) that provide guidelines for, and justifications of, specific foreign policies (e.g., T hies and Nieman 2017). Identity and role conceptions form the ideational environment in which competition between narratives can take place, eventually leading to any changes in that state's foreign policy and defence outlook (Kaarbo and Cantir 2017). FPA scholars point to the role of party ideology in democracies (Rathbun 2004; Raunio and Wagner, Chapter 17 in this volume), different factions in non-democracies (Weeks 2014; Hagan 20 17), organizational culture (Welch 2005), and the belief systems of individual leaders (Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) to account for the dynamics that help us to understand a state's choice to pursue a specific role as middle power. The literature says less about the extent to which other states are likely to accept or snub such a state's middle power ambitions.

The remainder of this chapter will illustrate this framework, presenting several aspiring great powers, regional powers, and niche powers. The discussion will focus on the origins of the roles sought by these middle powers and the extent to which they match the perspectives of relevant other actors. Specific attention will be paid to the extent to which these middle powers make use of the changing dynamics of power: expanding their power to project and investing in soft power.

Aspiring Global Powers

Since at least the mid-1970s, there have been discussions on the extent to which changing relationships within the two dominant blocs, each led by a superpower, have testified to a transformation into a multi-polar world in which middle powers might seek a global role. Within the communist bloc a rift between China and the Soviet Union had been apparent since the late 1950s. Deng Xiao Ping's reforms in the 1980s to combine a communist political system with a capitalist economy propelled China into a role as a global power rivalling the US by the 21st century. Within the capitalist-democratic bloc, the end of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the outcome of the Vietnam War signalled an increasingly weaker America. Economically strong countries, especially Germany and Japan, were expected to step up. Indeed, public debates in the 1980s were characterized by concerns that Japan's fast-growing economy would soon surpass America's. Interestingly, however, neither Germany nor Japan was seeking such a powerful global role. Socialized in modesty because of their roles prior to and within World War Two, neither country wanted to be seen as playing great power games and preferred multilateral consultation, especially through Group of Seven (G7) meetings. This underlines how middle power aspirations are not just the product of shifts in their capabilities but also require a corresponding shift in internal and external role conceptions.

At first, the Cold War's ending ushered in the unipolar moment of American hegemony, but rapidly intensifying globalization forced the US compete with other actors, state and non-state alike, for dominance in many domains. The long-term outcome of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the event reduced American effectiveness in the security domain (cf. Mearsheimer 2019). Economic studies indicated that the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries might step forward as middle powers with global aspirations (see Destradi and Wehner, Chapter 27 in this volume). Certainly, the BRICS developed into an institutionalized form of policy coordination between countries that did explicitly seek a global role in which they could (also) act as the voice of the Global South. BRICS countries founded several international institutions, including the BRICS Development Bank, that could both complement and compete with existing institutions (Hurrell 2018), supplemented by a common narrative defining their role in world politics (cf. Van Noort 2019). Also, with the

exception of South Africa, they invested heavily in naval, cyber, and even space capabilities. In the 2010s, however, the BRICS started to diverge economically, with China extending its lead. Indeed, China is now clearly recognized by most states in the system as seeking great power status, while Brazil, India, and South Africa may have to content themselves with the status of regional power.

The major BRICS-related puzzle is, of course, Russia. Russia represents the case of a former great power now fearing a loss of status and being 'demoted' to the rank of middle power. Here is an example of tension surfacing between expected and ascribed status in terms of international politics: since Vladimir Putin came into power, Russia has invested massively in hard and soft power in order to retain its great power status, for instance, through its interventions in Yugoslavia in 1999 and in Syria in the 2010s. The closest Russia has come to achieving such recognition was in 2013 when the US had to accept Russia's decision to offer protection to the Assad regime in exchange for gaining Russian cooperation in its negotiations with Iran regarding the latter's nuclear energy policies. Since then, however, most states have refused to confirm Russia's great power status, as can be seen in Russia's being by-passed in G7 meetings, the refusal to acknowledge Russia's security interests in its so-called 'Near Abroad', and the tough sanctions imposed on it during the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022. Indeed, such wars themselves demonstrate the dangers of perceived status discrepancy, as argued above.

The dynamics with and between the BRICS countries solicited a response from other middle powers. Indeed, many countries in the East Asian, Southeast Asian, and South Asian regions (India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam) heavily invest in military capabilities. They now face a choice of either bandwagonning with or balancing against emerging global powers such as China by joining different regional institutional frameworks (Koga 2018; Karim 2018; Tinh et al. 2021).

Some of these states have demonstrated an ambition to become an important player in specific domains that might increase their weight globally. Examples include attempts by Germany and Japan to strengthen their respective positions in global finance. Based on the size of their banking sectors, the level of their overseas investments, and the efficiency of their capital markets, both countries have aimed at making a mark on the negotiations towards the so-called Basel III arrangement in 2010. That

agreement served to create greater financial stability after the economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s. Despite their strong financial clout, Germany and Japan failed to overcome American and British dominance in the financial sector (Konoe 2014). This can be partly explained as being a consequences of the roles they have historically envisaged for themselves; given their respective militarist pasts, both countries have been reluctant to be seen as assertive player. They have refrained from converting economic and financial power into diplomatic, let alone military, power. Japan especially preferred has chequebook diplomacy over other foreign policy tools. Germany's position has been relatively stronger than Japan's because of its key role (with France) in the European Union, which has allowed it to mobilize support for its policies. Japan has lacked such multilateral networks of support.

However, two developments may change both of these countries' outlook and may create fertile ground for their renewed global ambitions: increased Chinese assertiveness since the rise to power of Xi Jing Ping in 2012 has caused Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to reinterpret its constitution to allow for a more externally oriented foreign policy, albeit without completely altering the country's postwar narrative of being a peace-loving nation. The law that made this reinterpretation possible was adopted in 2015, despite much protest, and was followed up by heavy investment in the country's military, especially naval, capabilities (Oren and Brummer 2020).

The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war may also lead to a change in Germany's dominant orientation with the country's announcement of a 100-billion-euro investment in its military in 2022 alone. It has also propelled Germany into the forefront of EU policies in relation to Russia, resulting in an abandonment of its erstwhile modest role in defence matters, as testified by its delivery of heavy artillery to Ukraine in the summer of 2022. The way for this change in orientation was already being prepared in 1999, when a Green-Red government coalition obtained domestic consent, after heavy debate, to engage militarily in what was labelled a humanitarian intervention, concretely North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s war against 'Little Yugoslavia' (Serbia) over Kosovo (Brummer 2012).

Regional Powers

The end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalization, followed by a more reluctant hegemon, required a reorientation not only of aspiring global powers, but also of other (aspiring) middle powers. The dissolution of the Soviet empire had already opened up new areas of possible competition, especially in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. The weakened American role in Central Asia and the Middle East, and the rise of China had the same effect. Various states have sought to become indispensable players in such regions. Iran serves as an exemplary case, aiming to become (recognized as) a 'big fish in a small pond'—the 'small pond' in question being the Middle East.

Whereas under the shah, Iran had assumed a role as a regional buffer against the advance of communism in the Middle Eastern and Central Asian regions, its orientation to the world drastically changed with the 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution. Based on its resentment against Anglo-American meddling in its domestic affairs from the mid-1930s, Iran, having restructured the state as an idiosyncratic mix of democratic and theocratic elements, sought to protect and promote the values of the Iranian revolution. Iran houses two narratives that compete for dominance and are represented in the Iranian foreign policy system. One narrative sees Iran's primary role as exporter of Iranian revolutionary values; the other narrative is one seeking instead to protect rather than export these values. As a consequence, the two narratives differ in their interpretation of Iran's preferred relationship with the West. The 'exporters', or Idealists, view Western states as being opposed to the spread of Iran's Shiite values, and thus as it views them as being allies of states that do not share its values, like Sunni Saudi Arabia. The 'defenders', or Realists, remain open to the possibility that the West might in fact tolerate Iran's values, and could therefore potentially develop into trustworthy partners in securing economic growth for Iran's citizens (Shahnoori 2020). Iran is thus a prime example of the importance of including a consideration of domestic dynamics when investigating major foreign policy changes of non-democratic states (cf. Hagan 2017).

This constant battle of narratives helps us to understand Iran's reactions to various changes in its international environment. The dissolution of the Soviet empire created a less threatening, if more complicated, northern

border, particularly because of the ensuing competition between Russia and Turkey (and later China) for influence in the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia (Bayramov 2021). The US failure to impose a lasting, stable political system on Afghanistan and Iraq then created a situation which prompted Iran to act during the 2011 Arab Spring, which affected Shiite(-related) groups in the region (particularly in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen). Iran, which had been investing heavily in military capabilities since the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, intensified its efforts to be a military power to be reckoned with, including investing in its navy. On top of that, Iran embarked on a nuclear energy programme that made regional actors wary of its intentions. It could be argued that part of the dynamic of the virulent conflicts in Syria and Yemen are the policies of a *de facto* coalition of states (Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, US, and Turkey) that have feared Iran's growing regional power (the so-called Shiite crescent).

Iran's nuclear power ambitions serve to illustrate the competing narratives' importance as well as its capacity to act as a middle power in an unstable region. The international negotiations that led, in 2015, to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should be seen in this light: this plan actually recognized Iran's role as a legitimate player, regionally as well as globally. This recognition came from parties that had previously viewed Iran as a relative outcast or 'rogue state': the UK and the USA (cf. O'Reilly 2007). It is nonetheless difficult to establish precisely whether Iran decided to sign this agreement because of a genuine desire to make use of tools other than power politics to affirm its status as a regional middle power, or because previous American-Israeli efforts to disrupt the its nuclear programme had been successful. Iran's continuing presence in, and partial compliance with, the JCPOA, despite the US exit in 2017, undoubtedly shows some commitment to European efforts to preserve the agreement, but it remains unclear whether its uranium-enrichment programme and potential desire for a nuclear arms arsenal continues. This is ambiguity understandable, however, in light of the two domestic narratives' competition over foreign policy explored above. For different reasons JCPOA was a useful instrument to both Realists and Idealists in Iran. For Realists the agreement brought the end of sanctions closer, with the possibility to export oil. This would thus act to produce wealth for domestic audiences and bring international acceptance. For Idealists, the lifting of sanctions would strengthen Iran's sovereign powers and thus its

revolutionary values. The US departure from JCPOA, however, reinforced the tension between both narratives, pitting Idealists against Realists.

The exercising of soft power has been problematic for Iran. In recent times, Iran has tried to apply some soft power in Afghanistan and, more importantly, in Iraq. In Afghanistan, given a long-standing popular hesitancy towards Iran, the attempt has had little effect. In Iraq, for a while it seemed that Iranian soft power could back up its economic assistance and military presence, thus serving Iranian foreign policy goals in the area. Iraqi political elites, however, even those of Shiite origin (Yee and Hassan 2021), have showed a clear inclination towards maintaining good relations with the US. Soft power plays a role in 'information operations', propaganda, and psychological operations. Russia's skilful use of information operations has introduced the expression 'hybrid warfare' in public and academic debates. As explained above, cyberwarfare includes not only the capability to launch 'kinetic' cyberattacks, which can physically destroy computers and networks, but also the ability to use the Web, social media, and traditional media 'to shape the narrative' of international events in ways favourable to one or other belligerent.

Iran has been the victim of the best known cyberattack to date, via the Stuxnet wurm, which considerably, if temporarily, slowed down its Uranium-enrichment programme in 2009 (and possibly convinced Tehran to join the JCPOA). Because Iran is a (moderately) technologically developed country, it boasted substantive cyberphysical infrastructure, but few efficient cyberdefences. Hence, Iran had to learn the 'hard way' (Erdbrink 2 012), against a formidable adversary, that a country with even moderately modern infrastructures cannot ignore cyberattacks. At the same time, Iran fully understood that with some investment it too could conduct cyberattacks not only against regional adversaries, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel (Fassihi and Bergman 2021), but also against some critical infrastructures in the US (Berger 2016).

Space is the last of our technological multipliers/indicators of modern 'middle prowess', and Iran has some presence here too, embodied in its national space agency (ISA). Iran was one of the twenty-four founding members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1958, and qualified as an 'orbital-launch-capable nation' in 2009. In addition to a number of orbital satellite launches, Iran has also

experimented with animals in space and has been quite active in space cooperation with China and other countries (Tarikhi 2009).

Niche Powers

Currently, world politics poses specific challenges to countries that seek to pursue their interests in an arena with a growing number of global powers but lack that the capabilities to become an aspiring global power or a regional power. This is the case particularly for countries that still seek to pursue policies on a global scale. Often, this includes states with many resources and/or sizeable economies, but relatively few inhabitants (such as Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands). In order to compensate for any perceived status discrepancy such states may opt to be a niche power in a specific domain, such as humanitarian policies, climate change, development assistance, gender foreign policy, or financial services (cf. Ag gestam and True 2020).

Such states may be motivated by material concerns: a state's leadership in niche domains may serve as leverage in other domains. At the same time, striving for niche leadership requires consensus on the legitimacy of the role it seeks to play as well as other states' recognition of this role. Not all states that could opt for niche leadership present such an ambition. Sweden, for instance, though potentially a niche leader in humanitarian issues and peacekeeping, prefers to consider itself a small state (Eriksson 2021). States that pursue niche leadership often present themselves as middle powers. As they lack the resources to invest heavily in hard power, they focus on public diplomacy and nation branding. The Netherlands might serve as an example of this.

The Dutch foreign policy elite often prides itself on representing a 'pocket sized middle power' (Voorhoeve 1991). This pride originates from the size of its economy, especially its financial sector, and the number of its registered multi-national firms. Some of these date back to its—now much contested—colonial past which conveyed the image of a small country with a global reach. After decolonization the Netherlands carefully built up a niche position in development assistance, international justice, and, more recently, the importance of water technology as an instrument in tackling climate change. Also, its position as one of the EU's six founding members

gave it considerable status. This position partly depended on its membership of the Atlantic alliance: American security assurances through NATO protected the Netherlands and even allowed for a downsizing of its armed forces after the end of the Cold War (Verbeek and Van der Vleuten 2 008; Oktay 2022).

The 21st century, however, poses important challenges to this niche power (Verbeek 2020). First, globalization brought a rise in emerging economies. The Netherlands made it a central concern to be recognized as a globally important economy by seeking invitations to Group of Twenty/Twenty-two (G20/22) meetings. Dutch membership depended on the goodwill of the annual chair, causing frantic soft diplomacy in seeking to be invited. This proved more difficult when Dutch taxation policies worsened its reputation. Being labelled as a tax haven harmed its public diplomacy efforts considerably. Second, the Netherlands faced several waves of EU enlargement, meaning that more states would be competing with the Netherlands for influence. The economic and demographic size of states like Spain, Poland, and Romania all weakened the Dutch claim to be one of the largest of the smaller member states. In that context, Brexit was a blessing in disguise as the Netherlands could then act as the voice of Northwestern Europe. Lastly, the rivalry between China and the US, culminating in President Obama's 'Asian Pivot', may lead to greater investment in European security, and hence, dependence on EU member states. As such, the war between Russia and Ukraine may provide a (temporary?) relief as the war seems to have re-engaged US attention, and investment, in Europe.

At the same time, the Dutch response to these systemic changes reflected a debate about what would represent the proper narrative on Dutch national identity and possible international roles congruent with that identity. For example, the internally perceived negative consequences of globalization and European integration reinforced a more nativist narrative, reflected by the rise of left-wing and right-wing populist parties. This resulted in politicians following a more Eurosceptic stance (e.g. Oğurlu 2019). This tougher, more negative, Dutch attitude in Brussels was detrimental to Dutch standing, particularly among southern EU member states who resented Dutch complaints about their presumed 'spendthriftiness'. Also, the influx of migrants and refugees since the 1990s has produced societal tensions that, combined with a perceived loss of sovereignty, provoked a national

debate in the 2010s on what constituted Dutch identity, and its consequent place in world politics, temporarily resolved by the adoption of a national history canon, which would also be a leading influence in education curricula (cf. Duyvendak 2021). However, the consensus on this was challenged in 2020 by the debate worldwide on racism and colonialism, which forced the Netherlands to change its national history canon to make it more inclusive and diverse. The popular self-image the country had of being a tolerant nation of free traders and investors with a good heart had to give way to a new image which would include a prioritization of sustainability, international justice, and tax transparency.

Conclusion

Clearly, the 21st century offers states ample opportunities in terms of gaining middle power status. New hard power elements, such as cyber- and space technologies, and the possibilities offered by soft power and public diplomacy, make it less expensive for a state to seek a significant role on the world stage. Nevertheless, whether states opt for such a role crucially depends on their own preferences. These rest on domestic debates about identity and roles. Also, a realization of this status depends on whether other states in the system recognize them as legitimate in such a role. In the 21st century, three types of middle powers seem to present themselves: aspiring global powers that are prepared to go as far as to invest in more traditional elements of hard power, such as blue water navies; regional powers that seek to carve out a position that ensures other powers will take their regional interests into account; and niche powers that pursue their national interests on a global and regional level by building up a recognized, leading position in specific niche areas.

This may make the future more uncertain, particularly when aspired status does not marry up with attributed status, as in the case of Russia. Whether this implies that the international system is becoming ever more fragmented and conflict prone, or whether it will develop into one or several more stable international orders, remains uncertain. For the coming decade, however, middle powers are here to stay. Likewise, defining with precision what are actual middle powers will remain a hotly debated challenge, requiring further research and debate by IR scholars.

At the same time, because middle powers operate at the crossroads of the international and the national, and because middle power status is also a matter of identity, a corresponding status in the international system, and the (failure of) recognition of such status by other states, future middle power studies will profit from the work of the FPA scholarly tradition. Specific choices for preferred status and recognition of such status are not just dictated by changes in the international environment. They are the product of domestic debates and struggles over such coveted positions in the system. As a consequence, FPA and middle power scholars should join forces in accounting for such choices.

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CHAPTER 30

Foreign Policy of International Organizations

KENT J. KILLE

As one of the key International Relations (IR) subfields, the scholarship on international organizations displays the issue of 'disconnect' between Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and IR emphasized by the editors of this volume. Since intergovernmental organizations (IGOs; distinct from non-state actors covered in a later chapter) are made up of sovereign member states, there is a natural intersection between the study of IGO and state policy-making. Despite such common ground, the linkages between the two subfields can be strengthened. For instance, research on IGOs addresses similar themes and questions which can gain support from FPA scholarly perspectives and advances. In return, IGOs are important actors that need closer examination in order to address FPA limitations brought about by the field's generally state-centric focus. Overall, the charge of this volume to place FPA in a 'central analytic location' is a ripe one for the study of international organizations and there is value to both fields in undertaking a dialogue in order to better benefit from their relative strengths and knowledge.

This chapter demonstrates how FPA-IGO linkages can be valuable by drawing upon areas where this has occurred, making logical connections where the scholarly work overlaps, and considering extensions of this work for repositioning the association between the fields in future scholarship. The material is organized around four core areas of consideration. First, FPA emphasis on opening the 'black box' for analysis has seen analogous in-roads in research on IGOs. This discussion is related to the overarching theme of this part of the book, the idea of 'actorness', which is reflected in related studies of IGOs. Second, an important dimension of FPA is the study of political leadership, which offers significant insights for understanding the decision-making of IGO leaders. Third, moving beyond decision-making at the individual level, a broader consideration of IGOs as foreign

policy actors is provided. Finally, the chapter examines the foreign policy of states in relation to international organizations. The chapter concludes by drawing implications from this discussion to look ahead for suggested avenues of FPA-IGO scholarship.

Opening the 'Black Box' for International Organizations

Shifting analysis to look inside the 'black box' of the state is a hallmark of FPA that has parallels in analyses of international organizations. There is a long-standing scholarly tradition of examining IGO internal processes (Smith 2004; Rosenthal 2017). In doing so, scholars explore IGO decision-making dynamics (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Gifkins 2021). While such work acknowledges the value of looking inside the 'black box', the quantitative turn in international organization analysis 'tends to treat IOs as homogeneous black boxes' (Haftel and Thompson 2006: 255). Yet, with theoretical developments 'the tide has only recently begun to turn' and 'encouraged more scholars to unpack the 'black box' of IOs' (Eckhard and Ege 2016: 961) that brings many in the field back closer to an FPA perspective. This extends to the analogous application of domestic state institutions to the study of IGOs, such as central banks, judiciaries, and congressional committees (Thompson 2006), with domestic legislative processes providing insight for international organizations (Conrad and Monroe 2020), and FPA being applied to understand both domestic and international courts (Eksteen 2019).

FPA scholars looking to connect their work to international organizations should recognize that there is debate over how best to define and classify these entities (Duffield 2007). The debate encompasses the degree of international legal personality and powers possessed by IGOs (Klabbers 2016), as well as how to understand the historical trajectory of international organizations and multilateralism in relation to sovereign states (Reinalda 2009; Lavelle 2020). Just as Part I of this volume explores FPA in relation to the full range of IR theories, international organizations can be viewed through all of these lenses (Archer 2015). However, the central theoretical debate between rationalist and constructivist approaches, and efforts to bridge these perspectives (Nielson, Tierney, and Weaver 2006) revolve around how to address member states relative to their IGOs. For instance,

IGOs could potentially transform member states over time, including bringing their interests into closer alignment (Bearce and Bondanella 2007).

The theoretical debate has deep implications for how to understand the 'actorness' of IGOs, with some emphasizing a state principal-IGO agent approach, with states delegating authority to international organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006), compared to others stressing the greater level of IGO autonomy that exists (Collins and White 2011; Oestreich 2012). This discussion extends closely into a dimension of FPA consideration, the autonomous role of bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Johnson 2014; Bauer and Ege 2017). Thus, a key area of IGO scholarship examines the organizations' secretariats as bureaucracies and their influence on shaping policy (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009; Weinlich 2014). Opening the 'black box' also shifts the onus for IGO performance onto the organizations themselves instead of external factors, which leads to analysis of reasons for operational variation (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Lall 2017). Similar to FPA, such decision-making analyses also reveal limitations and pathologies in international organization processes (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). The desire to improve problematic areas leads to an extensive literature on internal oversight and reform (Grigorescu 2008; Browne 2019).

Political Leadership in International Organizations

The calls for reform often fall to IGO executive heads, among the many demands on their leadership. Political leadership and decision-making is a core area of study in FPA. The wider debate that FPA faces in IR over whether to take analysis to the individual level versus treating actors in a unitary manner resonates in the IGO literature (Tallberg 2006; Rauh 2021). Yet, there is a broad understanding that 'A focus on leadership can offer important insights into our understanding of multilateral cooperation' (Parker and Karlsson 2014: 580). Thus, the need for careful analysis of international organization executive head leadership is emphasized (Schroeder 2014; Hall and Woods 2018). Organizations with rich literature addressing their leadership are the office of United Nations (UN) secretary-general (Gordenker 2010; Ravndal 2020) and European Union (EU) office holders (Tömmel and Verdun 2017), with a recent emphasis on the newer

position of high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Amadio Viceré et al. 2020). However, there is a wide range of IGO leadership positions analysed, such as the Commonwealth (Mole 2010), international financial institutions (Kraske 1996; Blackhurst 2012), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Hendrickson 2006; Risso 2020), and regional organizations in the Americas (Lopes and Ferraz Oliveira 2017).

With the shared interest in political leadership, FPA lessons can be carried over to the study of IGOs to build bridges between the fields. Leader psychology (see Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) is one such avenue. FPA is proficient at detailing leaders through *at-a-distance* means, including profiles of state leaders in action at IGOs (Marfleet and Miller 2005). Leadership trait analysis has been successfully translated to measure the traits and related leadership styles of IGO heads (Kille and Scully 2003; Kille 2006), which addressed claims in the IGO literature that personality matters but is problematic to measure. In addition, other forms of *at-a-distance* analysis can be used to examine IGO foreign policy (Aydın-Düzgit 2014) or how approaches taken by representatives in an IGO shed light on a state's foreign policy (Rocha and Medeiros 2021). Finally, in addition to individual leadership styles, organizational administrative styles can be incorporated (Knill et al. 2019; Well et al. 2020).

An important development in FPA is addressing the gap in coverage of gender and foreign policy (Aggestam and True 2020; Smith 2020b). Scholars examining international organizations are increasingly asking questions about gender as well (Prügl 2007; Holmes et al. 2019), including access to leadership positions (Haack 2017; Bode 2020), gender representation and equality (Haack et al. 2020), and the impact of women leaders in international organizations (Blackmon 2020). Another thematic overlap is policy entrepreneurship, with bureaucratic and norm entrepreneurs explored across various international organizations (Rushton 2008; Nay 2012).

International Organizations as Foreign Policy Actors

As one review of international organizations and foreign policy notes, the topic 'become(s) of interest to international relations scholarship … once international organizations became more active and were recognized as

independent actors in international politics' (Panke and Hennenberg 2018: 9). With IGOs operating distinctly from member states, FPA studies need to better take into account IGOs as foreign policy actors. This section opens by focusing on the foreign policy of a particular IGO, the EU, before turning to a broader consideration of IGOs connecting via interorganizational relations and alongside states in addressing global problems.

EU Foreign Policy

When examining IGOs as foreign policy actors, the advanced EU is emphasized for its potential role in the global arena (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005; Telò and Ponjaert 2013). EU foreign policy is a wide-ranging and complicated topic (Bindi and Angelescu 2012; Smith 2014; Westlake 2020), so the rich and diverse scholarship is too extensive to fully address in this chapter. For example, one analysis of EU foreign policy scholarship published between 2010 and 2014 in just seven journals encompassed 451 articles (Keuleers et al. 2016). Given the breadth of this literature, understandably there is debate over how best to organize such research and what should be the central questions asked by scholars (Carlsnaes 2004; Smith 2010; Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker 2017), but, overall, as one study emphasizes: 'The more we learn about the EU's role in the changing international order, the more we develop a concrete basis for understanding what the EU is as an international actor and where its foreign policy is heading' (Johansson-Nogués et al. 2020: v).

Yet, the direct link to FPA is limited for studies of EU foreign policy. This disconnect is emphasized by Brian White, who argues for the value of applying FPA to the EU (White 1999, 2001). Knud Erik Jørgensen criticizes overviews of FPA for overlooking EU foreign policy, but also acknowledges that efforts by scholars like White to advance such work has not become 'a sustained trend' (Jørgensen 2015: 21) and FPA influences on FPA in the EU remain limited compared to other forms of scholarly thinking. Caution is also raised regarding how directly applicable FPA approaches may be under some circumstances, such as one study which 'provide(s) clear evidence of a new transnational set of drivers behind EU foreign policy action … This can hardly be subject to traditional frameworks of foreign policy analysis, which have been applied by White' (Ekengren 2018: 180).

One way to further explore the linkage between FPA connected scholars and EU foreign policy is to review publications in the flagship journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Although an EU-related article appeared in the first issue (Hellmann et al. 2005), there was very limited EU scholarship, or studies on other international organizations, in the early days of the journal. This started to shift around 2012 when an article on the EU was included in a special issue on role theory (Bengtsson and Elgström 2012) and articles on the EU have regularly appeared since, including a recent special issue on political parties and foreign policy in which half of the articles involve research on the EU (Cicchi et al. 2020; Groen 2020; Raunio and Wagner 2020). This greater degree of coverage also corresponds with analysis following the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (Reynaert 2012) and reflections looking back at developments since this important shift (Furness and Gänzle 2017; Smith 2020a).

One central point of discussion in the post-Lisbon era is whether or not this has promoted greater policy coherence, with articles in *Foreign Policy Analysis* also puzzling over why the EU was not implementing more coherent foreign policy responses (Richey 2013; Howell 2015; Kugler et al. 2015). There is an emphasis on certain member states, in particular Germany (Brummer 2013), but also looking outside of the organization to consider implications for non-EU members (Chaban et al. 2017) and tying this to considerations of broader IR power dynamics (Cantir and Kennedy 2015; Kugler et al. 2015; Dursun-Özkanca 2017; Michalski and Nilsson 2019). While some internal EU dynamics are considered, most articles look outward to compare the EU or detail the organization's foreign policy towards others (Boogaerts 2018; Jenichen 2019). Thus, while FPA has traditionally focused on the foreign policies of states towards each other, EU foreign policy scholarship demonstrates the need to also incorporate IGO foreign relations towards states (Dominguez 2015; Neuman 2019).

Interorganizational Relations

The EU also maintains a significant foreign presence with other IGOs (Jørgensen 2010; Orsini 2014; Kaddous 2015). This includes representation at (Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Blavoukos et al. 2017) and joint activities with (Hussain 2017) universal bodies like the UN as well as interactions with other regional organizations (Gomez Arana 2017; Carbone 2020). Such EU activities are part of the broader dynamic of IGO-IGO interactions. For

example, other regional organizations can play an important role in UN peacekeeping operations (Gelot 2012; Jones 2020) and global affairs (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014; Nguitragool and Rüland 2015). Thus, foreign organizational policy analysis needs to be extended to organizational interaction in the same manner that FPA examines state-state foreign policy dynamics, not just viewed through an interstate lens (Boisson de Chazournes 2016). States are not the only external actors shaping IGO policy, since IGOs collaborate with and impact other IGOs (Gest and Grigorescu 2010; Margulis 2018). The importance of these dynamics is supported in the growing scholarship examining interorganizational relations (Biermann and Koops 2017).

International Organizations and Global Policy Challenges

Both states and IGOs face important policy decisions on how to cope with a range of global issues. This volume, particularly Part V, identifies such international challenges through the FPA perspective, but in many situations this requires incorporating international organizations into the analysis. From terrorism (Messmer and Yordán 2011) to global health (Beigbeder 2018), IGO efforts and partnerships with states guide global policy-making. Sanctions are often implemented by or through IGOs (Early and Spice 2015). IGOs also engage in a range of diplomatic efforts, sometimes as actors on their own authority (Iji 2017) and in other instances alongside states—as in the case of the Middle East Quartet (Tocci 2013). IGOs are an essential part of peacekeeping, which encompasses interesting FPA questions (Kathman and Wood 2016; Schiel et al. 2020), and challenge sovereign state control over policy through peacebuilding (Cavalcante 2019), shaming of states (Squatrito et al. 2019), and assertion of the responsibility to protect (Bellamy and Luck 2018).

Foreign Policy of States and International Organizations

The final area of consideration for building understanding of IGO-state interplay is the foreign policies of states. In order to fully broaden the actors addressed by FPA, as called for in Part IV of this volume, this means incorporating emerging powers, small states, and middle powers alongside great powers. Other overlaps between the study of FPA and IGOs are voting

decisions, international agreements, organizational design, membership, and public opinion.

International Organizations, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Regional Powers

Multilateral diplomacy through IGOs is a central mechanism for the full range of states to contribute to the global policy-making process. Universal organizations like the UN provide for access and contributions by all member states (Smith 2006). Foreign policy in relation to international organizations can be traced across varied states (Warner and Shaw 2018; Dž ananović 2019). Emerging powers could coordinate with IGOs to engage in other regions, such as India and the EU in Africa (Zajączkowski and Kumar 2020). In addition, regional dynamics, including regional IGOs, provide an important outlet for understanding the policy role of powers in that area (Fe lsch 2020; Vadell and Giaccaglia 2021) as well as on a global scale (Akbarz adeh 2015; Mesquita and Seabra 2020).

Great Powers at International Organizations

The foreign policy of great powers at IGOs draws much attention. The focus on US foreign policy in FPA is echoed in IGO literature (Lyon 2016; Clark and Dolan 2021), including shifts under the Trump administration (Sp erling and Webber 2019; Espín Ocampo et al. 2020). China is increasingly active in international organizations, which leads to analysis of implications for their policy and role in IR (Hempson-Jones 2005; Sun 2017), and Russia's policies in relation to international organizations also draw attention (Schmitt 2020). With its withdrawal from the EU, questions are raised about the power implications for the United Kingdom (UK) in relation to other IGOs as well (Blagden 2019; Zyla 2020).

Foreign Policy and Voting in International Organizations

The shift of the UK from being an EU country to an independent player in the UN Security Council is only one voting dynamic when examining foreign policy choices of states. Many studies focus on UN General Assembly voting patterns (Voeten 2013), including regional organizations (Mandler and Lutmar 2021) and the impact of foreign policy factors on

voting (DiLorenzo and Rooney 2021). Outside of seeking to understand state voting decisions within the UN context, this voting data 'has increasingly been used' as a measure of foreign policy variables (Balci and Hazar 2021: 280), which leads to a direct cross-over with FPA. There are also indications that voting behaviour is shaped by other policies in exchange for votes (Strand and Tuman 2012).

International Agreements: Creating, Signing, Ratifying, and Complying

States come together through IGOs to create and manage international agreements. At each stage, state policy choices and IGO processes intersect, starting with attendance at conferences (Kaya and Schofield 2020) and the design of agreements (Kreps 2018). States then face further decision-making over ratifying agreements (Greenhill and Strausz 2014; Böhmelt 2019). IGOs are also engaged with agreement implementation and compliance, which can vary across institutional set-ups and capacity (Allee and Elsig 2016; Dimitrov 2020), including through international courts coping with differing levels of state support (Powell 2013).

Design and Membership of International Organizations

An important dimension of tracking state foreign policy is the choices made to create IGOs (Haftel 2010) and the design of those bodies (Panke 2016) since it is a puzzle why sovereign states are willing to participate (Abbott and Snidal 1998), although there may be separate policy side-benefits to take into consideration (Dreher, Mikosch, and Voigt 2015). Shared IGO membership can impact states (Chyzh 2017), but the decision whether or not to join is not always under a state's control since organizational design includes tailored accession rules (Kaoutzanis, Poast, and Urpelainen 2016). The addition of new members can alter IGO makeup and policy emphasis or cohesion (Finke 2020), but in reverse states may disrupt IGOs by deciding to withdraw (Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019) or even end the IGO altogether (Gray 2018; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2020) if states maintain the ability to make this happen (Strange 1998; Debre and Dijkstra 2021). States may focus their foreign policy efforts on gaining membership (Sasley 2012), but some political entities wrestle with getting recognized as states to make them eligible for membership. Thus, IGOs can serve as

gatekeepers to statehood and the analysis of seeking recognition and organizational membership bridges the FPA and IGO literatures in cases such as Kosovo (Newman and Visoka 2020), Palestine (Badarin 2020), and Taiwan (Long and Urdinez 2021).

Public Opinion and International Organizations

Public opinion research carries over into the realm of international organizations as well, where 'theoretical and empirical insights have significantly advanced the literature on IGOs' (Appel 2018: 274). Since public opinion might affect state foreign policy, logically this extends to public views on IGOs, such as the International Court of Justice (Justwan et al. 2021), international financial institutions (Edwards 2009), and regional organizations (Schlipphak 2015). Analysis can employ extensive public opinion data across multiple countries and regions (Lagos and Chu 2013), take into account the rise of populism (Schneider 2018; Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019), and contrast with elite views (Kreps 2010; Busby et al. 2020; Verhaegen et al. 2021). In reverse, IGOs are a factor in shaping public opinion within states (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Greenhill 2020).

The impact of IGOs on democratization (Pevehouse 2005) informs the range of public opinion outlets available to citizens, while in return questions are raised over whether IGO foreign policy can be linked to democratic legitimacy (Niţoiu 2015) and how democratic norms might spread from domestic sources to IGOs and across organizations (Grigorescu 2015), with democratic governments showing stronger support for institutions promoting democratic norms (Hill 2018). Just as there is a distinction made between democratic and autocratic institutions and actors across chapters in this volume, scholars need to be clear on different approaches and impact of authoritarian IGOs and their member states, as in the situation of 'authoritarian regionalism' (Obydenkova and Libman 2019). Finally, there is an evaluation of 'world opinion' (Foyle 2003; Jaeger 2008) which can be extended to considerations of whether the organizations themselves are actors carrying out normatively based policy (Kreutz 2015).

FPA-International Organizations Research Agenda

As demonstrated across this chapter, there are important areas of scholarly intersection between FPA and the study of IGOs. The review demonstrates strides made in FPA to reflect on international organizations, including coverage in the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*, but with the breadth of work on IGOs which overlaps with FPA there is still much more to share and learn through dialogue across the fields. The shared concern with opening the 'black box', and engagement in the IR theoretical debate over the value and necessity of doing so, establishes an initial common ground between the fields—which can be seen directly through detailed examinations of decision-making via bureaucracies and political leadership. This congruence points to the need for even more explicit meta-analyses for these dimensions across state and IGO bureaucratic processes. As scholars dig further into IGO secretariats and executive heads, greater research into organizations beyond those most commonly addressed (in particular the EU, UN, and international financial institutions) is necessary in order to provide greater comparative evidence and understanding. Initial efforts to extend FPA *at-a-distance* techniques to the study of IGO executive head leadership proved fruitful, but this merely sets the stage for broader research employing varied forms of leadership analysis frameworks, comprehensive databases, and comparative analysis across state and IGO leadership. In addition, both FPA and IGO scholars are drawing important attention to gender and leadership, so as this works moves forward it will be valuable to develop research in conjunction across the fields.

The place of FPA in studies of EU foreign policy has progressed to a limited degree since White's critique, but there are clear grounds for further synergy given their thematic and conceptual overlap. More broadly, the material reviewed in this chapter provides an important reminder that the interplay between IGOs and state foreign policy is a two-way, interactive process. However, most often the impact of IGOs on states is an area of research distinct from studies on the impact of state foreign policy on IGOs. As FPA scholars extend their coverage to include IGOs as policy-making and influencing actors, it is important as well not to lose sight of the interorganizational relations between these institutions outside of a state-centric model. Voting positions in IGOs are a clear point of intersection with FPA. However, scholars should be careful not to veer too far into

simply using IGO voting data as a proxy measure for state foreign policy and direct diplomacy since this loses sight of IGO contextual factors which can impact multilateral diplomacy and voting dynamics. Similarly, public opinion is a major area of scholarly intersection, with consideration of the impact of domestic public opinion of IGOs on states' foreign policy and the reverse examination of IGOs affecting public opinion, so the dynamic interplay between these is ripe for closer inspection.

At the same time, scholars need to be clear on the theoretical basis of the FPA-IGO intersection being proposed in order to establish where such connections bring the most value versus other areas where different perspectives might better inform the research agenda. Indeed, as some initial studies argue, FPA and international organization research may at times need to adapt conceptual frameworks in varied manners when studying decision-making (Dörfler and Gehring 2021). Finally, analysts of both FPA and IGOs call for making this work policy relevant, so the more that the two fields can coordinate and demonstrate the joint policy relevance of their research the greater the potential policy impact this work can have. Overall, building stronger bridges spanning FPA and IGO scholarship will establish more coherent understanding of the interrelation between these two areas of study and thereby strengthen IR research as a whole.

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CHAPTER 31

Foreign Policy of Substate Governments

CRISTIAN CANTIR

INTRODUCTION

The study of paradiplomacy—normally defined as the foreign policy behaviour of substate governments—has developed since the second half of the 20th century in parallel with foreign policy analysis (FPA), with little theoretical and empirical cross-pollination. This state of affairs is puzzling since both communities have an appreciation for the impact of domestic dynamics on foreign policy behaviour and therefore criticize the international relations (IR) discipline for its insufficient understanding and conceptualization of agency. This chapter addresses the advantages of more interaction between FPA scholars and students of paradiplomacy.

The chapter begins with an analysis of definitional and conceptual issues, followed by a discussion of the explanandum and explananda in paradiplomacy scholarship. Next, in keeping with the arguments laid out by the editors in the introductory chapter, I contend that FPA can reclaim its central analytic location in IR in part by using its strengths and distinct perspective to broaden its attention beyond the state. FPA can theorize the place of substate governments in the national foreign policy decision-making process and, more generally, the agency of these entities in global affairs. An FPA that is more attuned to the foreign policy behaviour of substate governments can also attenuate some of the weaknesses the editors identify. Paradiplomacy can help FPA scholars overcome excessive state-centrism, forge more and better policy connections to decision-makers, enlarge its research focus outside of military security matters, and open doors to disciplines like political geography, comparative politics, and urban studies.

What Is Paradiplomacy?

Paradiplomacy describes the foreign policy behaviour of substate governments. This deceptively simple definition obscures a number of long-standing debates that converge on the normative valence of the term itself and its conceptual boundaries. The prefix is a shorthand for 'parallel' (Smith 2019), which may inaccurately suggest foreign policy that is automatically in confrontation with or in opposition to the central government (Cornago 2018: 3). Cornago (2010) argues, as a result, in favour of the more general concept of 'substate diplomacy' (see also Duran et al. 2009). Other terms have included multi-layered diplomacy (Sharafutdinova 2003), catalytic diplomacy (Hocking 1996), constituent diplomacy (McMillan 2012), non-central government diplomacy (Hocking 1996), and circumscribed diplomacy (Dyment 1993).[1] Despite frequent complaints about the concept's negative connotation, the notion of paradiplomacy has remained resilient and continues to be used either exclusively or interchangeably with the aforementioned concepts.[2]

The related notion of protodiplomacy is narrower: it is often used to define paradiplomatic activities with a 'more or less separatist message' (Duchacek 1986: 240). Balthazar (1999: 162) explains, for instance, that protodiplomacy is used to 'designate the diplomatic efforts of representatives who want to obtain recognition for an eventual sovereign state', while paradiplomacy refers to 'the diplomacy of a non-sovereign entity not specifically seeking a sovereign status'.[3]

Scholars also set more or less narrow boundaries for the types of entities that fall under the purview of paradiplomacy. There is virtual consensus that paradiplomacy outlines the foreign affairs of non-central governments one level below central authorities, which includes provinces, federal subjects, and autonomous regions, among others. Lecours (2002: 94–95) explains that such regional governments are unique entities because they are neither sovereign states nor non-state actors; they 'cannot readily use strategies of demonstration, advocacy, or political/economic pressure to get involved in world politics' and 'have to rely on the state-centric networks and mechanisms of traditional diplomacy that tend to be closed to them'. The bulk of the community of paradiplomacy scholars is indeed primarily concerned with non-central governments.

The concept has, however, been used to describe a variety of other local and city governments (Shen 2014; Nganje 2014). The study of city diplomacy involves its own community of scholars, with some significant overlap. In any case, similar to the very use of the term itself, where debates about its normative value have not led to its elimination from the vocabulary of scholars, most of the work in paradiplomacy tends to favour a broader tent that includes a variety of governmental institutions that are not central governments (Lequesne and Paquin 2017). All of these entities are unified by the fact that local decision-making elites recognize the reach of central authorities and have access to and control over regional and local governments, which they can use to either affect central foreign policy decision-making or engage in independent action. The central government is, therefore, a major variable that defines the opportunities and the constraints of these local elites, who more or less recognize its legitimacy.

In addition, paradiplomacy scholars—although they have disagreed on how narrowly to define the topic of study—have mostly refrained from using the concept to define entities that are already separatist or semi-recognized in international society (but see Cornago 2018: 11–12 on the concept of protodiplomacy in this context). Such entities, the argument goes, are not subject to the same domestic constraints since the central government is either absent or has little to no impact on the ability of the entity to engage in foreign affairs. Again, these conceptual boundaries are porous and entangled, characterized by a conceptual core that includes second-level substate governments and conceptual peripheries that incorporate cities, city councils, local governments, governments in exile, separatist entities, and other types of non-state actors, like the John F. Kennedy Institute (Scott-Smith 2016). The insights below will take these conceptual matters into consideration, drawing primarily on non-central government institutions.

Explaining Paradiplomacy

Scholarship on paradiplomacy is fairly recent. Most detailed literature review accounts (Nganje 2014; Kuznetsov 2015) identify foundational work in the 1970s and the 1980s, which shed light on the actions of substate units and challenged state-centric assumptions in traditional IR theories.

Initial scholarship set theoretical and empirical directions based on the international activities of US and Canadian substate governments in light of globalization and the fragmentation of sovereign state power in areas like global trade and economics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion and deepening of European integration later drove investigations into entities in those areas. Finally, contributions from the Global South became more visible towards the end of the 1990s and after the 2000s (see especially Kuznetsov 2015).

The explanandum in paradiplomacy illustrates the most impressive achievements—most of them empirical—in this field of study. Paradiplomacy scholars have compiled an extensive list of actions taken by substate governments that relate to foreign policy, all of which include considerable variation that facilitates comparative analysis, and span both institutional and non-institutional behaviour.[4] Substate units often make institutional choices to create foreign policy offices and train diplomatic officials (Sharafutdinova 2003; Setzer 2013: 213–214). Criekemans (2007) is a good example of this type of work: his description of the Flemish diplomatic apparatus illustrates the extent to which some regions can hone diplomatic expertise. At the other end of the continuum, other substate units have rudimentary or virtually absent foreign policy institutions (e.g., Wallis et al. 2016 on Papua New Guinea's Bougainville).

Regions can institutionalize contact with foreign entities by establishing diplomatic ties (either via diplomatic missions opened in the substate unit or the unit itself opening foreign offices (see Ackren 2019 for an example) or by signing a bewildering variety of documents, agreements, and *ententes* with peers in other countries or national governments themselves (see Mohammed and Owtram 2014 and Lopez-Vallejo 2021 for examples)). The content of these agreements usually covers non-military and non-security matters like development aid (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012), culture, trade, identity, and the environment; different substate units prefer different combinations.[5] Some substate units also commit to enacting international or supranational laws at the local level (often in opposition to the central government) (Khan 2003), and many become entangled in conflicts with the centre over the implementation of international laws at the local level in light of their institutional powers in this regard (see Meren 2012 on Quebec for example). The targets of foreign policy actions vary as well—substate units usually look to interact with peers in either neighbouring or far-away

countries, although some also interact extensively with countries[6] and international organizations (Tatham 2018). Local elites can also express a variety of more or less formal opinions on foreign policy (Sharafutdinova 2003) and can meet both officially and unofficially with foreign leaders, including via the use of private channels (Hunt and Minto 2017). This strand of research is often anecdotal, but some recent findings suggest that such activities constitute a sizable portion of the diplomatic affairs of local elites.

A lot of work on paradiplomacy, therefore, offers granular analyses of several types of behaviours, which can range from statements made by a governor to the opening of a trade office in a foreign country. Such activities are occasionally aggregated into variables that seek to assess the intensity or volume of paradiplomacy, although these tend to be, as we will see later, underdeveloped and undertheorized (for exceptions, see Schiavon 2018; and Lopez-Vallejo 2021).

Scholars are also curious whether such formal and informal actions are coordinated with central authorities or made independently. There is, for instance, an entire literature on 'by-passing' paradiplomacy, in which local elites do not work with (or even notify) central authorities of certain diplomatic actions. Major cases like Quebec and Catalonia reveal significant by-passing activities (see especially Duran 2011; and Segura 2017). For example, the Australian state of Victoria recently signed a memorandum of understanding to join China's Belt and Road Initiative (Tidwell 2021), apparently without the consent of federal authorities in Canberra. In contrast, in South Africa, paradiplomacy by subnational states has been closely coordinated with the central government (Nganje 2014; see also Wyn Jones and Royles 2012).

Another major thread in the literature looks to the outcomes or consequences of such actions, often as they relate to centre-region ties or to the actual policy achievements at the local level. Tidwell (2021), for example, identifies several paradiplomatic episodes that have exacerbated conflicts between regional and central authorities in countries like the US and Australia, including California's pursuit of an environmental policy in direct opposition to the Trump administration. Castan Pinos and Sacramento (2019) investigate 'counter-paradiplomacy' by Spanish central authorities in response to Catalan paradiplomatic activities, identifying another important conflictual outcome analysed by the literature. On the other hand,

paradiplomatic activities can improve conciliation and reduce tensions in multi-cultural environments (Wolff 2007; Nganje 2014). Scholarship on whether paradiplomacy 'works', in the sense that the outcomes match the expectations of substate elites (either in terms of development aid or deeper institutional ties with peer units or sovereign states, and so on) is sparse. Me ren (2012), for example, provides an analysis of Quebec's successful endeavours to project an international identity in the 1960s, often with assistance from Gaullist France (on the question of the actual policy achievements of paradiplomacy, see also Nganje 2014).

Analyses of the actions and the outcomes of paradiplomatic activities illustrate wide variation across time, region, and content. A substate unit can engage in significant formal activities that by-pass the central government and are primarily conflictual (Quebec in the 1960s, for example). Other substate units zero in primarily on economic paradiplomacy, coordinate their activities with the centre, and generate relatively little conflict (Chinese paradiplomacy after the 1990s, for example). The wide variety of actions and outcomes is what prompted research in the 1980s and the 1990s; authors used such empirical data to challenge IR scholarship to furnish theoretical explanations for the existence of the phenomenon.

The observation of significant foreign policy actions and outcomes by substate actors, therefore, spurred on efforts at identifying causes. A sizable portion of paradiplomatic literature gets into the weeds of institutional and constitutional analyses of the division of foreign policy powers between the centre and substate units. This is unsurprising since such analyses are essential for laying out the constraints and opportunities[7] of local elites, which vary significantly across countries (and sometimes within countries themselves) (see also McMillan 2018). One of the most valuable findings here is the inherent institutional ambiguity about what substate units can and cannot do in IR, especially when it comes to informal actions like foreign policy statements. Substate units with more autonomy, however, tend to at the very least have more opportunities for involvement (McMillan 2018). In addition, institutional landscapes can change and can either broaden or narrow the ability of substate units to get involved (Sharafutdino va 2003; Mukti et al. 2019). Literature on Russian paradiplomacy, for instance, describes multiple actions taken by substate units in the 1990s, which later—in an increasingly authoritarian system centralized by

President Vladimir Putin—became more severely constrained (on Russian paradiplomacy, see Kuznetsov 2015).

Other domestic institutional factors that are connected to some of the dependent variables described above refer to partisan relations between the centre and the regions (Setzer 2013; Donas and Beyers 2013), conceptualized in terms of the level of congruence between local and national political parties or leaders (e.g., Lachapelle 2018). Regime type has received some attention in the literature, although it remains underanalysed; we do not know much about the exact differences between paradiplomacy in democratic vs. semi-democratic or non-democratic regimes.[8]

Outside of the institutional context, the identity of the community represented at the substate level—normally defined in ethnic or religious terms—has produced arguments that substate units that profess a separate identity tend to behave differently from those that do not. Analyses of the so-called 'usual suspects' in paradiplomacy studies (Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, Wallonia, and Flanders) tend to dominate this portion of the literature, which has yielded subconcepts like 'identity paradiplomacy', and has produced contentions that the volume of paradiplomatic activities is higher in such areas (Lequesne and Paquin 2017). The capabilities, resources, and geographic position of the substate actor garner some attention as well: independent variables here tend to be defined in terms of the volume of resources substate units have and in terms of their nature as border entities.[9]

Finally, paradiplomacy scholars have identified a variety of elite motivations for paradiplomatic activities. The motivation of identity building or identity projection has drawn a lot of attention (see Hunt and Minto 2017, and Paquin 2018 for examples), along with socio-economic and cultural development. Elites also have wide-ranging political or ideological motivations that spur paradiplomatic activities, including commitments to grapple with climate change, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, labour rights, and so on (Kincaid 2002). Some local leaders have regional or national ambitions and see paradiplomatic activities as a way of building a national-level political identity.[10] Others have looked to more individual characteristics like level of education or interest in foreign policy (McMillan 2012), and there are a few running references to the importance of

personality (Lachapelle and Paquin 2005: 88), although these insights have remained mostly anecdotal and unsystematic thus far.[11]

The limitations of the Paradiplomacy Literature

The empirical and theoretical study of paradiplomacy is in a curious state. Authors have discovered and documented a large volume of actions by substate units, as well as the intended and unintended outcomes of such actions, often using the frameworks and concepts laid out in original scholarship from the 1980s and 1990s (Kuznetsov 2015). This steady accumulation of empirical data—particularly impressive because it includes insight from both the Global North and the Global South, with a lot of evidence presented in non-English languages—has not, however, borne anything resembling a reconfiguration or reassessment of theoretical approaches in IR that early proponents hoped for. Instead, one of the common complaints in the literature is the near invisibility of paradiplomacy in traditional IR (for some recent examples, see Alvarez 2020; Mocca 2020). The theorizing that does take place tends to be articulated by paradiplomacy scholars themselves, who often argue that some IR frameworks may be helpful in grasping the phenomenon (Cornago 2010). The same applies to explanations: causes have spanned several levels of analysis, including individual personality traits, geographic position, and constitutional structure, but are mostly advanced in an *ad hoc* manner and inductively based on case studies (which tends to be the preferred approach in the scholarship), without a significant amount of theoretical reflection. Since IR theorists have not reacted to the volume of evidence of the phenomenon itself, of course, it should not be surprising that few theoretical frameworks have been proposed to explain it.

Interestingly, paradiplomacy scholars often echo complaints by FPA scholars, who have, as Kaarbo and Thies argue in the volume's introductory Chapter 1, felt disconnected from IR debates. The commonalities do not end here: like FPA scholars, paradiplomacy scholars have at the same time seen IR theorists incorporate decision-making and domestic variables into their approaches as it relates to the role of substate actors, but this turn has been similarly underdeveloped. Consequently, paradiplomacy scholars see more *recognition* of the importance of substate actors in IR scholarship, but

less *engagement* with the wealth of empirical and analytical work put forth in the last few decades. FPA scholars can, of course, sympathize.

There are, for example, neoclassical realist analyses of the motivations and behaviour of elites in substate units like Kosovo and Taiwan (Mendez 2020) and Iraq's Kurdistan (Romano 2020). Although the spotlight on identity lends itself well to constructivist interpretations, there have been few attempts at using the conceptual tools of this school of thought to interpret paradiplomatic activities and agency (see Lecours 2002 for an exception). Sharafutdinova (2004), for example, proposes the combining of a constructivist framework with a 'domestic politics' framework in one of the few efforts that seeks to merge paradiplomatic studies with major IR theories. Finally, liberal analyses are more or less implicit in the literature that puts forward macro-explanations for the emergence of paradiplomacy as a phenomenon, implicitly arguing that diplomatic actions by substate actors are a response to processes like globalization or regionalization (Mc Millan 2018; Mauad 2020). These latter perspectives tend also to lack clear conceptualizations of agency.

FPA as Bridge Builder

In the introductory chapter, the editors stress that FPA approaches—which span multiple levels of analysis, seek their theoretical integration, and take agents seriously—have a lot to offer to an IR discipline that is in need of such explanations. In the context of paradiplomacy, FPA can serve as a bridge builder in two ways. First, FPA approaches can supply theoretical and methodological perspectives on substate units as potentially important actors embedded in the national foreign policy-making process. As IR theories become more attuned to the importance of agency and domestic political dynamics for state behaviour, the inclusion of substate governments further enriches these dynamics at every foreign policy decision-making stage (Billings and Hermann 1998; Ozkececi-Taner 2017). If IR scholarship is growing more aware of the centrality of agency, a wider conceptualization of agency is crucial for theoretical and empirical advancements. For instance, a foreign policy perspective that has assimilated substate factors would establish that the UK's interaction with the European Union cannot be understood fully without consideration of the

attempts of agents from Scotland, Wales, and the city of London to influence or participate in the national decision-making process (Toly 2017; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018; Trumm 2021).

Second, FPA's tools can advance an additional conceptualization of the agency of substate governments: as more or less autonomous actors that pursue their own foreign policies in IR by by-passing the national foreign policy decision-making process. The question of the frequency and breadth of this by-passing process remains empirical, of course, and, in both of these cases, FPA work spanning studies of individual leadership, identity, or culture offers avenues for research questions and hypotheses.

When it comes to shedding light on the diversity of actors that participate in the decision-making process, FPA's conceptual toolbox is more than prepared to add substate elites into general models that refine how and why states behave in the way they do (see McMillan 2018 for a similar argument). Foreign policy scholarship on decision-making units would be especially helpful here since substate actors are either formal or informal members of decision-making units (Hermann 2001). Leaders of cities, federal states, and autonomous regions are, in fact, occasionally part of the cabinet or are active institutional participants in foreign policy decision-making at the centre. Consequently, the question of their impact on the foreign policy process is empirical and could occur at, for instance, the stage of diagnosing a problem, developing options, choosing a foreign policy action, or implementation (Billings and Hermann 1998).

The inclusion of substate elites would add theoretical and empirical strength to analyses of state motivations and behaviours and would further bridge the gap between the decision-making complexity that FPA can examine and the decision-making complexity that IR scholars recognize but undertheorize. For instance, a neoclassical realist approach to the United Kingdom's foreign policy towards the European Union, especially Brexit, would acknowledge that the domestic political process mattered—and that Scottish and Welsh elites, among others, played a role at various stages—but an FPA perspective would give strength to such statements by bearing in mind decision-making, bureaucratic politics, and organizational process dynamics laying out how and why such elites might have gotten involved.

At the level of domestic politics, the inclusion of substate actors would also complicate some of the dynamics that bring about foreign policy choices while setting forth more accurate awareness of how those dynamics

work. Regional political parties, for instance, have participated actively in ruling coalitions and have often been involved in foreign policy-making (Wyatt 2017; Blarel and Van Willigen 2021). FPA scholarship on coalitions (e.g., Kaarbo 2012) possesses the conceptual tools to factor in such regional actors, further refining this process. This inclusion may solidify bridge building efforts by adding to the intricacies of the domestic political process. The extensive literature on democratic peace, for example, has little to say about substate governments, including cities and provinces. Evidence from the field of paradiplomacy indicates, however, that such entities can either exacerbate conflicts (including those between democracies) or encourage reconciliation between countries with different national-level regimes. US cities were active in building cooperation with counterparts in the Soviet Union during the Cold War despite federal government criticism and occasional concern, for instance, seeking to decrease tensions between the two great powers (*Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy* 1.1; see also Hobbs 1994). Within democratic dyads, San Francisco and Osaka recently ended a sister-city agreement over a conflict related to the former's public condemnation of Japanese atrocities in World War II (Tidwell 2021: 8). These interactions may or may not affect democratic peace dynamics, but that is an empirical question that FPA is prepared to answer in greater detail than IR theories that may acknowledge domestic dynamics at a more superficial level.

The insertion of substate entities in FPA literature on ideational factors (spanning concepts like culture, identity, and role, among others; see Chapter 12 by Breuning and Chapter 11 by Julka in this volume) would further diversify the types of elites involved in both debates about and actions in accordance with these ideational factors. In light of FPA criticisms about the underexamination of agency in constructivist identity-based analysis (especially structural constructivist approaches), the inclusion of substate elites could reveal patterns heretofore invisible in the literature. Connections with the 'identity paradiplomacy' scholarship are natural here: authors have found that local elites often define local identities in ways that challenge national identity construction efforts and project those identities abroad, creating an entangled web of transnational identity-based connections involving sovereign states, diasporas, substate units, and cities. Such agents use their local institutions and visibility as regional leaders to

project identity via paradiplomatic activities (Paquin and Chaloux 2010) and deserve more scholarly attention.

When it comes to the second major FPA-IR bridge building opportunity inherent in paradiplomacy—treating substate actors like agents in their own right, with significant autonomy to behave separately from the sovereign state—FPA provides multiple frameworks that can further contribute to a more systematic IR consideration of a more diverse set of actors. As mentioned earlier, paradiplomacy scholars acknowledge the importance of personality variables in driving substate diplomatic activities, but the insights remain mostly unexamined. It is, however, clear that substate elites react differently to the constraints and opportunities inherent in certain global issue areas (McMillan 2017). The literature on city and overall substate diplomacy regarding climate change has revealed significant activism and involvement, often in opposition to national-level policies. Studies in political psychology, including leadership trait analysis and operational code research (see Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume) may generate knowledge about which local leaders are more likely to become involved in global affairs and why, as well as the nature of their involvement (these approaches could offer much insight into the foreign policy activities of what Stren and Friendly (2019) call ‘big city mayors’, for example).

Scholarship on decision-making, domestic opposition, and ideational factors could also easily be transferred to the substate unit of analysis, which can deliver insight into the relationship between ideology, the nature of the decision-making unit, small group dynamics, and so on and the degree and nature of substate involvement. We know, for example, that ideological motivations spurred the creation of the European municipal movement in the first half of the 20th century (Gaspari 2002), which established transnational connections not mediated or controlled by sovereign states. These connections vary across time and region, and their dynamics affect global topics of interest to IR scholars like nuclear policy (Schregel 2015), Middle East policy (Cooper and Herman 2019), asylum and migration (Thouez 2020), and the dynamics of the global economy (Smith 2019). IR can move beyond general statements or the recognition that substate actors matter in global affairs to enlisting tools that would allow more exact statements and hypotheses.

How Paradiplomacy Scholarship Can Improve FPA

More careful attention to the study of paradiplomacy will also guide FPA in managing some of the lingering weaknesses Kaarbo and Thies point out in Chapter 1, especially state-centrism, few endeavours at policy relevance, and the lack of engagement with more issue areas and more diverse theoretical perspectives. One of the more surprising gaps in both paradiplomacy and FPA is the lack of communication between these two strands of scholarship, especially since they have natural affinities and often —more or less implicitly—make similar points about the limitations of IR scholarship in considering agency. FPA scholars have been especially absent in the literature on substate diplomacy, in part because attention has gone to examining central authorities. The addition of substate units would mitigate the field's state-centrism, either in the decision-making equation or by looking at them as somewhat autonomous agents that can have an independent bearing on global affairs.

Paradiplomacy would be especially helpful in responding to the common frustration in FPA analysis about the lack of networks with policy-makers and policy relevance in general. Substate diplomacy scholars are acutely aware of the policy relevance of their findings, which often dovetail with policy-maker interest in the nature and benefits of the phenomena (Smith 2019). Two connections stand out. First, large volumes of the paradiplomacy scholarship speak to the literature on conflict resolution in multi-cultural societies. In fact, Wolff (2007), Cornago (2010), and others have been emphatic that allowing substate units (especially those with an identity different from the one at the centre) agency in international affairs can mitigate on-going conflicts with the centre. Entities like the Aland Islands and South Tyrol—which have some degree of autonomy in foreign policy—are mentioned frequently as potential models for conflict resolution (Naucler 2009; Benedikter 2015). An FPA community with deeper theoretical and empirical connections to substate diplomacy can gain significantly more policy relevance, especially as we learn more about what types of leaders, institutional structures, and decision-making approaches can reduce the risk of conflict in diverse states, and what type of diplomatic actions by non-national elites can serve as conflict resolution mechanisms.

Second, FPA expertise on substate diplomacy can open communication pathways to significantly more decision-makers at lower levels of

government that are less entrenched in standard operating procedures and less isolated from academia. These decision-makers are often curious about how to project their agency abroad and are sanguine about the promise of diplomacy, but have relatively little systematic academic literature to draw on for advice or insights. Paradiplomacy scholars are also eager to discuss the policy implications of their work (for a recent example, see Holmes 2020), and mayors and other regional leaders themselves frequently articulate the need for and the advantages of paradiplomatic activities (for a recent example, see Emanuel 2020).[12] This is especially important since, as Kaarbo and Thies note in Chapter 1, one of FPA's normative tasks has been to identify factors that lead to policy-making mistakes. Paradiplomatic activities can sometimes run afoul of central authorities and can antagonize central decision-makers, which makes many local leaders wary about venturing out into the complicated world of international affairs. Deeper insights into when and how substate activities elicit aggressive reactions from the centre—and what types of paradiplomatic activities carry low risks and the potential for significant benefits—could assist local elites in fashioning paradiplomacy accordingly.

As Kaarbo and Thies mention in Chapter 1, FPA scholars have mostly overlooked broader issue areas like global governance, immigration, non-military security matters related to climate and energy, and financial policy, among others. The paradiplomacy scholarship, in fact, attends to these gaps in particular for a very simple reason: central governments insist on exclusive control over security and defence matters,[13] but are either less able or less willing to control foreign policy in other areas. Cities and other substate units often conduct non-security foreign policy that affects both national-level processes and global outcomes. Cities, for example, have challenged national-level immigration and asylum policies, as illustrated by the revival of the 'sanctuary city' movement during the Trump administration (Maisetti 2018). Scholarship on substate units within the European Union reveal an economic integration dynamic driven by local elites, who often have their own incentive structure and motivations (see Tatham 2010; and Antunes and Loughlin 2020). Global environmental governance is now inextricably tied to the actions of cities and substate units (Smeds and Acuto 2018). Global cultural governance is also informed by the desire and power of subnational communities—often in control of

local governments—to assert their international presence (Quebec's involvement in La Francophonie is a good example here).

Closer attention to developments in paradiplomacy also opens several doors to theoretical perspectives beyond realism, liberalism, and constructivism, as Kaarbo and Thies explain in Chapter 1. Historical institutionalist approaches have become more common in the study of substate diplomacy (Bursens and Deforche 2010; Royles 2017), which FPA scholars can learn from when it comes to dynamic interactions between local- and national-level elites and their implications for foreign policy institutions. The emerging work on mimicry in paradiplomacy (Dickson 2017; Jackson 2018) is a good example of how FPA scholars can maintain their concern with agency and domestic politics while looking past traditional theoretical approaches.

Beyond IR, FPA and comparative politics have always shared a belief in the importance of domestic agents and the notion of the central government as a site where much domestic and foreign policy is negotiated and implemented. Cabinets, heads of state, political parties, and bureaucratic entities, to name just a few agents, are therefore constant subjects of investigation in both subfields, with an underlying assumption that they seek access to or influence within the administrative centre where the reins of power are located. For example, while Muller (2016) defines the concept of populism and examines the impact of populists on democratic stability, Plagemann and Destradi (2019) use Muller's definition to parse out the impact of populist leaders on India's foreign policy. Many FPA scholars have, as a result, pointed to these similarities and have encouraged more theoretical cross-pollination between the two subfields (Hudson 2005; da Conceicao-Heldt and Mello 2018).

The study of paradiplomacy would build on these appeals and would open up broader pathways for FPA connections with comparative politics literature and data. First, paradiplomacy provides a natural bridge connecting FPA to literature on comparative federalization and regionalization, which has revealed and examined the impact of regional and administrative unit diversity on factors like regime legitimacy and stability (Sahadzic 2021) or ethnic conciliation (O'Driscoll et al. 2020). FPA scholars would benefit from studying both how regional and federal arrangements—of which there is wide variation both cross-nationally and within individual states—affect a country's foreign policy and how these

arrangements facilitate the emergence of new foreign policy agents. Especially helpful in this regard are the Local Autonomy Index (Ladner et al. 2016) and the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016),[14] which can serve as both sources for quantitative analyses and in-depth case studies tracking, for instance, how degrees of self-rule affect the foreign policy-making process inside a country. An awareness of regional diversity would also open possibilities for more comparative foreign policy scholarship that investigates the impact of socio-economic factors like regional GDP and trade connections on diplomatic connections (see Schiavon 2018 for an example). It would also strengthen FPA's commitment to comparative analysis: single country experts would be able to diversify their methodological approaches by lowering their level of analysis to provinces, cities, and other substate governments.

Second, scholars of paradiplomacy have discovered that substate units and central governments are often engaged in a debate about democratic representation, especially in foreign policy. Quebecois elites, for instance, have occasionally argued that Ottawa cannot legitimately represent the province abroad, and have sought separate membership in organizations like La Francophonie (Meren 2012). Representation is a major topic in comparative politics; studies span conceptual discussions (Pitkin 1972), institutional varieties (Rosema et al. 2011), and the consequences of both successful and failed representation (Werner 2020). Students of regional diplomacy abroad could help FPA draw on the rich theoretical and empirical literature on representation, broadening its application to foreign policy. Investigations would be especially fruitful in understanding why some substate governments are satisfied with the level of central government representation in foreign affairs while others are not.

Finally, additional FPA liaisons with paradiplomacy would open more doors to cognate areas like political geography and urban studies. Foreign policy scholarship has pointed out that the impact of material factors, including geographic variables like location and amount of territory, on behaviour is mediated through the perception of decision-makers. These variables, however, have not garnered a significant amount of attention in the field (see also da Vinha 2019). In contrast, notions like territory, borders, and multi-layered patterns of authority are front and centre in paradiplomatic studies. More intellectual bonds in this area would help FPA rediscover the importance and relevance of geography, especially the

manner in which borderlands play into ties between states. For example, foreign policy ties between neighbours (like the United States and Mexico) are difficult to ascertain without consideration for how border substate regions connect with each other and alter governance and cross-national connections (see Schiavon 2018 for details on the paradiplomacy of Mexican states). Paradiplomatic studies have also been more attuned to concepts used in urban studies, where notions like city branding, twinning, and mega-events point to a realm of diplomatic affairs developed by and conducted by substate elites that have been thus far overlooked by FPA scholars.[15] This mutual neglect cannot be attributed to insurmountable theoretical or methodological disagreements: FPA students are indeed curious about nation branding (Browning 2015) and the importance of events like the Olympics for status-seeking (Bezerra et al. 2015). These affinities could be easily expanded to other types of non-central actors.

Conclusion

There are many natural linkages between paradiplomacy and FPA, all of which converge on a more complex understanding of the nature of agency in IR. Both scholarly communities have also been rather marginal in the IR discipline, despite witnessing from the sidelines growing recognition that individuals, small groups, cities, and substate governments make a difference when it comes to the perception of a problem, the development of solutions, the choice of an action, the implementation of that action, and the incorporation of feedback regarding an outcome in foreign policy. It stands to reason that a unification of efforts, along with empirical and theoretical cross-pollination, will strengthen both of these communities and will help them reclaim a more central place in the study of global affairs.

Notes

1. See Kuznetsov (2015) for a more thorough analysis of the terminology.
2. For some recent examples, see the title of the Kuznetsov (2015) book.
3. See also Cornago (2018) for more extensive reflections on the differences between the two and accompanying consequences.
4. Since the focus of this essay is on foreign policy actions and outcomes, I don't spend any significant amount of time discussing variables that explain general macro-level patterns in paradiplomacy at the global level. There is literature on 'waves' of paradiplomacy (Duran 2011)

and scholarship documenting a global increase in activities, attributed to phenomena like globalization, regional integration, state fragmentation, and so on. On these topics, see Lachapelle and Paquin (2005); Setzer (2013); Nganje (2014); and Cornago (2018).

5. But see Paquin (2018: 17–18), who documents some examples of Quebec's security paradiplomacy. See also Takahashi (2019), who discusses Greenland's ability to influence Danish security policy; and Mauad (2020), who discusses security paradiplomacy examples in Latin America.
6. See Cantir (2020) on kin state contacts, and Dhawan (2019) for more anecdotal data on substate/state interaction.
7. The analysis of opportunities and constraints extends to regional and global environments. Some regions (the European Union in particular) allow more opportunities for substate entities to act internationally (Mocca 2020).
8. For some recent reflections, however, see Liu and Song (2020), who find that authoritarian central governments tend to have significant control over the paradiplomatic activities of substate units.
9. The expectation is that such entities tend to be more active (see Schiavon 2018).
10. See also Tubilewicz (2017), who found that local elites in Yunan use paradiplomacy to secure economic aid from the central government.
11. See Charountaki (2020) for a more detailed attempt to determine the impact of individual-level variables on paradiplomatic activities.
12. This is not to suggest an exclusively positive interpretation of paradiplomatic activities, as seen in celebratory books like Barber (2013). For some critiques of paradiplomatic activities, see Regan (1987).
13. But see Blarel and Sarkar (2019: 413), whose work has revealed that even in areas like defence, international cooperation often hinges on substate organizations, which the authors define as 'organizations that are a part of the government machinery but lack the official mandate to unilaterally devise and execute policy'.
14. I would like to thank Brett Manzer for bringing up this point.
15. For example, a search for the term 'city branding' in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, the leading journal in the discipline, yields no results.

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CHAPTER 32

Foreign Policy of Armed Non-State Actors

MAY DARWICH

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have highlighted a shift in the power of polities in the international system. Non-state actors, operating outside the direct hierarchical control of the state, are increasingly defining trends in global and regional politics. While the centrality of the state can hardly be overlooked, the role played by non-state actors in international relations (IR) has grown and continues to grow in diverse directions. Some international non-state actors, namely intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), transnational networks, and international NGOs (INGOs), are often perceived as the vanguard of globalization and international solidarity. Other non-state actors are seen as villains in international politics; armed non-state actors (ANSA), in particular, are consistently perceived as de-stabilizing forces in IR leading to war and instability. Be it warlords, rebel groups, mercenaries, resistance movements, or pirates, ANSAs have been seen as antagonists to the state. Students of IR, regardless of their theoretical starting point and their normative position on the role of non-state actors in the international system, must accommodate the fast-evolving nature of actorness in the international system.

This chapter focuses on non-state actors using military capabilities to achieve their political goals and examines their role in world politics through repositioning the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to capture their international involvement. A glance at the data delineates the quantitative dimension of ANSAs' involvement at the international level. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Pettersson and Öberg 2020) registered a total of 763 active 'non-state conflicts', a category which refers to violent encounters between non-state actors only (compared to 183 state-based conflicts). During 1989–2011, the yearly average was thirty-one, but the

conflicts increased to an average of seventy during the 2012–2019 period (Pettersson and Öberg 2020: 597–603). ANSAs not only challenge state authority in the international system through the use of violence and military means, but there is substantial evidence of ANSAs maintaining foreign relations and carrying out what looks like traditional foreign policy with other states and non-state actors during both war and peace times. The foreign engagement of ANSAs have been examined in the context of civil wars from several perspectives, including proxy warfare dynamics (Berman and Lake 2019; Moghadam and Wyss 2020), international interventions as negotiated processes between international actors and ANSAs (Idler 2012; San-Akca 2016), the diplomacy of these actors conducted alongside their war tactics (Coggins 2015; Huang 2016), their international activism (Bob 2010), and their digital diplomacy to garner internal and external support (Bos and Melissen 2019; Jones and Mattiacci 2019). Nevertheless, the study of foreign and external relations held by ANSAs is far from systematic. The study of ANSAs has been dispersed between IR, civil war literature, and terrorism studies. This chapter repositions FPA into the study of ANSAs. While FPA has been criticized for its state-centric focus and its overwhelming preoccupation with Western powers, it has a record of theoretical, conceptual, and methodological toolkits to bring a novel perspective into the study of ANSAs' foreign engagement. FPA, with its advantage of including a variety of agents, structures, institutions, and processes, has the potential to bring an enhanced and more systematic understanding to ANSAs' role in international politics. In addition, this area of inquiry would revitalize FPA by adapting its techniques and analytical methods to a 'new' arena and allow it to move beyond its traditional state-centric confines while broadening its research agenda and orientation to critical developments in world politics.

The chapter proceeds as follow. I first identify the realm of ANSAs and their foreign policy. While examining the various definitions of these actors, I examine the existing literature on their foreign engagement in world politics. In the second part of the chapter, I reposition FPA to examine the realm of ANSAs and reflect on the opportunities and avenues for future research within FPA. A case is made for arguing that mainstream FPA approaches can be adapted to the complex arena of ANSAs and their foreign policy. I illustrate the continuing strengths of FPA and its adaptability through the decision-making frameworks to examine the realm

of ANSAs. This section also shows that the study of ANSAs presents an opportunity to revitalize FPA research by bringing to the fore the question of actorness and its impact on foreign policy.

ANSAs in World Politics: The State of the Art

Non-state actors have long been recognized as independent and autonomous players in IR. As early as the 1970s, the interdependence literature showed that IR are not the exclusive domain of states (Keohane and Nye 1977). In recent years, a growing body of literature has ascribed agency to non-state actors in IR (Avant et al. 2010). Criteria differ among scholars on defining an international non-state actor. Most approaches towards international actorness include a capability for making decisions and implementing them beyond states' borders (Josselin and Wallace 2001: 3–4; Aydinli 2015: 4). Josselin and Wallace (2001: 3–4) define international non-state actors as organizations that (1) operate independently from the authorities, (2) act within a cross border network, and (3) aim to influence political decision-making. Several scholars have examined and presented several typologies of non-state actors in world politics. Baumann and Stengel (2014: 492–494) present a typology along two dimensions: the public-private divide and the domestic-international divide, discerning three types of non-state actors: (1) international (transgovernmental) actors (public / beyond state) such as international organizations; (2) private actors (private actors operating at the domestic level) including business companies, media, etc.; and (3) transnational actors (private actors operating beyond state control), such as transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Catholic Church, the Red Cross, and terrorist and criminal networks. Yet, defining non-state actors by their independence from state authority or by a domestic/international focus would be misleading. These categories often obscure the complexities of practice. Governments often provide financial support for some transnational groups. Intelligence agencies might support some armed groups to promote shared causes, and states may be supporting and sponsoring subversive groups to undermine other governments. Also, categorizing the scope of non-state actors as either domestic or international may mask their interactions. Many non-state actors often operate across international divides; some non-state actors are primarily operating at

domestic levels but are also involved transnationally and internationally, and vice versa.

This chapter focuses on one particular category of NSA, i.e. those using military capabilities to achieve their political goals at the international level. The choice to spotlight ANSAs does not mean that all armed groups are operating at international levels. Instead, this choice is rooted in the nature of their impact on current world affairs, which often involves conflicts and crises. In other words, I view ANSAs as a central factor affecting international processes within IR. The role played by Hezbollah in the Middle East, the Contras in Nicaragua, al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa, among others illustrates the nature of ANSAs examined in this chapter.

ANSAs are far from an ideal-type phenomenon. ANSAs are diverse in their structures, strategies, and ideologies, and they also operate in various political, social, and military environments. Some of these may not be independent of states and are tightly institutionalized and operating within a state (e.g., Hezbollah, or the Kurds in Iraq after 2003), others lack sovereignty and operate in parallel to states (e.g., the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabab). Some of these groups are opposing governments and demanding separate states (such as the Kurds in Syria, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009). Others are operating as quasi-states (such as Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO). While this diversity should not be understated, all these ANSAs are pursuing foreign policy activities along coherent and discernable lines that have evident consequences for others in the international system.

Yeşiltaş and Kardaş (2018: 7) define these entities as holding an ideology and having the freedom of action to use violence to achieve political aims while controlling a particular territory and people. That said, many ANSAs operate without control over territories and/or people, such as Jaysh al-Islam in Syria, Al-Qaeda, and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in Columbia. Schneckener (2006: 25) offers the most comprehensive definition of ANSAs as those actors ‘1) willing and able to use violence for pursuing their objectives; and 2) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police or special forces. They may, however, be supported by state actors whether in an official or informal manner’. Based on these definitions several categories of ANSA are discerned, such as domestic militant groups,

insurgents, warlords / urban gangs, private militias / military companies, terrorists, criminal organizations, rebels, guerrillas, and clans (Aydinli 2015: 4–6; for another typology, see Krause and Milliken 2009). A few works looked at the actorness of ANSAs and the nature of their agency in the international system (e.g. Berti 2016). Aydinli (2015, 2016) presents a framework for defining, understanding, and evaluating ANSAs along the criteria of autonomy, representation, and influence (see also Hill and Wallace 1996; Davis 2009). Autonomy here indicates the distance from a state and the state-centric system. Representation reflects ANSAs' ability to attract support and membership. The final element of the framework—influence—denotes the impact of ANSAs on others in world politics (Davis 2009; Krause 2010).

While foreign policy is traditionally the prerogative of states, ANSAs' international behaviour often shows they are capable of a form of autonomous foreign policy action (Hill 2015: 34), and they can be characterized as purposive decision-makers with international objectives. Hill defines foreign policy as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually but not exclusively a state) in international relations' (2015: 4). The term 'independent actors' shows that foreign policy is not an activity necessarily restricted to states, and foreign policy is then the pursuit of a policy that is carried through some conceived strategies that are intentional and coherent. According to Hill's definition, ANSAs are capable of conducting coherent, consistent policies along a strategic line and these policies are 'foreign' in the sense that they are aimed at other actors beyond ANSAs' constituency and territorial control. ANSAs should not be seen solely as a security threat and a challenge to the state's monopoly on the use of force. Instead, these armed actors apply discursive and symbolic policies, and maintain alliances with other ANSAs, regional, and international powers.

Mainstream approaches within IR, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism, give primacy to states as main actors in IR. Research on ANSAs within IR has been very much state inspired, in the sense that the main focus remains on how these actors, with their ability to act autonomously, challenge the state system at regional and international levels—what Chong (2002) calls 'rival actorness'.

IR scholars thus focus on how ANSAs threaten states' loss of monopoly over violence (Mendelsohn 2005), indirectly influence state foreign policies

(Schumacher and Schraeder 2019), and challenge state sovereignty through transnational terrorism (Bapat 2007; Moore 2015). The external and foreign relations of ANSAs have also been examined in several strands within the literature on proxy warfare. This scholarship has prioritized the agency of ANSAs and examined various dynamics related to their agency and their interactions with other actors in and outside the context of war (Cunningham et al. 2013). Scholars have often focused on when and why these actors use violence in pursuing their goals at an international level, thereby focusing on terrorism, insurgency, and rebel groups (Varin and Abubakar 2017). Also, ANSAs are studied in the context of changes in warfare dynamics (Kaldor 1999) and how their emergence has influenced international crises (Mishali-Ram 2009). With the multiplicity of proxy conflicts in the 21st century, especially in the Middle East, scholars increasingly examine ANSAs through the principal-agent lens, where states employ ANSAs as proxies in the form of 'conflict delegation' (Salehyan 2011). They also examine the conditions under which ANSAs are likely to accept the support from external backers (Salehyan et al. 2011).

The development of proxy warfare reveals the growing role of ANSAs as independent actors conducting independent foreign policies, outgrowing the roles of proxies, and even becoming patrons of other ANSAs. An understanding of proxy war based on the assumption of an exclusively state-based benefactor and a perpetually non-state proxy does not reflect the growing role of ANSAs in shaping proxy wars. Mumford offers a wider definition of proxy wars, according to which 'proxy wars are constitutive of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non- state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and their chosen proxies who are the conduit for weapons, training, and funding from the benefactor' (Mumford 2013; see also Phillips and Valbjørn 2018, Moghadam and Wyss 2020). Scholars of the Middle East have, for example, employed this understanding to show that proxy wars in the post-2011 regional conflicts are not necessarily based on a state actor mobilizing non-state actors. Instead, non-state actors also engage other non-state actors as clients in a proxy relationship (Moghadam and Wyss 2020). Some scholars also highlight the autonomous nature of ANSAs and characterize the relations with other states as a form of alliance (San-Akca 2009, 2016). ANSAs become independent actors who pursue their own agenda, posing several questions regarding 'actorness' in the international system. Scholars also

show ANSAs' international activities extending beyond receiving external support in a proxy war context but rather by employing a number of tactics and strategies beyond violence, which can increase their chances of international recognition and achieve their political goals (Bob 2010; Coggins 2015; Huang 2016; Arves et al. 2019).

While ANSAs' external relations in and outside of the context of wars have been examined, the scholarship has offered far from a systematic examination of this phenomenon. Despite its state-centric framework, FPA with its agency-based approaches, has been considered most capable of linking non-state actors and the IR discipline (Baumann and Stengel 2014; Stengel and Baumann 2017). Efforts to adapt FPA to the realm of non-state actors have predominantly focused on European Union foreign policy (White 1999, 2018) and the transnational dynamics of globalization in the West (Jørgensen and Hellmann 2015). ANSAs' external relations present a novel area of inquiry for FPA beyond the traditional confines of the nation-state and allow its frameworks to adjust to the significant changes that foreign policy as a social practice is undergoing. The remainder of this chapter shows the contributions of extending FPA's research to include the study of ANSAs and argues that FPA can provide a valuable framework.

The Foreign Policy of ANSAs: An Agenda for FPA

The rise of ANSAs in world politics has far-reaching consequences for the nature of the international system and IR. The increasing involvement of international non-state actors in world politics thus requires a better understanding of the nature of agency (actorness) and a systemic understanding of their foreign relations: what are they; how do they interact; and what drives their foreign policy towards other actors? Do ANSAs behave in predictable ways as do traditional states at the international level? Extending foreign policy research to include ANSAs as a new research domain of foreign policy would revitalize the FPA agenda. Highlighting the continuing strengths of FPA, this section first argues that decision-making frameworks within FPA can be adapted to the complex arena of ANSAs and their foreign policy. Moreover, the study of ANSAs offers FPA an opportunity to grapple with the question of actorness and its impact on foreign policy outcomes.

Adapting FPA Decision-Making Frameworks to ANSAs

Despite the broad applicability of FPA's theoretical and conceptual toolkits, and its constant promise to defy the unitary state actor model, foreign policy analysts have concentrated on decision-making processes within national governments, with notable exceptions in research on EU foreign policy and mixed actor constellations (Stengel and Baumann 2017; White 2018; Kille, Chapter 30 in this volume). Whereas some scholars cast doubt on whether the traditional approaches for analysing foreign policy—due to its state-centric focus—would suffice in analysing the foreign policy of ANSAs (e.g. Black 2016: 272), other scholars argue that an FPA perspective, having individuals and group dynamics at the heart of actors' decision-making processes, is best placed to examine decision-making processes in disaggregated units, be they states or non-state actors (Baumann and Stengel 2014: 502). FPA's focus on decision-making processes can challenge the conception of ANSAs as unitary actors at an international level and can make a significant contribution to a systematic understanding of these actors and their role in IR.

The foreign policy decision-making process is a major focus of FPA scholarship seeking to enlighten state behaviour at an international level. Over the decades, FPA has relied on rationalist, psychological, and neurological approaches to examine decision-making processes (Mintz and DeRouen 2012; Stein 2016). As FPA scholarship focused on individuals in shaping state foreign policies, this body of the literature can be adapted and extended to examine decision-making processes shaping ANSAs' international behaviour. ANSAs are particularly diverse in their organizational structures and their decision-making processes. While some are dominated by individual charismatic leaders, others are governed by a group of decision-makers. FPA's eclectic and diverse frameworks of decision-making processes are particularly apt to capture this diversity while providing a systematic examination of ANSAs international behaviour.

FPA research has focused on powerful and charismatic leaders in shaping their states' foreign policies, and this literature can be adapted to investigate how individuals matter in the decision-making process of ANSAs. Beyond the rationalist models, scholars of foreign policy have drawn from several prominent areas of psychology, especially in examining the role of

individuals in decision-making processes (Levy 2013; Rapport 2017). Some strands examine individual beliefs, identities, images, and personalities for foreign policy and can inform scholarly understanding of ANSAs behaviour and their foreign policy decision-making process (Kaarbo 1997; Görener and Ucal 2011; Saunders 2011; Dyson and Parent 2018; Kesgin 2019, 2020; Dyson, Chapter 20 in this volume). Other scholars focus on cognitive biases, heuristics, errors, misperceptions, and learning processes (Jervis 1976; Levy 1994; Kinne 2005; Duelfer and Dyson 2011; Yarhi-Milo 2013; Saunders 2017; Ziv 2017; Flanik 2017; Houghton, Chapter 19 in this volume). The analysis of ANSAs' foreign policy decisions taken by their leaders can benefit from the psychological and cognitive approaches within FPA. Hezbollah's foreign policy towards the post-2011 Syria crisis is an evident illustration. Hezbollah's decision to intervene militarily in Syria in 2013 has been often attributed to the group's strategic calculations at domestic and regional levels. At a regional level, Hezbollah's alliance with Syria constitutes a geopolitical necessity to sustain its supply routes from Iran (Tokmajyan 2014). At a domestic level, Hezbollah has been facing a critical, tense situation, and the intervention in Syria was a form of exporting the political struggle out of Lebanon (Saade 2017): i.e., it was a diversionary foreign policy. Whereas Hezbollah in their foreign policy is overwhelmingly analysed as a unitary actor, an FPA approach would trace the individuals who are at the heart of the decision-making process in Hezbollah's foreign policy, i.e. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. While Hezbollah's official decision body is the Decision-Making Consultative Council (Majlis Shura al-Qarar), Hassan Nasrallah has increasingly exerted his influence and preferences over the organization, especially after his exceptional performance during the 2006 Lebanon War, which caused a steep rise in his popularity across the Arab world. During the early stages of its formation, the organization was heavily influenced by Syria and Iran. Over time, the leadership of Hassan Nasrallah turned Hezbollah into a powerful organization capable of conducting independent actions in Lebanon and abroad. Unfortunately, this dimension has been barely studied at all. Looking at the personal traits of Nasrallah and his perception of the Syria crisis, especially alongside the evolution of his power and influence within the organization, may transform our understanding of Hezbollah's regional and international role after 2011. Similarily, FPA research may inform the foreign policy activities of other ANSAs where influential leaders are at the

heart of the decision-making process, such as Osama bin Laden then Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda and Yasser Arafat of the PLO.

Second, ANSAs are not necessarily led by a single leader having the highest bearing on foreign policy choices. If no single individual has the authority to act alone on behalf of an ANSA, decisions are structured around a small group of decision-makers, and this group dynamic has significant ramifications for foreign policy decisions. FPA literature on group decision-making shows that psychological and cognitive factors also apply, not only to individual decision-makers but also to group dynamics (Janis 1982; Sylvan and Haddad 1998; Beasley 1998; Schafer and Crichlow 2010; Badie 2010; Eder 2019). Janis' work (1982) on 'groupthink' shows that individuals operating in a group tend to seek consensus in promoting more efficient perspectives on foreing policy issues. Consistent with group dynamics in decision-making, C. F. Hermann et al. (2001) specify how a leader's orientation and the composition of the group interact in shaping decisions. If the leader is an ideologue, and members of the group identify with the leader, they are likely to exhibit dynamics of groupthink. If the leader is pragramtic and encourages unanimity in arriving at a decision, then there may be a deadlock or a stalemate with more time needed to achieve a decision. C. F. Hermann (1978) asserts that elements of the group's structure, such as the distribution of power within the group and the different roles played by members, can have implications for foreign policy choices. Beasley (1998) shows that small groups have a taxonomy based on particular characteristics, such as the centrality of particular leaders, the complexity of group discussion, etc. FPA research has also looked at the different roles played by members of the group in shaping consensus around particular foreign policy choices (Stewart et al. 1989). Sylvan and Haddad (1998) examine how group members compete with each other over the causal argument of a particular problem. Those who provide the most persuasive story will shape the decision made by the group.

Many ANSAs are not ruled by a charismatic leader or an individual acting and taking decisions on behalf of the group but by a group of decision-makers where there are collective, interactive decision processes. This group can be a formal body within the group or it can be an elite or group of advisors around the leader. A discernable example of group dynamics in ANSAs' foreign policy is Hamas where decisions are the outcome of a collective processes involving several leaders (Silver 2006).

Hamas has pursued one of the most complex foreign policies in the region (Muslih 2000: 25–28). Hamas' decision-making body is the Political Bureau, which has internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and two external leaderships, one by Mousa Abu Marzook (in Damascus, and then in Cairo) and a Kuwaiti group led by Khaled Mashal. Hamas' policies towards Israel and other Arab states have often been the result of interactions and tensions between internal and external leaderships (Seurat 2015: 31–34). This dynamic has led Hamas to some of the most controversial foreign policy choices in the region (Seurat 2022), such as its alliance choices following the 2011 Arab uprisings, including breaking its long-standing alliance with the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis (Mohns and Bank 2012), then its later rapprochement with the axis after 2018. Another example of group decision-making is the Afghan Taliban and its foreign policy aiming to receive international recognition under the leadership of Mullah Mansour (Harpviken 2021). Decision-making in the group is consultative involving the *amir* (leader), his two deputies, and the *rahbari shura* (Jackson and Amiri 2019). The case of Al Shabaab, incorporating senior Al-Qaeda operatives, was also characterized by leadership splits that shaped its transnational recruitment and training of members of the group (International Crisis Group 2014).

ANSAs Actorness and FPA

While FPA mainstream approaches can be adapted to enlighten ANSAs' external behaviour, FPA can equally benefit from the study of these actors. One of the traditional weaknesses of FPA is its static conception of the state, and its persistent attempts to explain state behaviour without addressing the nature of statehood and actorness. While FPA, in its abstract definitions, moved to embrace other types of actors by replacing 'state' with 'actors' in textbooks and allowing 'independent actors' in the definitions of the field (Hill 2015), the nature of actorness and its impact on policies remain largely omitted. Brown and Ainley (2005: 65) argue that this omission impedes a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy, 'as we do not have a clear sense of what is that states are motivated by, what their function is, and how they work'.

The emergence of ANSAs with their conducting of foreign policy activities that mimic state behaviour bring the question of actorness and its impact on behaviour to the forefront of the FPA research agenda. In the IR literature, there is wide disagreement on whether actorness has impact on behaviour at the international level. Some scholars argue that different actors, including ANSAs, behave uniformly in the international system. Lemke, for example, demonstrates statistically that ANSAs' alliance behaviour is similar to that of states and that they are are likely to ally themselves to balance external threats (Lemke 2008a). Lemke (2008b) also shows that power politics theories of war have explanatory power within the domain of non-state actors. Other scholars argue, however, that different types of states (and actors) use different behaviour. Scholars examining state foreign policies in the Global South often assume that the nature of the state and its history of formation lends it to different foreign policy dynamics (Hinnebusch 2015: 121–153; Salloukh 2017). Alden and Aran (2017: ch. 5) question the static conception of the state within FPA and rely on historical sociology to develop a different conceptualization of the state and its implications for FPA (Halliday 2005: ch. 2). They discerned three types of state—institutional, quasi-, and clustered—based on the degree to which states possess 'material statehood' ('the institutions comprising states and the extent to which they have authority over binding rule making and political force') (Alden and Aran 2017: 102). They argue that an explicit conception of the state shows that different states pursue different foreign policies.

The question is then whether the foreign policy of ANSAs will manifest different dynamics due to the different nature of the actor. ANSAs have exhibited a large diversity in their structure, ideology, and decision-making processes, which makes the categories of state versus non-state seem oversimplified. Some of these groups are *de facto* entities controlling territories and populations without international recognition, and they are often operating in parallel to state structures, especially in the context of civil wars. Arjona et al. (2015) write about 'rebel governance', Lemke and Crabtree (2020) examine 'territorial contenders', Florea (2017) offers a data set of 'de-facto' states. Other terms have also been used, such as warlords, proto-states, quasi-states, and states within states. Other ANSAs are operating without territorial control and do not seek recognition, such as terrorist and criminal organizations like as al-Qaeda, Somali Al-Shabab in

the Horn of Africa, the Nigerian Boko Haram, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, and the FARC in Columbia. These categories are not absolute and the characteristics of these actors (i.e., territorial control, population control, etc.) can change over time lending the groups to different foreign policy dynamics. Some terrorist organizations, for example, develope and pursue territorial acquisition, such as the Islamic State. The question of whether these different types of ANSAs lead to different foreign policy dynamics and outcomes remains overlooked. Even though some of the literature within IR and civil war studies have examined varied aspects of ANSAs' behaviour, a systematic understanding of their foreign behaviour remains lacking. FPA, with its eclectic frameworks, could expand its research agenda to include different types of actors, which would also allow it to develop a conception of actorness and the impact of this on foreign policy.

Recent development within FPA shows increasing engagement with dynamics related to actorness, such as role, socialization, recognition, and representation (see Breuning, Chapter 12, and Maitino and Guimarães, Cha pter 26, both in this volume). ANSAs offer abundant cases of actors with mystifying characteristics that attempt to socialize others within the international system, which could enrich the sociological foundations of FPA by extending it to other actors in the international system. First, FPA research on role and socialization is particularly relevant to ANSAs (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012; Thies 2014; Harnisch 2018; Breuning 2018). ANSAs create alternative systems of governance and take up functions that are traditionally ascribed to the state while challenging the state's claim to exclusive sovereignty. ANSAs often hold some role conception and socialize themselves in the international system in an attempt to be part of or alter the social structure. Recent works within role theory examine the socialization of novice states and aspirant states in the international system (Thies 2012; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018). The example of Hezbollah's socialization process in Lebanon and the Middle East reveals how the party's interactions with Israel and regional actors have shaped the group's identity and role conception in the region over the decades (Dionigi 2014; S aouli 2019). Pace and Pallister-Wilkins (2018) present an account of the relations between the EU and Hamas as two actors in 'a state of permanent liminality'—a category between the non-state/state binary involving

imitation of state practices. Both actors' foreign policies are shaped by their social positioning as 'in-between categories'.

In the same vein, ANSAs foreign policy activities are often driven by the struggle to get recognized in the international system. Many foreign policy activities and decisions taken by actors (either states or non-state actors) can be driven by the dynamics of recognition, representation, and status in the international system (Duncombe 2016; Gallagher 2016; Kinnvall and Svens son 2018; Bouris and Fernández-Molina 2018; Newman and Visoka 2018; Murray 2018; Ryan 2021). While FPA has focused on rising powers (see De stradi and Wehner, Chapter 27 in this volume), *de facto*, and aspirant states, ANSAs exhibit similar dynamics. Many ANSAs aspire to receive recognition of their status and/or role in the international system, and their foreign policy activities are driven by the dynamics of recognition. ANSAs' use of violence, in some instances, can be reactions to misrecognition, and their foreign policies are often grounded in identities and social roles that these armed groups aim to establish (Lindemann 2018). Among these groups, several are worth highlighting, such as the LTTE which fought the Sri Lankan government between 1983 and 2009, demanding a separate state for the Tamil people; the Kurds in Iraq who have aspired to an independent state since 1990s; Tigray's People's Liberation Front (TPLF) seeking independence for the Tigray region from Ethiopia; and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) seeking independence from Myanmar. The PLO is another ANSA whose foreign policy practices were driven by the quest for recognition (Norton and Green berg 1989).

Finally, the study of foreign policy has been based on the differentiation between the internal and external spheres of states as a necessary condition for the conduct of foreign policy (Wæver 1994: 238). In the era of globalization, classical images of foreign policy as a practice conducted by sovereign states seem less and less adequate as the frontiers between internal and external have become blurred. The engagement of ANSAs in foreign policy behaviour questions the traditional divide between 'external' and 'internal' in understanding foreign policy. Would a policy conducted by an ANSA towards another non-state actor or a state within the same territory be considered a 'foreign policy'? Is the Al Qaeda employment in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for example, of proxies in Yemen to be considered a 'foreign policy'? Is Hezbollah's policy in employing other

ANSAs inside Lebanon to be considered a 'foreign policy'? Developing hypotheses on actorness and foreign policy of ANSAs and testing these would lead FPA beyond the static concept of the state and orient its research towards recent developments in world politics.

Researching the foreign policy of ANSAs could follow several methodologies. First, examining the foreign conduct of these groups could benefit from producing large-*N* data sets on various groups and their foreign policies, which are essential to test hypothetical propositions about actorness and FPA. Scholars developed several data sets on different aspects of ANSAs, such as the NAG (Non-state Armed Groups) data set operationalizing external support of non-state armed groups (San-Akca 2016); the Big, Allied, and Dangerous (BAAD) Dataset tracking terrorist organizations over time (Asal et al. 2018); and the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD) data set on ANSAs' rivalry (Powell and Florea 2021). Large-*N* analyses can provide a test of ANSAs' foreign conduct and allow examination of the influence of leadership, ideology, identity, among other variables, on foreign policy decision. Large-*N* analyses can also develop a better understanding of actorness and its impact on foreign policy. In addition to large-*N* analysis, research on ANSAs' foreign policies can adopt comparative case study research designs using process tracing to examine particular foreign policy decisions.

There may be some issues pertaining to the application of FPA theories to ANSAs. Obviously, the crucial issue is that of availability and accessibility (or lack) of information. With the lack of archival documents and official documents (which may be found in research on state foreign policies), the nature of ANSAs present researchers with various challenges. More importantly, the secrecy of ANSAs' operations, due to their nature as challengers of states or those operating in parallel, creates another layer of complexity in researching their decision-making processes. That said, these challenges are also present in researching states foreign policies.

Conclusion

ANSAs are operating across borders, and they often adopt state-like goals at regional and international levels. Several ANSAs maintain a network of foreign relations and conduct a foreign policy that is often influenced by

individual, institutional, ideational, and structural variables. While foreign policy is traditionally the prerogative of states, extending this domain to ANSAs can have implications for scholarly understanding of these actors and their role in the international system. This chapter has sought to bring FPA and the study of ANSAs together in a fruitful dialogue to examine the foreign policy of ANSAs as a new area of inquiry. Mainstream FPA approaches may be adapted to explain foreign policy activities by ANSAs. The theoretical eclecticism and process orientation of FPA make it suitable to connect to the foreign policy of ANSAs without degrading the diversity of these actors. FPA could enable a systematic understanding of the various foreign policies conducted by ANSAs. Moreover, examining the foreign policy actions of these non-state actors reflects on FPA and unravels its weaknesses, some of which present opportunities and avenues for future research by expanding its scope to dynamics of role, socialization, and recognition of ANSAs and their foreign policy behaviour. FPA's perennial weakness of not theorizing the 'state' has become a pressing issue to uphold the relevance of the field in response to recurrent changes in the international system.

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PART V

FOREIGN POLICY CHALL ENGES

CHAPTER 33

Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons

MOLLY BERKEMEIER AND RACHEL ELIZABETH WHITLARK

INTRODUCTION

In her opening piece for the newly formed *Foreign Policy Analysis* journal i n 2005, Valerie M. Hudson argued that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) was uniquely positioned to contribute to the broader field of International Relations (IR) on theoretical, substantive, and methodological grounds: 'The actor-specific theory of FPA provides the theoretical micro-foundations upon which actor-general IR theory may be grounded as a social science enterprise' (Hudson 2005: 21). In the intervening fifteen years, FPA scholarship has remained largely separate from broader IR journals and debates, despite the two fields addressing similar questions, using common methodological tools, and generating related theoretical and policy implications. This strange divorce is particularly clear when examining literature on nuclear weapons, where scholars have increasingly moved beyond strict realist and security-focused theories to consider domestic explanations and actor-specific theories for explaining outcomes of interest from proliferation and non-proliferation (e.g., Hymans 2006a; Fu hrmann and Horowitz 2015) to deterrence and crisis dynamics (e.g., Sagan 1994).

As Kaarbo and Thies argue in Chapter 1 of this volume, the divide between FPA and IR is problematic; reconnecting FPA and IR could help us to link domestic and international politics, strengthen theory, and bridge the gap between academia and policy. It is past time to acknowledge and build on FPA-IR linkages in the nuclear context. While previous scholars have focused on the intersection of foreign policy and nuclear politics writ large (Berkemeier and Fuhrmann 2017), the impact of nuclear weapons on foreign policy (Bell 2015), and country cases of nuclear weapons and domestic decision-making (Kaufman 1994; Ahmed 1999; Basrur 2001),

there is still much to be learned by integrating the intellectual traditions and contributions of FPA and general IR nuclear scholarship.

Many of the categorizations of foreign policy research discussed by Hudson (2005) are still relevant and highly applicable to the nuclear realm. These include research on organizational processes and bureaucratic politics, individual leaders and advisors, national and societal characteristics, as well as research focused on new data and methods. Based on these categories, we first link research on nuclear weapons and politics in the FPA and IR-security traditions. We highlight research on groups including scientists, technologists, and ethnic lobbies; the role of leaders and advisors for decision-making; the role of partisanship, public opinion, and national culture; and work showcasing advances in data and methods. In discussing these categories of literature, we demonstrate how research on nuclear weapons in both the FPA and IR-security traditions is linked by theme, theoretical underpinnings, methods, and conclusions.

We then turn to four distinct empirical areas discussed in both the nuclear FPA and nuclear IR traditions to highlight what can be learned from the collective contributions of these works. By comparing synergistic literature on arms control, extended deterrence and assurance, advisors, and leaders, we demonstrate how most nuclear scholarship implicitly, if not explicitly, engages with FPA traditions. We also illustrate how simultaneously considering these sometimes disparate traditions allows for strengthened understandings about outcomes of interest.

Finally, we address how lessons learned from FPA and IR nuclear literatures can inform contemporary policy debates. We argue that FPA is a crucial tool that can be deployed to address key international policy questions. By focusing particularly on debates surrounding Iranian proliferation, we demonstrate how scholars are already bridging the gap between academia and policy-makers in the nuclear realm and suggest how FPA-specific tools can help to further advance policy contributions from the scholarly nuclear community.

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

Early nuclear scholarship focused on the transformative nature of nuclear weapons, highlighting the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons

and their consequently revolutionary impact on international politics (Brodie et al. 1946; Dunn 1959; Schelling 1966; Jervis 1989). Over time, scholars began to investigate why states pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan 1997) or choose to abstain (Paul 2000).[1] Hymans (2006b) noted that (particularly American) 'thinking on proliferation … has been dominated by the realist camp'. Though at the time, Hymans called for additional attention to how liberal or idealist thought could add to academic theories of proliferation, the point extends beyond the context of proliferation: the literature on nuclear weapons writ large—from their advent until approximately 2000—was dominated not only by realist thinking, but also by structural perspectives and security concerns.[2] More recently, the nuclear literature has expanded to focus on the micro-foundations of political behaviour.[3] Scholars have increasingly focused on internal state characteristics and other levels of analysis, resulting in a more diverse and robust accounting of the nuclear landscape beyond the structural level.

Organizational and Bureaucratic Politics

In recent years, the nuclear literature has included a role for organizations, key actors within organizations, and other powerful substate actors as important for nuclear decision-making. Focusing on the scientific and military communities that control the nuclear apparatus, Sagan (1994, 1995) demonstrates how organizational politics, standard operating procedures, biases, and parochial interests are fundamental to understanding deterrence failures and nuclear accidents in tightly coupled, complex organizations like those within the nuclear complex. Likewise, Eden (2004) shows how self-reinforcing fallacies inside organizations led the US to fail to predict the fire damage resulting from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Other scholars have looked further inside organizations to highlight the important role played by well-positioned experts including scientists and technologists (e.g., Gilpin 2015; Macdonald 2015; Blarel and Sarkar 2019). Still others demonstrate how the interaction between leaders or government and substate groups can complicate the proliferation pathway (e.g., Hymans 2012; Braut-Hegghammer 2016). Beyond experts, governmental structures, and organizations broadly, the nuclear literature has also made room for key substate actors including ethnic lobbies (Kirk 2008) and veto players (Hymans 2011). Taken together, this scholarship suggests that examining

different types of substate organizational and bureaucratic actors, as the FPA literature suggests and the IR literature often overlooks, improves our understanding of key nuclear outcomes.

The Individual Level of Analysis

Moving to the role of individuals, scholars have explored the importance of leaders' beliefs and experiences, images and rhetoric, and relatedly, the force exerted by key advisors. Hymans (2000, 2006a), for example, describes how certain national identities make some leaders more prone to pursue the bomb while Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015) demonstrate how previous rebel experience is correlated with nuclear weapons' pursuit. Describing leaders' perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons, Rathbun and Stein (2020) show how ethical considerations including self-assessment of morality drive foreign policy attitudes towards nuclear use.

Others have demonstrated how leader images and perspectives shape critical nuclear decisions beyond questions related to nuclear proliferation and use. DiCicco (2011) highlights how changes in Ronald Reagan's images of the Soviet Union following the Abel Archer event helped lead the administration towards rapprochement. Similarly, Fuhrmann and Early (2008) employ prospect theory, a theory of decision-making under risk, to account for George H. W. Bush's willingness to pursue unilateral presidential nuclear initiatives despite no guarantee of Soviet reciprocity.

Numerous scholars have highlighted the consequences of rhetoric, signalling, and framing for key outcomes in the nuclear realm. Crall and Martin (2013) identify how labelling a situation as a crisis constrains decision-making surrounding the use of force. Berkemeier and Cone (2021) argue that a leader's rhetoric, be it positive or negative, influences the proliferation and reversal decisions of foreign governments. Relatedly, McManus (2018) demonstrates how leader visits yield deterrent effects more significantly than other potential signals of commitment. Finally, scholars have pointed to the importance of considering the role of advisors in influencing leaders' nuclear decisions (Chang 1988; Cameron and Rabinowitz 2017; and more on this below). As in the broader field of FPA, considering the role of individual leaders adds insight to important processes and outcomes in the nuclear space.

National and Societal Characteristics

Returning to the level of the state as a unit, recent literature has focused on the role of partisanship, public opinion, and national character on a variety of nuclear matters. Writing in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, DeLaet and Scott (2006) show how partisanship is an increasingly important factor in US Senate votes on arms control treaties in the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War eras. Exploring public opinion, Lupovici (2016) documents how securitization, or the deliberate articulation of a situation as a security issue, brought the Iranian nuclear programme to the forefront of the Israeli public agenda since the 1990s and to a climax under the Netanyahu regime. Work considering public opinion has continued to explore a purported nuclear taboo or norm against nuclear use. Press et al. (2013) use a survey experiment to showcase the American public's only weak aversion to nuclear use. Looking at the Iranian context in particular, Sagan and Valentino (2017) extend their findings to highlight how a majority of Americans would support the use of nuclear weapons against Iran if doing so would save a significant number of American soldiers.

The literature exploring the role of national character or culture in nuclear matters is similarly diverse. Rivera (2016) explores how national honour plays a critical role inside Iran's factional competition. Ritchie (2010) considers nuclear weapons through a sociological lens and documents the social construction of interests assigned to the technology of nuclear weapons in the British case. Using an ideational lens, Jackson (2018) shows how an elite threat consensus constrained US policy options by limiting the discussion of North Korea's nuclear programme to intersubjective images of hostility, making it more difficult for US decision-makers to pursue rapprochement. Similarly, O'Reilly (2007) documents a consistent rogue state enemy image held by American decision-makers leading to a preference for containment policies. Collectively, the state-centric scholarship details a variety of previously overlooked causal pathways germane to the nuclear environment.

Advances in Data and Analysis

The nuclear literature has also undergone an expansion concerning data and empirics that has widened the field of exploration. Recent scholarship offers a more granular assessment of nuclear concepts and new means of getting

at age-old questions. As the large-*n* scholarship developed, scholars first found new ways to model the proliferation pathway cross-nationally (e.g., Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007). Looking beyond proliferation as the dependent variable, scholars have since explored adjacent nuclear contexts. Kreps (2018) considers negotiated nuclear arms control measures, finding that the degree of legalization has the counter-intuitive effect of making bargaining more difficult, delaying if not all together subverting negotiations. With their 'Nuclear Latency Dataset', Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) investigate an earlier but critical step in the proliferation pathway—latency or the possession of either operational uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities. Scholars have also creatively sought to use war games as a source for data and analysis (e.g., Lin-Greenberg et al. 2020). As one example, Pauly (2018) uses the archival records of US governmental war games to identify a variety of explanations for nuclear non-use.

In sum, the above exploration of critical segments of the recent nuclear scholarship demonstrates the diversity of sources, questions, and methods being deployed to investigate nuclear matters. It also showcases that the same characteristics Hudson identified as critical in the field of FPA manifest in the broader literature on nuclear weapons. This suggests a blurring of the lines between the IR-security scholarship and that which is self-evidently FPA. What exactly has been learned, however, from this and related nuclear literature?

The Collective Contributions of Nuclear Scholarship

As the above discussion demonstrates, much of the scholarship on nuclear weapons in IR is inherently tied to FPA traditions and themes. By bridging the gap between what has been written in traditional foreign policy journals, such as *Foreign Policy Analysis*, and other IR outlets, we can strengthen the collective understanding of various questions and phenomena of interest related to nuclear weapons. While there are many empirical linkages across these literatures, we focus on four specific areas to highlight substantively what has been learned: arms control, extended deterrence and assurance, the role of leaders, and the role of advisors. Rather than reviewing all relevant literature across each of these four themes, we focus on how key

contributions from the FPA and IR-security lenses complement each other and increase collective knowledge about key areas of interest.

Arms Control

One need only look to the historical record to observe that arms control is relatively rare. This scarcity is puzzling, argue Coe and Vaynman (2020), because arming is mutually costly. The expense of arming should therefore suggest that countries may prefer to find other, mutually beneficial, solutions. Potential solutions are difficult to negotiate, however, in large part due to the monitoring component of arms control agreements. Of particular issue is what Coe and Vaynman term the transparency-security tradeoff, in which monitoring needs to be at once transparent enough for compliance and opaque enough to not threaten security. Drawing on evidence from Iraq's weapons programmes after the Gulf War, Great Power competition in the interwar period, and superpower rivalry during the Gulf War, Coe and Vaynman demonstrate that while monitoring can often present complications to successfully pursue arms control, the presence of three factors can alleviate the tradeoff between transparency and security: the presence of a third-party monitor, advances in sensing technology allowing for unilateral monitoring, and greater openness.

The relative rarity of arms control agreements can also be traced to several additional factors, many of which are tied to FPA frameworks. At the individual and group level, Adler (1992) highlights how epistemic communities of scientists and policy-makers shape and define arms control. Focusing on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Adler theorizes that experts in the US were responsible for creating a shared theoretical understanding of arms control that influenced negotiators in both the US and the Soviet Union, ultimately allowing the agreement to be signed. In other words, Adler (1992: 104) argues that the ABM treaty was signed not due to changing balances of power or security incentives, but rather because the two superpowers were 'able to converge on an American intellectual innovation as the key to advancing both their irreconcilable interests and their shared interest of avoiding nuclear war'. This argument, in addition to highlighting how important groups of policy intellectuals can shape state behaviour in the nuclear realm, also harkens back to literature examining the role of individual scientists, technologists, and advisors in influencing leader and government decision-making in areas of high complexity (e.g.,

Macdonald 2015; Braut- Hegghammer 2016; and see also discussion of advisors below).

Other individuals and characteristics of the state can shape governments' ability to successfully negotiate. At the domestic level, Kreps et al. (2018) show that the partisanship of the chief executive can influence the ease with which the United States negotiates agreements. Kreps et al. (2018) point to the difference in the politics of domestic ratification of arms control agreements for hawkish and dovish presidents. While Republican presidents generally do not have difficulty pursuing ratification, Democratic presidents tend to pay higher costs for similar ratification efforts. This 'ratification premium' results from a credibility problem that Democratic presidents face, in which pivotal legislators in Congress whose votes are needed for ratification know that doves are interested in cutting military efforts even in the absence of a treaty. The dovish interest in arms reductions thus gives high-information legislators bargaining power to extract concessions from the president in exchange for endorsement. Evidence from the SALT Treaties under Presidents Nixon and Carter and the SORT Treaty and New START under Presidents Bush and Obama demonstrate how both Democratic and Republican presidents can obtain ratification of arms control treaties; but costlier side payments are required for Democrats while Republicans need make fewer concessions.

Turning to one of the key contributions on arms control in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Kreps (2018) considers how the degree of institutional legalization influences when states are willing to participate in arms control agreements. She notes that while highly legalized commitments create the risk of constraints and vulnerability, they also decrease the likelihood of cheating and opportunism. This duality creates a tradeoff in which states need to consider how to effectively bargain over credible and sustainable commitments. Examining a new dataset of all arms control agreements concluded, negotiated, and seriously considered since 1945, Kreps argues that states are more likely to favour agreements that are more flexible, less precise, and involve lower delegation. While agreements with higher obligation and delegation make commitments more credible and sustainable, these agreements are more difficult to bargain over, making cooperation less likely and immediate. The implication of this argument is that reaching an agreement often requires softening legalization along several dimensions.

Together, this scholarship highlights how simultaneously examining explanations at different levels of analysis, as FPA encourages, can help to build knowledge about puzzling phenomena with important implications for nuclear policy and politics. More broadly, this literature suggests that while arms control is rare, there are ways to ease bargaining problems at the individual, state, and international levels. These include human- and technology-focused solutions to monitoring problems, recognizing the benefits of arms control outside of partisan lenses, and finding the right balance of legalization or exploring options to transition from soft to hard law. These lessons will continue to be important as future US administrations work to negotiate new arms control agreements.

Extended Deterrence and Assurance

Extended deterrence and assurance have received much attention in both the FPA subfield and in general IR-security journals. Scholars have considered questions including: what determines when states would prefer an extended deterrent commitment to developing their own arsenal? When is extended deterrence effective? Are hand-tying or sunk cost mechanisms more powerful for strengthening extended deterrence? Are rhetorical statements or physical actions more powerful for influencing a country's desire for nuclear weapons?

Writing in *Foreign Policy Analysis* in 2014, Dan Reiter notes that countries face a choice in how to ensure their own security in the nuclear realm: they can either seek assurances from a nuclear-armed state or pursue an independent nuclear programme. This decision, argues Reiter (2014), depends on whether potential proliferants fear abandonment, entrapment, or both. Security commitments from nuclear-armed states reduce the risk of abandonment but increase the risk of entrapment, while acquiring nuclear weapons eliminates the problems of abandonment and entrapment but can impose high economic and diplomatic costs. Based on this logic, Reiter expects that states who fear abandonment but not entrapment will prefer security guarantees, but will seek to acquire nuclear weapons if they are unable to acquire a credible commitment from a nuclear-armed ally. By contrast, states with high abandonment and high entrapment concerns are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons regardless of the presence of an extended deterrent commitment.

Of course, the perceived credibility of the commitment from the nuclear-armed state is important as well. Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014) consider how leaders signal their commitments to others. Their analysis joins a long debate on the efficacy of hand-tying versus sunk cost mechanisms for communicating resolve in international politics (e.g., Fearon 1994, 1997). Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014) examine these mechanisms by considering the impact of formal alliance commitments and foreign nuclear deployments on the likelihood of conflict. They find that while alliances carry significant deterrent benefits, reducing the likelihood of an ally being targeted in a militarized interstate dispute, foreign nuclear deployments do not bolster commitments further. This finding points to the strength of hand-tying mechanisms for signalling commitment in the nuclear realm.

Related to this question of whether allied security guarantees can be effective tools of deterrence is the concern about whether these same security guarantees can inform a state's proliferation decisions. Ko (2019) considers what tools are most effective for diminishing a client state's nuclear ambitions, exploring forward deployed nuclear weapons, declaratory policy, and the conditional threat of punishment. Using experimental data on the South Korean public's support for nuclear arms, Ko finds that neither forward deployed weapons nor the conditional threat of punishment reduces support for nuclear weapons more than declaratory policy. This finding points again to the strength of words and verbal commitments in non-proliferation and international politics (see also Berkemeier and Cone 2021).

Overall, this body of literature suggests that states' concerns about abandonment versus entrapment can govern decision-making about nuclear proliferation, and that formal alliances are powerful signals that can strengthen deterrence and make proliferation less likely. At the same time, stationing nuclear weapons abroad does not appear to increase the efficacy of deterrence or reduce proliferation risks. These findings inform how nuclear weapon states should seek to protect and assure allies. Alliances are powerful tools both in terms of their ability to deter and their ability to convince client states to remain non-nuclear, though there is some evidence this may be conditional on low entrapment concerns (Reiter 2014). This scholarship also suggests the potential advantage of hand-tying mechanisms over sunk costs for both deterrence and assurance. While this can point the US and other nuclear weapon states towards the most effective policy tools

for encouraging non-proliferation, it also means there should be increased scholarly attention paid to the perceived credibility of commitments by both allies and adversaries.

The Role of Leaders

Work in *Foreign Policy Analysis* has acknowledged the crucial role leaders play in nuclear politics (Fuhrmann and Early 2008; DiCicco 2011). There has been a related proliferation of literature on the importance of leaders in the broader IR-security field with scholars considering the importance of a leaders' psychology and experience for proliferation and threat perception (Hymans 2000; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Whitlark 2017, 2021). This literature highlights the importance of considering the individual level of analysis alongside psychological and perceptual approaches for understanding why governments take certain actions. Furthermore, contributions from the FPA literature are useful for understanding the processes behind how images and perceptions can change, which is crucial for addressing key policy questions such as how relations between adversarial states can evolve towards cooperation (DiCicco 2011).

Hymans (2000) offers one perspective on how a leaders' identity can shape perceptions about threat and capability. Examining the Australian nuclear journey, Hymans argues that the change from nuclear pursuit to non-proliferation can best be explained by changing security perceptions from leadership in which leaders' national identities create a perceptual screen that filters their external understanding of objective reality. Hymans points to two types of individually held identities that are particularly important: the identity of opposition, which can lead to misperceptions about existential threats and fears of competitor nations; and the identity of nationalism, or the strong belief in one's own nation's innate worth and capabilities. Taken together, the national identity of oppositional nationalism can lead politicians to perceive existential threats and believe in their country's ability to deter threats. Tracing the transition of Australian prime ministers from Sir Robert Menzies to John Gorton and Gough Whitlam, Hymans demonstrates that while the external security environment did not substantially change, each leader's perception of the security environment did. This argument highlights how leaders' threat perceptions and understanding of national strengths and capabilities can influence decision-making. This study also suggests important implications

for policy-makers interested in non-proliferation. In particular, some tools such as security guarantees may not effectively eliminate a desire for nuclear weapons if leaders perceive their own security situation to be dire; likewise, in some circumstances external tools of inducement are not necessary to change the nuclear policies of other countries.

Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015) add to the understanding of how leaders influence the likelihood of proliferation by linking a leader's prior experiences with certain characteristics that make nuclear pursuit more likely. The authors argue that leaders who have previously participated in a rebellion against the state are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons because prior rebel experience is linked to excessively valuing national independence, distrusting other countries to provide for defence, and having a higher tolerance for risk. In aggregate, this means that former rebels are more likely to value the potential benefits of possessing nuclear weapons compared to leaders who did not participate in a rebellion. Based on an analysis of 1,342 leaders after 1945, Fuhrmann and Horowitz find that former rebels are 415 per cent more likely to pursue nuclear weapons.

Whitlark (2021) examines a distinct but related aspect of nuclear politics, exploring the role of leaders' beliefs and the leaders' accompanying likelihood of consideration and use of preventive war as a counter-proliferation strategy. Whitlark describes how individual leaders vary in their nuclear beliefs concerning both the general consequences of nuclear proliferation in the international system and the implications of a particular adversary's nuclear acquisition for the leader's own state and its security. Exploring successive American presidents and Israeli prime ministers, she finds that leaders not only vary in these key beliefs, but that this variation helps explain later preventive war policies. In particular, Whitlark demonstrates how leaders who are concerned about the dangers of additional global proliferation and not confident in their ability to deter a future adversary once they are nuclear armed should be more likely to consider and potentially use preventive military force as a counter-proliferation strategy.

Taken together, the work from Hymans (2000), Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015), and Whitlark (2017, 2021) suggests that certain aspects of an individual's psychological makeup can influence their foreign policy preferences. The implication of this research is that policy-makers should be on the lookout for foreign leaders who exhibit characteristics of

oppositional nationalism, were former rebels, or who are worried about nuclear proliferation generally and by one adversary specifically, since these leaders may be more inclined to pursue a nuclear weapons programme or use military force to forestall another's programme. The natural next question, of course, is what should be done about these leaders once they are identified?

DiCicco (2011) offers one approach, building on key contributions from the FPA tradition. Focusing on the Reagan administration during the Able Archer exercise, DiCicco (2011: 255) theorizes about enemy images, or the 'mental constructs that depict the enemy as deceptive, untrustworthy, unjustifiably aggressive, and evil', and which often condition a leader's worldview, threat perception, and decision-making. DiCicco argues that for rivalries to change and for adversarial relations to improve, leaders' mental constructs need to evolve as well. While this is difficult, new intelligence coupled with changes to the strategic environment and the presence of advisors interested in advocating for cooperation may make change more likely. DiCicco demonstrates this argument in reference to President Reagan's changed attitude towards the Soviet Union. New intelligence from the Able Archer exercise led Reagan to face his own misperceptions about how the Soviet Union perceived the United States, making it clear that the US did not appear as benign and peaceful to its adversary. Coupled with changing threat perceptions and the influence of moderate advisors including George Shultz and Jack Matlock, who advocated for cooperation, this led to more cautious rapprochement. This argument is important because it highlights how certain conditions can make cooperation more likely, even under intractable circumstances.

The Role of Advisors and Experts

While the previous discussion makes clear that individual leaders can powerfully shape international politics and nuclear decision-making, leaders are also strongly influenced by the advisors and experts who surround them. A rich body of literature on the role of advisors and experts demonstrates how certain elites can influence outcomes to various extents based on the complexity of the contextual environment, state capacity and organizational set-up, and the leader's own experience. This research builds on the observation that leaders are usually assisted in making decisions either by a close group of advisors or by larger groups of scientific or

technical experts. The degree to which leaders rely on others for assistance is in large part based on available information. As the discussion below highlights, expert input is more likely in areas of high complexity where leaders have less knowledge and expertise, but for these interactions to be as effective as possible there needs to be a high level of state capacity and the right mix of experience among leaders and their advisors.

Macdonald (2015) and Blarel and Sarkar (2019) observe that scientists and technical experts often participate in the policy-making process and investigate the circumstances under which these individuals and substate groups are likely to be involved in foreign policy decision-making. Looking at the nuclear test ban negotiations during the Eisenhower administration, Macdonald (2015) notes that scientists are particularly influential in the foreign policy process in complex contexts in which policy-makers are dependent on external sources of information. Policy entrepreneurs can in turn take advantage of these information asymmetries to gain access to political leaders and refocus policy agendas based on their own preferences. Similarly, Blarel and Sarkar (2019) note that technologically advanced areas, including defence, space, and nuclear realms often necessitate technical and scientific expertise that is not commonly available to foreign policy executives. This leads to policy-makers deferring to experts with specialized knowledge to devise policy. The implication of both of these works is that foreign policy decision-making depends on a series of interactions between multiple actors with the ability to influence the policy-making process both within and outside of government.

While involvement from experts is more likely in issue areas of high complexity, the presence of skilled advisors and experts alone does not automatically lead to more successful decision-making. Braut-Hegghammer (2016) and Saunders (2017) highlight two factors at the state and group levels that contribute to the ultimate outcome of decision-making processes. First, based on case analyses of the nuclear proliferation pathways of Iraq and Libya, Braut-Hegghammer (2016) argues that state capacity affects the ability of leaders to exert control over programmes and the ability of scientists to work on solving complex problems. Saunders (2017) emphasizes how the level of experience of the leader can impact the ability of the policy team to be effective. Examining the cases of the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, Saunders shows how less experienced leaders are less able to monitor their advisors, delegate to experienced advisors, and diversify

advice. Overall this leads to the decreased availability of information. Experience then, argues Saunders (2017: 221), 'is not fungible: an experienced team cannot compensate for a lack of experience at the top'. While the involvement of experts is more likely in situations of high complexity in which executives need to rely on outside sources to substitute for their own lack of knowledge, the degree of foreign policy experience a president or chief executive has matters as well.

The implications from each of these four empirical areas are, of course, central to policy questions about nuclear weapons and international security. The aforementioned scholarship sheds light on how to achieve effective arms control negotiations, consider the use of extended deterrent guarantees in deliberations between superpowers and their clients, and evaluate the role of individual leaders and advisors in a variety of essential nuclear outcomes ranging from proliferation to counter-proliferation and beyond. More broadly, the expertise that can be drawn from scholars in these areas can be crucially helpful for addressing important policy concerns.

Policy Contributions: FPA and Iran's Nuclear Ambitions

The discussion of arms control, extended deterrence and assurance, leaders, and advisors demonstrates how incorporating FPA tools into the study of nuclear weapons can broaden our empirical understanding of these critical areas. Collectively, these works show how considering different levels of analysis—highlighting leaders and critical elite groups as well as important substate organizations and bureaucratic politics or national cultural preferences or images—can build knowledge beyond the original security and systemically focused literature. In addition to contributing to scholarly knowledge, the FPA approach has much to offer the policy community and can help to bridge the gap between academics and policy-makers considering interrelated questions. FPA tools have already been used fruitfully by the scholarly community to offer important policy considerations regarding the Iranian nuclear challenge and may be helpful for examining other pressing concerns in the future.

Consider recent literature on Iranian nuclear ambitions using an FPA-type approach. Rivera (2016) examines the role of honour in Iranian

society, and describes how American hostility has allowed actors inside Iran to strategically connect the nuclear programme to Iranian national honour. Likewise, investigating the interaction between US and Iranian activities, Davies (2012) argues that US coercive diplomacy strengthens Iranian hard-liners who continue to push for the programme's development. Taken together, this work highlights the critical importance of examining the key domestic constituencies inside Iran and the implications of US coercive behaviour on these groups, but also more broadly it points to the salience of enemy images and national prestige. It also raises an important question about how one can change the image one holds of an enemy, if possible.

Existing literature also offers much food for thought when considering states who wish to see the termination of the Iranian nuclear programme. Lupovici (2016) uses the lens of securitization theory to understand the growth and prioritization of the Iranian nuclear programme as a national security threat to Israel. Sagan and Valentino (2017) identify a strong willingness on the part of the American public to support the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, if doing so would save significant American soldiers' lives during hostilities. These works and others suggest a critical and dynamic role for domestic publics inside the states seeking to roll back Iranian nuclear capabilities. Collectively, this work also indicates that it might be fruitful to consider the Iranian nuclear pursuit and responses to this activity as a complex multi-party game.

There are of course a variety of outstanding questions that remain, surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme, and significant uncertainty about the future. The FPA lens can help illuminate these pertinent questions and suggest future lines of inquiry. First, how do states successfully negotiate treaties? How might the international community do so with Iran to avoid the use of military force to forestall its nuclear programme? The previously described arms control literature (Coe and Vaynman 2015; Kreps 2018; Kreps et al. 2018) points to the importance of third-party monitoring, consideration of domestic constraints, and the tradeoffs between strict legalization and institutionalization, on the one hand, and flexibility on the other.

Second, consider the role of leaders and advisors. How did the Trump administration influence the long-term perception of American credibility with respect to its trustworthiness in abiding by pledged commitments? Can the Biden administration (or any future administration) return to the status

quo prior to US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? Are there ways to encourage a negotiated solution by empowering key scientific leaders or communities inside the US, Iran, and elsewhere to design a solution and verification regime to which all parties could agree? Are there benefits to be had if the negotiators themselves are known to one another, perhaps as previous participants in the negotiations that led to the 2015 JCPOA?

Third, if security remains a central driver of the Iranian nuclear programme, how can the US and Israel credibly take the use of force off the table, assuming a security guarantee will not be forthcoming? Here the work of Reiter (2014) and Ko (2019) could be useful. Tied to questions of assurance, how might perceptions and enemy images influence both American policy towards Iran and Iran's own calculation about what is necessary to guard against external threats?

Of course, these questions only scratch the surface of how the FPA toolkit can contribute to the evolving discourse surrounding the Iranian nuclear challenge within both the scholarly and policy communities. What is clear is that by explicitly incorporating FPA tools into the study of nuclear weapons and politics, scholars can build on academic knowledge and more easily contribute to policy relevant discussions.

Conclusions and Future Areas for Exploration

Research on nuclear weapons in both the FPA and IR-security traditions is linked by theme, theoretical underpinnings, methods, and conclusions. Beyond these similarities, explicitly incorporating FPA tools into the study of nuclear politics can allow scholars to more usefully contribute to policy relevant discussions. These efforts are already being made in the context of Iran's nuclear ambitions, but other areas could benefit from a cross-pollination between academia and policy. Policy-makers are currently grappling with questions concerning, among other things, the rise of peer and near-peer adversaries (Colby 2018; Brewer and Tabatabai 2019), cross-domain deterrence and new technologies (Mehta 2019; Hersman 2020; John son and Krabill 2020), challenges to arms control and disarmament regimes (Davis Gibbons 2017; Williams 2020), nuclear modernization (Parthemore

and Weber 2020; Hinck and Vaddi 2021), and the impact of new or non-traditional actors in the nuclear space (Bateman 2019; Sahay 2021).

These areas are ripe for engagement from the academic community, and well suited to the application of tools and theories from FPA and an FPA-inspired approach. Lessons learned from FPA scholarship on the importance of accounting for individuals and groups both within and across state boundaries can aid in explaining the rise and consequent implications of non-traditional actors in the nuclear space. Incorporating different levels of analysis can illuminate challenges to arms control and disarmament regimes increasingly driven by actors long thought to be less dominant in the nuclear realm (Gibbons 2018). Considering the role of technologists, scientists, and experts in nuclear decision-making can inform debates about modernization, new technologies, and the impact of these changes on deterrence and IR. A robust incorporation of psychological and perceptual theories may strengthen understanding about changing relations with adversaries. Across all these areas, academics can advance knowledge by continuing to collect and analyse data, employ novel methodological tools, and contribute to debates based on robust theorizing, research design, and methods. While work remains to continue bridging the gap across academic and policy divides, this tour through the IR-security and FPA literatures on nuclear politics indicates the complementarity of their collective contributions. The sum is more valuable than the component parts; to continue answering pressing questions regarding nuclear politics and policy, scholars should strive to speak across, or eliminate, the subfield divide.

Notes

1. What follows is not intended as a comprehensive overview of all literature on nuclear weapons; instead its purpose is to illustrate one broad arc of direction in the scholarship.
2. While realist and security-focused examinations dominated the nuclear literature early on, there were notable exceptions (see Scott Sagan's arguments in Sagan and Waltz 1995).
3. These changes follow a similar trajectory to the larger international relations scholarship (e.g., Kertzer 2017).

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CHAPTER 34

Foreign Policy and Development

SUSANNA P. CAMPBELL AND SHANNON P. CARCELLI

INTRODUCTION

International development lacks a singular definition. The United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals aim to 'end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources' (UN General Assembly 2015: 3). In practice, these ambitious goals are translated into a range of international development programmes—ranging from conditional cash transfer projects, to socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, to infrastructure rebuilding projects, to programmes that reform the education system—implemented by bilateral aid agencies, multilateral aid agencies, recipient governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private contractors. Other development efforts focus on direct government to government cooperation agreements, blurring the lines between international aid, trade, and foreign direct investment.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, international relations (IR) scholarship on international development, much of which was written by economists and anthropologists, focused on broader debates about the causes of poverty (Sachs et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2005), the role and effectiveness of aid conditionality (Cohen et al. 1985; Uvin 1998; Kanbur 2000; Morrissey 2004), the potentially perverse incentives embedded within development cooperation (Knack 2001; Martens et al. 2002; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Gibson et al. 2005), the neocolonial practices of the development industry (Escobar 1988; Ferguson 1990), and the underdevelopment trap faced by countries experiencing both violent conflict and impoverishment (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier et al. 200

3). This scholarship focused on the power dynamics, complex decision-making processes, and high levels of uncertainty about the determinants of aid effectiveness, all of which are conducive to a foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach (Kaarbo 2015). As the IR scholarship advanced throughout the 2000s and 2010s, it lost much of its focus on the complexities, politics, and power of the international development industry and, instead, focused on aggregate patterns of aid allocation.

This more recent IR scholarship on international development has been dominated by debates about foreign policy motivations for donor aid allocation. Much of this literature argues that donor governments give aid to 'buy' unrelated policy concessions from recipient governments, rather than respond to levels of recipient need (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dreher et al. 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2013). Other scholarship argues that both strategic interest and recipient need shape aid allocation decisions, arguing that recipient countries may be the source of terrorism, migration, or other forms of potential instability that donor governments have a strategic interest in mitigating (Berthélemy 2006; Dollar and Levin 2 006; Feeny and McGillivray 2008; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Buüthe et al. 2012; Heinrich 2013; Bermeo 2017).

While this scholarship points to the mixed motives behind foreign aid allocation, it largely overlooks the complex decision-making processes through which donors reconcile these potentially competing motivations and decide to allocate one type and amount of aid versus another (Bermeo 2 011; Kleibl 2013; Dietrich 2016; Campbell and Spilker 2021). Furthermore, by focusing primarily on donors' initial aid allocation decision, without unpacking the decision-making process that led to this decision, existing IR scholarship has often left unexplored the preferences and behaviours of the multitude of actors who participate in international aid decision-making and implementation. A range of non-governmental actors, civil servants, legislators, and states shape the broad norms around aid allocation, such as those established by agenda-setting organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and initial bilateral and multilateral aid allocation decisions (Neumayer 2003; Schneider and To bin 2013). Once donors have agreed on the amount and type of aid, a growing number of private, non-governmental, intergovernmental, and state actors participate in the implementation of this aid policy, complicating the

delegation chain and, ultimately, shaping the effect of aid on international development outcomes (Martens et al. 2002; Annen and Knack 2015; Nunn enkamp et al. 2017; Honig 2018, 2019).

We contend that the long delegation chain that shapes the content and effectiveness of international development makes development a unique foreign policy problem that merits an innovative approach to FPA. International aid donors and thinktanks have long acknowledged the complexity of international development, and proposed multiple solutions to address its deficiencies (OECD 2005; Wood et al. 2011; IDPS/OECD 2011; OECD 2020). We argue that IR scholarship can more directly speak to the concerns of international and domestic policy-makers by opening up the black box of international aid allocation and implementation, uncovering the diverse motivations and behaviours of the multitude of aid actors who, ultimately, determine the effect and effectiveness of international development efforts.

An FPA approach to development would also open the 'black box' of recipient government decision-making (Hudson 2005), enable scholarship to more directly address and acknowledge how internal dynamics within the recipient government shape both aid allocation patterns and aid effectiveness (Girod 2012; Bush 2015; Girod and Tobin 2016; Swedlund 2017c). It would also enable deeper examination of how different donors, including China and other emerging powers, approach development cooperation, conditioning the effect of aid allocation behaviours (Thiele et al. 2007; Woods 2008; Bräutigam 2011; Swedlund 2017b). By focusing on the process of international development (Smith et al. 2016), an FPA approach would enable investigation of how aid effectiveness is shaped by domestic and transnational actors operating on both the donor and recipient sides of international development's long delegation chain and the diverse actors, interests, and ideologies that it traverses.

Below, we first consider the actors who constitute the policy-making process related to foreign aid, ranging from the initial preferences of constituencies, through the lobbying process, through the policy-making process that leads to the decision about overall aid allocation amounts and sectors. We, then, consider the implementation of the aid allocation decisions, which we contend is shaped by increasingly diverse preferences among donor aid bureaucracies, implementing partners, and recipient governments. We close by discussing alternative modes of development

cooperation, with a particular focus on South-South cooperation and broader implications for new research on international development that integrates new actors into an FPA approach (Risse 2013; Jørgensen and Hell mann 2015).

Determinants of Foreign Aid Allocation

An FPA perspective elevates scholarly understanding of the foreign aid allocation decision-making process. It was not until recently that scholars began to open the black box of donor decision-making. Rather than considering donor states as unitary decision-makers, recent work has begun to trace the policy-making process that leads to the allocation of foreign aid. Domestic actors, such as interest groups, bureaucracies, parties, and politicians, do not always agree on foreign aid. Who wins and loses in these domestic battles depends on factors such as legislative bargaining, which contributes to the creation of a fragmented foreign aid bureaucracy dominated by multiple foreign aid fiefdoms (Carcelli 2018, 2019). Given that existing IR scholarship largely assumes that the executive leadership of the state determines foreign aid allocation, these foreign aid fiefdoms and their powerful influence on the aid allocation process further complicates the standard aid allocation story. Further research could consider the role of various political actors in shaping the aid allocation decision-making process.

An Actor-Centric Approach to Development

Just as the tools of FPA have allowed scholars to better understand the mechanisms behind large-scale foreign policy events and crises (e.g., Alliso n 1969), these same tools can help scholars understand the complex determinants of poverty and development. International development, perhaps even to a greater extent than any other foreign policy tool, is the product of a long chain of delegation. Donor country populations and leaders demand development and foreign aid for ideological and strategic goals. In turn, domestic and international intermediaries, such as bureaucracies, organizations, and corporations, are delegated to carry out those goals. Finally, actors based in recipient countries, including politicians and NGOs, shape the way that those broad goals translate into

development on the ground. All of these actors influence the creation of foreign policy around international development.

Development policy, of course, encompasses more than just foreign aid. Just as foreign aid is often used for non-development goals (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007), international development can be served by policies not involving foreign aid. For example, trade policy is often leveraged to improve quality of life in less developed countries. The goal of foreign investment is often to develop a sector of a country, for the profit of investors—in fact, foreign aid itself often takes the form of investment. Even foreign policy tools that are not necessarily motivated by development can have development effects. For example, debates about sanctions policies often consider the role those sanctions might have on investment and growth (Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013).

FPA and Foreign Aid

Two of the major puzzles driving foreign aid research can be addressed from an actor-centric perspective. First, FPA can provide insight into one of the most basic puzzles of foreign aid: why do states give away money to other states? Leaders often take policy cues from voters and special interests, raising important questions about the role of the selectorate and politics in driving international development incentives. Second, FPA can tackle questions of inefficiency in foreign aid. Given that donors are willing to spend money on other states' development, why do they often spend that money poorly?

Foreign aid scholarship has offered several explanations for states' incentives for delivering foreign aid. Much scholarly understanding of states' motivations is driven by classic IR theories of norms, institutions, and power. In fact, one of the earliest academic works considering foreign aid motivations came from realist scholar Hans Morganthau (1962). Morganthau argued that foreign aid is a useful tool when 'the United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means' (301). Scholars of various orientations agree, especially during the Cold War period, that much of US foreign aid was delivered in order to secure US interests (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Meernik et al. 1998). Other non-altruistic motivations for foreign aid can include the desire to help a recipient to comply with a preferential trade agreement (Baccini and Urpelainen 2012), curb migration (Bermeo and Leblang 2015), and to

encourage UN voting (Wang 1999; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 2008).

Other scholars are increasingly questioning both the accuracy and the generalizability of such expectations. There is clear evidence that donor nations do not all behave similarly (Heinrich 2013). For example, Scandinavian states tend to focus more on reputational and normative concerns when delivering foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and Dollar 2000). Individuals within states are also difficult to generalize. How leaders choose which domestic constituencies to support determines how states spend foreign aid. Rather than debate the normative, institutional, and material incentives of donors, an FPA approach would enable the literature to address how the axis of power in any given state influences foreign aid decisions.

The foreign aid scholarship also provides a range of descriptions of how inefficiently aid is spent, once allocated. States often give foreign aid to corrupt regimes (Ahmed 2012; Dube and Naidu 2015), choose recipients who are not in dire need (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Briggs and Weathers 2016), spread funding thinly over many projects (Knack and Rahman 2007; Kilby 2011), and are inconsistent in aid funding from one year to the next (Nielsen et al. 2011). An actor-centric approach, which considers states and their aid budgets as more than just units, could help explain these inefficiencies. For example, Bearce and Tirone (2010) and Bermeo (2016) suggest that wasteful aid spending is partially attributed to donors' dependence on recipient states for foreign policy concessions. As a result, it is difficult for donors to credibly threaten to withdraw aid from states they depend on for geopolitical reasons (Dunning 2004; Swedlund 2017a).[1] This is true of state managed international organizations (IOs) as well (Stone 2004, 2008). When donors do not depend as heavily on recipient policies, they are more likely to demand accountability from recipients. When the political will exists, donors may employ conditionality or even bypass the recipient government altogether, instead tasking NGOs with aid authority (Dietrich 2013). As scholarship begins to further disaggregate the patterns of foreign aid allocation, new questions emerge about the underlying foreign policy logic of development aid.

The foreign aid literature is increasingly digging into the precise determinants of states' foreign aid spending; however, as FPA scholars know, states are not necessarily the most useful units of analysis for studying policy. By breaking down the delegation chain from donor public to recipient public, it is evident that donor motivations and strategies in foreign aid run the gamut from pure humanitarianism to selfish cynicism. In this section, we discuss the roles of ideology and domestic institutions in driving foreign aid outcomes.

Ideology

Foreign aid spending is not popular among all donors. Ideological differences determine preferences over whether and how foreign aid is delivered. First, scholars have found a clear relationship between conservatism and scepticism about international giving. Surveys show that conservative ideology is associated with a preference for lower aid spending (Paxton and Knack 2012).[2] Other observational research finds a similar phenomenon (Thérien and Noel 2000; Tingley 2010; Milner and Tingley 2010; Brech and Potrafke 2014; Greene and Licht 2018). Much of this public opinion is driven by ignorance more than ideology. As Gilens (2001) found in the US case, much of the public believes that the country spends more on foreign aid than they actually do. When survey respondents are given the correct information about aid spending, they are more likely to support it. Other work suggests that individuals' material self-interest plays a role in their preferences for foreign aid (Heinrich and Peterson 2020), and Prather (2020) finds that individuals with personal ties to friends and family in recipient states are more likely to support aid spending.

Ideology also affects preferences regarding *how* foreign aid should be spent. Conservative individuals and governments are more likely to spend foreign aid money on strategic goals than on economic development (Milner and Tingley 2010). Economic ideology can also affect a state's willingness to use multilateralism (Milner and Tingley 2013) and lead the state to bypass the recipient government in delivering aid (Dietrich 2016; Suzuki 2020). As Breuning (1995) finds by using a traditional FPA to measure national role conceptions, aid ideology and state behaviour can go well beyond the

traditional left-right divide. Depending on the individuals and organizations making foreign aid decisions, foreign aid spending is likely to differ state by state and year by year.

Domestic Institutions

Ideology is constrained by institutions. Even when leaders want foreign aid to take a specific form, the implementation of their policy preferences hinges on the bureaucracy's willingness and ability to carry them out. An FPA perspective allows scholars to consider how organizational barriers and substate actors shape states' international development policy. First, legislative institutions determine the way that donor interests are aggregated, moderating the role of public opinion. Second, domestic bureaucracies and organizational barriers constitute the international development delegation chain. An actor-centric approach encourages scholars to directly observe the effects of domestic institutions in shaping aid policy and its implementation.

Interestingly, research on the domestic politics of IR has moved into the realm of foreign aid. A productive strand of research has considered the ways that bureaucratic rules can shape leaders' foreign aid decisions. For example, the independence of bureaucracies can play a role in the ability of the executive branch to translate preferences into policy (Arel-Bundock et al. 2015; Honig 2018, 2019). The structure of the bureaucracy, of course, can also be endogenous to political factors (Carcelli 2018). Other scholars note the institutionalized importance of the motivations of foreign aid spending (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Fariss 2010).

Still more scholars study the effects of divided government institutions on constraining the executive. Milner and Tingley (2015) find that foreign economic aid fits into a larger pattern of legislative-executive interactions, with United States institutions advantaging the legislative branch. Milner and Tingley (2013) and Kersting and Kilby (2018) find that divided government can inform aid allocation preferences, with more constrained executives spending foreign aid through international, rather than domestic, institutions. Domestic politics can bring forward the preferences of leaders themselves in determining aid allocations (Lebovic 1988; Drury et al. 2005).

Aid Implementation and Its Agents

Moving from consideration of the actors and institutions involved in the aid allocation process, we now turn to the actors engaged in the aid implementation process and their diverse preferences and sources of authority. Once a bilateral or multilateral donor decides to allocate an overall amount of aid to a particular country and/or to particular sectoral priorities (i.e., health, education, postconflict reconstruction) a range of new actors become engaged in the aid implementation process. While the IR literature has largely viewed these actors as agents of donors that simply implement donor policy preferences, we contend that an FPA perspective on these actors would enable the agency, authority, and preferences of the range of actors involved in the aid implementation, and how these preferences are shaped by heterogeneity within the recipient country's environment (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Schneider and Tobin 2016). We proceed by discussing the primary actors in the aid delegation chain: the aid bureaucracy and donor country office, the recipient government, donor implementing partners, and donor agenda-setting organizations, such as the OECD.

In most aid allocation processes, the aid bureaucracy plays an important role both in shaping principal-level decisions about aid allocation, and in determining how these same aid allocation decisions will be made (Bräutigam 2000; Mosse 2005; Easterly 2006; Carey 2007; Nay 2012; McLean 2012). There is also potentially important variation in bureaucratic influence within governments, conditioned by the relative independence of the aid agency from presidential decision-making (Arel-Bundock et al. 2015). For many bilateral and multilateral donors, the country office that they set up within the recipient country to oversee aid implementation also plays an important role in deciding who will benefit from aid and how it will respond to dynamics within the country (Campbell 2018). In other words, the aid agency's country office often possesses the authority and autonomy to decide how the aid agency's policy will be shaped by the circumstances within the recipient country (Gibson et al. 2005; Campbell 2018; Honig 2018). Nonetheless, these country offices are rarely fully independent or autonomous from the foreign policy preferences of their headquarters, which determine the overall aid policy and the delivery modalities that

guide aid implementation (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Campbell and Findley 2021).

Beyond the donor bureaucracy, recipient governments play a crucial role in determining the content of the aid allocation portfolio provided by a bilateral or multilateral donor and how this aid portfolio is implemented. Not only is the ability of the donor to allocate aid to the recipient government contingent upon the recipient state's capacity to absorb the aid (Cohen et al. 1985; Easterly 2002), but a donor government is unable to allocate aid without the recipient government's consent to the amount and conditions of the aid (Murphy 2006; Girod 2012; Girod and Tobin 2016; Swedlund 2017a). Rather than being a passive recipient of aid allocation decisions made by the donor's political principals at headquarters, recipient governments actively shape the nature and content of the aid that they receive and how it is implemented within their country (Bush 2015; Andrews et al. 2017; Campbell and Matanock 2021).

International NGOs (INGOs), national NGOs (NNGOs), and private contractors also play a crucial role in the delivery of development aid. Financed by private donors, foundations, bilateral donors, and multilateral donors, NGOs and private contractors often deliver goods and services directly to the population or to local-level health centres, schools, communities, or government officials. Aid scholarship has found that donors tend to rely on these implementing partners, in particular, when the government has weak capacity and the donor is unable to give direct government to government aid (Dietrich 2013). Although scholarship has largely painted these actors as pawns of donor preferences (Cooley and Ron 2002), the way that these implementing partners decide to engage with aid recipients and implement other aspects of their donor funded projects can determine the effectiveness of this aid (Campbell 2018).

In addition to shaping how aid is allocated, this range of actors also influences the overall policies and norms that guide donor aid allocation decisions. For example, the OECD, which is composed of the majority of traditional development donors, establishes standards, norms, and policies with which both donor governments and recipient governments agree to comply (OECD 2005; IDPS/OECD 2011). The shared targets that all donor governments and multilaterals have agreed to pursue—the Sustainable Development Goals—were agreed upon by UN member states in 2015, shaping the subsequent aid allocation behaviours of these donors (Fukuda-P

arr and Hulme 2011). Finally, changes in the specific political and security context in the recipient country can lead to quick alterations in the type, amount, and aims of international development aid even while donor strategic interest and recipient need remain constant (Joly 2014; Campbell and Spilker 2021). An FPA approach would enable a deeper analysis of the heterogeneity of actors that influence the implementation, and even the initial allocation of international aid and more effectively capture how this complex network of actors influence development outcomes.

Conclusion: Moving Forward

An FPA approach is likely to be increasingly important for analysing the range of international development efforts carried out by an increasingly diverse set of donors, implementing partners, and recipient governments (Jørgensen and Hellmann 2015). The actor-centric approach of FPA is likely to become increasingly common in the study of international development due to new data, new donors, and new perspectives (Hudson 2005; Thies and Nieman 2017). First, technology and trends towards transparency have allowed scholars to access a universe of new, disaggregated foreign aid data that was not available to previous generations. Second, a proliferation of new foreign aid donors allows scholars to test theories of foreign aid on a greater variety of donors. Finally, the field has the opportunity to include a greater variety of perspectives than have been considered in previous foreign aid research. We expect these trends to continue and provide a more precise picture of the universe of foreign aid within the IR literature and help to expand FPA scholarship to cover new actors (including non-state actors), policy domains, perspectives, and to engage in increasingly policy relevant research, as outlined in the introductory chapter in this volume.

Technology and increased government transparency have made new data available to foreign aid scholars. This allows scholars to further disaggregate foreign aid, providing a more precise idea of how aid processes work. The AidData project (Tierney et al. 2011) is one of the clearest examples of this foreign aid data. Drawing from a variety of state and IO resources, the AidData project continues to provide one of the most comprehensive foreign aid datasets available. Because of the push for increased transparency within donor countries, many aid donors now

provide detailed project-level data on aid spending.[3] For less transparent donors, new realms of study are possible through new data-collection means, like AidData's Tracking Unreported Financial Flows (TUFF) project (Strange et al. 2017). Technology has also allowed for new measures of economic development, such as the use of satellite imagery to measure urban development by picturing night skies (e.g., Henderson al. 2012). As new data on both foreign aid and development arise, the ability to use the actor-centric approach of FPA is likely to increase.

The misconception that foreign aid policy is only about development is also increasingly difficult to claim as newer donors have become prominent in the foreign aid and development cooperation field. In fact, many new donors are themselves *recipients* of foreign aid. Understanding the motivations, aid allocation patterns, and accompanying economic and political interests of these donors has become the focus of an increasingly large literature on non-traditional aid donors (Asmus et al. 2017), and on China in particular (Cheng and Smyth 2016; Dreher et al. 2018). Much of this scholarship calls for an actor-centric approach that examines whether these newer donors follow similar policy-making and aid allocation processes as more traditional OECD donors.

Initially, this scholarship focused on mapping the actors and instruments used in South-South cooperation, with a specific focus on how Brazil, India, China, and South Africa were altering traditional conceptualizations of development cooperation, if at all (Dreher et al. 2011; Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013; Quadir 2013; De Renzio and Seifert 2014; Paczyńska 2019). Other scholarship examined the interactions between traditional OECD donors and emerging new donors, and asked how the aid practices of China, in particular, were reshaping donor-recipient cooperation on the ground and placing new demands on IOs to orchestrate donor interactions (DeHart 2012; Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; Morvaridi and Hughes 2018). Other scholars have highlighted the presence of other new donors—Cuba, Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey—and how these donors are also reshaping South-South cooperation (Bergamaschi et al. 2017; Santander and Alonso 2018). Still other scholarship has focused on aid recipient motivations in engaging with these newer donors, including in response to new pressures created by the COVID-19 pandemic (Udeala 2010; Cheru 2016; Richey et al. 2021). Further scholarship has begun to examine the intersection of development and security policy, within both newer donors

and more traditional OECD donors (Chandler 2007; Benabdallah 2016; Gamso and Yuldashev 2018; Benabdallah and Large 2020). All of this scholarship points to the significant progress already made towards an FPA approach to studying international development, and the importance of a continued focus on the diverse actors that constitute the international development industry and how their divergent and convergent preferences, rules, and ideologies shape development outcomes.

An FPA approach to international development also offers the opportunity for further examination of the emergence of international development standards, targets, and norms and how these global standards affect development outcomes (Holsti 1970; Sjöstedt 2007; Miyagi 2009; Thies and Nieman 2017). The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015, aimed to reshape international development cooperation, ensuring not only that basic health, education, and economic needs were met, but also that gender equality, rule of law, and conflict prevention are integrated throughout international development cooperation. Newer scholarship has asked how these transformational global standards emerged (Kanie and Biermann 2017; Fukuda-Parr and Muchhala 2020), how they are altering development practice (Allen et al. 2018), and how they alter donor-recipient power dynamics (Horn and Grugel 2018). An FPA approach to studying the emergence and implementation of international development should better reflect the perspective of scholars from the Global South who are currently underpublished in IR journals (Briggs and Weathers 2016). A deeper investigation of the heterogeneity of agents that make up the international development enterprise will enable newer crucial voices to contribute to our understanding of the nature of international development today.

Finally, just as an FPA approach is beneficial to the international development literature, studying the aid allocation process may be useful for FPA scholarship. By enabling FPA scholars to consider the domestic policy-making processes on both the donor and recipient sides, as well as the interaction between the two, the international aid literature could help the FPA literature continue to expand the geographic coverage of its analysis and question the broader relevance of its core theories (Holsti 1970; Hermann et al. 1987; Thies and Breuning 2012). By enabling FPA scholars to understand the actor-specific dynamics within the long international aid decision-making chain, which reaches across continents and cultures, and involves state and non-state actors, the study of foreign

aid and development could enable FPA scholars to question the literature's implicit assumptions about power, authority, and agency (Jørgensen and Hel lmann 2015; Kaarbo 2015; Wehner 2015). Furthermore, by focusing on studying the diverse challenges and actors within international development, FPA scholars could engage in increasingly problem-driven research that has important implications for policy-makers around the globe (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).

Notes

1. See Wright and Winters (2010) for a survey of the literature on the politics of aid effectiveness.
2. For a recent review of the public opinion literature, see Milner and Tingley (2013).
3. For a US example, see the 2016 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act.

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CHAPTER 35

Foreign Policy and Human Rights

COLTON HEFFINGTON AND AMANDA MURDIE

INTRODUCTION

The research questions at the heart of human rights scholarship (why do rights violations occur? How can the international community limit rights violations?) can be answered partly with insights provided by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). By explaining why leaders make decisions and how domestic political forces bind and constrain leaders in the making of policy, human rights scholars can provide a more comprehensive answer to these core questions. Likewise, FPA has much to learn from human rights scholarship. Indeed, FPA scholars seek to identify what motivates leaders and delimits their worldview. Increasingly, the evidence suggests that many leaders are motivated by reputational concerns and norms that lead governments to respect human rights and acknowledge international law when they would not otherwise wish to do so. A stronger partnership between FPA and human rights scholarship is warranted on these practical grounds.

Beyond the advance of research, a closer union between these two research traditions within international relations (IR) is logical for several reasons. First, most FPA research is explicitly interested in the nexus of international and domestic politics, and the result is a body of work that examines the interaction between these political spheres. Likewise, human rights scholars have always been wary of dividing internal and external politics in Political Science and remain sceptical of whether any states retain traditional Westphalian sovereignty in the 21st century. Both research traditions find themselves in the realm of Gourevitch's (1978) 'second image reversed', where otherwise presumed barriers between domestic and international politics do not always apply.

Next, FPA has long served the role of opening the 'black box' of policy-making and incorporating a multitude of domestic political forces into both theory and research, including the media, government bureaucracies, and public opinion to name just a few. The scientific study of human rights has simultaneously emphasized the importance of those same forces. Though the human rights scholarship has traditionally been focused on different kinds of actors than FPA (e.g., activists, norms entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international courts), both areas of scholarship have entered the 21st century open to the possibility that a wide array of actors influence policy.

The Pre-Existing Theoretical and Empirical Overlap

There are several key points of contact that currently exist between human rights scholarship and FPA research. First, the linkage between role theory in FPA and the human rights research on the normative life cycle is too obvious to ignore. Next, both FPA and human rights have learned and borrowed much from comparative politics in the 21st century—FPA scholars have developed a strain of research on comparative foreign policy that illustrates how party politics, electoral institutions in democracies, and ideology affect foreign policy. Human rights scholars have similarly developed institutional explanations for repression. Further advances in this area of shared interest would be fruitful.

FPA and human rights research enjoy a natural synergy when it comes to the evolution of norms, the value of reputation, and the concept of role within a community. Borrowing from psychology and sociology, a large strain of research in FPA examines roles in world politics (Walker 1987; Thies and Breuning 2012; Breuning, Chapter 12 in this volume). The core assumption of this work in role theory is that a state's socially defined role affects policy—leaders and states live up to both internal and external expectations. This research examines how states adopt roles (e.g., Breuning and Pechenina 2020) and how states behave to fit into their roles. Inevitably, appropriate behaviour in a given role, according to role theory, is partly delimited by norms, while the state's self-perceived role simultaneously influences the integration of international norms. That is,

there is a feedback loop between a state's role performance and the adoption of new norms.

Crucially, one of the most dominant traditions in the human rights literature, that centring on the normative life cycle and naming and shaming, speaks directly to this subset of FPA. Keck and Sikkink's (1998) theory of transnational activism elevated the role of NGOs and highlighted the ability of activists to alter norms related to human rights. Simultaneously, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) outlined the norms life cycle, treating the development of norms as a process with discrete stages influenced by an array of actors, again many of which naturally relate to repression in the postwar era. This literature has expanded in numerous directions detailed below, but common assumptions in the research inspired by both pieces are that:

(1) State identity influences policy.
(2) Domestic and international norms are inextricably linked.
(3) Non-state actors play a role in defining norms and delimiting appropriate behaviour.

All three of these assumptions turn out to be important for any FPA scholar interested in identity and policy choice. Work inspired by both Keck and Sikkink and (1998) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) help illustrate the natural theoretical overlap. On the first assumption, for example, Adler-Nissen's (2014) work in the area of norms shows that states who have been stigmatized by the international community may reject the imposition of norms by external actors depending on how they internalize the shame of that stigmatization. The key inference for scholars of both human rights and FPA is that the processes of identity formation and transformation have significant implications for norm acceptance (see also Snyder 2020).

The link between FPA and the norms life cycle literature, especially on the assumption that domestic and international norms are linked is quite clear (Harnisch et al. 2011; Thies 2013; Wehner 2015; Cantir and Kaarbo 20 16). According to this perspective, FPA research on roles and the human rights research oriented around norm contestation share a clear lineage. This matters because it points a way forward for both literatures. The human rights scholars focused on identity and change (Risse et al. 2013) and the FPA scholars working on roles are fundamentally interested in very similar processes related to identity. Some research has already explicitly tied human rights norms to foreign policy (e.g., Sobek et al. 2006) but more

work at the specific intersection of role theory and human rights norms is possible.

On the third assumption—that activists matter—empirical human rights research has found itself more frequently in a nexus with the study of international law than with FPA. Research on the effect of ratifying treaties and how activists affect human rights behaviour and the standards of human monitoring has made significant progress towards outlining when and how activists and the laws they enforce matter most (Murdie and Davis 2012; Kr ain 2012; Salehyan Siroky and Wood 2014; Fariss 2018). FPA research has been slower to study transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and NGOs. However, some FPA research has begun to theorize about the role of non-state actors traditionally valued more in human rights. For example, work by Allen et al. (2021) examines how the presence of NGOs limit civilian casualties as a result of air strikes. Kim's (2017) analysis of NGO influence on US foreign aid is also instructive—however more research that explicitly focuses on NGOs and TANs within FPA is necessary, as we argue below.

The other major commonality between FPA and human rights is that both research traditions have drawn heavily on comparative politics. Within FPA, an entire strain of literature examining how institutions (Auerswald 19 99), parties (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Clare 2010), and ideology (Haesebr ouck and Mello 2020) influence decisions has drawn on comparative politics in industrialized democracies. Much of this research has been traditionally focused on security and international political economy outcomes. Human rights research on institutions and domestic politics has matured into an area of research that takes the same factors seriously (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010). This recent shared interest in constitutions, parties, and ideology helps point a way forward for these subdisciplines; it is easy to imagine research relying on factors from this comparative foreign policy area of FPA, like parties and ideologies, explaining how states behave in the area of international human rights—either enforcing or refusing to enforce human rights laws and norms. Work like Hildebrandt et al.'s (2013) on the domestic politics of humanitarian intervention is an example of such work.

Even with these commonalties, there are still areas where greater integration between these two bodies of research is necessary, as we detail in the following two sections. In understanding the role of public opinion and the media, human rights scholars could learn from FPA. Likewise, the

FPA scholarship needs to expand its theoretical horizons to understand the impact of TANs, NGOs, and activists more effectively.

Incorporating FPA into Human Rights Scholarship

Research in FPA privileges the study of leaders and states in decision-making. However, a large subset of FPA literature also examines how public opinion and the media constrain or incentivize decisions made by elites. With that point in mind, research in human rights has already begun to explain human rights outcomes with an FPA-style approach, incorporating information about a multitude of domestic actors and forces into theory and data. Human rights research emphasizing the role of public opinion, media, and government bureaucracy must be credited for this. Some mark the beginning of the quantitative cross-national study of human rights as starting roughly around the time of Poe and Tate's (1994) work, which places the formative decades of that portion of the subdiscipline during the 'end of theory' debate of IR (Dunne et al. 2013). The consequence is that, while human rights research has engaged with the primary meta-theories of IR, especially feminism, constructivism, and the rationalist school, it has benefited greatly from theoretical pluralism. For that reason, human rights scholars are eclectic in their epistemology and methods—which is true of contemporary FPA as well. For this reason, human rights scholars have examined a wide array of human rights outcomes. One primary human rights outcome of interest that the FPA literature can inform us on is humanitarian intervention. In particular FPA scholarship on public opinion and media can advance our shared understanding of decision-making on states' choice to engage in humanitarian intervention.

Public opinion research in the style of FPA asserts that the public is generally aware of international politics (Holsti 1992), and that public opinion incentivizes certain policies, like the use of force, while also constraining leaders from engaging in risky conflicts (Jentleson and Britton 1998). Developments in the human rights literature have likewise begun to focus on public opinion. Some research explores the variation in perception of repression and the value of human rights (Hertel et al. 2009; Koo 2017). At the nexus of these two literatures is a massively important question: to

what degree can public opinion on human rights influence foreign policy decisions?

Notable answers to this question include work by Michelle Allendoerfer (2017) who finds that Americans are generally in favour of the use of foreign aid (and its freezing) as a carrot (and stick) to improve human rights conditions in foreign countries (see also Heinrich et al. 2018). Looking at Congressional votes authorizing humanitarian intervention, Hildebrandt et al. (2013) consider public opinion amongst other domestic political factors, finding that general public approval of a given mission (e.g., to Somalia or Haiti) guides individual Congressional votes. Tomz and Weeks (2020) use survey experiments to show that the American public is hesitant to approve of the use of force against states who do respect human rights, but that the public may willingly approve of violence against repressive regimes. This is one area where human rights research could advance rapidly, drawing on the framework of decision-making supplied by the FPA literature. Further research into the area of public opinion and human rights could even elucidate on how the public views the repressive behaviours of their own government and other local actors (e.g., Ron et al., 2017). Such research could further inform our understanding of when and why leaders repress. Indeed, Barton et al. (2017) highlight the need for more research in this precise area.

Early research in FPA highlighted how media coverage, usually from traditional sources, influenced leader behaviour. Just as with public opinion, the enduring assumption of this research tradition is that media coverage influences by incentivizing and constraining leaders' decisions, often via the above-mentioned levers of public opinion and the so-called CNN (Cable News Network) Effect (Livingston 1997; Baum 2002). Some research in the FPA tradition has contemplated how media coverage on human rights might affect foreign policy decisions specifically related to human rights, including the use of force and sanctions (Balabanova 2010; Peksen et al. 2014). Given the already influential literature at the nexus of human rights and media (Ramos et al. 2007), it makes sense for human rights scholars interested primarily in human rights outcomes to think more holistically about how all of these factors work together.

The human rights literature inspired by Keck and Sikkink's (1998) work is highly interested in the correlates of external pressure on repressive states. While this research has largely focused on the role of activists and

TANs, FPA scholars have developed a literature on when leaders, mainly those in the US, choose to engage in humanitarian intervention or to condition the offer of foreign aid on a lifting of repression. At the juncture of these two literatures are a number of questions, mainly related to human rights outcomes, that are yet to be answered (e.g., how does media coverage and public opinion interact with NGO campaigns to generate humanitarian interventions?). Integrating these theories and findings more closely into the study of human rights outcomes is necessary for this reason.

What FPA Can Learn from Human Rights Scholarship

FPA offers a rich perspective and subfield with much to contribute to the future of research in the area of human rights. In addition to the ways in which human rights scholarship can be improved by existing theoretical insights from the FPA tradition, recent insights from the IR and political science literatures on human rights have much to offer FPA. These insights concern both the phenomena of study familiar to FPA scholars and the methodologies often used in FPA research.

First, human rights scholarship shows that the process following leader decision-making can be as important for policy outcomes as the decision-making process itself. FPA has historically focused on the 'central decision-making unit' within a government and the processes, ideologies, and backgrounds that contribute to their decision-making (Kaarbo 2015: 191). While central decision-makers can be powerful actors in the area of human rights, a wide array of human rights scholarship shows that abuses may be driven not be leader decisions but by unmonitored or untrained security agents acting out of step with government policies (Englehart 2009; Mitchell 2009; Cingranelli et al. 2014). Human rights abuses may be the result of actions taken in the heat of the moment, like the use of torture to extract information from a terrorist or simply for the personal gratification of security agents, like the use of ill treatment by a prison guard to feel more powerful or to extract a bribe. Without high levels of bureaucratic or state monitoring, security agents may abuse citizens even when not directed to do so by state leaders. This research highlights the importance of bureaucratic and state capacity, and draws heavily on cross-disciplinary

insights concerning principal-agent relationships and agency 'slack' (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8; see also Braun and Guston 2003, Miller 2005).

Human rights abuses taken without leader intent or direction are still abuses that violate international human rights law. However, these abuses require us to focus as much on state and bureaucratic capacity after decisions are made as on the bureaucratic processes and personalities driving decision-making. The human rights literature would suggest that FPA scholars expand their focus beyond that of the agency of the 'central decision-making unit' (Kaarbo 2015: 191). Instead, scholars must focus on the individual decisions and constraints of those in a position to carry out specific policies, including policy relating to human rights abuses. While abuses could be the result of directives from central decision-makers, they could also go against standard policies and procedures. Individual actions by security agents could also result in reductions in human rights abuses where security agents refuse to carry out orders to abuse citizens (DeMeritt 2015). This logic implies that the focus needs to be on both the decision-making process and the process by which policy directives are followed or largely ignored. Decision-makers may consider whether agents will carry out their orders when deciding on a course of action. For example, no leader would want their directive for security agents to fire on protestors to be ignored. Such a move would then make the leader appear weak. Bureaucratic and state capacity to screen, train, monitor, and punish government agents that do not follow government directives may be an important but somewhat overlooked factor influencing the central decision-maker's decision-making process. By paying attention to these dynamics, future FPA work may better understand the decision-maker and the complicated process driving his or her decisions. In addition, future work could lead to a better understand of when directives are likely to be ignored or implemented in ways that are not consistent with the decision-maker's chosen policy.

Second, FPA could benefit from incorporating the theoretical insights of existing human rights scholarship concerning TANs. While FPA has been an innovator in the focus on domestic political actors, including domestic interest groups, less attention has been payed to the potential role of cross-border coalitions of NGOs and advocates. Within human rights scholarship, existing work has examined the process by which connected groups of NGOs, churches, third-party states, and other interested actors can

coordinate their efforts transnationally to change a country's human rights performance (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999, 2013). This scholarship draws on social network analysis and network science, focusing on how an individual actor's power can depend on his or her position in the overall transnational network and his or her ability to receive resources across borders (Carpenter 2007; Murdie 2014). Moreover, human rights scholarship has developed detailed theories concerning the process by which TANs can affect domestic decision-makers, focusing on the full progression from denial by the targeted states to, in certain situations, complete acquiescence and socialization consistent with the desires of the TAN (Risse et al. 1999, 2013). Both the focus on transnational networks and the detailed attention to the process of possible policy change may help FPA better address the 'interplay of societies, states, and transnational actors/forces', something Hill noted as 'one of the most important focal points for future foreign policy analysts' (2010: 12).

Some human rights scholarship has noted how NGOs, shaming, and human rights rhetoric may not work in all situations (Termann 2016; Gruffy dd-Jones 2019; Snyder 2020). Without domestic buy-in and legitimacy, international support for human rights and civil society could backfire, leading to a retrenchment of civil society and human rights support within the targeted state. Coupled with a rise in nationalism and far-right politics, a lack of domestic public support for advocacy efforts has contributed to new laws restricting the ability of international NGOs to work within some countries (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). Pre-existing domestic support for human rights may be necessary for international assistance to be effective in improving human rights conditions. Like the traditional theme of FPA, this work draws attention back squarely to the prominence of domestic actors, highlighting their importance even within TANs. This recent human rights scholarship may be helpful to FPA scholars interested in understanding how foreign policies could backfire in certain conditions where domestic non-state actor support is lacking. Understanding the potential utility of certain foreign policy actions requires a careful consideration of the conditions on the ground in the targeted state.

There is the possibility of further synergy between FPA and human rights scholarship in research on shaming and advocacy backlash. In human rights scholarship, the focus has turned to the psychological mechanisms underlying how individuals respond to criticism and shame (Ilgit and Praka

sh 2019; Snyder 2020). FPA's historic focus on role theory and the psychological disposition of agents could help future scholars understand when a targeted state is likely to respond to advocacy attempts with defiance, especially within the domestic population that the advocacy is intended to help (Thies and Breuning 2012; Kaarbo 2015). FPA's existing theory and approach may benefit from further engagement in this issue area.

Methodological innovations in the human rights literature also show much promise for the work of FPA scholars. These innovations centre on issues of bias in observed patterns of abuses, and focus on the data generating processes that underlie the abuses which scholars observe (Hasc hke and Arnon 2020). Data on human rights abuses are influenced by what Clark and Sikkink (2013) call 'information effects', where the 'process of information collection and interpretation' influences the levels of abuses observed rather than the 'process that actually gives rise to human rights violations or their mitigation' (540). Information effects are driven by many different factors, including an 'information paradox', where activists, by creating new issues and producing new information, observe more abuses, ultimately giving the 'impression that practices were getting worse, when actually they were just becoming more visible' (Sikkink 2018: 27–28). Similarly, as the information environment has improved over time, aided by advances in information and communication technologies, the advocacy organizations and monitors producing information on abuses have also became more fine-grained in their discussion of rights and abuses, leading to deeper taxonomic complexity (Park et al. 2020).

Data on human rights abuses are also influenced by what Fariss (2014) terms the 'changing standard of accountability', where over time the standard 'used to assess state behaviors becomes stringent as monitors look harder for abuse, look in more places for abuse, and classify more acts as abuse' (297). If information effects are not taken into consideration, observed levels of human rights abuses over time may give the false impression that situations are not improving or that certain highly transparent countries have worse human rights records than they actually do (Eck and Fariss 2018; Fariss 2018, 2019; Sikkink 2018).[1] Information effects have contributed to a disconnect between qualitative human rights scholarship, where scholars have generally been optimistic about the possibility of human rights improvements, and quantitative human rights

scholarship, which often relies on indicators derived from source material that could be biased (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).

Fariss (2014) proposes one potential solution to the issue of a changing standard of accountability, that of a measurement model that accounts for dynamic changes in the standard of accountability over time. The model incorporates a variety of existing measures concerning human rights and produces a latent variable that helps to correct for the potential bias of increased information on human rights abuses over time. By using this variable, quantitative researchers are able to see the improvements in human rights practices that have been observed by qualitative scholars since the 1970s. Other human rights scholars are also working on innovative ways to incorporate more information into the creation of new human rights measures (Conrad et al. 2014; Cordell et al. 2020; Farris and Lo 2020). For example, Clay et al. (2020) suggest a new way of gathering data on human rights abuses directly from practitioners and then using Bayesian scaling to adjust for any information effects and potentially biases, while still allowing for the classification of a range of different abuses.

There are many lessons that FPA can garner from human rights scholars' inquiry into how information effects influence the abuses scholars observe and the inferences they draw. First, standards of accountability may have changed in other political arenas, affecting how foreign policy processes are discussed and recorded over time. Second, the information available may not be uniform, with certain time periods and situations having more information than others. Even outside the realm of quantitative indicators, careful attention to the possibility of information effects may help a new generation of FPA scholars make sense of the decision-making processes they observe and the nuances with which certain behaviours are discussed over time.

What Policy-Makers Can Learn at the Junction of Human Rights and FPA

The growing synergy between FPA and human rights has produced a number of theoretically informed empirical findings which are of great importance to the policy world. Arguably, the three most powerful findings in this area can be summarized as:

(1) Some foreign policy actions can help human rights in targeted countries, but not all foreign policy actions taken with reference to human rights objectives work as intended. Some foreign policy actions may actually backfire and further harm human rights.
(2) Human rights concerns can motivate some individuals in certain situations, especially with a particular framing.
(3) Human rights promotion is an international security concern. Protecting human rights helps lower a country's risk of international war and terrorism.

First, scholars now know that there are myriad foreign policy actions often taken with reference to human rights goals that do not in fact improve human rights, at least not in most situations. Somewhat most surprising in this regard is that of sanctions. A large body of research shows that sanctions, even sanctions with clear human rights goals, typically lead to a worsening in human rights performance in targeted states (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2009; Carneiro and Apolinário 2016; Adam and Tsarsitalidou 2019). Sanctions not only affect core physical integrity rights (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009), they also reduce respect for women's rights (Drury and Peksen 2014), civil and political rights (Peksen and Drury 2009), and economic rights (Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2016). Sanctions also increase violence, including domestic terrorism (Heffington 2017). As Liou et al. (2020) found, sanctions work to reduce state capacity leading to an increase in violent protests within the targeted state. By reducing state capacity, there is an increase in human rights abuses that are due to a lack of oversight and monitoring. By increasing violent protest, governments may order additional abuses as a way to try to control their population and remain in power. These findings are important for policy-makers and human rights practitioners; if they are calling for action to improve human rights, it would be unfortunate if their advocacy led to policy changes that only exacerbated existing problems and further harmed vulnerable populations (Peksen et al. 2014).

Military interventions may also harm human rights, especially if such interventions are not taken for human rights or humanitarian purposes (Bellamy 2008; Murdie and Davis 2010; Peksen 2012). However, UN peacekeeping, a very specific type of military intervention taken at the end of hostilities, may actually improve human rights practices and the rule of law in postconflict countries (Blair 2021; Bsisu and Murdie 2020). Actions by other international organizations, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are also often associated with a worsening of human rights practices (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, 2009). Some of these negative effects may have lessened over time, perhaps as a result of

international organizations incorporating the lessons learned from existing research (Oberdabernig 2013).

The existing literature concerning the effect of aid allocation on human rights also implies that caution should be used with advocating for foreign aid as a way to improve human rights conditions. While some authors find that aid may reduce human rights and democratization levels (Ahmed 2016), others find a more positive relationship (Wei and Swiss 2020). Certain constellations of donors and/or targeted aid may improve human rights practices in limited situations (Scott and Steele 2011; Trisko Darden 2019; Bsisu and Murdie 2020; Ziaja 2020). However, as Nielsen et al. (2011) point out, drastic changes or 'shocks' in aid flows may lead to more violence. In short, across a wide array of foreign policy tools, the existing literature shows that good intensions or rhetoric alone may not be enough to improve human rights in targeted states.

Second, building on advances in survey and survey experiments, researchers can now definitively say that many individuals are motivated by human rights norms (Hertel et al. 2009; McEntire et al. 2015; Koo 2017; Zvobgo 2019). Individuals may even be motivated to support foreign policies or actions taken for human rights reasons (Allendoerfer 2017; Zvobgo 2019). These findings are important and go against traditional notions that foreign policy opinions are mercurial or only influenced by personal gain (Baum and Potter 2008; Allendoerfer 2017). Support for human rights may be influenced by personal characteristics (Wallace 2013; Koo 2017; Ron et al. 2017), domestic actions (Barton et al. 2017), and the characteristics of the abused (Conrad et al. 2018; Edwards and Arnon 2021; Lupu and Wallace 2019). Moreover, support for human rights can be influenced by the information produced by advocates and the framing used to discuss cases of abuse (Allendoerfer 2017; McEntire et al. 2015; Zvobgo 2019; Bracic and Murdie 2020; Haines et al. 2020). Support for human rights may also be influenced by references to international law, although the role of international law in influencing human rights opinions may vary by individual and country-level characteristics (Wallace 2013, 2014; Chilton 2014; Lupu and Wallace 2019). For policy-makers interested in supporting human rights causes, this line of inquiry shows how the creative use of framing and legal information may help sway public opinion in line with domestic and foreign policy actions taken to promote human rights.

Finally, the most important lesson from the current literature on human rights and foreign policy is that human rights are more than just normative, feel-good ideals. Countries with better human rights records are less likely to go to war, even when we account for the potential effects for democracy and economic development (Sobek et al. 2006; Hudson et al. 2009; Peterson and Graham 2011). Countries that protect human rights are also less likely to fall victim to insurgency and terrorist attacks, even after controlling for a wide variety of factors that could complicate the causal relationship (Walsh and Piazza 2010; Bell et al. 2013; Daxecker and Hess 2013). This research highlights the role of citizens in helping to protect against violence. When citizens within a state know that their rights are respected, they are more likely to turn in information on potential violence and are less likely to be motivated to act violently against their governments. For policy-makers, this research shows that human rights can be a fruitful policy goal, even divorced from any normative agenda. Protecting human rights at home and abroad can have powerful effects on a state's own security.

Conclusion

FPA and research on human rights share a common key interest: mapping the boundaries of acceptable political behaviour. FPA does this by tracing the decision-making process of leaders and elites, examining how an array of domestic factors either incentivize action or remove options from the playbook. Obviously, the outcomes of interest in FPA can be related to any policy dimension, though most typically the literature has focused on security issues. Human rights scholars have identified several major pathways by which domestic and international actors create new norms and alter pre-existing ones to protect human rights. These include shaming and the boomerang model, practical applications of the norms life cycle, and the rising standard of accountability conferred by international law. At the centre of this shared interest is a desire for more effective and humane outcomes. Our hope is that the insights of FPA can help explain at least key outcomes in the area of human rights research, specifically humanitarian intervention.

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, FPA has become increasingly comfortable with the incorporation of non-state actors into its theories about

decision-making. The most important cue that FPA scholars can take from human rights scholars is to continue this approach and to consider how non-state actors incentivize or sanction policy options. There is an entire universe of scholarship that charts TANs, the role of norms entrepreneurs in shaping discourse, the power of activists, and the rising tide of international law. FPA scholars should engage it. Human rights advocates are strategic and resourceful. Their impact on domestic and foreign policy will be felt throughout the foreseeable future.

Notes

1. See Richards (2013) and Cingranelli and Filippov (2018) for further discussion on whether changing standards of accountability and information effects influence the coding practices of major human rights data sets.

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CHAPTER 36

Foreign Policy and Global Health

CATHERINE Z. WORSNOP AND SUMMER MARION

INTRODUCTION

On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization's (WHO) country office in the People's Republic of China notified WHO's Western Pacific Regional Office of a media report from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission noting cases of viral pneumonia in the city of Wuhan (WHO 2020c). As of August 2021, what is now known as COVID-19 has spread to every country in the world with a global total of almost 200 million reported cases and over 4.2 million reported deaths (WHO 2021a). The COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented in many ways, including the breadth of spread, number and distribution of cases and deaths, the massive social and economic disruption of government policy responses, the extent of scientific cooperation, and the rapid development of vaccines (Lewis 2020; Haghani and Bliemer 2020). COVID-19 also reveals serious and long-standing gaps in the current system for governing the global response to major disease outbreaks. Despite increasing attention to global health and outbreak response within International Relations (IR) (see Finnemore et al. 2020), IR perspectives do not fully capture the complexities. In this chapter, we show that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) sheds new light on key challenges in the global response to major disease outbreaks.

WHO has verified around 500 infectious disease outbreaks in the past twenty years and outbreaks of new and re-emerging infectious diseases have increased in recent decades (Smith et al. 2014). Indeed, COVID-19 was the sixth of what have now become seven Public Health Emergencies of International Concern—PHEIC—an official designation made by WHO's director-general that a public health event is extraordinary, poses a risk to other states, and requires a coordinated international response (WHO 2005: article 1). The first five others include Ebola (2019), Zika (2016),

Ebola (2014), Polio (2014), and H1N1 (2009). The seventh, Mpox, was declared a PHEIC in 2022. WHO has the authority to declare a PHEIC and coordinate the global response to major disease outbreaks through a binding international agreement called the International Health Regulations (IHR), which were most recently updated by WHO member states in 2005 in the wake of the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak.

States have not always upheld commitments made under the IHR. Since the 2005 revision, states have withheld information from WHO and other states, and ignored WHO guidance about how they should (and should not) respond during major outbreaks. These trends have been on full display yet again during COVID-19 (Lee et al. 2020). The IHR do not explicitly cover the issue of vaccine development or distribution, another area in which COVID-19 has made shortcomings glaringly clear, with many states pursuing policies of *vaccine nationalism* at the expense of less developed states and, some argue, future control of the pandemic and the global economy (Kamradt-Scott 2020).

For its part, WHO has had mixed success in coordinating the response to major outbreaks through the IHR. In the face of the most severe outbreak of Ebola in history in 2014, WHO's actions were called 'plodding' and 'belated' (Sun et al. 2014). In response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, some praised the organization's early action, while others charged it with prematurely sounding the pandemic alarm, leading to the 'waste of large sums of public money, and also unjustified scares and fears about health risks' (Council of Europe 2010). The 2003 outbreak of SARS, however, is often acknowledged as a success for WHO, which provided leadership to rapidly contain the previously unknown disease within a number of months (Kamradt-Scott 2011). WHO's role in the COVID-19 response has been praised by some for providing early warning, sound technical advice, and a focus on lower resourced states (Youde 2020). Yet, others criticize the organization for its praise of China's response and resistance to updating guidance in response to new evidence, in particular related to international travel restrictions and the role of aerosol spread of the virus (Rauhala 2020).

The process-oriented, agent-based, psychological focus of FPA uniquely situates it to understand the complex dynamics that have stymied the collective response to disease outbreaks over time. In what follows, we identify three puzzles from the COVID-19 pandemic that prevailing IR theories cannot adequately explain: government adoption of cross-border

health measures at odds with WHO guidance, the timing of WHO's PHEIC declaration, and the design and operation of COVAX. Drawing on Kaarbo (2015), we show how FPA approaches can be used to shed light on these outcomes as a complement, competitor, and crucible, respectively. The chapter not only demonstrates the connections between FPA and traditional IR theory, but also the added value of FPA for explaining key challenges in outbreak response. Furthermore, the chapter makes clear that FPA approaches can be applied beyond just government decision-making to explain small-group decision-making within international organizations (IOs) as well as IO behaviour, and macro-level outcomes like the design of cooperative mechanisms such as COVAX.

US Cross-Border Health Measures during COVID-19: FPA as a Complement

We first consider the nature of United States (US) decision-making regarding cross-border health measures during pandemic under the Donald J. Trump and Joseph R. Biden administrations. In this case, FPA offers a useful complement to IR theory. Policy outcomes under the Trump and Biden administrations demonstrate surprising continuity, thus prevailing IR theory might distinguish little between the two. Yet we argue that the introduction of an FPA lens demonstrates how divergent domestic policy processes led to similar policy outcomes at the border for both administrations.

Under the IHR, WHO member states committed to follow WHO guidance with regard to cross-border health measures—which include border closures, visa restrictions, flight suspensions, and other restrictions on movement of people or goods across international borders—during global outbreaks (see WHO 2005: article 43; Lee et al. 2021). While states are permitted to adopt measures not recommended by WHO, they must provide scientific justification and follow a specific process outlined in the IHR (WHO 2005: article 43).

To meet the challenge of global outbreaks in an interdependent global economy, the IHR have the dual purpose of preventing the spread of disease with minimal unnecessary interference in international traffic and trade. Therefore, the IHR seek to provide public health protection while guarding

against negative externalities of travel and trade measures, which include: increased transmission caused by a rush of travellers to complete journeys in advance of announced measures being implemented, travellers by-passing health screenings by crossing borders illegally, disruptions to medical and other supply chains, increased opportunities for human rights violations, and incentivizing government concealment of outbreaks in order to avoid being the target of costly restrictions (Worsnop 2019; Devi 2020; Meier et al. 2020).

WHO advised against 'any travel or trade restriction' when it declared the outbreak of 2019-nCoV (now known as COVID-19) a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020 (WHO 2020a). Relatively early in the COVID-19 outbreak, however, all 194 WHO member states imposed some form of travel restriction in spite of WHO guidance to the contrary (WHO 2020f). Adopting cross-border health measures against WHO recommendations is not a new phenomenon, yet during past outbreaks including H1N1 (2009) and Ebola (2014) only around 25 per cent of states enacted trade and travel measures (Worsnop 2017a, 2017b). Universal implementation of border measures during COVID-19 highlights potentially widespread state non-compliance with the IHR and serious limits in the extent to which the IHR can facilitate a coordinated global response to outbreaks (Ferhani and Rushton 2020).

Why do governments adopt cross-border health measures against the advice of WHO? Explaining government decision-making about border policies during a major outbreak is critical to understanding and improving outbreak response and crisis decision-making generally, the operation of and future prospects for the IHR (2005), and more broadly, whether and how policy-makers account for international commitments during situations of uncertainty. Past research on the use of international travel and trade restrictions points to the role of electoral considerations and public pressures, and past experience of facing few consequences for disregarding WHO guidance (Worsnop 2017a, 2017b). But, COVID-19 raises several alternative possibilities including the role of shifting scientific evidence about the utility of cross-border health measures during outbreaks (Grépin et al. 2021), changes in advice from WHO (2020d), domestic partisan and bureaucratic politics (Kumar 2021), path dependence, and the interplay between domestic policy responses and border policy (Kenwick and Simmons 2020). The change in administration in the US during the COVID-19

pandemic offers a unique opportunity to examine the relative influence and interplay of these factors.

Early measures adopted under the Trump administration were widely criticized as ineffective from a public health perspective, isolationist, and xenophobic by Democrats and global health experts alike (Bollyky and Nuzzo 2020; Habibi et al. 2020). In spite of expectations that the Democratic Biden administration would fundamentally shift the US policy response to the pandemic, Biden's entrance into office heralded little change, and in fact it perpetuated previously adopted border measures. What explains US government border policy during COVID-19? The following describes US border policy under both the Trump and Biden administrations during COVID-19 and demonstrates that while mainstream IR theory can explain some aspects of US policy outcomes in this area, FPA serves as a useful complement.

On 31 January 2020—the day after WHO declared a PHEIC and recommended against the imposition of travel or trade restrictions—President Trump issued a proclamation barring international travel into the US by foreign nationals physically present in the People's Republic of China (PRC) within the preceding fourteen days, to take effect on 2 February. The order permitted repatriation of US citizens and immediate family members (White House 2020a). Alongside these measures, the US announced the country's first quarantine requirement in half a century—an order mandating that passengers returning to the US from Hubei Province in China should self-quarantine for fourteen days (Cohen 2020). At the federal level, these actions were not accompanied by the significant domestic measures recommended by WHO and others, such as increased testing or contact tracing, mask mandates, regulation of domestic travel, or mitigation measures to allow schools and business to operate safely, all of which were left to be determined by state governments (Noack 2020; WHO 2020e).

By late March 2020, similar border restrictions had been extended to include foreign nationals previously present in Iran, the European Schengen Area, and the United Kingdom (White House 2020b, 2020c). On 21 March 2020, the White House enacted another set of international travel measures, announcing mutual restriction of non-essential travel along the borders with Canada and Mexico (DHS 2020a, 2020b). In the case of the US-Mexico border, this measure was adopted despite opposition from the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) officials (Bandler et al. 2020). In May, the restrictions on travel from China, Iran, the Schengen Area, and the UK were extended to Brazil (White House 2020d). While Biden avoided a blanket denouncement, he repeatedly criticized the measures, exemplified by a 12 March tweet reading 'A wall will not stop the coronavirus. Banning all travel from Europe—or any other part of the world—will not stop it' (Kessler 2021).

On 18 January 2021, days before the end of his presidency, Trump quietly announced the lifting of travel restrictions against Europe and Brazil, effective 26 January, after Biden was to take office. Despite renewed multilateral coordination and rhetoric, as well as requiring a negative COVID-19 test for incoming international travellers, functionally, the Biden administration adhered to (and in some cases reinstated) border policies instituted under Trump, announcing restrictions on Europe and Brazil would stay in place. During Biden's first days in office, these measures were expanded to include South Africa, in response to the new SARS-CoV-2 variant circulating there (White House 2021).

Prevailing IR theories suggest policy similarities across the two administrations are unsurprising. A neorealist perspective, for example, accords no explanatory power to domestic policy processes, international commitments, or norms regarding the use of cross-border health measures during outbreaks (Mearsheimer 1994). While early versions of liberalism held domestic policy actors and processes influence outcomes (Keohane and Nye 1977; cited in Kaarbo 2015: 196), neoliberal perspectives tend towards the conceptualization of the state as a black box (Keohane 1984). International agreements such as the IHR (2005) carry more weight in the liberal paradigm when it comes to explaining state behaviour, but the way in which these commitments are weighed in domestic deliberations is underexplored (see Krasner 1983; cited in Kaarbo 2015: 196). Likewise, many constructivist explanations of norm development would not find consistent border policies across the two administrations puzzling. While constructivism better accounts for the role of socialization in individual and group decision-making at the substate level (for example, the manner in which personal background and partisan affiliation influenced both Trump and Biden), the constructivist paradigm does not provide a full systematic explanation for other substate factors influencing policy decision-making (Haas 1992; Checkel 2008).

FPA acts as a complement to IR perspectives, providing a more complete explanation of US border policy during COVID-19 by focusing on the *distinct processes* that nevertheless led each administration to similar policy outcomes. An FPA approach to individual leader characteristics and beliefs would see consistent border policies across the two administrations as a puzzle (Goldgeier 1997; Saunders 2017). We might expect former President Trump, who championed isolationist policies and questioned expertise and science throughout his administration (Washington Post Editorial Board 2020), to disregard international commitments and evidence-based guidance in a crisis, whereas we would have a higher expectation that President Biden would enact policies prioritizing international cooperation as well as scientific evidence (Lawler 2021)—for example, by publicly acknowledging the tradeoffs and limits of implementing travel measures, and their interplay with the domestic policy response to the pandemic.

At the same time, FPA work on bureaucratic politics offers some possible answers to this puzzle. Research on interagency politics tells us any shift in bureaucratic dynamics has staying power (Welch 1992; Brower and Abolafi a 1997; Allison and Zelikow 1999). As such, perhaps the marginalization of the CDC under the Trump administration early in the crisis and the consolidation of decision-making within the White House were not easily reversed after Biden entered office. Similarly, partisan dynamics and conflicts persisted after the transition of power and FPA research on elite-mass relations (Kertzer 2020) suggests that the Biden administration may have maintained the border policies as political cover, while expending its limited political capital on what were seen as more important policy priorities (Maxmen and Subbaraman 2021).

Beyond these purely domestic level factors, FPA points to the need to understand how broader contextual factors were filtered through domestic decision-making processes (Carlsnaes 1992). The Trump and Biden administrations made initial decisions about border policies at different stages of the outbreak, facing different global contexts regarding COVID-related border policies. In contrast to Trump, by the time Biden entered office every country had imposed some sort of border restriction; new evidence called into question WHO's initial recommendations against such measures, and WHO itself had even softened its stance and implicitly supported more stringent border policies than the ones adopted under Trump and continued by Biden.[1] FPA research on leadership, decision-

making, and societal context offers insight into how domestic political actors account for shifting and contested beliefs and norms.

While prevailing IR theories would expect similar border policies across the two administrations, the FPA focus on decision-making processes reveals potentially important differences between the two administrations, with implications for US (and other states') policy in the on-going pandemic, future crises related to public health or otherwise, and the role of WHO and other IOs.

WHO's Public Health Emergency Declaration for COVID-19: FPA as a Competitor

FPA can also play the role of theoretical competitor to IR theories. Declaring a PHEIC is one of WHO's key roles in coordinating the response to major outbreaks. We show here that FPA research on state-level decision-making, leadership characteristics, and small-group dynamics offers a compelling explanation of the timing of WHO's PHEIC declaration for COVID-19.

A key part of the 2005 IHR revision was to create a better global alert system for major outbreaks, requiring states to quickly report potential PHEICs as well as other relevant public health information to WHO, and giving WHO's director-general authority to declare a PHEIC after receiving advice from an Emergency Committee made up of scientific and medical experts. A PHEIC declaration gives WHO authority to issue recommendations about how governments should respond to a given outbreak. Governments are supposed to follow such guidance (with some exceptions) (WHO 2005). Yet, over the past decade, implementation of these new requirements has been mixed.

Government outbreak reporting is often delayed due to a combination of factors including lack of surveillance capacity, room for subjectivity in IHR reporting requirements, and fears of negative economic and political repercussions, which the IHR have not adequately addressed (Worsnop 2017a, 2019). WHO has also been criticized for sounding the PHEIC alarm too early, too late, or unnecessarily, and has not yet solved the fundamental challenge of providing credible information to the international community in the face of emerging evidence and a rapidly evolving situation.

One challenge is that the process for declaring a PHEIC is neither clearly defined nor consistently applied in practice. The IHR define a PHEIC as (1) an extraordinary event that, (2) poses a public health risk to other countries, and (3) potentially requires a coordinated international response (WHO 2005: article 1). Yet the regulations do not provide guidance on how the Emergency Committee should assess whether these criteria are met. Further, elsewhere the IHR stipulates the director-general may consider factors beyond those criteria when making the final determination including information provided by the affected state, the 'risk of interference with international traffic', and 'other relevant information' (WHO 2005: article 12).

While the director-general has never deviated from Emergency Committee advice (in one case—Mpox 2022—the Emergency Committee did not reach consensus and the director-general declared a PHEIC), analysis of nine of the ten convened Emergency Committees since the new IHR entered into force reveals variation in interpretation and weighting of different factors. In particular, whether and to what extent political and social consequences (like the tendency of countries to respond to declarations with cross-border trade and travel restrictions) entered into Committee decision-making varied across outbreaks (Mullen et al. 2020).

WHO's Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus convened an Emergency Committee for COVID-19 on 22–23 January 2020, three weeks after China first reported the outbreak. The Committee was split on whether criteria for a PHEIC had been met and so the director-general did not declare a PHEIC. He reconvened the Committee on 30 January, at which time the Committee advised the director-general to declare a PHEIC, and he did so (WHO 2020a; Mullen et al. 2020). While most public health experts commended WHO's early warning through its 30 January PHEIC declaration, many questioned what role geopolitical factors might have played in the 22 January decision against declaring (Pillinger 2020).

Why does the timing of a PHEIC declaration matter? First, as a key revision to the IHR in 2005, understanding PHEIC declaration dynamics is important for evaluating the operation of the IHR. Second, PHEIC declarations influence when and how governments and other actors respond to outbreaks, though these effects are neither fully understood nor always intended or desirable (Wenham et al. 2020). Third, understanding the processes shaping PHEIC decisions can shed light on other WHO decisions

ranging from how it develops outbreak response guidance for countries to whether and why the organization praises some governments and criticizes others.

COVID-19 has thrust WHO into a familiar debate about the role of IOs in international politics—are they constantly trying to push the limits of state delegation and expand their authority, or are they just a tool of the most powerful actors? Though IR scholarship offers tools for understanding the PHEIC process and timing of the COVID-19 declaration (see Busby 2020), mainstream approaches that are largely outcome oriented leave key unanswered questions. Given its process focus, FPA is arguably better suited for analysing PHEIC timing.

To begin with, neorealism sees limited value in explaining the timing of WHO PHEIC declarations, as they are unlikely to have system-level effects. And, since IOs themselves play no independent role in outcomes (Gilpin 1983a; Mearsheimer 1994), failure to declare the PHEIC earlier could be explained by pressure on WHO from the Chinese government. But, if the PHEIC declaration truly does not matter, why would China worry about the consequences of WHO making the declaration? While public health information provided by China (and lack thereof) was critical to WHO decisions (WHO 2020a, 2020b), this is only part of the story. Neorealism offers little insight into either the pattern of information sharing by China or other parts of the process which involve decision-making within WHO.

Unlike neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism would acknowledge the PHEIC declaration as important and would agree that IOs can play a role in outcomes (Keohane 1984; Hopf 1998). But, neither can explain China's use of 'informational' power or dynamics at WHO that led to the declaration. Neoliberal institutionalism would acknowledge that country compliance with international agreements will be incomplete, but cannot easily explain variation over time in China's cooperation with WHO. Constructivist approaches might argue China's balancing act of sharing just enough information to look cooperative accords with its overall identity on the international stage, yet this perspective glosses over the domestic processes that result in that balancing act (Tan 2021).

Turning to dynamics within WHO, neoliberal institutionalism would view WHO's PHEIC declaration as part of its information provision role, explaining the declaration process through a functionalist lens (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Yet, neoliberal institutionalism largely ignores dynamics

within IOs, missing the importance of the WHO director-general and IHR Emergency Committee members' own interpretations of the IHR. Unlike neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism recognizes that what happens inside of IOs is worth understanding. Approaches based on organization theory, for instance, might suggest WHO expansionary tendencies underlie the Emergency Committee's consideration of political and social factors in addition to public health criteria laid out under the IHR in evaluating whether a PHEIC should be declared (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). But what explains the initial split opinion in the Emergency Committee and variation in how members evaluated the same information, the public health criteria, and the potential economic, social, and political costs?

The timing of the PHEIC declaration remains a puzzle for mainstream IR theories. In contrast, FPA recognizes that internal processes within both the Chinese government and WHO shaped the PHEIC declaration, and that the timing of the PHEIC declaration is an important outcome of interest. An FPA explanation would acknowledge the timing of the PHEIC declaration as the culmination of a three-stage decision-making process involving: first, a range of government actors within China; second, the WHO director-general; and, third, the IHR Emergency Committee.

Explaining China's use of 'informational' power requires an FPA analysis of intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics (Carlsnaes 1992; Welch 1992; Brower and Abolafia 1997; Allison and Zelikow 1999) and how key political and public health actors at multiple levels within China weighed issues of state capacity, threat perception, bureaucratic pressures, concerns about domestic political and economic stability, and concerns about global reputation (Buckley et al. 2020). Interestingly, Huang (2020) writes that COVID-19 'reveals a pattern of cover-up and inaction similar to that which occurred during the SARS outbreak … however, local government leaders and health authorities appear to have played a more prominent role'. Understanding such domestic political nuance requires an FPA lens.

Turning to WHO, FPA scholarship on leadership characteristics and small-group dynamics can shed light on decision-making within WHO (Goldgeier 1997; Saunders 2017). For example, the director-general's history of strategically using praise rather than criticism to get actors to cooperate—such as the (now reversed) appointment of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe as a goodwill ambassador for non-communicable disease (*The Guardian* 2017)—looks similar to the director-general's public praise approach to getting

China to share information. Furthermore, FPA's process-oriented approach (Thies and Breuning 2012) would look beyond the director-general's public statements and see that in spite of resource constraints and limited formal authority, WHO was 'urgently trying to solicit more data' from China at the beginning of the outbreak but it was 'stuck in the middle' and had limited success (Associated Press 2020). As such, an FPA approach to the director-general's decision to convene an Emergency Committee for COVID-19 would examine leadership characteristics to understand how he navigates his position as the head of a special type of bureaucracy (Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001)—an IO—and the competing priorities that brings, including the need for China's continued cooperation, satisfying other member states, fulfilling legal authorities under the IHR, WHO's reputation, and the imperative to act in the face of a growing public health crisis.

Finally, in explaining dynamics within the IHR Emergency Committee, FPA would look to the composition of the Committee including individual members as well as group dynamics to explain contested ideas and disagreements about the role of the Emergency Committee (Kaarbo 2003; Ashizawa 2008; Cantir and Kaarbo 2012; Kaarbo 2015: 203). For example, what looks like 'expansionary tendencies' of the Emergency Committee is just as likely the outcome of different subjective interpretations of the IHR, or a result of the medical and scientific backgrounds of many Emergency Committee members who may not be well versed in the text of the IHR (Wenham et al. 2020). Furthermore, the backgrounds of specific members (such as past experience on the committee) may be significant.

Unlike mainstream IR theories, FPA provides a strategy for explaining the timing of WHO's PHEIC declaration for COVID-19, a multi-step process including a multiplicity of actors adjudicating between contested views and identities. This case makes clear that FPA approaches can be applied to explain decision-making within both the Chinese state *and* WHO. Importantly, an FPA perspective illustrates that portrayals of WHO during COVID-19, as either comprised of bureaucrats trying to expand their authority or just a tool of the Chinese government, are overly simplistic. Instead, WHO occupies a complex middle ground that can be understood using FPA approaches.

Hybrid Cooperation through COVAX: FPA as a Crucible

Finally, we examine global cooperation emergent in the form of COVAX, the public-private partnership (PPP) supporting COVID-19 vaccine development and promoting equitable global vaccine access. Here, FPA may act as a crucible for IR theory. Previous findings in IR suggest the COVID-19 pandemic is a case in which the immediacy and magnitude of the crisis should lead to state cooperation (Fazal 2020), alongside global health research suggesting that variation in state capacity may elicit greater state cooperation during crises (Barrett 2006). Yet FPA findings allow for deeper understandings of how domestic leadership type interacts with structural conditions (Carlsnaes 1992), giving way to new theoretical explanations unreachable through IR paradigms alone. We postulate crisis conditions, convergent with powerful private actors and prevalence of populist leadership among key states, results in shallow forms of *hybrid cooperation*—in which private actors play lead roles in multilateral governance arrangements—while state engagement remains weak (Fazal 2020; Marion 2021b). This case demonstrates how FPA paradigms are relevant to the study of non-state actors in IR, an area in which they are rarely utilized.

The COVID-19 pandemic put debates about global vaccine equity into stark relief. Reportedly the largest multilateral effort since the 2016 Paris Climate Agreement, COVAX is a collaboration of 191 states (as of this writing), with wealthier countries signing on to both benefit from vaccine development themselves and fund access for ninety-two middle- and lower income countries (Belluz 2020; Gavi 2020). The initiative is spearheaded by WHO and two PPPs: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation (CEPI). COVAX was heralded early on as a groundbreaking cross-sector cooperative effort. But the initial absence of certain powerful states and research suggesting state commitments may hold little significance (Fazal 2020), or could be intended to divert attention from discussions about more meaningful reform to the pharmaceutical industry (Williams 2012; Saksena 2021), cast doubt on this early optimism. Narratives about shallow cooperation have only grown stronger given stark inequities in vaccine distribution.

Unlike most conventional multilateral agreements, states may negotiate individual arrangements with COVAX. Furthermore, many wealthy

countries that joined COVAX also secured vaccine doses through bilateral deals with pharmaceutical companies. Details of both types of arrangements are rarely transparent. While states often resort to *vaccine nationalism* to satisfy short-term interests, global health experts argue global vaccine equity is in states' best interest longer term to slow disease transmission, prevent future illness, loss of life, and economic harm (Rushton 2011). Despite the urgency of vaccine development, many of the world's most powerful countries initially relied solely on such bilateral deals, remaining conspicuously absent from COVAX until late in the game (Branswell 2020).

China delayed joining until October 2020 despite rhetoric to the contrary, with President Xi Jinping pledging in May 2020 to treat vaccines as a 'global public good' (Wheaton 2021). Early data on China's bilateral vaccine diplomacy suggests it is not reaching populations most in need, and is more likely targeted at reinforcing geopolitical influence (Bollyky 2021). While the US did not join COVAX under the Trump administration, incoming Biden administration Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the US intention to join in January 2021 (Lawler 2021). US vaccine diplomacy under the Biden administration demonstrated greater focus on foreign aid, yet it appeared to prioritize US allies and shorter term interests over vaccine equity (Sevastopulo et al. 2021). And Ghana received the first delivery of COVAX vaccines destined for low- or middle-income countries on 24 February 2021, more than two months after wealthier countries had begun vaccinating their populations (WHO 2021b).

While some IR paradigms concur with global health scholarship suggesting the COVID-19 pandemic met optimal conditions for cooperation (see Barrett 2006; Fazal 2020), others contend the collective action assumptions underlying global outbreak response are untenable, arguing states will unfailingly prioritize short-term interests (Peterson 2002). Yet existing paradigms do not fully explain the nature and structure of multilateral cooperation in the case of COVAX, especially with regard to the leadership role of PPPs.

Neorealist explanations, for example, would not expect meaningful cooperation to occur—offering a partial explanation of early state isolationism, but either failing to account for state participation in COVAX or simply writing these commitments off as shallow and irrelevant (Gilpin 1983b; Mearsheimer 1994). Neoliberal explanations, while similarly state-

centric, would expect greater international cooperation in response to early calls from WHO (Keohane 1984). But many states still have not followed WHO guidance about how they should respond to the pandemic, and major private organizations generally pledged more funding earlier in the crisis than most states (Marion 2021a), in addition to engaging in operational aspects of the response—a trend for which neither paradigm fully accounts. Constructivism better explains the role of non-state actors and epistemic networks in shaping outcomes (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998), yet it does not fully explain the structure and nature of international cooperation reflected in COVAX.

Applying FPA lenses to this analysis adds nuance to IR explanations and yields new theoretical insights. Engaging frameworks of leadership and political psychology, one might argue global prevalence of populist and isolationist leadership lends itself to crisis decision-making prioritizing short-term aims, explaining lack of early state cooperation (Goldgeier 1997; Saunders 2017; Carnegie and Clark 2020), and its shallow nature (Fazal 20 20). Tana Johnson advances a similar argument in her analysis of the pandemic response, citing a lack of *resolute leadership* as an obstacle to crafting policies aimed at tackling long-term interests (such as vaccine equity) in the context of collective action problems posed by the pandemic (2020). This line of reasoning aligns with work on elite-mass relations suggesting constituent views may matter in foreign policy decision-making (Worsnop 2017b; Kertzer 2020). Thus, work on leadership type, small-group decision-making, and elite-mass relations offers a set of potential explanations for two outcomes: (1) weak state leadership early in the development of COVAX; and (2) the shallow nature of state cooperation over time.

Drawing on scholarship on bureaucratic politics, one could furthermore argue that shifts in interagency relationships under the Trump administration, such as marginalization of the CDC and State Department, constrained the Biden administration's ability to re-engage in global cooperative arrangements (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Glennon 2014). This demonstrates how the presence of early populist leadership in a key state set the stage for shallow cooperation with path dependent effects. Biden officials restored past practices such as bilateral coordination with traditional US allies, and made public financial and diplomatic commitments to supporting WHO-led efforts like COVAX (Maxmen and S

ubbaraman 2021). Yet FPA work on societal context illustrates how the timing of Biden's inauguration, more than a year after the COVID-19 pandemic began, limited his options in shaping both the domestic and global responses (Carlsnaes 1992). US material and rhetorical support for COVAX may have been more extensive without the populist foundations of Trump's presidency. In this way, FPA research on bureaucracy, societal context, and elite-mass relations points to causal factors explaining both the development and nature of multilateral cooperation under COVAX, beyond conventional IR explanations.

These FPA approaches, taken in context with the strongest available neoliberal IR explanations, might lead us to postulate that COVAX represents a weak form of *hybrid cooperation*—when pre-existing private actors play a leadership role in global cooperative initiatives—occurring under structural conditions when cooperation would typically be expected *and* domestic decision-making factors in key states that would normally lead cooperative efforts are not conducive to state-led initiatives (Marion 2021b). The emergence of COVAX is a manifestation of a broader trend, also illustrated by early and unprecedented levels of philanthropic support for the COVID-19 response, even in the absence of state funding and services (Marion 2021a). This case offers an illustration of how FPA approaches are relevant to IR conceptualizations of non-state actors, and ultimately demonstrates how FPA research on leadership type, interagency politics, and elite-mass relations may serve as a crucible for IR explanations, enriching both fields and giving way to new theoretical approaches.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates that FPA approaches can shed new light on key challenges in the global response to major disease outbreaks. FPA work on leadership, bureaucratic politics, small-group decision-making, and elite-mass relations helps to explain government adoption of cross-border health measures at odds with WHO guidance, the timing of WHO's PHEIC declaration, and the emergence of global cooperation through COVAX. FPA research offers unique insights into each with implications for policy to improve outbreak response.

With regard to government adoption of cross-border health measures at odds with WHO guidance, FPA approaches point to bureaucratic inertia as a potential domestic-level barrier to compliance with international commitments. This mechanism will not be addressed by technical solutions like improving the evidence base behind WHO guidance or adding specificity to the language of the IHR. While such changes are important (Habibi et al. 2020), applying an FPA lens to this issue illustrates non-compliance will persist without addressing domestic-level processes.

The chapter also clearly demonstrates the utility of FPA for explaining outcomes related to non-state actors including IOs and PPPs. Applying FPA approaches to WHO's PHEIC declaration for COVID-19 reveals three decision-making processes that influence the policy outcome. Global health experts have suggested several reforms to the PHEIC process, the effects of which cannot be fully considered without thinking through implications at each of the three steps in the PHEIC decision chain, and their interconnections.

With regard to COVAX, FPA helps makes sense of weak hybrid cooperation through COVAX in a time when populism has grown worldwide. But, even if populist leaders are replaced over time, preventing such me-first approaches during future outbreaks requires a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms by which private actors interact with global- and state-level decision-makers across the political spectrum.

Overall, applying FPA research to these key issues in outbreak response highlights a general trend in global health academic and policy circles: a focus on technical and public health factors at the expense of political dynamics. While political science research on global health is well established and growing, policy engagement may remain a challenge. As Maliniak et al. (2020: 17) write, 'the opportunities for scholars to influence policy will be constrained when some other discipline currently occupies that policy space'. This is certainly the case in global health and outbreak response due to the primacy of the public health and medical professions and pre-existing relationships between those fields and global health practitioners. COVID-19 has drawn attention to the importance of politics to public health, and as this chapter demonstrates, FPA has much to offer for both scholarship and policy in the area of global outbreak response.[2]

Notes

1. It is important to note that though the evidence base has shifted regarding the utility of travel restrictions during an outbreak, we are not suggesting US border policies throughout the pandemic have been sound. In fact, findings from studies on the use of travel restrictions during COVID-19 suggest US policies at the border across both administrations have been relatively ineffective.
2. The authors acknowledge support from the Pandemics and Borders Project, which is funded by the New Frontiers in Research Fund (Grant NFRFR-2019-00009) through an operating grant awarded under the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Rapid Response Funding Opportunity. CZW is a Principal Investigator on the grant. SM is a Research Fellow. The funders were not involved in the design or writing of this analysis.

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Please note that this chapter was written in 2021 during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. As such, some information may have changed by the time of publication.

CHAPTER 37

Foreign Policy and Immigration

ANNA R. OLTMAN

International migration occupies a complex position in international politics. Migration can be understood as broad movements of people across international borders, as the result of policies at the international, national, and even subnational level, and the decisions of individual migrants. The field of International Relations (IR), where it has engaged with migration at all, has tended to analyse it as the outcome of structural factors such as the distribution of labour across countries or the availability of protection abroad in the case of forced migrants. When it comes to immigration, or the arrival and reception of migrants in particular countries, analysis has often been relegated to domestic politics, where the processes and determining factors of where people choose to migrate are obscured. In this sense, the study of immigration is caught between the domestic and the international, and between a privileging of either structural factors or policy-makers' decisions. Contemporary immigration policy is also rife with empirical puzzles for IR, in that even as it provokes nationalist and xenophobic sentiments in immigrant receiving states it also reflects the dynamic and changing nature of the state itself. With its focus on the policy-making process and the human agency behind political decisions, a foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach is key to unpacking these puzzles. Furthermore, the uniqueness of immigration as a foreign policy issue involving control over embodied individuals themselves making decisions about transborder movement means that an FPA approach to immigration promises theoretical and empirical innovation for the study of foreign policy more broadly.

This chapter begins by positioning immigration as a foreign policy issue in that it represents an interaction between states and other actors in the international system. Yet immigration policy is rarely constructed in isolation from other international concerns of states, and new research in the area of 'migration diplomacy' highlights how foreign policy actors link

other substantive issues of international politics to their negotiations over migration. The chapter goes on to document several ways in which immigration is at odds with a conception of the state as a unitary actor. Immigration policy is determined and executed by a diverse and diffuse set of actors within states, often driven by competing interests and a wide range of institutional forces. Furthermore, any understanding of a national interest with regards to immigration must take into account the fluid and changing nature of national identity in immigrant receiving states. Diasporas, as populations situated in a transnational space between origin and host country, integrate and impact on the host nation while also advocating for particular foreign policy goals related to their origin state. What makes immigration unique among foreign policy issues is that it involves the regulation and control of embodied humans as they navigate the international system, and in the next section I highlight the uneasy relationship between immigration policy and the human rights of migrants. The concluding section offers suggestions for further synthesis between immigration studies and FPA, which promise to be both theoretically significant and policy relevant.

Throughout the chapter, the terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘migrant’ are used to refer broadly to people who move across international borders and should be understood as being inclusive of asylum seekers, refugees, and other forced migrants. The distinction between refugees and other migrants, while significant for accessing legal protections under international law, is often the result of legal and bureaucratic processes that take place after a person has already migrated. In addition, the prevalence of ‘mixed migration’ flows or migrant populations containing both refugees as conceived under international law and other types of displaced people, means that state policy is often directed towards migrants of all kinds simultaneously.

Immigration as Foreign Policy

Immigration research has long struggled to gain a toehold in the field of IR, for reasons of both structure and substance. As I will discuss in the next section, the structure of immigration decision-making is typically far more decentralized than decision-making over other areas of foreign policy, and this complicates efforts of IR theorists to conceptualize the state as a unitary

actor. The substantive significance of immigration itself for IR has also been contested. Whereas IR can broadly be understood as the politics of two or more unitary states in the international system, the politics of immigration often play out more prominently on the domestic stage. Twentieth-century political science research on immigration, for example, was primarily interested in the impact of immigration on the politics of receiving states, such as through its influence on voting behaviour or the composition of the labour market. To the extent that the 'international' entered into these discussions, it was limited to a concern for the 'foreignness' of new immigrant populations. The idea that immigration might constitute an interaction between states in and of itself was rarely acknowledged.

Against this backdrop, scholars of immigration developed two key strategies to establish immigration as a concern for IR: securitization theory and issue linkages. If IR is the realm of high politics, or issues of war and state survival, securitization constructs a topic as one of IR by reframing it according to its security implications (Wæver 1989). For immigration, this has meant highlighting the threat to state security posed by immigration, for example as a source of radical ideology or terrorism (Freeman et al. 2009). This securitization of immigration has been pushed by policy-makers and scholars alike—humanitarian institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, have found it efficacious in their goal of protecting refugees to frame displacement crises as a threat to global security, which garners greater financial contributions from states and greater deference towards UNHCR policy (Hammerstad 2014). The precise threat that immigration poses to security has been located both in immigrants themselves as a vector for the spread of conflict and terrorism, and in the risks posed by inadequate policy responses to migration and displacement. Indeed, scholars will often place immigration and refugee protection in the category of human security, which makes explicit the link between state security and the safety and protection of *people* (King and Murray 2001; Kaldor 2007; Edwards and Ferstman 2010). Yet the securitization of immigration is not without its drawbacks. The positive reframing of human security notwithstanding, the association of immigration with security cannot avoid the implication that immigrants themselves are a security threat. As a result, this framework risks providing

intellectual justification for policies of immigrant exclusion, deterrence, and containment (Huysmans 2006).

An alternative framework for understanding immigration as foreign policy can be found in research that links immigration policy to issues more commonly recognized as being in the realm of IR, such as globalization and development. For example, recent research has tied immigration restrictions to the lobbying influence of firms, whose interest in pushing for greater 'low skill' immigration is tied to trade and investment openness (Peters 2014). Similarly, states' decisions about where to target their foreign aid donations are often based on a strategy of using economic development to reduce emigration from those countries (Bermeo and Leblang 2015). These synergies offer insights into both immigration and economic policy that could not be found by looking at either in isolation. Issue linkages also offer a strategy for understanding immigration's relationship to international war and conflict without constructing migration as a security issue itself. For example, patterns of refugee admittances during the Cold War can only be understood through the lens of geopolitical competition between the US, the Soviet Union, and their proxies. American refugee policy, for example, strategically recognized asylum seekers from communist countries as refugees in need of protection, while systematically denying refugee status to asylum seekers from regimes the US was allied with (Teitelbaum 1984).

In recent years, FPA has reinvigorated the study of issue linkages to immigration under the heading of migration diplomacy. In a pivotal 2017 publication, Tsourapas defines migration diplomacy as 'the use of diplomatic tools, processes and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility, including both the strategic use of migration flows as a means to obtain other aims, and the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration' (2370). This definition helpfully delineates a unique field of inquiry within IR that includes both immigration policy-making and the strategic use of immigration policy towards other foreign policy goals (see Greenhill 2010). Adamson and Tsourapas point to the 2016 EU-Turkey Agreement on immigration and refugee policy as an example of migration diplomacy at work. In this case, Turkey agreed to accept the return of unauthorized migrants who arrived in Greece from its territory (including asylum seekers) and to take steps to reduce the flow of migrants into the EU. In exchange, the EU offered considerable concessions, including a 6 billion euro aid package and renewed talks on

Turkey's accession to the EU (Adamson and Tsourapas 2018). The source of Turkey's bargaining power was its position as a key transit state for migrants attempting to enter the EU.

While the research programme on migration diplomacy is still relatively new, it continues to grow and has made an invaluable contribution to the study of the IR of Global South countries. Indeed, traditional statist approaches to IR have often overlooked non-Western, small, or poor states as actors with significant power in international politics, where power is understood in terms of a state's size, economic capacity, or military strength. Positioned as they are in proximity to the origins or key nodes of transit for international migration flows, states in the Global South wield a considerable amount of bargaining power in the area of migration and its policy linkages. This is true both in the relations between states in the Global South, where migrant expulsions and admittances have been used as sticks and carrots respectively in bilateral diplomatic relations (Paoletti 2011; Thiollet 2011; Tsourapas 2017, 2018a), and in the relations between the Global South and North (Délano 2009; Schenk 2016; Demiryontar 2021).

Finally, the study of migration diplomacy helps to clarify the scope of what immigration as foreign policy consists of. Too often, immigration is treated as an exogenous force to which states can only respond,[1] and the policies that shape it are left unexamined. Those policies include bilateral and multilateral agreements to promote certain types of immigration, as well as those to contain or discourage unauthorized immigration and asylum seeking (Adamson and Tsourapas 2018). Unilateral decisions to expel or admit immigrants as a tool of bargaining with other states or with international organizations (IOs) are also tools of immigration foreign policy, as is the use of a state's diaspora population as soft power to influence another state's culture or politics. As I will discuss in the final section of this chapter, border policy and the treatment of migrants in transit should also be understood as foreign policy related to immigration.

In sum, the tools of FPA have helped to identify immigration as a substantive issue of IR and to integrate it into analyses of states' overarching foreign policy goals. As the next section shows, an FPA approach is also uniquely equipped to answer questions about how immigration foreign policy is made and whose interests it reflects.

Institutions of Immigration Policy-Making

When images and stories of migrant families being detained and separated at the southern US border began to circulate in 2018, public outrage over the policy's inhumanity centred squarely on then president, Donald Trump. Responsibility for the human rights of people in their government's custody undoubtedly falls to the leader of a country, and FPA offers crucial insight into the role of individuals in shaping policy. Yet when it comes to immigration, an exclusive focus on leaders as the source of policy obscures the full picture of the structures, institutions, and processes that both shape and implement that policy space.

A variety of institutions within states hold responsibility for crafting, enforcing, and evaluating immigration policy. This diversity complicates any effort to identify a single immigration policy-maker or a single immigration policy. While legislatures may craft immigration law, decisions about enforcement of that law are often the more proximate source of immigration policy. In the US, this enforcement is carried out by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), an executive agency that includes Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In the case of Trump and the family separation policy, these agencies were instructed to offer 'zero tolerance' towards unauthorized border crossings.[2] Under the presidential administration of Barack Obama that preceded Trump, enforcement was based on a policy of discretion where action against unauthorized migrants was discouraged if, for example, they had strong social ties to the US or had been there for a long time. That two vastly different policies can emerge from the same immigration law is evidence of what Cox and Rodríguez call the 'tremendous gap between the law on the books and the law on the ground' when it comes to immigration (2015). Of course, such policies have also been litigated in the courts, and as I discuss below the judges in these cases can also be understood as foreign policy actors when it comes to immigration.

In fact for most states, there is not a single national immigration policy but rather many interacting immigration policies as the result of complex and diffuse immigration institutions. Federalism, for example, creates space for regional and local governments to pursue immigration policies in line with their own interests. Where the process of issuing visas or residence

permits or recruiting labour immigrants is delegated to subnational actors, this can place federal governments at odds with the actions of localities. The German *Länder*, for example, repeatedly attempted to restrict both residency permits and family reunification for migrants throughout the late 20th century, until policy became more firmly centralized in the early 2000s (Soennecken 2014). Local institutions such as municipal governments, law enforcement, and civil society are often enlisted to enforce orders of removal against immigrants. Where these actors hold less restrictive immigration policy preferences or are beholden to pro-immigrant civil society groups, they may refuse to enforce orders for detention or deportation. The phenomenon of sanctuary cities is a prominent recent example of this (Ridgley 2008).

On the one hand, the diffuse nature of immigration institutions and the diversity of interests they represent dampen the power of any one of them to unilaterally forge a state's immigration policy. On the other hand, by locating immigration policy-making in a variety of institutions within the state, FPA can identify relevant immigration actors that are largely ignored by IR. These actors are of interest both because their preferences with regards to immigration help to explain immigration policy outcomes and because their decision-making itself can be understood as a foreign policy-making process. Below, I discuss some of the insights from recent research on two such sets of actors: bureaucrats and the courts. Furthermore, while FPA has largely drawn attention to immigration actors within states, IOs and regional organizations (ROs) are two additional sets of actors that play a significant role in immigration policy. I conclude this section with a brief discussion of how research on international and transnational migration actors can build useful synergies between FPA and IR that traverse the boundaries of the state.

Immigration Bureaucracy

Immigration bureaucracies consist of the specialized agents tasked with implementing immigration policy. Decisions about visa applications or asylum status, monitoring of unauthorized immigrants and those whose status is undecided, and the tasks of detaining and deporting[3] migrants all fall within the realm of bureaucratic action on immigration. There is a great deal of power in implementation, even at the level of individual

bureaucrats. Asylum officers, for example, are tasked with evaluating both the veracity of a migrants' testimony and the congruity of their case with the requirements for refugee status. Outcomes for asylum seekers are therefore highly dependent on individual adjudicators. Similarly, border officials tasked with identifying unauthorized entry and filtering migrants into legal processes for asylum adjudication or protection for victims of human smuggling exercise considerable power when they identify the point at which people have entered into the legal territory of the state (Mountz 2010).

Recent scholarship on immigration bureaucracy has argued that bureaucracies do not just implement policy, they also take an active and often unacknowledged role in crafting it. At times, this policy-making takes place at the level of agency heads and administrators, who set the agenda for immigration enforcement and establish guiding principles for evaluating individual cases. In a 2017 study on American border control, for example, Kang argues that high-level officials in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) took an active role in constructing the southern border as a zone for policing and interdicting migrants in the name of national security (Kang 2017). Yet bureaucratic policy-making can also take a bottom-up form, driven by mid- and low-level bureaucrats. Research by Paquet has shown that in the Canadian context, where immigration bureaucracies are autonomous and relatively non-politicized,[4] provincial bureaucrats have played a significant role in promoting a pro-immigrant stance in Canadian immigration policy (Paquet 2015, 2020). When one considers that immigration restrictionism and openness to immigration are key characteristics of contemporary US and Canadian foreign policy, respectively, the significance of bureaucrats as foreign policy actors cannot be overlooked.

The Courts and Immigration

Compared to immigration bureaucracy, the courts have received far more attention for their immigration decision-making, and yet they are still rarely viewed as being foreign policy actors (Oltman and Renshon 2018). There are two main roles that courts play in shaping immigration policy. First, immigration policy produced by executives, administrative agencies, or legislatures can be challenged and overturned in the courts. In the US, for

example, the state of Texas sued the federal government in 2015 to block resettlement of Syrian refugees. Under the Trump administration, a series of lawsuits challenged federal government policy restricting entry to individuals from Muslim majority countries, changes to temporary protected status, and efforts to punish sanctuary cities, among others. International courts too have the power to shape immigration policy through review processes. While it is careful not to take too activist a role in shaping immigration policy directly, the European Court of Human Rights has produced rulings in a number of cases related to immigrants, particularly with respect to their access to legal processes and rights against detention and deportation.

Second, courts can decide on the status of immigrants themselves, both as first instance decision-makers on asylum cases or orders of removal, and through the practice of judicial review of immigration decisions (Law 2010). As with immigration bureaucrats, there is evidence that judges are influenced in their immigration decisions by media coverage and the salience of immigration in current politics (Holmes and Keith 2010; Spirig 2021), and decisions have been shown to vary according to personal characteristics of judges themselves (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Miller et al. 2015). Judges have even utilized asylum decision-making to further the explicit foreign policy goals of the state, as scholars have shown in the case of US asylum decisions favouring applicants from communist countries, which lent direct support to anti-communism efforts during the Cold War (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008; Rottman et al. 2009). What is more, immigration judges themselves face the daunting challenge of applying immigration law while navigating both the political interests of the state and the individual rights of immigrants. For example, in asylum cases related to a migrant's sexual orientation or gender identity (SOGI), judges often struggle to overcome their own biases about SOGI when assessing the strength and veracity of an asylum claim, as the growing interdisciplinary field of Queer Migration Studies has shown (Raj 2017). These challenges point to the fact that even the courts, often treated as the least politicized arm of government, are a black box of politics that must be opened to fully understand immigration policy.

IOs and Immigration Policy

Any discussion of the multiplicity of institutional actors that shape immigration policy would be incomplete without mention of the role of IOs. While migration policy-making is only weakly institutionalized at the international level as compared to issue areas like trade and even human rights, the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) each engage in agenda setting, policy coordination, and migrant advocacy efforts. The UNHCR also plays a direct role in adjudicating refugee status in some contexts, particularly in the Global South. As an RO, the European Union both coordinates national-level immigration policy and exercises direct control over the external European border. Yet recent scholarship has argued that European migration policy is far less coherent at the EU level than might be assumed, and that member state objectives remain the driving force behind Europe's *non-entrée* regime (Richey 2013). Nonetheless, even if IOs are not themselves a primary driver of immigration policy there are a number of potentially generative synergies with the study of IOs that FPA can pursue. First, if we understand IOs as forums for coordinating member state interests, we can examine them as sites of contestation and negotiation over competing immigration foreign policies. Second, more attention could be paid to the ways foreign policy actors within states use or form IOs and other transnational organizations strategically to advance particular immigration interests. For example, as part of the 2018 Global Compact for Migration (GCM) process, 150 cities signed the Marrakech Mayors Declaration calling on governments to participate in the GCM and the related Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and advocating for migrants' rights. Finally, we can begin to explore the ways that anti-immigrant sentiment is constructed across national borders, for example through processes of regional identity construction.

Diasporas as Tools of Foreign Policy and as Foreign Policy Actors

The topics and research covered in this chapter have so far focused primarily on the foreign policy of the immigration process: how states negotiate the volume and type of immigration they will accept, linkages

between immigration and other foreign policy issues, and the diverse set of actors who engage in such policy-making. The result of these policies, of course, is immigration itself. Individuals, families, and communities traverse international borders and resettle in countries other than the one where they were born. Their political membership and identity may shift in the process. Yet they also bring with them elements of the culture and politics of their origin country. In addition, they often retain important ties with their family and community in their country of origin, and these ties become vectors through which ideas, culture, and even capital may flow across borders. In this section, I consider the effect of immigration itself on foreign policy, asking first how the links that immigrants retain with their origin countries are exploited by those countries to further their own foreign policy goals, and second how immigration affects the identity and foreign policy goals of the states where they settle.

Of course, not all immigrants maintain connections with their origin countries and immigrants themselves may choose to cut ties culturally and socially with the countries they come from. A conceptual distinction should therefore be made between immigrants overall and diasporas, or internationally dispersed populations with shared ties to a particular country of origin. Diasporas may include immigrants themselves as well as the descendants of immigrants, and a key feature of diasporas is that 'they reside outside their kin-state but claim a legitimate stake in it' (Shain and B arth 2003: 450). Increasingly important for our understanding of diasporas is the role that sending states play in shaping and empowering them; Délano and Gamlen thus describe diasporas as 'constituency-building projects initiated and led by political entrepreneurs in origin states and abroad' (Déla no and Gamlen 2014: 44). As organized interest groups, diaspora lobbies have long been significant influences on the foreign policy of their new homes. Yet they have received limited attention in IR research and they have rarely been identified as actors in international politics. One exception is in the study of remittance flows across borders, or income made abroad that members of diasporas send back to their families or communities in their country of origin. Indeed, both sending and receiving countries view remittances as an important source of development capital for communities in the Global South (Ratha 2005; Ireland 2018).

A growing body of research has highlighted the political significance of diasporas for the foreign policy of sending countries. Remittances are a

benefit that origin states receive whether or not they actively seek them out, but FPA has shown origin states to be both proactive and strategic when it comes to leveraging the advantages of their diasporas. For example, Tsourapas documents how under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser Egypt utilized its diaspora as a soft power tool in its foreign policy arsenal. Labour migrants from Egypt were deployed as cultural diplomats, particularly in their role as schoolteachers, to promote the Nasserite principles of pan-Arab unity and anti-colonialism. In addition, Egypt counted on emigrants to assist countries in its sphere of influence with developing their own infrastructure and economic capacity. Far from being simply an altruistic gesture, this effort was a tactic in Egypt's competition against Israel for regional influence (Tsourapas 2018b). Today, immigrant sending countries continue to leverage their diaspora populations in their IR in much the same way. India's diaspora in Singapore, for example, is key to its engagement with Southeast Asia and its effort to exert influence in the region (Pande 2018; Mohapatra and Tripathi 2021). Turkey as well has increasingly viewed its diaspora as a key source of soft power in Europe and the US (Adamson 2019).

These insights are crucial to understanding how states project soft power within their geographic region and beyond. With its attention to the interactions between foreign policy actors at different levels of analysis, however, FPA research recognizes that diasporas are not simply an extension of their origin state. Diasporas, both as organized interest groups and the individuals who constitute them, are political actors with their own preferences and strategies. They are also situated in a unique transnational space between sending and receiving country that must be accounted for. This 'simultaneity' means that the policy impact of diasporas is conditional on factors related to both the sending and the host countries (Tsuda 2012). For example, Mirilovic finds that a necessary but not sufficient condition for diasporas to positively affect good relations between sending and host state is that both states in the dyad should be democracies; under this condition, the interests of both states and the strategies of diaspora groups can be decisive (Mirilovic 2016).

As political actors in their own right, diasporas lobby governments, IOs, and civil society actors to exert influence over foreign policy. In some cases, diaspora advocacy closely reflects the foreign policy goals of the sending states, as in the case of the American Israel Public Affairs

Committee (AIPAC) (Newland 2010). More often, diaspora groups can be seen to take a side in a political conflict within the origin state. Members of the Cuban diaspora in the US have been influential in shaping US policy in opposition to the Castro regime (Haney and Vanderbush 1999), and a segment of the Somali diaspora in Norway pressured for Norway to take a stance against the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, although the diaspora was not uniform in its position on this issue (Tellander and Horst 2017). Both the political conditions that make diaspora advocacy possible and the contextual factors that determine which issues diasporas will mobilize around are essential to our understanding of diaspora advocacy.

Ultimately, diasporas are politically significant populations who occupy a transnational space of belonging, where they can participate in and identify with two states simultaneously (Levitt and Dehesa 2003). This presents a challenge to the assumptions of traditional IR theories, which view the nation-state as a clearly bounded actor with a defined national interest. Research in FPA, by contrast, demonstrates how foreign policy preferences are shaped by (and help to shape) the cultural and ethnic makeup of the population. States that pursue explicitly multi-cultural projects in their domestic politics, as has been the case in Sweden and the Netherlands over the past several decades, may as a result see their foreign policies influenced by organized and empowered ethnic or diaspora lobbies (Hill 2013). Yet multi-culturalism has also been associated with populist and xenophobic backlash with its own implications for foreign policy, notably in the case of Brexit in 2016. For scholars of immigration and foreign policy, this points to the importance of the contingent impact of immigrants' interests and identities on national foreign policy goals, for example as mediated through types of integration policies or other conditions of domestic politics.

Borders and Biopolitical Control over Immigrants

As implied by the discussion above on diaspora politics, globalization has generated flexibility in the link between the territorial nation-state, belonging, and political interest. Yet when it comes to immigrant entry, states are as concerned with their territorial borders as ever. Recent years have seen states devote ever more resources to externalizing migration

control outside of their territorial borders in an effort to contain displacement and migration at arms' length. These have included everything from patrols both on land and at sea to interdict migrants during their journey, to offshore detention of asylum seekers and extraterritorial asylum processing, to seemingly more benign practices like external security checks for travellers. At the same time, technologies for monitoring and controlling migrants within the state's territory have proliferated as well. These policies are primarily *biopolitical*, reflecting an effort to control and contain people's physical movement (Vaughan-Williams 2009). IR has long been called upon to acknowledge this type of control as part of the full range of state power (Barnett and Duvall 2005), and with its focus on how institutions like immigration bureaucracies and border agents enact state power on individual migrants, FPA is well positioned to take up this call.

Research on immigrant control shows that from at least the 1990s, when post-Cold War conflicts and improved global access to international travel combined to increase demand on states' asylum systems, immigration policy in Western democracies has been increasingly oriented towards denying immigrants access to the receiving state's territory (Hamlin 2012). Deterrence policies, intended to reduce the benefits and increase the costs of attempting to migrate without authorization, abound, as do policies directly restricting the physical capabilities of individuals to reach a given destination (Kent et al. 2020). Borders are heavily monitored using technologies such as thermal cameras, radar, satellites, and drones, and coast guards and border patrols use violence to prevent migrants from accessing legal protections before they even reach the border (Topak 2014). Within the state, surveillance and detention combine with restrictions on necessary public benefits to create a 'hostile environment' for immigrants (Goodfellow 2019). The effects of these policies on the incidence of unauthorized border crossings is often difficult to pin down, but it would be a mistake to consider effectiveness exclusively in terms of the volume of immigrant entry; as Andreas points out in a study of the US-Mexico border, 'policing methods that are suboptimal from the perspective of a means-ends calculus of deterrence can be optimal from the political perspective of constructing an image of state authority and communicating moral resolve' (Andreas 2000: 9).

International cooperation is a key element in these efforts to deny immigration. States that share high-traffic borders, such as the US and

Mexico, routinely coordinate their border enforcement by necessity, and through linkages to trade and security issues the US has been able to make Mexico an effective partner in its border control practices (Andreas 2000). Frontex, the EU coast guard agency, coordinates with the Libyan coast guard to identify unauthorized migrants attempting to enter Europe through the Mediterranean Sea and to return them to Libya (Vaughan-Williams 2015).[5] States also formalize this type of cooperation through a rising number of bilateral readmission agreements, which establish conditions for the return of unauthorized migrants from one member of the agreement to the other. This type of cooperation can be understood functionally as a way of making deportation more efficient, but it has also been flagged as a source of refugee rights violations. Safe third-country agreements, for example, allow states to effectively refuse to adjudicate asylum applications from migrants who have travelled through a partner state that has already been designated as 'safe' (Giuffré 2013).

Even where cooperation among states is not formalized in international agreements, we can understand efforts to deny immigrants access to the state as being foreign policy practices. Indeed, the securitization of border control has emphasized the foreignness of immigrants and justified practices at odds with migrants' rights as necessary for the protection of the state in the international system. At the same time, surveillance and control at the border is being ratcheted up slowly and without public debate, treated as an administrative and apolitical necessity rather than a political choice. Combined with the fact that the object of these policies is not another state or international institution but rather immigrants themselves, this creates a situation in which it would be easy to not see border control practices as constituting international politics at all. Through an FPA lens, however, the treatment of migrants at the border and throughout the immigration process can be understood as the result of political decision-making rather than as a natural consequence of sovereignty as a structure.

In particular, two key questions arise from an FPA perspective. First, which domestic interests are served by an increase in biopolitical control over immigrants? Research shows that recent electoral successes by right-wing populist candidates are driven by the salience of immigration rather than an increase in the raw level of anti-immigrant sentiment in the population (Dennison and Geddes 2019). This suggests that the increasing restrictiveness of border measures may be linked to proportionately small

but electorally powerful anti-immigrant constituencies. Immigration bureaucracies themselves may also have an institutional interest in promoting the securitization of immigration, which is associated with increased resources and deference to border control agencies. On the other hand, non-state foreign policy actors such as human rights NGOs or diaspora groups should receive more scholarly attention both as interest groups applying pressure against policies like offshore detention and as direct providers of immigrant protection themselves.

Second, interdiction, offshore processing, deportation, and forced detention are increasingly practiced by states with established roles in international politics as human rights defenders. The Netherlands and Canada, for example, have long oriented their foreign policies towards promoting human rights abroad (Brysk 2009), and yet each have come under fire in recent years for their detention and deportation practices (see Walia and Tagore 2012; Wittock et al. 2021). This raises questions about the limits of foreign policy roles under competing foreign policy objectives (e.g., promoting human rights norms abroad versus controlling the border at home). It also suggests that states make a distinction between immigration processes and other areas of domestic policy when it comes to human rights, raising questions about the unique political spaces that emerge in 'borderzones' where international and domestic politics operate simultaneously (Topak 2014).

Conclusions

The goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate the importance of conceptualizing immigration as a foreign policy issue and showcasing the range of research that has laid the foundations for this approach. Due to its political salience and substantive linkages to other areas of IR, migration often factors into interstate bargaining over issues as diverse as trade policy, foreign aid, and military intervention. Immigrants themselves, particularly when organized into formal advocacy groups, lobby to influence foreign policy in both origin and host countries, and diasporas shape the objectives and spirit of cooperation between states. Immigration itself remains a contentious political issue in many destination states, and the impact of

restrictive immigration policies on migrants themselves constitutes a key policy concern for international human rights.

Existing research on immigration, whether it positions itself as FPA or not, has productive synergies with foreign policy studies in its focus on the multiplicity of immigration actors within the state and its ability to identify linkages between immigration decision-making and other policy areas. A more explicit and intentional meeting of immigration and FPA research agendas is the next step. The tools and theoretical frameworks developed by FPA research in other substantive areas can productively be applied to the immigration research agenda. For example, studies of leaders in IR have explored how leaders' ability to communicate resolve in their statements on the international stage impact their bargaining position in international conflict. Leaders' statements on immigration, both restrictive and welcoming, can be similarly significant for foreign policy; as just one recent example, in 2021 Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made public statements about his willingness to allow unauthorized migration across the border into Poland as part of a broader dispute between Belarus and the EU.

Most importantly, immigration is an area in which FPA research can be pushed forward in precisely the ways suggested by this volume. Immigration has emerged as a salient political concern in Western democracies in the 21st century, but migration is a global phenomenon with importance far beyond North America and Europe. As the migration diplomacy literature has shown, countries in the Global South use their immigration policy strategically in their relationships with other countries. Further attention to both immigration and emigration in Global South countries, which both send and receive large numbers of immigrants, will surely result in new theoretical innovations in FPA itself.

NOTES

1. Consider the news media's frequent use of phrases such as 'a human flood', immigrants 'pouring across borders', and other metaphors likening immigration to a flood or natural disaster. See, e.g., Kainz (2016).
2. Unauthorized entry into most states is a low-level offence, and parties to the 1951/1967 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees agree not to punish unauthorized border crossing when it occurs for the purpose of seeking asylum.
3. Some legal systems make a distinction between the notion of 'deportation', which is targeted on people whose removal from the country is deemed a matter of public urgency, and the broader

concept of 'removal', which may apply to anyone who is removed due to a lack of authorization to remain. I use the term 'deportation' to refer to all such actions, as it more accurately reflects the agency that governments exercise in forcibly removing an individual from their territory. For more, see de Noronha (2020).

4. Compared to contexts such as the UK and the US, where immigration bureaucracies are less politically isolated. See Ellermann (2009) for a comparison of the effects of politicization on deportation in the US and Germany.
5. Frontex disputes the extent of this collaboration, although it has been well documented by NGOs and journalists (Amnesty International 2017).

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CHAPTER 38

Foreign Policy and Climate Change

ALEXANDRA HARDEN AND MARK A. BOYER

INTRODUCTION

There is an on-going disjuncture in the conceptualization and study of climate change. That disjuncture produces the negative side-effects of shaping the popular discussion of the problem, its veracity and severity as a policy issue, and the solutions developed to tackle it on the ground. Specifically, until relatively recently, climate change has primarily been conceptualized as a global issue, and most public attention and knowledge centres on two primary policy focal points: (1) the on-going UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, which hosts the annual Conference of the Parties (CoP); and (2) the recurrent assessments produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which issued its sixth assessment in 2022. While these two bodies provide a visible global presence keeping the issue on the public radar (the UNFCCC centring on political decision-making and the IPCC on scientific assessment), their centrality to the actual decisions made and actions taken on climate change are indirect and less than operational.

Further exacerbating this disjuncture from a conceptual perspective is the fact that the focus on the UNFCCC and the IPCC further reifies the state as the locus of authority and action on climate change. This is where the foundational view of foreign policy analysis (FPA) that the state should not be the focal point of decision-making, authority, and action very much needs to come into play. In reality, scholars and policy-makers are forced to grapple with the multiple centres of policy authority and how that impacts action to mitigate the existential threat of climate change. As a result, analysing climate change is perfectly suited to being embedded within FPA, even if the dominant language of the field has rarely drawn on the wealth of conceptual work in FPA, as we will discuss below in much greater detail.

Fortunately, over the last two decades, there has been enormous growth in research and writing focusing directly on the operational components of how climate change is engaged by policy-makers (or not) below the global level and outside the auspices of state decision-making. This has included work on policy action by city governments (see, for instance, Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Betsill and Corell 2008; Hoffman 2011), states or provincial governments (see Rabe 2004, 2008; Selin and VanDeveer 2009; Boyer 2013; MacDonald 2020), the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs; see Betsill and Corell 2008; Bulkeley and Newell 2010), local governments (Gore and Robinson 2009; Boyer et al. 2016), and much more.

This disjuncture and how it has been handled in both policy and scholarly circles places climate change squarely in the domain of FPA as a field of study. In the words of the arguable founder of the field, James Rosenau (1987: 1):

> Foreign policy analysis is a bridging discipline. It takes as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called nation-states build to link themselves and their subsystems to the even more encompassing international systems of which they are apart.

By its very nature, climate change is a global policy problem that requires decisions and actions at every governmental level (Bulkeley and Newell 2010; O'Neill 2017); in other words, the systems and subsystems of which Rosenau speaks. It also allows us to understand how action occurs when several of the largest carbon-emitting states (China, India, the United States, and others) have been among the most significant laggards in implementing state-level actions aimed at dealing with climate change.

Moreover, given how climate change manifests itself physically and socio-politically, it creates a logic that urges policy action be taken at an appropriate governmental level to focus on the particular problem. For example, storm-water management caused by increasingly unpredictable and more intense weather patterns *should* be handled at local levels where the problem is most acutely felt. And the development of policy aimed at addressing power grid instability, as acutely witnessed in the February 2021 Texas storm, *should* be appropriately centred on the state and local level because of the source of the infrastructure shortfall. By contrast, greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation *should* be dealt with at the highest government levels, given the global diffusion of gasses in the atmosphere. One must note that the normative use of 'should' doesn't mean that that is indeed where policy is located on those issues, as we will discuss below.

The other characteristic of climate change that makes it a particularly vexing policy issue is that it exemplifies the coupling of human and natural systems in ways that shape the potential for policy success because many variables remain outside the control of decision-makers. These socio-ecological systems present humans with a cycle of interactions across the human and natural worlds that forces decision-makers (if they take their roles seriously) to rely heavily on biophysical science to understand ecological dynamics, as depicted by Willig and Scheiner (2011) in Figure 38. 1. It also requires analysts to study deeply how human action and conscious policy decisions impact climate, weather, and the environment more generally. Thus, in contrast to an issue area like armed conflict, where humans are the primary or perhaps exclusive decision vectors, climate change policy research exists at the nexus of social scientific work and how such work might shape the natural world but likely not control it. In this context, climate change analysis is foundationally grounded in environmenta l geopolitics (O'Lear 2018).



FIGURE 38.1 Socioecological (coupled human-natural) system.
Source: Adapted from Willig and Scheiner (2011: 344)

Following Figure 38.1, the struggle of managing the natural world is located in the central portion of the diagram, where decision-makers must account for ecological processes often beyond their control. For instance, climate change is causing increased salinization rates in estuaries, a phenomenon that has many implications for fish, amphibians, and birdlife in coastal areas. This is partly due to rising ocean and estuarine (i.e., sounds, bays, coastal river outlets, etc.) temperatures, and once it occurs, remediating the original 'intact' ecosystems is often beyond the control of policy decisions. In other words, once degraded ecosystems develop, humans may be able to cultivate their restoration, but nature has its own time frame and high levels of inherent complexity that often defy quick human correction. We raise this issue now so that the reader can recall this limiting factor on climate policy action through the remainder of this chapter's discussion.

Public Goods, Polycentrism, and Policy Action

For so many environmental topics, placing issues inside a public goods frame provides a useful tool for understanding policy challenges. Climate change is perhaps the exemplar of the utility of applying public goods theory. As such, climate change presents an array of problems that manifest primarily as negative externalities that must be managed. In this context, Gordon Tullock (1969) argues that 'the governmental unit chosen to deal with any given activity should be large enough to "internalize" all the externalities which that activity generates' (19). Building on the same conceptual foundation, Mancur Olson (1969) argues that 'we can be reasonably certain that a broad array of governmental institutions is a necessary condition of Pareto optimal provision of collective goods, and that neither the extreme centralist nor the extreme decentralist position makes sense' (487) all of the time. These arguments lead us directly to the more recent framing of the climate change policy dilemma by Elinor Ostrom. As she argues, 'a polycentric system for coping with global climate change is emerging and is likely to expand in the future' (2010a: 555). Further, 'the efforts of many organizations at less-than-global scale can help reduce emissions to some extent, and they can also spur their own governments to take necessary national and international efforts' (2010b: 11). A polycentric perspective on climate governance encourages 'experimental efforts at multiple levels, as well as the development of methods for assessing the benefits and costs of particular strategies' (Ostrom 2010c: 6).[1] As this implies, polycentric perspectives on climate governance provide ample opportunities for conceptual parallels with the FPA field and also illustrates the degree to which policy solutions must be implemented beyond the state for effective resolution. This conceptualization of climate policy, we argue, follows directly from the intellectual space as envisioned by Rosenau and the many others who have followed his work.[2]

As this framing further implies, polycentricity, as Polanyi initially defined it in his book *The Logic of Liberty*, is a 'social system of many decision centres having limited and autonomous prerogatives and operating under an overarching set of rules' (as cited in Aligica and Tarko 2012). Although one might apply polycentricity to many policy domains, it is especially apt for the climate arena as its root causes, impacts, and the decisions made regarding them range from the global to the local in quite obvious and highly

diverse ways, and it forces analysts to grapple with the subsystems from local to global and how they interact with one another to create outcomes with global impact.

What is unclear in the seminal work by Ostrom and her collaborators (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 2015; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; and much more) is the degree to which polycentric policy development is intentional or the direct product of identified 'problems' at other levels of governance. This distinction is important in understanding why the climate policy process is located at particular levels and within particular types of governmental units at specific points in time. For instance, as mentioned above, and building from Tullock and Olson, one might assume that climate policy centred on GHG mitigation, and the focus on alleviating its global diffusion process *should* be located at the global level. That *intentional* location of GHG mitigation policy globally might then result in coordinated action across boundaries and political systems. But as we know, differences in national interests regarding fossil fuel production and the breadth of their use in industrial and residential sectors have led to radically different national strategies and little concrete *global* action. As a result, there has been little tangible progress on GHG mitigation globally. Thus, while we might wish to follow the prescriptions of polycentric policy-making, especially as laid out in the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994), the implementation of its tenets may well meet political roadblocks in many forms.

As a result, policy-makers are presented with at least two other forms of polycentrism: *de facto* and *subversive*. *De facto* polycentrism emerges when intentional efforts fall apart in some way. For instance, the past thirty years in the United States have shown a cycle of action and inaction on climate change at the federal level. The George H.W. Bush administration saw a distinct reluctance to engage with climate change, even if there was a delegation sent to the 1992 Rio summit. The Clinton administration did more, but it was often hamstrung by a Republican-dominated Congress. And although the Clinton administration was rhetorically more climate action friendly, they were lukewarm in their response to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (at least initially). Next came the deliberate ignorance of climate change under The George W. Bush administration, which at times saw the conscious electoral strategy of climate denial (see Dessler and Parsons 2006). Specifically, the The George W. Bush administration team viewed climate denial as a means to grab the business-friendly electoral middle while

ignoring the growing body of science around both mitigation and adaptation demand and slow-walking policy development regarding the growing problems engendered by climate change. The Obama years held promise and some success, but not nearly the engagement laid out in the 2008 election campaign. Then there was the Trump administration's open hostility to nearly any and all climate action directed at a federal level. The policy outcome of this cycle of action-inaction was the *de facto* assignment of climate action in the US to state and local governments. Given the federal climate policy vacuum, particularly during the George W. Bush and Trump years, lower levels of government, regional conglomerations of governments, and NGOs developed policy programmes focusing on both mitigation and adaptation (Rabe 2004, 2008; Boyer et al. 2016).

The third form of climate polycentrism might best be termed *subversive*. Without assigning the overt pejorative connotation to 'subversion', this third form proceeds from a vacuum of action at a more appropriate locus of policy. As such, it grows from the active efforts of groups working against climate action and seeks to develop 'under-the-radar' policy action to solve the problem at hand. For example, during the George W. Bush term, US environmental officials were forbidden from using the words 'climate change' and 'global warming' in communications and documents. Thus, long-time officials who remained committed to personal and professional goals that were at odds with the administration's dictums found other ways to keep the agenda alive rather than lose years of activity on a growing policy problem. For instance, one group of officials charged with modelling climate impacts continued their work in the early 2000s, but under the auspices of 'health' modelling. The health models were identical to the climate models they had been using for years, but whenever they were mentioned verbally or in writing, the officials highlighted health vectors, and downplayed or eliminated their climate terminology. In this way, the work to understand changing climate impacts continued but below the surface and off the radar of higher up political appointees loyal to the administration (Off-the-Record Interview 2010).

Both *de facto* and *subversive* polycentrism raise implicit and explicit links to the well-known literature on bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Marsh 2014; Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume). In both polycentric types, lower level officials go about their work in ways that may or may not be in concert with high-level policy directives. In addition, bureaucratic actions are often the ones felt on the ground when

policy directives present general frameworks for action, but with little operational guidance or practical constraints on lower level decisions (even if those decisions are being applied in a narrower way). But as we know from work on bureaucratic politics, those actions are often the ones that have real impact and determine policy outcomes on the ground. The policy studies field also tells us that effective implementation is crucial to effective policy delivery (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). Policy design may be truly elegant, but little will get done to solve policy problems without the boots on the ground and those boots marching in the desired direction.

As a result, a major problem of policy design centres on the degree to which *de facto* and subversive polycentrism are the modal types when considering how policy is most often made. This is especially true in the case of climate change because the global and (in countries like the US) national policy levels have mainly been removed from the policy design equation leaving lower levels to govern climate policy action. Some activists might argue that this is an acceptable outcome because things are getting done. But from the vantage point of pursuing optimal, coordinated policy solutions across multiple levels of governance and countries, this policy reality is hardly an outcome that would be optimally designed for effective problem-solving. Moreover, it is not only the explicit and sometimes intentional disconnect between higher and lower levels of governance but rather the entrenched nature of organizational processes and past practice that will promote policy inertia rather than policy innovation. Especially for an emergent policy venue like climate change, innovation and policy experimentation are an essential part of methodology for understanding what works where and when, and how much it costs (see Hoffman 2011).

The takeaway from this discussion is that the ideal form of polycentrism, as a means for grappling with the complexity of climate change globally, nationally, and below, is the intentional variant. But the reality of policy is much messier, especially regarding climate change, and it is one where all three variants operate. This also means that placing climate policy inside an FPA frame demands that the analyst grapple with the implications of the three variants and the intentions and processes they engender. Moreover, the realities of how these variants manifest themselves around climate policy are crucial for understanding what aspects work, what do not, and what that means for future policy pathways.

To fully understand the potential for polycentric policy-making, one must also recognize the basic policy differences between those aimed at GHG

mitigation versus adaptation to climate impacts. Since GHG mitigation is fundamentally a globally centric policy problem created by the diffusion of GHGs throughout the atmosphere, it advocates for action to be taken at an authoritative global level. By contrast, most climate impacts are felt in more localized ways, and therefore, their particular problems and proposed solutions are better suited to local action, especially as these climate change implications are more understandable to the average citizen than the projections of atmospheric scientists. In this way, local authorities likely know the dynamics of storm-water problems or coastal erosion better than their global or national counterparts. Hence, adaptation policy will be centred below the national level in most instances, even if funded or coordinated from above in some form.[3]

As a result, the remainder of this essay is less a survey of climate change policy studies and more an exercise in focusing the FPA lens to overlay the concept of polycentric decision-making with action. Although placing climate change policy within an FPA framework might seem obvious, it is worth noting how little has been done thus far to do that. For example, a cursory search through the *Foreign Policy Analysis* journal back issues finds only three articles with 'climate' in the title over the journal's sixteen years of publishing. That small number speaks volumes about where most scholarly attention regarding climate change policy rests, as it has spawned a diverse group of perspectives and approaches to the problem, some of which will be discussed below. The reader should also note that the following is far from an exhaustive review of climate change scholarship, as such an endeavour would be far too broad for the limited space we have here. As a result, we do more to frame the field rather than to copiously analyse it.

Globalization, Penetration, FPA, and Climate Change

FPA as a field has an extensive intellectual history. As argued by Hudson (2005), FPA is rooted in seminal work by Snyder et al. (1954) and Sprout and Sprout (1956), with the field developing in both breadth and depth extensively in the nearly three-quarters of a century since. Perhaps most notably, building on those works, Rosenau's pre-theory (see Rosenau 2006) took FPA and, well ahead of its time, conceptualized what we now term 'globalization'. In particular, the latter half of Rosenau's widely cited work focuses attention heavily on what he termed a 'penetrated system'. Today we

would call it a ‘globalized system’. Along those intellectual lines, Rosenau bemoans the artificial distinction in political science between comparative politics and international relations. As he puts it bluntly and eloquently, ‘it is regrettable that when a specialist in comparative politics and a specialist in international politics get together, they tend to talk around each other’ (1987: 180).

Aside from the dampening effect this has on intellectual collaboration, it denies the degree to which globalization has blurred those political and intellectual boundaries. Directly, it forces us to consider a more holistic and systemic understanding of how political units grapple with the problems of the day. Although some issues still allow for that artifice of separation to be maintained, climate change’s global character makes that separation simply wrong. It then forces the researcher (and policy-makers) to grapple with the problems across governmental levels both horizontally (e.g., from country to country; sector to sector) and vertically (e.g., global to national to local).

As a result, it is important to link Ostrom’s framing of the polycentric nature of climate policy both to the larger literature on globalization (e.g., H eld and McGrew 2003; among so many others) and to the inherent bridging character of FPA. Moreover, that importance is emphasized by the chaotic nature of climate change and the eclecticism of climate policy (see Mayer 20 12) when we seek to understand the wide array of approaches to grappling with climate change around the globe. In this vein, focusing on polycentricity emphasizes the multi-causal nature of climate change and its demands on decision-making units for global, state, regional, and local responses. This results in an overlap of governmental influence and authority. But unlike most other policy issues that might exhibit some degree of polycentricity (e.g., trade policy blurring the distinction between domestic and international interest), climate change presents what is arguably the most comprehensive polycentric policy conditions with few procedural (i.e., how might good decisions be made?) or operational (i.e., what are best practices for tackling the specific challenges?) policy precedents. As a result, much of what is actually done in the climate change effort can be characterized as ‘experimentation’ (see Ostrom 2010c; Hoffman 2011) or ‘trial and error’.

In trying to wrap this all together, it is worthwhile working through a brief overview of how climate policy manifests across governmental levels. In all instances, this review highlights the way lower levels of policy action impact higher ones, shaping policy options and influencing outcomes on a global existential concern. We begin with a discussion of macro-global efforts on

climate change because we argue that global climate change, by its very nature, demands coordinated global action, as buttressed by Tullock's and Olson's arguments above. But short of that goal, we must move to understand the subglobal systems that are generating polycentric approaches to climate change. Such a discussion highlights the degree to which climate action is uncoordinated, eclectic, and even chaotic in character and exemplifies the intentional, *de facto*, and subversive aspects of climate policy in various settings around the globe. As the globalization literature asserts, the global has indeed become the local in the manifestation of climate action around the world, even if that means policy is less than optimal in process and outcome.

Global Limits

While we have argued that the global level for climate policy is the most appropriate one for action (at least in the mitigation realm and from a normative perspective), the record to date on binding climate action is mixed at best and has centred on two parallel global organizations: the UNFCCC and the IPCC. The UNFCCC was negotiated and signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Its on-going, non-binding character has meant that it keeps countries talking about GHG emissions but little else happens in terms of concrete action. The annual CoP negotiations put the recurrent discussions on display, even if any significant progress on emission targets has been fleeting and inconsistent.

The 1992 agreement was designed to support the global community in addressing and responding to the risks associated with climate change. As such, the UNFCCC is considered the parent treaty to other prominent agreements, like the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015). Both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement were largely focused on reducing GHG emissions based on a country's respective capabilities. This global-scale process was firmly situated within mitigative frameworks to identify and report country-specific emission targets to minimize the anthropogenic causes of climate change.

Since the creation of the UNFCCC, minimal progress has been made to curb GHG emissions. This is largely the result of taking the conventional view that foreign policy is a state-centric process, where emissions goals are

designed to preserve and promote state interests. This state-centric approach downplays the global impact of GHG emissions and the responsibility of different states in identifying and meeting GHG emission targets. It also highlights the degree to which states are not leading climate action effectively (Dyer 2014). The state-centric framing also reinforces North-South inequalities as wealthy Northern countries are able to magnify their voices through representation numbers at global conferences, like CoP. In essence, wealthier states can promote their interests more expansively by having larger delegations attend negotiations, with negotiations often held concurrently, preventing states with smaller contingents from taking part as comprehensively as those with larger representations (Kaya and Schofield 2020). For example, at the 2015 Paris CoP meetings, Trinidad and Tobago sent three delegates, whereas Canada sent 287. These differences in delegation size shape the framing, prioritization, and solution spaces in climate change policy, leading to an underrepresentation of less wealthy, smaller countries where climate change impacts tend to be felt more acutely.

Perhaps the most intuitive logic on the limits of the UNFCCC process focuses on the domestic interests that drive national participation and policy positions. For instance, Genovese (2019) finds that national stands on climate change are significantly impacted by domestic industrial interests. While this is not a surprising conclusion, the finding underscores the problems inherent in enforcing global agreements based on nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Using these domestic pressures as a frame for understanding national stands, the 2015 Paris Agreement:

> requires each Party to prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.
>
> (UNFCCC 2021)

Operationally, then, agreements through the UNFCCC confront the classic problems of global governance centring on enforcement and compliance. And the struggles of authoritative governance under relative anarchy are one reason why climate change action has evolved more thoroughly below the global level.

Although the Paris Agreement is arguably a strongly positive step towards progress in global GHG mitigation, Figure 38.2 shows that little real progress on mitigation has taken place globally over the history of the UNFCCC process. While we see a levelling of emissions from the US and

other advanced industrialized economies over the past twenty-five years, emissions by China, India, and others have outpaced the slowing elsewhere. We should note that 2020 saw a 7 per cent reduction in GHGs (Newburger 2020); this result was primarily due to the pandemic's economic dampening effect on emissions-producing behaviours. That decline is likely short-lived as the global economy returns to form over the next few years. It is also worth noting that there has been some levelling off in African and Latin American emissions, but that this could be fleeting if the Global North continues to transfer production facilities to various venues in the Global South. And according to the Climate Action Tracker,[4] the Gambia and Morocco are the only two countries currently on track with the less than 1.5°C warming policy outlined in the Paris Agreement. The United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (and others) are at the opposite end of the spectrum, being on target to emit GHG numbers consistent with a 4+°C global warming outcome, which places them in the critically insufficient category. As such, despite some signs of progress, emissions targets remain significantly out of reach when benchmarked against achieving a target of future warming below 1.5°C. As discussed above, the NDCs agreed to in the UNFCCC process leave far too much leeway for individual national priorities and focus too little on the global impacts of those national priorities.



FIGURE 38.2 This graph shows the lack of aggregate progress on global CO_2 emissions made to date even with the on-going UNFCCC process.

Source: Global Carbon Project (2021); Andrew and Peters (2021).

Perhaps more notable than the UNFCCC, from a results-focused perspective, is the IPCC and the impact of its recurrent assessments on the debate and policy agenda worldwide (see IPCC 2014). While not a decision-making body, the IPCC has put the science of climate change and the challenges it presents to humanity front and centre of global policy debates. Released in its sixth assessment in 2022 (see IPCC 2022), the IPCC has become the authoritative global source for climate information.

The IPCC was established in 1999 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The objectives of the IPCC are to provide unbiased, scientific research on the status of human-induced climate change along with the myriad risks and possible responses that these changes pose to natural, political, and economic systems. This research is conducted through global collaborations and contributed substantially to the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement. As this suggests, the IPCC's work is often the foundation that informs the annual CoP negotiations. The contributions of the IPCC have

evolved over time to more thoroughly incorporate the multi-causal nature of climate change into the shaping of holistic policy capable of transcending traditional hierarchical systems and working to create more complex systems where consistent points of reference are fluid.

The IPCC has also become a bell-weather for changing climate change policy action approaches globally. Paralleling the evolution of perspectives among most activists in the global environmental community, the IPCC began its work primarily focused on GHG mitigation (Off-the-Record Interview). But beginning with the 2007 fourth assessment, greater attention has been paid to the need to adapt to climate impacts globally. This has echoed the changing views of many activists who have recognized that the need to adapt is inevitable and that adaptation strategies might be the 'backdoor to mitigation' (Stults 2011) as the politics of adaptation might be an easier sell than dealing with GHG emissions that will produce warming a generation or more into the future. In other words, as climate impacts and adaptation strategies become more pronounced and publicly identified, aggregate public sentiment might swing further in support of action. So as the story goes, one doesn't need to 'believe' in climate change to understand that weather weirding is occurring and that roads are flooding more regularly in one's hometown. Nonetheless, concrete climate action at the global level remains elusive, aside from the tremendous scientific progress achieved under IPCC auspices and the on-going political profile raising and agenda setting that gets done through the UNFCCC.

National Priorities Building from Global Policy Shortfalls

Flowing from our discussion on the limits of global climate policy in the last section, it is also worth noting the degree to which national policy action has shown limited success. Unfortunately, we see a worsening of climate change profiles with some countries, despite two decades of growing concern within the scientific community and in cross-national public sentiment over the current and future climate-related disasters directly linked to human activity. For instance, since 1990, the United States' CO_2 emissions have hovered around 6 million metric tons annually, with relatively little change in either direction. As a result, the action-inaction cycle mentioned above has not dramatically impacted CO_2 production. In contrast, China experienced

explosive CO_2 growth during the same period. While showing increasing CO_2 emissions overall, China's emissions turned decidedly upward around the turn of the century, with the country overtaking the US as the largest national global emitter in 2005 (Climate Watch 2021). Of the top ten national emitters,[5] only the EU in aggregate has shown a steady, if not steep, decline since 1990. Overall, EU policies have produced an almost 25 per cent decline in emissions since 1990, making it a 'world leader in climate governance' (Harris 2021: 78). However, one should note that at least some of the declining or static emissions results in the North are the result of production off-shoring to locales with laxer environmental standards.

Diving further into the impacts that national policy has on climate change globally, Figure 38.3 and Table 38.1 highlight the global and cross-national record of climate laws passed between 1990 and 2019. The peak of global legislative action occurred around 2013, as shown in Figure 38.3, with a tailing-off since then. More striking is the data in Table 38.1 showing a wide scattering of the volume of legislation cross-nationally. Drawing on country classifications used by Oxford University Press for its publication programmes, we see higher levels of legislation passed in countries predominantly in the Global North. Nonetheless, Brazil, Chile, and several European and African countries are among some of the highest achievers, which some might attribute to their low starting points. However, this scatter-shot legal picture masks the aggregate impact identified by Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), who found that global CO_2 and GHG emissions would have been higher without legislative activity across the countries in the study (754). Such a finding lends credence to the idea that every little helps, even when there are laggards among the countries involved.

It is also worth noting that in cases where a country is not a legislative leader (in the context of Eskander and Fankhouser's study), other factors may influence national action on climate change. For instance, in the US, the Supreme Court ruling in *Massachusetts vs. EPA* led to a domestic legal setting where climate policy could be created by regulation rather than legislation. In ruling that GHGs are criteria pollutants under the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Court gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power (and responsibility) to limit GHGs even without explicit legislative direction. The implementation of this authority was attempted by the Obama administration, but it was constrained by the Republican-controlled Senate's repeated threats to defund the EPA. Whether the Biden administration will

pursue this approach is unknown to date, but it is worth noting the personnel holdovers across Obama and Biden in this topical area (see Lazurus 2020).

In sum, national efforts on climate change fall well below the threshold of action and results needed on GHG mitigation to keep global temperatures below 1.5°C. So even though there appears to be scattered and incremental progress, the reliance on national policy in the wake of authoritative global action is too little and will very likely be too late to avoid the catastrophic consequences predicted by scientific consensus. This forces the policy focus even further down levels of governance to try and find pathways for climate action of significant impact.



FIGURE 38.3 Climate change laws passed between 1990 and 2020.
Source: Adapted from Eskander and Fankhauser (2020).

The nature of polycentric governance also leads one to consider the cross-cutting and sometimes countervailing pressures that exist within the state that produce counter-productive (from a problem-solving perspective) and sometimes unexpected outcomes. Although far too lengthy a topic to address here in more than a cursory fashion, it is worth noting the variation in elite-mass sentiment that exists in many countries around climate change, and how difficult it is to pin down the exact nature of public sentiment on the

issue (e.g., there is great variation depending on question wording and structure), its intensity relative to other pressing issues (like economic disruptions and a global pandemic) and by extension how it shapes national policy decisions. Along these lines, one study found that while cross-national awareness of climate change has indeed been on the rise, it has not yet translated into significant action or 'greater willingness to bear the costs of climate change mitigation or adaptation' (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014). This conclusion continues to be borne out in much of the on-going work of the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.[6] As a result, we are left with the messier, narrower, yet modal policy solutions that occur below the state level around the world.

Table 38.1 The global and cross-national record of passed climate laws between 1990 and 2019

Country group	Mean/Median number of Laws passed		Total number of laws passed in grouping	Max/Min country laws in group	Max/Min countries in group	
	Mean	Median			Max	Min
OUP Free Access Countries *n*=49	2.10	2	103	6/0	Ethiopia	Burundi, Cabo Verde, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Marshall Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan
OUP Reduced Rate Countries *n*=35	3.69	3	129	15/0	Dominican Republic	Grenada, Guyana, Nauru, Sudan
Others (not discounted) *n*=91	6.68	5	608	40/0	Republic of Korea	Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Estonia, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland (Eswatini)

Source: Adapted from Eskander and Fankhauser (2020).

Substate and Cross-State Regional Policy Action

The emergence of substate engagement in climate change policy arises less out of necessity and more out of the inherent inconsistencies that occur during leadership transitions at the national level, especially apparent in Western/liberal democratic processes. This trend also seems to occur because state, provincial, and municipal initiatives are uniquely situated within a policy environment to be more aligned with local needs.

Regional climate action by various actors has followed an intuitive pathway for climate response. Such initiatives build on the need for multi-jurisdictional collaboration that is often needed in order for cities, towns, and rural communities to address challenges that require coordinated efforts, shared resources, and even some specialization through local comparative advantages. While regional action provides a social support system to integrate and implement climate change action items, this approach is also often a more holistic way to manage transboundary ecological zones and natural resources. One illustrative example of such a polycentric approach is the management of the Colorado River and the development of the Colorado River Basin Drought Contingency Plan agreed to in 2019. The Colorado River watershed spans seven US (Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and California) and two Mexican states (Baja California and Sonora) and provides one of the only continuous water supplies to some of the driest regions in North America. These large, complex ecological zones can often cause complex policy challenges because of the dynamic, heterogeneous, socio-ecological environments that span large transboundary areas. Incorporating policy approaches capable of addressing the needs of countless stakeholders, communities, and industries while maintaining biophysical vitality requires management support at various decision-making centres.

The creation of the Colorado River Basin Drought Contingency Plan utilized a consensus-based approach that was divided into two primary geographic sections. The first portion of the plan covered the Upper Colorado, and the second portion covered the Lower Colorado Region. This effort included collaboration at global, national, state, and substate levels and mandated input from state and non-state actors to reduce the collective risk associated with the fluctuating flow levels of the Colorado River which can lead to temporary or prolonged disruptions in available water resources.

It is important to note, however, that while collaborative efforts were used to address water allocation issues in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan, there is limited information available on the different levels of stakeholder engagement within that process (Karambelkar and Gerlak 2020).

The Colorado River Basin Drought Contingency Plan demonstrates the need for collaborative, multi-scalar solutions to manage natural resources in order to minimize unequal access through the prioritization of a collective need for long-term, sustainable futures. With the drought contingency plan set to conclude in 2026, improving polycentric resource governance and strengthening institutional support will be critical to maintaining continuity and capitalizing on windows of opportunity to implement a climate-smart policy. This type of multi-state/bilateral planning process also represents an explicit recognition that climate change, and environmental issues more generally, present policy challenges that span national and subnational boundaries in ways that challenge the efficacy of single jurisdictional solutions.

Similarly, the New England Governors / Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) group has sought to promote coordinated and collective action on environmental issues in the northeastern region of North America. Connecting five Canadian provinces and six US states, NEG/ECP signed its first climate action plan in 2001, with its most recent update in 2017. Sharing common waterways (e.g., St. Lawrence), watersheds (e.g., Connecticut River Valley), lakes (e.g., Lake Champlain), and even electrical grid interactions and storm impacts, this organization consciously recognizes the need for rational management of climate mitigation and impacts through collaboration across state, provincial, and national boundaries. Although there is no authoritative compliance mechanism, NEG/ECP has become a leader in policy development, despite the absence of enforcement capacity within its agreements. The bottom line, however, is that even without enforcement mechanisms across boundaries, the ability to benchmark common goals and coordinate responses to climate challenges provides information that each individual unit would find more difficult to gather individually (Boyer 2013; CCSC 2021). Moreover, it further solidifies cross-national recognition and policy coping on topics that defy single jurisdictional solutions, as is so often the case on environmental challenges.

Local Challenges: The Front Lines for Climate Adaptation

The complexity of the challenges faced by policy-makers and their potential solutions is also evident at the local level.[7] The difference, though, is that local communities are often where climate impacts, such as sea-level rise, storm surges, storm-water management, and longer term concerns, like impacts on agricultural productivity, are felt most acutely. Local policy-makers are typically best situated to both identify and develop appropriate responses to climate-related issues, but they are also leading the most financially constrained governmental units. In the words of one town planner in Connecticut, 'Money is the big issue in addressing climate change. Other projects take precedence over climate change' (Off-the-Record Interview 2013a). Bluntly put, in a region like the Northeastern US, local governments must spend their limited funds on the big three: schools, roads, and snow removal. The specifics of the big three may vary by region, but engagement with climate change impacts is unlikely to percolate upwards in the priority list for most regions unless crisis circumstances from major storms or other types of natural disasters make its impact felt.

A second major issue confronted by local policy-makers is how the built environment limits policy action. As one coastal town municipal official put it, our town is 'already developed, and it's not like we can make up regulations that require people to elevate their homes or move further back from the coast, because they're already there' (Off-the-Record Interview 2013b). Resistance to any thought of 'retreat' (often referred to as the 'R-word' along the coast) from coastal living runs counter to the interests of wealthy property owners, some of whom are not permanent residents of a particular community. But the economic development interests of maintaining coastal life, its traditions, and the tourism value it brings makes change hard to achieve for towns running low on financial resources.

Lastly, the resources constraint on local action also entails a staffing and expertise gap that limits climate engagement. For example, one inland official stated, '[our town] has not been [overtly] affected by climate change, but time, money, and personnel would be our greatest challenges' (Off-the-Record Interview 2013c). This sentiment was echoed across almost a quarter of the 154 Connecticut towns interviewed for the larger research project on climate action across governmental levels in the Northeastern US. Put directly, most town staff are hired as teachers for public works projects and

other direct citizen services, and not to focus on addressing the longer term, more amorphous impacts of climate change. This is especially true for smaller towns that may be large geographically but sparsely populated, thus possessing a small tax base.

In the end, while these examples are drawn mostly from Connecticut municipalities, the themes are heard from officials virtually everywhere, even if the specific climate impacts confronted locally vary widely. These themes also illustrate both the degree to which addressing climate change is left to localities and how reliant they are on higher levels of government for funding, expertise, and guidance. Thus, even if towns wish to grapple with climate adaptation, they must appeal to federal or state/provincial authorities for the resources needed to do their work locally. So while many municipal officials want to engage with climate change as part of a polycentric governance model, they rarely can do so alone.

Conclusion

One of the most significant barriers to meaningful, coherent action in climate change policy is a lack of acknowledgment of the larger systemic drivers of climate change. Over the last 200 years, two-thirds of GHG emissions can be traced to a small number of companies, mostly in the oil and gas industry (Grasso 2019). In the 1980s and 1990s, these companies banded together to form interest groups and research organizations that often misrepresented scientific work on environmental and climate change issues to promote corporate interests and agendas, which also happen to be the primary drivers of climate change (Frumhoff et al. 2015). These groups continue to influence public attitudes, often greatly undermining any consistent climate policy efforts at global, state, and substate levels, and denigrating reliable, truthful information sources (Lewandowsky et al. 2015). Confronting this constraint on action requires national governments, especially in countries like the United States, to hold corporate organizations accountable for their global emissions while simultaneously investing in research, widespread infrastructure changes, and the implementation of renewable energy resources. To date, this holding to account has not occurred.

Moreover, in the absence of an authoritative global governing body, collaboration among (state, substate, and non-state) actors is required for effective action in the management and restoration of global public goods,

like those evident in the global climate crisis. Such a coordinated collective approach can be undermined by three primary gaps, however, as outlined in Kaul et al. (1999) and shown in Table 38.2.

These gaps are particularly apparent when looking at global initiatives to limit country-level emissions of GHGs. This bring us to the reality that studying and understanding climate change is a fundamentally embedded part of the FPA field and a fuller understanding of polycentric policy-making is a must if we are to have any hope of solving what many have termed a global 'existential crisis' (Osaka and Yoder 2020).

As a result, for the foreseeable future, the world is stuck with climate policy-making that clearly resides in the *de facto* and *subversive* categories discussed above, with some hope that the global community can turn towards a more *intentional* version. Such an intentional policy-making world would actively and consciously work across the policy levels sketched above and seek to design more thoughtful policies and structures than those we have seen to date, all the while recognizing and grappling with the reality that our state-centric global community remains ill-suited to solving truly global problems like climate change.

Nonetheless, the components of polycentric approaches outlined in Ostrom's work can help minimize policy gaps, even if imperfectly. Ultimately, the global community will need to acknowledge and confront the implications of policy failures on the part of large, influential countries who are producing significant negative externalities only to redistribute these to smaller decision-making units (i.e., smaller countries and lower levels of governance), who often lack the resources or the human capacity to adequately respond to the resultant emerging and growing challenges. Although far too large a topic for this essay, recognition of a transfer of negative externalities and policy responsibility brings us to the need for a more fully integrated evaluation of environmental justice within what is a polycentric policy environment (see Shue 2014), especially as we aim to *design* a future rather than to have a future foisted upon us.

Table 38.2 Three primary gaps in effective action in management of global climate crisis

Jurisdictional Gap	The gap that emerges between the global boundaries of policy concerns and national boundaries of policy-making ability
Participation Gap	International cooperation is primarily intergovernmental despite living in a multi-actor world.
Incentive Gap	Moral persuasion is not enough for countries to rectify international infringements

Source: Kaul et al. (1999: 450).

NOTES

1. Another similar strand of conceptual thought focuses on 'clumsy solutions' to global problems (Verweij and Thompson 2006). Clumsiness focuses attention less on elegant solutions and more on the complexity of problems and need for social and policy experimentation and continual innovation and creativity in the search for solutions to vexing problems.
2. See for instance the 'second generation' volume edited by Neack et al. (1995) and the great diversity of studies published in the journal, *Foreign Policy Analysis*.
3. For a very practical discussion of climate adaptation and its breadth of impact, see Pogue (2021).
4. https://climateactiontracker.org/
5. The top ten global emitters identified in this data are in order of highest to lowest: China, the US, India, the EU, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, Japan, Iran, South Korea (Climate Watch 2021).
6. https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/
7. The references to interviews in this chapter were conducted under the auspices of the first author's University of Connecticut IRB protocol HR #10-108 and done in compliance with the University of Connecticut's human subjects research process.

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CHAPTER 39

Foreign Policy and Organized Crime

FRANCESCO NICCOLÒ MORO AND FRANCESCO STRAZZARI

INTRODUCTION

Organized crime (OC) is closely connected with prohibition and regulation in national and global affairs (Andreas 2015). Once largely confined to the domain of domestic politics and policies, OC has increasingly gained attention in the foreign policy agendas of Western democracies, beginning with the United States and—through dynamics of norm diffusion and policy convergence—other international actors such as the European Union. These conceptual and policy shifts reflect changes in the perceived nature of threats that states face and should address through external action. In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, the inclusion of OC in the catalogue of new unconventional threats dates back to the revision of strategic concepts carried out during the 1990s and has been further sharpened during the following decades.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, growing emphasis on globalization entailing a diminished role for statecraft in international relations (IR) was matched by the emergence of a wide body of literature alerting both policy-makers and the wider public on how organized criminals, whose 'visible hand' was described as gaining control of transnational shadow economies, were taking over key political processes in weak states (Andreas 2011), thus becoming 'perhaps the major threat to the world system' (Strange 1996: 212). As a result, a number of national and multilateral initiatives and new institutions envisioning forms of enhanced international cooperation were launched, and the fight against transnational organized crime (TOC); this policy field grew as the external dimension of domestic crime fighting efforts and became a policy domain characterizing global governance.

As a new foreign policy domain, TOC comprises diverse, very heterogenous, and multi-scale sets of phenomena—ranging from illicit drug

trade to human trafficking, from maritime piracy to cybercrime—that are connected to local and domestic criminal landscapes but are identified as posing menaces to national and international security. In designating OC as a threat, the definition of the referent object *security* has often been quite ambivalent: depending on the circumstances, OC is described as a threat to society, democracy, the economy, national security, or regional stability. Notwithstanding the frequent reiteration of the call to address the threat posed by omnipresent criminals, the definition of OC itself, as far as international law is concerned, was left quite loose by the Palermo Convention of 2000 that led to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), while normative amalgamation among different national domains remains far from being achieved today. Be that as it may, it is no coincidence that OC emerges as a target in the foreign policy agenda of Western democracies in parallel to the promotion of free markets and democracy. As the US incorporated democracy promotion among national security priorities, OC was considered a corrupting factor that underlies transitions towards open society and market economies. In this relatively simplistic narrative, globalization offers unprecedented opportunities and profits to organized criminals, who exploit the withdrawal of the state and end up much empowered in the process; a tangible outcome would be the emergence of so-called narco-states at different latitudes.

Traditional foreign and defence policy establishments and tools have often been considered unfit to deal with a new, multi-dimensional set of threats. Responses to OC have historically followed two major patterns. On the one hand, existing agencies restructured themselves to cope with new challenges. This was especially the case with armed forces, which looked to acquire new skills and develop new a *modus operandi* to maintain their key role in the foreign policy processes. On the other hand, new agencies were born, or—among those traditionally dedicated to domestic law enforcement—specialized functions were developed beyond national borders. Different forms of governance have therefore emerged, with combinations of different national actors and links between domestic agencies and international organizations engendering multi-level arrangements.

Notwithstanding the centrality acquired by OC in international politics, scarce attention has been given to this theme in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). In this context, the purpose of the present chapter is to provide a framework that allows us to link the literature on OC (counter-OC

policies) and FPA scholarship. To do so, it first traces the evolving phenomenon of OC, moving beyond the *mafia mystique aura* (Smith 1975) and sensationalist accounts, to consider its place in international affairs, looking at the diffusion of norms and practices (criminalization and its enforcement) as endogenous analytical factors. Critically engaging in the debate on the threat environment presented by OC today helps to reconnect the fields of IR and FPA, considering how shifting our focus to understanding the 'the dark side' of global economy and politics could impact foreign policy-making and FPA. Second, the chapter looks at policy models to fight OC. Responses have taken two major forms. One is securitization and militarization, a model that historically stems from the 'war on drugs'. Responses following this logic tend to take the form of 'war on crime', focusing on the 'crime-terror nexus' especially in 'ungoverned' or 'insecure' spaces typically located in the Global South, and looking at military action as the appropriate response, aligned with the repertoires of the 'War on Terror'. The second approach is linked to criminal justice: transnational OC here is treated as an extension of domestic criminal policy, with a quite different set of law enforcement tools adopted. In this context, states have also been pushing for norms creation at an international level, creating a plurality of anti-crime regimes (Jakobi 2017). As the different strategies are blended together by actors, hybrid approaches to tackling OC at the international levels often prevail.

A final section of the chapter provides empirical illustrations of how the fight against crime is affecting foreign policy-making in two specific criminal domains, namely anti-drug and anti-cybercrime policies. The section will briefly discuss the origins, dynamics, and consequences of such policies showing how pluralization of agency and hybridization of approaches are two dominant trends across different criminal domains and how these processes can be analysed through categories developed within FPA. Although clearly not exhaustive, this analysis allows us to unpack the 'black box' of the state as the actor in charge of (foreign) policies and observe the role of cooperation among states as well as the role of international organizations in the fight against crime by providing adequate coverage in terms of geographic and thematic scope. In doing so, it shows how analysing key factors in FPA—i.e., the impact of public opinion, bureaucratic politics, interagency competition and coordination problems—can provide important insights on counter-OC policy processes and

outcomes. By way of conclusion the chapter highlights the persistent challenges in the analysis of OC, paving the way for a preliminary analysis of the key problems raised by OC to FPA analyses and those can fruitfully proceed in examining them.

OC as a Policy and Foreign Policy Domain

Defining OC raises fundamental ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions that are relevant from the point of view of public policy. OC is an umbrella concept (Von Lampe 2001) that encompasses a wide variety of social, economic, and political practices. Its elusiveness is such that questions exist about the benefit of conceiving OC as one discrete phenomenon as opposed to a broad set of activities that generate challenges in various social and policy domains.

What the public and policy-makers know about criminal organizations comes in part from stereotypical representations, of which popular culture —often derived from media coverage, films, and literature—is rife. Among the sources of knowledge that have become widely available are, for example, non-profit/non-governmental organization (NGO) initiatives and judicial acts. Much of our knowledge concerning activities against and beyond the law—including threat assessments—is publicly made available by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which follow guidelines that prioritize certain forms of OC over others, and tend to be affected by media sensationalism and by politics (Larsson and Korsell 2010). The police, for example, tends to focus on those forms of crime that fit in with what is traditionally seen as ‘real police work’: narcotics-related crime is quintessential OC for the police, who aim to build cases that can lead to prosecution. Thus threat assessments and similar reports often tell the researcher less about the form of OC and its scope, and more about policy priorities (i.e., where resources are being allocated) and the knowledge status of the field.

This circumstance is significant: selective evidence, and the sensationalist bias for violent occurrences eclipse much of the wide gamut of activities in which criminal organizations are involved, which do not necessarily take place in criminal domains and even less necessarily are associated with observable violence. If OC is essentially profit oriented, it is

then reasonable to assume that much if its business is focused on ‘ships that pass in the night’. The fact that OC is often a crime without a victim makes quality data acquisition for policy purposes a problem that is particularly acute, as the analysis is conducted from a distance, as it is the case in international affairs. Official data regarding OC in the international arena are low quality and difficult to compare, while aggregated data are often suspect. Reuter and Truman (2004) and Andreas and Greenhill (2010) have shown how our knowledge in this field is made up of initial ‘guesstimates’ that quickly take on a life of their own by being repeatedly referred to. These circumstances make the mobilization of knowledge for ‘evidence-based policy’ and for policy evaluation a significant challenge in the domain of fighting OC in the international sphere.

Demystifying widespread perceptions about the criminal under- and over-world as a space of exception is imperative for effective policy-making. Contributions have come from many quarters: organization studies highlight the salience of analytical distinctions on the different forms that OC can assume (Catino 2019); critical criminology delves into the iatrogenic effects of criminalization; political economy sheds light on OC as criminal enterprise; (historical) comparative sociology emphasizes dynamics of extraction and protection (e.g., elimination of clients’ enemies), while political science and IR theory focus more on questions of patronage, collusion, selective enforcement, as well as borders. Generally speaking, several research perspectives highlight how response policies (and the agencies that decide and implement them) cannot be considered exogenous to the problem of OC in itself. The evasive nature of ‘doing business’ in this field, and its extreme sensitivity to interdiction are such that even observing and measuring—for example, paying attention to certain criminal dynamics such as smuggling—has an impact on incentives and disincentives, and therefore on how criminal dynamics develop.

Criminalization is typically associated with higher business risk, which, in the presence of a constant demand, results in a rise in prices and profit for those actors that are able to successfully dodge interdiction and/or to minimize the risk of disruption through better organization and connivance with public authorities. As stakes become higher, a form of collusion between OC and ‘organized legality’ is often observed. The ‘unintended consequence’ that is observed with a certain regularity under these circumstances is criminal professionalization leading to the selection of the

most skilled and politically capable criminal groups. Growing profits, in their turn, dynamize criminal dynamics, while successful criminal stories and wealth accumulation feed social legitimacy: criminal profiles offer role models in areas where social mobility is extremely low. Likewise, emergency-driven, tough-on-crime campaigns based on force and militarization are often accompanied by the tilting of established clientelist mechanisms, and the form of social stability pact that they usually embody. The outcome can easily be an outbreak of violence among criminal groups seeking to relocate their interests, seizing new opportunities, and filling new voids among them and vis-à-vis law enforcement agencies (Snyder and Dur an-Martinez 2009; Osorio 2015).

To understand how the fight against OC has come to intersect external affairs and foreign policy, however, one has to adopt historical lenses, and bring the trajectory of modern statecraft into sharp focus. While debates about the question of the mafia as a form of extralegal governance accompany the Italian state since its unification (Fulvetti 2004), the term ‘organized crime’ as such comes into use much later in the United States, in a context where the domestic concept of law and order appears to be corrupted by forms of racketeering and extortion that are represented in the public debate as ‘alien conspiracy’—that is, a form of crime that is prevalent among (and therefore imported by) recently settled migrant communities (Finckenauer 2005). By the late 1960s, OC has tended to be defined as a list of crimes, unlawful activities that presuppose some form of organization, and disciplined association (e.g., crime syndicates) to be perpetrated. The point is worth noting, as it sets a framework whereby criminal threats that are typically within the mandate of ministries of justice and home affairs (criminal justice being the traditional domain that legitimizes state intervention to protect society and individuals domestically) are explained as threats with roots and causes abroad, beyond the state’s borders. Built on the designation of drug abuse as a ‘serious national threat’ a couple of years earlier, President Nixon’s famous speech of 1971 defining ‘drugs as public enemy no. 1’ and kicking off the ‘war on drugs’ via the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to coordinate all other agencies, can be seen as step in the direction of militarizing the fight on crime beyond the borders of the domestic domain. The Reagan presidency rekindled the US war on drugs through the involvement of the CIA and the military in international drug interdiction

efforts, targeting designated foreign criminal constellations through the use of force and other means (e.g., conditionality, sanctions, etc.).

While receiving an amount of evidence-based criticism, the war on drugs rests on a larger and deeper discourse about the (selective) criminalization of commodities and activities that in different times and circumstances have come to be considered an evil threat, one whose damages are deeply corruptive of the fibre of a given community or nation. In particular, the historical trajectory of the US, its ascendancy to the role of superpower during the 20th century, is accompanied by a normative inclination towards assertively expanding the catalogue of favoured prohibition norms (as opposed to regulation) and enforcing bans across the international spectrum (Andreas 2013). Moral/emotional resolve is often inextricably mixed with political and economic interests. The history of prohibition is fuelled by fear of crime, puritanical cultural wars, and racism. Beginning with the late 19th century, anti-opium, anti-alcohol, anti-marijuana campaigns in the US were aimed at distinct migrant communities whose habits were seen as deviant and corrupting.

As with the British Empire, whose economic interests in deploying military force for free trade were an important aspect of the ‘opium wars’ fought to maintain the legal trade of narcotics in China, US hegemony in expanding trade and use prohibitions from the domestic to the international sphere is linked with economic interests and transformations. A controversial example is offered by how in the 1930s corporate investment in the timber industry (paper) and new synthetic fibres (nylon) contributed to the destruction of the hemp industry. Be that as it may, beginning with the institutionalization of an international drug control regime, US allies have been under pressure to demonstrate their alignment with the framing of the problem contained in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports annually produced by the US State Department, by complying with a system of norms, diplomatic statements, data exchange, police cooperation, and the adoption of multilateral initiatives that were developed along an axis of criminalization and militarization.

While the sophisticated international regime that regards the production, the commercialization, and the consumption of narcotic substances offers plenty of illustrations regarding ‘the ambitious efforts by generations of Western powers to export their domestically derived definitions of crime’ (Andreas 2006: vii), a wider array of market activities—from endangered

species to money laundering—have at different times fallen under prohibition provisions that international institutions have adopted. This has occurred along a chain of norms diffusion (attempts at legislative homogenization—e.g., extradition agreements) and increasingly frequent interaction and collaboration among law enforcement agencies—from the creation of Interpol to the development of regional agencies as well as synergies among newly established national offices tasked with handling international law enforcement.

Militarization or Internationalization of Criminal Policy? Approaches to Tackling OC

For all the alarmism about globalization disproportionally empowering criminals and states being overrun, globalization has not challenged the fundamentally monopolistic power that states have to define what is legal and criminalize what is not. Nor has it fundamentally altered the symbiotic relationship that historically exists between the control of the market of security provision—a defining feature of OC, according to Gambetta (1996)—and the making and unmaking of states: once one admits that the world of crime is a mirror of on-going transformations, TOC can be seen not so much as a mere underside of legal economies and governance, but as a phenomenon that is intimately connected with them (Friman 2009: 1). If Tilly's (1985) classical study about the state offering a type of protection analogous to racketeering remains substantially valid, the way in which the relationship of state-making to war-making has been evolving (Leander 2004) bringing about questions about how war and OC are connected today, and how the reconfiguration of their nexus may affect peace building and state building (Strazzari 2012).

Militarized responses are usually introduced in the political debate as measures that are necessary given the failure of other approaches, when pressure is mounting for adopting effective solutions. Ranging from the deployment of 'boots on the ground' to the adoption of rhetoric, operational styles, tactics, that are (para)military in nature, conceptually speaking militarization can be seen as an extreme form of securitization—the framing of a given issue as a security threat. Part of today's interest in OC as a foreign policy domain derives from its inscription in the catalogue of

unconventional security threats in a context characterized by ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 1999), where criminal economies and criminal networks thrive. Likewise, one strand of literature has been delving into the links between OC and terrorism. The crime-terror nexus (Makarenko 2004) is an idea to which the policy sphere—in Europe and elsewhere—has proven receptive, despite calls for evidence from deeper comparative study (Felbab-Brown and Forest 2012). Rampant OC is often cited in this context as a key de-stabilizing factor for entire regions. The standard narrative whereby a remote space is depicted as ‘ungoverned space’—i.e., locales where no authority is exercised and that, accordingly, have become the home of terrorists, bandits, and criminals (Rabasa et al. 2007). The soldering of OC and terrorism is sometimes referred to as narco-terrorism (Björnehed 2004), a spectre that evokes the adoption of exceptional means. Alternatively, ‘spectralization’ can be seen as part of the problem. Calls have been made to place the criminality problem in its context and see its reality as offering the provision of protection, particularly in interactions with political institutions and economic actors, thus moulding original forms of extralegal governance.

A well-known policy dilemma, in this regard, has to do with strategic choices to be made when designing forms of intervention in areas that are affected by an insurgency process, or are recovering from conflict. It is precisely the goal of avoiding a convergence of OC and ‘terrorism’ that underlies the choice to ‘pick one battle at a time’ and selectively condone, by simply turning a blind eye or even by attempting some kind of co-optation, extralegal or criminal activities that underpin the territorial prominence of some local strongman, often in the name of achieving ‘stabilization’. Examples abound, from anecdotes about the way in which local *mafiosi* facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily in 1943, to the so-called ‘American drug barons’ risen to the status of warlords in post-2001 Afghanistan, to ‘big men’ involved in drug trafficking but exempted from prosecution in the jihadist insurgency stricken Sahel region of Africa while foreign counter-insurgency operations were being conducted. In post-2011 Libya, overrun by civil war and jihadism, and crossed by irregular migration flows, there have been calls denouncing foreign actors who, while declaring themselves as willing to destroy the business model of traffickers, have in fact been putting local criminals in power, and feeding them, while expecting that they would curb migration

towards Europe by exposing the migrants to systematic human rights abuse (Malakooti 2019).

Similar circumstances raise an important normative question that needs to be addressed when debating foreign policy and OC. Anti-crime campaigns whose effects are exacerbated by militarization typically entail high costs in terms of human rights infringements. The domestic war on drugs waged by President Duterte in the Philippines, to offer another blatant example, resulted in thousands of extrajudicial executions, displaying the symbolic traits of a genocidal crusade (Simangan 2018). On a superficial level, in international diplomacy spheres, states tend to agree that 'fighting crime'—presented to the public as eradicating evil—is good, with repeated announcements of 'more cooperation in this field'. To what extent are foreign policy choices informed by normative considerations in such a sensitive ambit, where evidence is elusive and ambivalent? How should foreign policy engage with the domestic and multilateral manifestations of criminalization dynamics displayed by authoritarian regimes?

In the post-Cold War era the war on drug and crime control became the cornerstone of US relations with its Latin American neighbours. Beginning with countries that have been most affected by drug-related violence and by the phenomena of narco-politics, a different policy model, based on harm reduction, has gained traction internationally. This is why, in the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session, a more pluralist agenda emerged that leaves room for experimenting with different policy paths, policy nuancing, and contingency planning, bearing witness to a new will to acknowledge the limits of the somewhat facile 'tough on drugs and crime' slogans.

Aside from militarization, strengthening more traditional tools for criminal policy in order to deal with 'increasingly transnational' OC has been regarded as a somewhat natural solution. The basic idea underpinning such an approach is that tools that are typical of the domestic policy repertoire in tackling OC should now acquire an international dimension through enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation and the development of international agreements. In terms of tools, these are first related to the adoption (or the adaptation) of norms that define the type of crime and the specific measures to be implemented to fight it, usually in agreement with emerging international standards. The latter often pertain to law enforcement activities aimed at disrupting the (economic) core of OC business—such as asset seizures and their subsequent use—as well as their

support networks—e.g., special provisions targeting 'white collar' facilitators and corruption. Second, tools to fight OC in this domain require a strengthening of law enforcement capacity for action (and thus, resources, restructuring, training, etc.) in different domains, from surveillance to financial matters.

As different legal systems vary in their very definition of criminal activity, and OC is one of those domains where the degree of homogeneity is particularly low (Paoli and Vander Beken 2014), international agreements do play an important role. This is the logic underpinning the above-mentioned 2000 UNTOC, strongly sponsored by the United States, and signed by 147 countries (and soon to include about forty more). UNTOC contained provisions about states committing to adopt legislations aimed at: (a) criminalizing activities related to participation in an organized criminal group (Article 5); (b) criminalizing activities related to specific actions committed to pursuing criminal objectives, such as money laundering (Article 6) and corruption (Article 8); (c) adopting specific measures to combat these activities, such as confiscation and seizures; (d) adopting measures to facilitate international cooperation, such as extradition, information sharing, and law enforcement collaboration.

The internationalization of criminal policy tools as a strategy to fight OC on an international scale faces some major hurdles. The first is the persistence of significant differences in legal systems. Since the exploitation of such differences between the various state legal systems (and law enforcement models) is strategically taken full advantage of by criminal groups, a harmonization of criminal codes and law enforcement practices and international cooperation is much needed, but it has proved very difficult. Largely US-based standard setting (Beare and Woodiwiss 2014) would require the overcoming of many cultural and institutional barriers deeply embedded in other states' legal traditions and law enforcement organizations. Even among democracies, their different legal systems do not necessarily share the same views on how to fight OC: while US definitions, operation models, and policies do influence institutional thinking inside the European Union, for example, the EU countries in overall terms lay more emphasis on prevention and the rule of law in contrast to the US emphasis on execution and intelligence (Strazzari and Russo 2014). This being premised, not all harmonization takes the form of normative change. Communities of practice—constituted by distinctive

areas of expertise, understanding, and professional subcultures (Sheptycki 1998) too—play a distinctive role. In the EU, for instance, agencies such as the Europol (formerly known as the European Police Office and Eurojust (European Judicial Cooperation Unit) solve some coordination problems in information sharing and the smoothing of legal practices in the implementation of measures such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) guarantees simpler procedures to arrest and transfer suspects from other member states (Rozee et al. 2017).

Second, there is a disconnect between formal steps undertaken by countries signing the Convention and participating to other international forums and their actual actions. De-coupling occurs quite often as the very definition of what actually constitutes OC remains highly politicized: while members of criminal organizations are subject to extradition, their political connections and the law enforcement agents that constitute key networks for drug trafficking are generally not. The EU, for instance, had measures to tackle OC incorporated in key missions such as EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, the largest EU operation abroad to date), tasking the mission with strengthening domestic rule of law institutions. Yet, the impact of the mission was limited as it was found—among other things—unable to deal with the 'connection between politics and criminality' that hindered its effectiveness (Radin 2014: 182). Even bilateral initiatives that have managed to speed up police cooperation and extradition, such as the Merida Initiative between the US and Mexico (which also includes other Central American countries), fall short in their ability to effectively disrupt the broader networks in which criminal activity is embedded (Seelke and Finklea 2017).

Third, resources constraints largely affect the effective application of the planned measures to combat OC. Few countries can afford the costs of acquiring the material capabilities and human resources needed to tackle large-scale criminal networks operating in different countries and across different domains. Bilateral cooperation and international assistance, as in the two cases just mentioned, have been addressing scarcity of resource by a variety of tools, from contributing personnel to training local police to providing money for a broader set of anti-crime policies that could also address the roots of criminal activity. Results are mixed. In post-2001 Afghanistan, an anti-drug policy conducted by the international coalition led by the US and UK largely failed to achieve the planned eradication of

poppy plantations that contributed to sustaining the local war economy (Felbab-Brown 2009). In broader terms, the very presence of international forces can contribute by creating the incentive to foster black markets, as Andreas (2008) has shown with reference to the siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian War (1992–1995). On the flip side, other UN led operations that included specific police forces (UNPOL) largely dedicated to capacity building and community patrolling have been found to help reduce criminal violence in conflict and postconflict contexts (Di Salvatore 2019).

The emergence of hybrid solutions that combine, spatially and temporally, aspects of militarization with an expansion of practices in criminal justice is not, in this context, surprising. Public outcries about growing transnational threats contributed to a distinction between law enforcement (policing) and intelligence tasks (security), two realms whose interaction and overlaps appear to have sharply increased (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), with inevitable frictions; while it has become more frequent to see the military or militarized police (*gendarmes*) embracing policing tasks. Militarizing the fight against OC in the form of drug trafficking cartels—to give one example—has had ominous consequences in terms of a violent escalation in Mexico and, in a different way, in Colombia. Questions related to contingency planning, building institutional capacity, as well as considering social vulnerabilities and the importance of local community involvement have come into focus. The problem of developing strategies for reducing demand (as opposed to supply only) and targeting money laundering have been put centre stage. Several researchers, scholars, and activists have advocated a more nuanced understanding of the political economy and the political sociology of OC at different latitudes, and especially in more fragile contexts. This recommendation includes a more sophisticated understanding of why/when certain markets are more prone to violence than others, of the role of white-collar crime, of the interactions between central authorities and peripheral elites, and—ultimately—of political stability and the state-crime nexus (Lewis 2014; Le Billon 2017; Felbab-Brown 2017).

The Emerging Governance of Anti-OC Foreign Policies: Pluralization and Hybridization in Context

The emergence of OC as a foreign policy problem has had a profound impact on foreign policy agency and, more broadly, on the governance of anti-crime policies. Bodies traditionally entrusted with foreign policy-making were restructured to face the new threat; next to them, new agencies were created and given specialized responsibilities in the new domain, or one of its subdomains. OC is an umbrella concept: as a multi-layered phenomenon, it requires different responses vis-à-vis more traditional foreign policy challenges. Thus, one can observe an internal diversification of functions as actors have tried to establish new tasks with the related skills and a corresponding multiplication of agencies. There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs: among them, changing public perceptions about societal security, technological change enabling new activities and responses, and the inherent heterogeneity of criminal domains. Table 39.1 provides a summary of the different forms of OC, organized by macro-categories relating to the various types of cross-border crime and the responses adopted, based on the distinctions presented in the previous section.

What follows is a more in-depth analysis of examples within two policy domains: (1) the fight against large-scale drug trafficking organizations (DTOs); (2) the attempts to tackle cybercrime. These examples briefly highlight (1) their emergence and role as a foreign policy issue, and (2) the way in which the definition of the threat coevolved with institutional and policy change that directly affects foreign policy-making. Of course, these examples below cannot capture the very heterogeneous nature of criminal arenas and of anti-crime responses, which would require further and detailed treatment. For instance, ‘irregular migration’ has been left out here, and is discussed elsewhere in the volume. Notably, responses also vary geographically. Most visibly, in Europe, the presence of the EU has an important impact on policy-making in dealing with OC. While these examples cannot provide an exhaustive overview of counter-OC policies, they nonetheless show how this pluralization of agency and hybridization of tools (blending military and law enforcement) are key features in tackling OC.

Table 39.1 OC Domains

Category/activity	Examples	Foreign policy governance
Trade in illegal goods	drugs	hybrid
	weapons	hybrid
	natural resources	law enforcement
Human rights violations	human trafficking	hybrid
	human smuggling	hybrid
	organ trafficking	law enforcement
Maritime crime	piracy	hybrid
	illegal fishing	law enforcement
Economic and financial crimes	corruption	law enforcement
	money laundering	law enforcement
Cybercrime	cybertheft	hybrid
	cyberransom	law enforcement
	crimes against persons via the Web	law enforcement

Drug Policies

Counter-narcotics and drug control policies have arguably been representing the most stable criminal domain in IR. In modern times, following initiatives to control and regulate psychoactive substances in the 19th century, by the 1920s public attitudes had changed across the Anglo-Saxon world, with narcotics beginning to be associated with behaviours perceived as immoral; and with prohibition (criminalization of trade and consumption) being introduced inside and outside national borders. The global illicit drug market has been rapidly expanding since World War II, with consumption in the US and Europe being a powerful driver. Growing attempts to slow demand have been undertaken both domestically and internationally, with production often located outside the borders of the major consumers' countries. By 1961, with the signing of the United Nations Conventions on Narcotics Drugs, further steps were taken to set up an international regime to fight the illegal drugs trade. The US strongly pushed for the adoption of a tougher set of policies against trafficking (and consumption), largely using the international arena to advance its domestic, pro-prohibition, policy preferences (Bewley-Taylor 2002).

A distinctive aspect of the above-mentioned declaration of war on drugs by President Nixon was to tackle directly the supply side of drug markets. This started with strengthening measures on the borders with Mexico to

limit marijuana and heroin flows; and port security to contain heroin trafficking mostly through the American Cosa Nostra on the east coast. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty was signed with Italian authorities in 1982, with provisions relating to the exchange of information, witnesses, possibility to freeze assets, which partly represents an antecedent of the UNTOC. The DEA was set up in 1973 to deal specifically with drug-related offences. It was put in charge of supporting Italian law enforcement authorities, together with the FBI. In 1989, pressure from the DEA led to a modification in the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 to remove obstacles for a more active approach for US law enforcement agencies working abroad (Catino 1990). This is an early example of a 'narco-enforcement establishment' (Bertram et al. 1996), featuring the growth of executives and agencies, and increasing executive autonomy.

Such processes are easily identifiable in policies directed towards Mexico. Activities in the drug domain see the involvement of DEA, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plus local law enforcement agencies together with the State Department, the CIA and the Department of Defense (DoD). The State Department includes an *ad hoc* body, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs that was created in 1978 to take part in the war on drugs. More broadly, the State Department has been sponsoring supply-side-focused actions to eradicate drug cultivations, and has broadly supported Mexico's actions in combating the drug war when such support—rather than being based on real success—was deemed to be in line with advancing US interests in that region (Andreas 2013). The DoD has been claiming an important role in the drug war, formalized in the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) granting space (and budget) for action in this domain, particularly in the Latin American and Caribbean region (under the US southern command). This has entailed a direct role for the US military in fostering bilateral military to military relations as well as in planning and executing operations; and it has also been interpreted as another example of an extension of US hegemony in the region (Mercille 2011). Policy continuity has been remarkable: the director of the Office for National Drug Control Policy, established in 1988, became known as the 'Drug Czar' under the Bush presidency, and was raised to cabinet-level status under the Clinton administration in 1993.

Increasing budgets over time have fostered further growth in this department, which in turn has reinforced its status, contributing to the consolidation of a vast anti-drug establishment. This also means that it is particularly motivated to maintain its strong position through ensuring a high level of attention is retained on this war on drugs, by a depiction of the drug trafficking problem as representing an evolving, growing threat. Interagency competition has also contributed to the escalation in policy (Vor obyeva 2015). Both political parties in the US have contributed to engraining such narratives in the system, with a strong bipartisan consensus on the major tenets of drug policy including its foreign policy components. Change in policy has been rather slow to come (Lassiter 2018), even though in recent years there were officials elected within the Democratic Party that called for a sharper focus on harm reduction and less emphasis on interdiction—partly in response to the shifting of public opinion on the subject.

In terms of approach, what has emerged is hybridization, which is captured by measures to improve coordination of activities undertaken by the different agencies, such as the set-up of the Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) at the El Paso Intelligence Center in November 2010 (White House 2011). To sum up, tackling the trade in drugs has had a profound impact on *how*, and *by whom*, US foreign policy is conducted. The emergence of these measures should not mask the fact that each agency is pursuing a similar goal by adopting the strategies that best fit its resources and interests (and by reframing the way the goal is defined in line with this), a process which has produced a highly layered domain with clear challenges in terms of interagency coordination. Indeed, the fate of the BIFS, which ceased to exist after only three years, demonstrates the persistence of the problem.

Cybercrime Policies

Cybercrime has been emerging in the last decade as a key new policy domain. As with OC more broadly, the definition of what effectively constitutes a cybercrime is far from agreed and continues to evolve. The key point of contention is in whether cybercrime is seen to include all (traditional types of) offences perpetrated through the Web or whether it is restrict to only those crimes that are specifically perpetrated against a computer system or network (Brenner 2007). Cybercrime represents then a

problem for foreign policy-making on two levels. First, there is a need to design measures to safeguard business activities to ensure there is well-structured cooperation between public and private actors. Second, facing increasing connectivity between information infrastructures requires some level of international (and transnational) cooperation to effectively address the challenges from OC in the cyberdomain. The possibility for criminal activity in the cyberdomain to originate in a country different from where the crime is committed creates practical hurdles in both jurisdictional and law enforcement terms.

Inclusion of multiple stakeholders in the governance of anti-cybercrime policies has given rise to so-called multi-stakeholderism, a system where several governance functions are demanded by private actors (i.e., software companies or Internet service providers (ISPs)), consortia of private actors (such as those engaged in certification and standard setting) and public bodies at the national and international level that have responsibility for developing rules and agreements (Raymond and DeNardis 2015). As a consequence, even more than in other domains, foreign policy in this field cannot be limited to the work of diplomas: the cyberagenda is vast and encompasses technical and political aspects that cannot be managed without the inclusion of major business actors in the policy process (Barrinha and Renard 2017). These actors, beginning with tech giants such as Google and Microsoft, appear to be both donors and key providers to governments of technologies in the field. Business actors thus contribute in different forms to foreign policy-making, from providing essential knowledge (thus constituting part of the relevant 'epistemic communities') to lobbying to advance favourable solutions (Kim and Milner 2019).

Foreign policy-making in this field is clearly affected by the availability of both material and non-material resources: recent research on developing countries has placed an emphasis on the lack in terms of an adequate domestic scientific and technological base (Calderaro and Craig 2020), making this a key factor in hindering these states in developing key capacities in the cyberdomain. This has also led to foreign policy initiatives attempting to incorporate international developmental perspectives and tools, since successfully tackling cybercrime globally is based on successful anti-crime efforts in these areas—for instance in parts of sub-Saharan Africa—that represent sources of attacks targeting the rest of the world (Kshetri 2019). Some projects of law enforcement cooperation have begun, for

instance through Interpol activities that facilitate liaisons and information sharing with African countries or through African Union rule-setting agreements; however, attempts in the direction of addressing the structural problems underpinning cyber(in)capacity are still limited.

Anti-cybercrime foreign policies are clearly also affected by traditional 'power politics' considerations. Cybercrime in fact is often perceived and denounced as being a tool used in foreign policy to advance national agendas. Disagreements among major powers, especially the US, Russia, and China, are particularly focused on the precise definition of what cybercrime is and what type of support (direct or indirect, such as by not monitoring) states provide to criminal activities. Accusations from US policy-makers relating to intellectual property theft from American companies by hackers based in China, and to Russian hackers' activities in financial scams have now been part of the public debate for at least a decade. This has led to the development of a whole-government approach spanning most law enforcement agencies, with the DoD, and its intelligence bodies, such as the National Security Agency, playing a role in some areas with specific substantive relevance (such as critical infrastructures or defence industries) or that require specific technical skills.

FPA AND OC: WAYS AHEAD

State capacities to detect, deter, and interdict OC have been expanding enormously in recent decades. While crime has been a theme in foreign policy for a long time, it is only in recent decades that it has risen to prominence in scholarly literature in IR. As with most emerging themes, it still suffers from the lack of an unambiguous definition of its analytical domain. Definitional tensions echo underlying political disagreement. Historically speaking, the hegemonic actors have been able to project their own normative preferences (i.e., their own definitions of OC both as an actor and as actions) and their *modus operandi* onto the international arena. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that much of the disagreement today regards sectors of technological innovation that are key to holding or challenging hegemony—hence the questions regarding lawful handling of intellectual property, patents, signals, and data. As a multi-dimensional concept, OC denotes a very large and varied field of work, whose

demarcations are often not clear, but whose public invocation helps in gathering policy consent.

Quite tellingly, there are just a limited number of studies that directly relate FPA with OC. To produce evidence for policy, research in this domain has to overcome not only methodological challenges, but also a legitimacy problem, especially when its findings contradict commonly held views about either the controlling power of integrated criminal organizations in illicit markets or the effectiveness of policy response. Arguably, for better policy-making we need more comparative research on the effectiveness of international policy strategies and tools in different criminal domains (Felbab-Brown 2021). Some key trends relative to how OC is addressed in the international arena suggest promising avenues of research for FPA-related approaches.

The first of these trends is *pluralization*—that is, the emergence of a diverse set of agents that address crime: with law enforcement agencies that were traditionally active in the domestic arenas acquiring functions related to foreign policy; and military actors increasing their involvement in tackling domestic security challenges. We observe, then, a mosaic of organizations that cross between any internal/external distinctions. The second—and related process—is the *hybridization* of policy approaches that emerges as a key feature of the governance of anti-OC policies. A short empirical overview of anti-OC governance in different criminal domains shows that while these trends are widespread, notable differences still exist. An important aspect is the level of inclusion of actors beyond nation-states and intergovernmental organizations in such governance: as in other foreign policy domains, pluralization of state agents is accompanied by an increasing number of non-state actors—ranging from business to NGOs—that represent key stakeholders.

In this context, what is somewhat striking is not so much the blending of different approaches, but rather the relative absence of further policy dimensions. Anti-OC policies are largely interpreted through the lens of repression, with the focus still on traditional tools such as the use of military force or on the degree of international cooperation through the establishment of regimes and their functioning. Yet, non-coercive policies are essential to combatting crime, by addressing (some of) the root causes of crime—examples include poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, which represents a hedging strategy to guarantee households' incomes (Bove and

Gavrilova 2014); or a lack of access to fisheries, which contributes to local support for piracy off the Somalian coast (Weldemichael 2019). These examples show how focusing on solutions to OC requires a wider set of policy tools. While partial exceptions exist (Kaunert and Zwolski 2014), the global discourse on tackling crime is definitely more geared towards repression than aid, development, or inclusive conflict resolution.

Where do these considerations lead in terms of scholarship? Embedding analyses of anti-crime policy into the rich framework provided by FPA might take different forms, at least partly deriving from cases discussed above. The impact of public opinion, and how it is translated by civil society organizations and political entrepreneurs/parties, represents a key dimension of analysis. Recent shifts in public opinion have been associated with changes in anti-drug policy, depending on cases, in more or less restrictive directions (Kenny and Holmes 2020). Yet, as most FPA literature has shown, the effects of public opinion on foreign policy are often mediated by other factors (see Boucher, Chapter 14 in this volume). Bureaucratic politics and the role of executives in foreign policy-making (see Kaarbo and Lantis, Chapter 18 in this volume) have been found to matter in shaping criminal policy at the domestic level, and affect its international and transnational dimension too (Romero 2020). Anti-crime policies can further serve the purpose of 'constituting agency', for instance in the context of the EU (Bueger 2016; Russo and Stambøl 2021). As noticed by Paoli and Vander Beken, 'European Union bureaucracy … have been keen, since the early 1990s, to emphasize the transnational dimension of the OC threat in order to increase their competencies and powers and/or to harmonize and extend criminal laws and law enforcement procedural powers across their Member States' (2014: 15). Pluralization of agency, with multiple public bodies involved and public-private interaction further increases the need to observe how interagency coordination and intra-elites conflict can shape anti-crime foreign policies. Looking into how big business is able—and most effective—in lobbying (Kim and Milner 2019) as well as how NGOs manage to succeed in reshaping both public debates and policy (Kim 2017) can provide fruitful directions in advancing research.

Other avenues include moving towards further integration with literature addressing similar themes in a different perspective. Conflict studies has already shown promising avenues of research with linkages to FPA

(Daxecker and Prins 2016), and so does literature on participation in military intervention. Similarly, a closer dialogue with criminological research can help us to avoid excessive simplifications over the very notion of OC, while also providing potential analogies over which strategies have been effectively able to reduce crime in the domestic domain. Finally, and notwithstanding important advances at the national and subnational levels, advancing require changes in data policies. No large cross-country or cross-time databases exist for scholars to use (or to first debate) as standard references, as is increasingly the case in conflict studies as well as in other areas that are relevant for FPA (ranging from elections and political parties to voting in international organizations). In developing knowledge on how states and IOs tackle OC, there is a growing need for more widely shared scholarly standards over data use policies, together with joint undertakings to produce data sets minimizing the biases of the current process of data gathering and—consequently—hindering comparative analysis.

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Introductory Note

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

Tables and figures are indicated by *t* and *f* following the page number

References such as '178–9' indicate (not necessarily continuous) discussion of a topic across a range of pages. Wherever possible in the case of topics with many references, these have either been divided into sub-topics or only the most significant discussions of the topic are listed. Because the entire work is about 'foreign policy analysis', the use of this term (and certain others which occur constantly throughout the book) as an entry point has been restricted. Information will be found under the corresponding detailed topics. Cross-references such as '*see also individual presidents*' direct the reader to entries in a category (e.g. in this case 'Trump, President Donald.') rather than a specific '*individual presidents*' entry.

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